Chapter 4

Employment and the Disability Support Pension

I reckon I've probably applied for at least 300 jobs and I have not heard back from a single one. I think maybe one in every 50 I’ve been forced to apply for is something I could actually do.1
4.1
People with disability face significant barriers to participate in paid employment and commonly encounter discrimination in the workplace. Evidence suggests there is little recognition of these issues in the way the Disability Support Pension (DSP) is designed—creating unrealistic expectations about DSP applicants and recipients’ abilities to engage in the workforce. It was also contended that people are not well supported by employment service providers, or government programs and policies, and that there are other aspects of the DSP that create further barriers and disincentives for people wanting to work.
4.2
This chapter explores the reality of employment participation for people applying for, or living on, the DSP. It also examines the barriers to employment in the current labour market, and the additional barriers created by the DSP. This includes issues with the program of support (POS) requirement and effectiveness of employment services, particularly Disability Employment Services. Finally, it explores alternative models to improve employment engagement and outcomes for people with disability and chronic illness.

The Disability Support Pension and employment capacity

4.3
The Department of Social Services (the DSS) told the committee that the DSP is potentially a life-long pension payment and, therefore, any possibility that a person can support themselves through employment must be explored.2
4.4
As discussed in Chapter 2, a person’s capacity for employment is a central consideration in the DSP eligibility criteria, and requires a person to show that, due to their level of functional impairment, they have a continuing inability to work.3
4.5
In addition, unless a person has a ‘severe impairment’, they must undertake a POS for an 18-month period in order to be eligible for the DSP. This usually involves participation in an employment services program whilst on the JobSeeker Payment.4
4.6
As discussed below, there are low levels of workforce participation amongst people with disability and chronic or terminal illnesses, and a range of barriers to employment which are not acknowledged or addressed by the DSP.

Disability and workforce participation

4.7
It is commonly accepted that there are broad ranging benefits for people with disability to participate in the workforce. For example, for people with disability workforce participation can support independence, offer improved quality of life and mental health, and protect against vulnerability.5
4.8
Employment of people with disability also benefits employers and society more broadly, through increased diversity and inclusion in the workplace and by challenging stereotypes about people with disability, and offers the potential to prevent future declines in the labour force.6
4.9
Inquiry participants told the committee that people with disability overwhelmingly want to work; however, they experience significant barriers to workforce participation and, as a result, experience higher rates of unemployment and underemployment than people without disability.7
4.10
The Chief Executive Officer of Children and Young People with Disability Australia, Ms Mary Sayers, said that young people in the community are ‘hungry, ready and excited to find and have a job’. Supporting this statement, she provided the inquiry with a comment from one participant at the 2020 National Youth Disability Summit:
[Having a job means to me] independence. … [A]t the moment I'm on the DSP, which I am grateful for, but at the same time its something that … I'm worried that it's like not infinite. So, being able to work and have an income that I sort of have control over and it's also something that, if I'm allowed to say, in something that I love doing, that would be fantastic. It would be catering to social needs, financial needs, yeah, it's pretty important I think.8


Rates of employment for people with disability

4.11
The employment rate of working-age people with disability is significantly lower than those without disability, with workforce participation decreasing as the severity of disability increases.9
4.12
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 53 per cent of working-age people with disability are in the labour force compared with 84 per cent of those without disability.10 Of those not in the labour force, over half (59 per cent) are permanently unable to work.11
4.13
Those with a disability who live in major cities are more likely to be in the labour force compared with those who live in inner regional areas.12

Unemployment and underemployment for people with disability

4.14
The AIHW reported that people with disability are twice as likely to be unemployed than those without disability.13 Further, one in ten people of working age with disability are underemployed, with a quarter of employed people wanting to work more hours.14
4.15
Importantly, between 2003 and 2020 the unemployment rate for people with disability rose from 8 per cent to 10, whilst the rate of unemployment for people without disability remained steady.15

Trends and international comparisons for people with disability

4.16
In comparison to other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Australia has historically had a relatively low employment rate for people with disability, ranking 21 out of 29 OECD countries on this metric in the late 2000s.16
4.17
The OECD noted that, despite increased efforts to develop and expand employment measures, levels of employment for people with disability did not improve during the decade following the turn of the century. It stated that in the late 2000s employment rates, on average, were just over 40 per cent for people with disability. This was in stark contrast to the 75 per cent employment rates, on average, for their non-disabled peers.17

Disability Support Pension recipients in the workforce

4.18
People on the DSP can engage in paid employment for less than 30 hours per week without suspension or cancellation of their pension, subject to other eligibility criteria. Those who earn income may receive a part-pension dependant on their level of income.18 In 2021, 6.9 per cent of people in receipt of the DSP reported earnings from income, down from 10.2 per cent in 2006.19

Barriers to workforce participation

4.19
A range of barriers to workforce participation exist for people with disability and chronic illness. Inquiry participants argued that these barriers, and the difficulty finding and retaining suitable employment, are not adequately acknowledged, or addressed, in the design of the DSP.20

Labour market conditions

4.20
Inquiry participants commented on the challenges experienced by people with disability due to current labour market conditions. It was suggested that the DSP is not designed for the current and future labour market, which is increasingly casualised and insecure.21
4.21
The committee heard that there are poor general and public sector employment rates for people with disability in the context of broader economic shifts to casual and precarious employment and increasing employment volatility caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.22
4.22
Finding and maintaining suitable employment in this context, therefore, can be a significant challenge for people with disability and chronic illness. As a result, many are forced into insecure and precarious employment. Springvale Monash Legal Service noted that:
By and large for the clients we see, opting for insecure or precarious employment is not a matter of choice but often as a result of having no other alternatives. This may be especially so for clients living with a disability.23
4.23
Inclusion Australia added that people with disability, especially with intellectual disability, do not generally work in long-term, permanent jobs with secure incomes:
Increased casualisation of the workforce and the growing gig economy means there will be more people with occasional employment and income. The current DSP (and other income support) systems are not designed or resourced to deal with these, especially on a large scale.24
4.24
According to Children and Young People with Disability Australia, young people with disability are commonly hired in roles with fewer hours, and in precarious and seasonal employment. In addition:
… young people with disability are more likely to take jobs that do not fully use their skills. Research indicates that young people who take these ‘low quality’ jobs have higher chances of longer-term unemployment and reduced future wage growth.25

Discrimination

4.25
Discrimination by employers and work colleagues was cited as a significant barrier to workforce participation for people with disability. The committee heard broad ranging and concerning accounts of workplace discrimination based on disability and a range of other intersecting factors, including age and First Nations status.26
4.26
The committee heard that young people with disability rely on income support at a disproportionate rate because of the discrimination and challenges they experience as they are preparing for, and transitioning into, the workforce. Children and Young People with Disability told the committee that ‘[t]he discrimination that young people face in the workforce needs to be considered when we're thinking about the DSP’.27
4.27
Carers receiving the DSP can also experience discrimination due to their own disability, as well as challenges associated with balancing the demands of their caring role with their employment. Carers NSW stated:
Many carers report to Carers NSW that they cannot access employment that provides adequate flexibility that enables them to balance both their employment and their caring role. Where carers are discriminated against due to their caring role, or are unable to find suitable, flexible employment, this often results in unemployment or underemployment for carers.28
4.28
Inquiry participants told the committee that the discrimination experienced by people with disability, which restricts their ability to engage in the workforce, must be recognised through improved access to the DSP.29
4.29
The Chief Executive Officer of Queensland Advocacy Inc, Ms Matilda Alexander, noted that ‘endemic discrimination’ against people with disability in the labour market is a factor that drives the demand and need for the DSP. Notwithstanding this, she said:
… the Disability Support Pension in its current form has lost its purpose and is unreasonable in its eligibility criteria. It fails to account for discrimination within the labour market, is inadequate in monetary value and it fails to acknowledge the economic benefits of improved income support payments for people with disability.30
4.30
It was also suggested that there is a need for stronger legislative protection for people with disabilities, including by strengthening the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and regulatory responses of oversight bodies.31

Inflexible, unsupportive, and inappropriate work

4.31
Employment restrictions (such as restrictions on the types of jobs, hours able to work, accommodations, supports and assistance required to do a job) present an additional challenge to workforce participation.
4.32
The committee heard that many disabilities and conditions require workplaces that can provide flexible hours of work and accommodate planned and unplanned leave.32
4.33
People with fluctuating disabilities and conditions, in particular, struggle in the open employment market. According to ME/CFS Australia, these types of disabilities are rarely accommodated:
The unpredictable nature of severity fluctuations and PEM [Post-Exertional Malaise] in ME/CFS, as well as the various potential comorbidities, make the prospect of employment difficult for the majority.33
4.34
The committee heard that employers need to take on greater responsibility for learning how to support people with disability in the workplace.34 Inquiry participants commonly lamented the inability to find workplaces or employers who are able and willing to provide accessible employment.35
4.35
It was noted that notions of productivity and efficiency which underpin the employment market are not recognised in the DSP policy and processes:
Without challenging and changing these notions, assessing the capacity of people with disability to work as part of the DSP claims process is ineffective because the wider structures are limiting.36

Barriers to workforce participation created by the Disability Support Pension

Income thresholds

4.36
Concerns were raised with the income thresholds for the DSP, and the impact this has on a person’s ability to meet the high costs of living with disability while participating in employment.37
4.37
The income limit for the DSP varies depending on a person’s living situation. For those on the single adult DSP rate, earning more than $180 a fortnight means that their DSP payment will be reduced by 50 cents for every additional $1 earned.38
4.38
The committee heard that some people with fluctuating conditions are unable to maintain consistent patterns of works. It was noted that the income thresholds fail to account for ‘boom’ periods where a person is able to work, and ‘bust’ periods where working is not possible due to poor health.39
4.39
According to ME/CFS Australia, the thresholds act as a disincentive to working longer hours during ‘boom’ periods because it will reduce their DSP payment:
There is a need for a greater incentive to work more hours, by increasing the threshold. This will alleviate elements of the Boom/Bust income disparity and incentivise more hours where it is possible.40
4.40
The Whitlam Institute argued that the reduction of benefits for individuals should be tapered as the hours and remuneration available to them in employment change. Their submission noted that:
People with disability should not be subject to the enforcement of specific arbitrary cut-off of benefits. When employment ceases or the number of hours worked is reduced then benefits according to circumstance can be reinstated over time.41
4.41
Disability Council NSW argued that because the cost of living often exceeds what the DSP rate covers, the income thresholds should be lifted substantially to ensure that DSP recipients are not living in poverty.42 It was also noted that people with disability incur higher living expenses compared to people without disability and that these additional costs commonly come in the form of healthcare, medication, equipment, specialised transport, and housing. This is further discussed in Chapter 5.
4.42
Ms Kristin O'Connell of the Antipoverty Centre explained the benefits of lifting the income thresholds:
It would allow those of us who do have episodic disability to move in and out of the workforce in ways that suit us without fear of losing our DSP—which is a huge fear that came across in our survey—and also not to be worried about how much time it might take to get our payment back if our paid employment income is cut off suddenly.43

Limitation on hours

4.43
As discussed in Chapter 2, to be eligible for the DSP a person must be assessed as being unable to work at least 15 hours per week in the next two years. Disability Council NSW told the committee that this limits a person’s capacity to find and maintain ongoing and sustainable work with the potential to move off the DSP eventually. Their submission noted that:
If a person has acquired a disability and has been undertaking rehabilitation in readiness to return to the workforce, they may need to start working on a part-time, limited hours basis and work up to more hours, potentially full time. If this is the case, there is no incentive or support for someone in this situation to work more than 15 hours …44
4.44
It was suggested that there should be recognition of a person’s rehabilitation and training to return to work and which can enable them to gradually build up to longer working hours.45

Fear of losing the Disability Support Pension

4.45
Inquiry participants highlighted the fear that exists amongst DSP recipients that, should they attempt to re-engage in the workforce, they will lose their pension and have to start the claims process again.
4.46
Legal Aid Queensland told the committee that the precarious nature of employment for people with disability has resulted in people not working and staying on income support:
The small number of clients living with disability who do have capacity to work feel that it is necessary for them to maintain their ongoing entitlement to income support payments as a safety net due to the precarious nature of their employment.46
4.47
On this issue, the Chief Executive Officer of the Council of Single Mothers and their Children, Ms Jenny Davidson, said the following:
[T]hose on the DSP have no end in sight to this financial hardship unless the system alters to allow greater flexibility. As it is, there's a future of struggling to afford housing and basics, of poverty in older age and of rising risk of homelessness. The lack of flexibility in the DSP in relation to disability permanency and engaging in paid work is fundamental to this issue. Some recipients of the DSP are sporadically able or unable to work in a way that makes retaining a standard job impossible. These recipients dare not try to find flexible work that they can undertake when well enough, because too often we hear: if you lose the DSP, there is a high risk you cannot get it back. This leaves so much talent unavailable to our society from intellectual and capable women.47



Program of support requirement

4.48
The committee heard overwhelming criticism of the POS requirement as an eligibility criteria for the DSP. These criticisms referred to evidence of poor employment outcomes, the challenges of meeting mutual obligations associated with other payments, and the difficulties in obtaining exemptions.
4.49
The POS requirement was introduced in September 2011 and applies to claimants who attract 20 points under the impairment tables, but do not attract 20 points on any single table. To be eligible for the DSP, these individuals must demonstrate that they have tried to improve their work capacity by participating in an employment services program for a period of time.48
4.50
Box 4.1 outlines one submitter’s frustration with the POS requirement.

Box 4.1:   The lived experience of a DSP applicant

I’ve spent years in these Programmes and found little support within them. Most of the Disability Employment Consultants I’ve had have had little or no training or experience working with disabled people or even in recruitment. I’ve had consultants not turn up for appointments with me. I’ve had DES consultants send me to workplaces that were physically inaccessible and call me to interviews only to tell me on arrival that due to the physical demands of the job, I wouldn’t be interviewed. If they worked with us to identify opportunities and strategies to overcome barriers, that might be some help but it rarely happens. A PoS is not a programme of support. It’s a programme of pointless activity that wastes jobseeker’s time, increases their suffering, pushes them towards poverty, makes it harder for them to do what is needed to cope with their disability and intensifies their feelings of powerlessness and worthlessness.49
4.51
The inequitable nature of the requirement was highlighted by Social Security Rights Victoria, which noted that two people with the same impairment rating can be treated very differently under the eligibility criteria:
A person with a spinal condition rated as 20 points under Table 4 is not required to have participated in a PoS, but a person with spinal, leg and arm conditions will be required if their impairment only reaches 20 points when considered under Tables 2, 3 and 4 together. These two people have the same level of impairment under the Impairment Tables, but the latter is subject to an extra requirement before they can receive the DSP.50
4.52
Economic Justice Australia (EJA) submitted that people with significant disability, and little or no work capacity, are excluded from the DSP as a result of the POS requirement, and that they are consigned to serve a ‘waiting period’ on the lower JobSeeker Payment. It concluded:
In our view the POS requirement creates an unfair barrier to accessing DSP, particularly for older people with numerous chronic health conditions where it is the effect of the conditions combined that limits or precludes work, rather than any single condition assessed in isolation.51
4.53
In its submission to the inquiry, the Australian Federation of Disability Organisations (AFDO) told Peter’s story. Peter experiences shaking, pain, muscle weakness, incontinence, and progressive deafness due to Multiple Sclerosis. His initial claim for the DSP was rejected, and he was forced to enter the review process and directed to undertake a POS:
… an entire year after applying for DSP, Peter was sent to a Disability Employment Services (DES) Provider and advised that he needed to complete a Program of Support. This would mean an 18-month delay before Peter would be able to access DSP, while he suffers from a degenerative condition and has supporting evidence from his medical team to say that he is unable to work at all. The DES Provider advised Peter that they had taken him off their system because of his inability to work, but refused to provide any documentation for Centrelink, insisting that it’s up to Centrelink to officially exit him from the program.52

Poor outcomes

4.54
People with Disability Australia argued that participation in a POS is neither a viable pathway to employment nor to accessing the DSP. Referencing data obtained through the budget estimates process, it submitted that in 2019–20 only 1423 people were granted the DSP through a POS. Given this, it concluded that the POS requirement is ‘unfair, unnecessary, unsuccessful, and holds us back when we are seeking genuine support, both financial and with finding suitable work’.53
4.55
The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) called for the abolition of the POS requirement, noting that evidence showed that it fails to support people into paid employment, and that it ‘merely serves to deny people DSP for 18 months or more’.54
4.56
In 2020–21, 1006 DSP claims were rejected because the claimant did not meet the POS requirement. In the same year 1393 DSP claims were granted on the basis of a person fulfilling the POS requirement, equating to a 42 per cent rejection rate due to not fulfilling the POS.55 Over a ten year period, these rejection rates reached 69 per cent in 2015–16.56
4.57
While acknowledging that the POS is an eligibility criteria, DSS explained that an aim of the POS is to assist people to return to the labour market. However, when questioned about whether any evaluation had been undertaken to assess if the aim of the POS was being met, DSS advised that no such evaluation had been undertaken.57

JobSeeker and mutual obligation requirements

4.58
It was argued that the barriers to entry to the DSP, such as the POS requirement, commonly require Australians with disability to subsist on the JobSeeker Payment for extended periods of time. The Salvation Army Australia noted that:
The barriers of entry to the DSP … mean many Australians with disability, particularly those with mental ill-health and other unseen conditions, are unable to access the DSP, which was designed to support them. Instead they must rely upon the much lower rate and meet the mutual obligations associated with the JobSeeker Payment.58
4.59
A significant mutual obligation requirement is to apply for a certain number of jobs per fortnight. Failure to do so risks payments being suspended or cancelled. It was suggested that the emphasis of these mutual obligations is on quantity and not quality, which fails to recognise a person’s limited capacity to work.59
4.60
In addition, the pressure to meet mutual obligations has a significant and detrimental impact on a person’s health and wellbeing. Mutual obligations require a person to prioritise job searching in order to maintain their payment, and constant rejections from prospective employers negatively impacts on a person’s self-confidence.60 This is further discussed in Chapter 3.

Pausing participation in a program of support

4.61
A person may obtain a medical exemption from completing a POS; however, such exemptions only ‘stop the clock’ on the 18month time requirement.61 Noting that the time spent under an exemption does not count towards the time requirement, ACOSS submitted that people who are not well enough to participate are put in an impossible situation, and that this causes ‘immense distress and frustration’.62
4.62
Inquiry participants noted that this also means that someone who has consistent medical exemptions, because of their impairment, chronic condition, or illness, may never qualify for the DSP. This is despite the fact that they are unable to work, as evidenced by their continued medical exemptions, and should therefore be eligible for the DSP.63

Exemptions from the program of support requirement

4.63
The committee heard that, while there is a mechanism for a person to be exempted, or exited early, from the POS requirement, this is rarely utilised. It was suggested that it is not clear how exemptions are to be sought, and that the onus is on the person completing the POS to seek an exemption.64 AFDO explained why this is problematic:
The criteria for exclusion or exit are complex, requiring an individual’s permanent impairment to be the sole reason that they cannot complete the POS. It is difficult, bordering on impossible, to successfully argue this. Additionally, feedback from Disability Employment Service (DES) employees has been that management actively discourages the exiting of participants. In some cases, participants are specifically told by their case worker that, while they know there is nothing a POS can do for them, and they recognise the person's disability will prevent them from achieving employment, they still will not exit them. There is a clear conflict of interest present here for the DES, as exiting a person causes them a financial loss.65
4.64
Although the committee heard overwhelming evidence in support of completely removing the POS requirement, it was suggested that if the POS is not abolished exemptions should be made before the POS requirement is actually applied.66

Effectiveness of employment services

4.65
The Government provides a number of employment programs and services aimed at supporting people with disability into the workforce; however, inquiry participants were generally very critical of the quality and effectiveness of these offerings. For example, Sacred Heart Mission stated that an impersonal, harsh, and compliance driven employment services system was a significant barrier for people with disability wanting to engage in employment.67
4.66
The committee also heard that the overwhelming majority of people required to participate in employment services do not find employment. For example, Victoria Legal Aid submitted that for each month in 2019, on average only 1.72 per cent of people in the Disability Employment Services caseload obtained employment for at least six months.68
4.67
Victoria Legal Aid also highlighted that the cost of the disability employment system is approaching $40 000 per long-term job placement. The likelihood of a participant finding employment through these programs has declined despite Government reforms in 2018 to provide increased revenue to providers.69
4.68
The Brotherhood of St Laurence argued that the employment services system was preoccupied with compliance, and that it is too often under resourced to effectively provide the support, training, and engagement with employers required to overcome the barriers to employment for people with disability.70
4.69
Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand noted that employment service providers were commonly identified as ‘problematic’, and that they made it difficult for people with disability on JobSeeker, Youth Allowance, and the Parenting Payment to meet their mutual obligations, while also failing to provide support into meaningful employment.71
4.70
Numerous witnesses submitted that employment services providers were incentivised to get people back into work, regardless of how unsustainable or inappropriate that work might be for the specific individual.72 For example, the Whitlam Institute explained:
DES and Jobactive providers can perpetuate ableist notions by recommending that people with disability on JobSeeker Payment[s] apply for jobs which are inappropriate or do not recognise the impact of their impairment on their functional capacity.73
4.71
The committee also heard that the generic employment approaches utilised were inappropriate and ineffective, and that there needed to be a more personalised and individualised approach for people with disability on income support. It was argued that such an approach must recognise and support an individual’s goals, desires, and aspirations for economic participation.74


Disability Employment Services Program

4.72
The Disability Employment Services (DES) Program aims to employ a marketbased approach to provide employment outcomes for people with a disability, chronic illness, or injury. Specifically, the DES Program focuses on matching individuals and job opportunities, and also provides preemployment and post-employment support. As at March 2020, over 100 service providers supported nearly 280 000 registered participants in searching for a job, in the workplace, and in education.75
4.73
In 2020, the Government commissioned Boston Consulting Group to undertake a midterm review of the DES Program. In the review’s report, six ‘primary challenges’ with the DES Program were identified:
mixed quality service;
insufficient flexibility to allow innovation;
excessive complexity and lack of clarity;
ineffective market mechanisms;
poor alignment with adjacent programs; and
growth in cost-per-outcome.76
4.74
Recognising that more could be done to improve employment outcomes for people with disability, the Government is currently designing a new Disability Employment Support Model to replace the DES Program in 2023. The Government notes that the new model will be informed by the knowledge gained through the Australian Disability Strategy; Disability Employment Strategy; Disability Royal Commission; and the National Disability Insurance Scheme.77
4.75
The Government states that the new model will be part of a broader suite of reforms to Government-funded employment services, including the New Employment Services Model being developed by the Department of Education, Skills and Employment (DESE), and the New Remote Engagement Program being developed by the National Indigenous Australians Agency.78
4.76
In her evidence to the committee, Ms Benedikte Jensen, First Assistant Secretary at DESE, provided further information on the New Employment Services Model being developed by her department:
Going forward to July 2022, we'll be bringing in the New Employment Services Model. A key motivation and objective of that model is to do an even better job of supporting disadvantaged jobseekers. From there, we'll be rolling out the enhanced services, which have been tested over the last couple of years to make sure that they've really been fine-tuned, with the user at the centre, to get a higher level of servicing and much more personalised support and, again, to do an even better job of the upfront investment in people, whether it's training or other support and then, once they're in a job, to provide that postplacement mentoring and ongoing support.79

Segregated employment and Australian Disability Enterprises

4.77
Concerns were raised about segregated employment for people with disability through Australian Disability Enterprises (ADE). For example, Inclusion Australia submitted that ADEs perpetuate societal beliefs about people with intellectual disability.80 The Chief Executive Officer of Inclusion Australia, Ms Catherine McAlpine, told the committee that:
People who are manifestly eligible for the DSP are only offered employment support via an Australian disability enterprise. Another more recent change is that Centrelink reporting requirements are lower for people who work in ADEs than they are for people working in open employment. Inclusion Australia recommends a complete overhaul of the system—with an emphasis on how income support and employment systems operate together to support people, not punish them for having a disability.81
4.78
First People’s Disability Network Australia submitted that there needs to be a pathway to mainstream employment for all people with disability who want to work, and a transition plan for people with disability currently working in ADEs.82

Alternative approaches of employment support

4.79
It is recognised that people on the DSP have a desire to work, and that there is an ongoing need for structured, personalised, and culturally safe programs to support people to join the workforce and gain employment. A number of alternatives proposed during the inquiry, and via other processes such as the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability (Disability Royal Commission), are discussed below:


Individual placement and support model

4.80
A number of inquiry participants discussed the merits of the individual placement and support (IPS) model in assisting people obtain employment. This model is an evidence-driven approach which involves the colocation of vocational specialists with mental health clinical teams, with the aim of working collaboratively to support people with mental illness either enter the workforce or study.83
4.81
It was argued that IPS is the most effective way of assisting people with mental health conditions into the workforce and that, where it has been implemented and successfully managed, employment outcomes for people with a lived experience of mental illness have been as high as 54 per cent, compared to traditional methods achieving only 24 per cent.84
4.82
The Government decided to trial IPS services and initially allocated funding to 14 headspace sites. Following a positive evaluation, funding was expanded to 24 sites and, in the 2020–21 Budget, further resourcing was provided to expand the concept to a further 26 sites. From 2021, a total of 50 headspace centres will deliver IPS.85
4.83
The Productivity Commission also recognised the benefits of IPS, and has proposed, as a priority reform, that all governments extend IPS beyond its current limited application, through a staged rollout, to community ambulatory mental health services.86

The provision of peer support workers

4.84
Providing peer support was suggested by some respondents to the Disability Royal Commission issues paper on people with disability in employment as a way to help people with disability find and maintain employment. For example, in its response Mission Australia said that peer support workers could offer ‘authentic empathy and validation’, particularly with mental illness. Another two organisations, the NSW Public Service Commission and Aspergers Victoria, believed that these roles could also create training and employment opportunities for people living with disability.87



Work experience and school-to-work programs

4.85
For many people with disability, the transition from school to work can be difficult, and these individuals commonly encounter numerous barriers. For example, these can include inaccessible or unavailable work experience; a lack of accessible and affordable internships and work placements; and few options for accessing mainstream employment. This is particularly prevalent for people with intellectual or cognitive disability.88
4.86
A number of participants to the Disability Royal Commission stated that internships and work experience can help create pathways to employment, and that it is important to engage young people with disability in work before they leave school. For example, the Centre of Research Excellence in Disability and Health stated that:
… work experience can be a practical way to counteract negative attitudes and misconceptions about the capabilities of people with disability, and is an opportunity for employers to learn how to support staff with disability and provide reasonable adjustments.89

Committee view and recommendations

Rates of employment and discrimination

4.87
The committee recognises that people with disability face significant challenges engaging in the workforce. Those that have entered the workforce are commonly forced into insecure and precarious employment arrangements. Discrimination within the workforce is also another key barrier and day-to-day challenge for people living with disability. The committee was alarmed to hear how widespread and ‘endemic’ this problem has become.
4.88
The committee agrees with inquiry participants who argued that the DSP’s eligibility criteria fail to recognise the challenges faced by claimants as a result of discrimination.

Barriers to workforce participation

4.89
Evidence suggests that the current income test for the DSP provides a strong disincentive for people with disability to participate in paid employment, as income over $180 per fortnight results in a reduction in the DSP of 50 cents per additional dollar earned. The committee is concerned that this threshold is completely inadequate for a person living with disability to afford the everincreasing costs of living and, hence, consigns people to live in chronic poverty.
4.90
The committee also considers that the existing framework fails to recognise people with fluctuating conditions who are unable to participate in paid employment on a frequent and regular basis due to the sporadic nature of their impairment. The current test fails to cater for these conditions and for recipients who would like to maximise their employment and income when they are able to do so, to offset those potentially lengthy periods where they are unable to work.
4.91
It is unclear if the threshold and reduction rate have recently been reviewed to determine whether they appropriately encourage people to enter the workforce or act as deterrents.

Recommendation 22

4.92
The committee recommends that the Australian Government considers reforming the income test for recipients of the Disability Support Pension to better support individuals facing structural barriers to participating in the workforce, and to better recognise the fluctuating nature of a person’s ability to participate in paid employment due to their impairment.
The committee envisages that such reforms could, amongst other things, raise the income thresholds at which the Disability Support Pension payment is reduced, and lower the rate which it is reduced once this threshold is reached.

The program of support requirement

4.93
As discussed above, and previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the POS is an eligibility criterion with the aim of assisting DSP claimants find employment. As a criterion, the POS restricts the number of people who qualify for the DSP. In 2020–21, 42 per cent of people who undertook the POS were rejected for the DSP for failing to meet the POS requirement. This rejection rate reached 69 per cent in 2015–16.
4.94
For those who were able to fulfil the POS requirements and qualify for the DSP, this delayed their access to the DSP for a minimum of 18 months.
4.95
In support of the POS, DSS advised that its aim is to assist people to return to the labour market, which has clear benefits for the individual. However, no evaluation has been undertaken to assess if the aim of the POS is being met.
4.96
The committee agrees that the benefits for people, including those with a disability, who participate in the workforce are numerous and wide-reaching and therefore supports programs that genuinely achieve this aim. However, the outcomes of these programs must be measurable and quantifiable.
4.97
DSS also argued that only three per cent of applicants are required to undergo the POS and, therefore, this requirement effects only a small number of applicants. In 2020–21, this amounted to 2399 individuals.
4.98
Overwhelmingly, the committee heard that the POS results in poor employment outcomes, incurs high costs, is inequitable, and can deny people with significant disability the DSP for an extended period of time.
4.99
The committee notes that a number of inquiry participants called for the abolition of the POS requirement and that participation in an employment services program be made voluntary. In light of the evidence, the committee cannot see any benefit in retaining the POS requirement and agrees with the suggestion to make participation in an employment services program voluntary for all claimants.

Recommendation 23

4.100
The committee recommends that the Department of Social Services reviews the program of support requirement and considers making participation in an employment services program voluntary for all Disability Support Pension claimants.
4.101
The committee is also concerned by reports that the POS requirement is not well understood by claimants at the time a claim is made, and that many are unaware of it until they reach the point of review after being rejected. If the Government does not support recommendation 19, above, the committee recommends that the visibility of the POS requirement be vastly improved to ensure that all relevant information is provided to every claimant at the beginning of the claims process.

Recommendation 24

4.102
The committee recommends that the Department of Social Services and Services Australia improve the visibility of, and information on, the program of support requirement for all claimants. Amongst other things, such improvements would ensure that relevant information is provided to all claimants at the beginning of the claims process.

The effectiveness of employment services

4.103
Based on evidence received during the inquiry, the committee is concerned that the employment programs and services for people with disability are ineffective; under resourced; and preoccupied with compliance, rather than meaningful outcomes. Worryingly, evidence also suggested that providers are incentivised to place people into work regardless of how sustainable or appropriate that work may be for the specific individual and their particular disability.
4.104
The committee is cautiously optimistic about the Government’s proposed reforms to government-funded employment services to be introduced over the next two years. This includes the New Employment Services Model being developed by DESE for introduction next year and the Disability Employment Services Model, to replace the DES Program, in 2023.
4.105
Notwithstanding these proposed reforms, the committee remains supportive of suggestions to develop a more personalised and individualised approach to meet the needs of disabled job seekers with complex needs.

Recommendation 25

4.106
The committee recommends that the Australian Government abandon punitive compliance measures and ensures that the employment services system provides genuine support to disabled job seekers with complex needs, including focussing on providing personalised support and skills development as well as effectively engaging prospective employers.

Alternative approaches

4.107
The committee recognises the importance of ensuring that individuals with a desire to work have access to structured, personalised, and culturally safe options of support to help them gain ongoing employment.
4.108
The committee notes that a number of alternative approaches of employment support were proposed during the current inquiry, as well as through other processes such as the Disability Royal Commission. The committee is supportive of these suggestions and agrees that IPS services should be extended and that the feasibility and effectiveness of other approaches, such as peer support workers, should be thoroughly assessed.

Recommendation 26

4.109
The committee recommends that the Australian Government continues to extend across Australia approaches that are voluntary and provide appropriate support, such as the Individual Placement and Support Model.

The Government should also consider the feasibility and effectiveness of other approaches, such as providing peer support workers, work experience opportunities, and schooltowork programs, in improving employment outcomes for people with disability by providing well-supported, voluntary programs.

  • 1
    People with Disability Australia, Submission 116, p. 88.
  • 2
    Department of Social Services, Services Australia, and the National Disability Insurance Agency (DSS), Submission 29, p. 5.
  • 3
    DSS, Submission 29, p. 3.
  • 4
    DSS, Submission 29, p. 8. See also discussion in Chapter 2.
  • 5
    Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability, Issues Paper: Overview of responses to Employment Issues paper, March 2021, p. 3.
  • 6
    Inclusion Australia, Submission 94, p. 7.
  • 7
    For example, see: Children and Young People with Disability, Submission 96, p. 6; Ms Mary Sayers, Chief Executive Officer, Children and Young People with Disability Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 25; and The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 5.
  • 8
    Ms Mary Sayers, Chief Executive Officer, Children and Young People with Disability Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 25.
  • 9
    Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), People with Disability in Australia 2020, 2020, p. 258.
  • 10
    AIHW, People with Disability in Australia 2020, p. 258. Working age refers to people aged between 15 and 64.
  • 11
    AIHW, People with Disability in Australia 2020, p. 258.
  • 12
    Australian Bureau of Statistics, Disability and the labour force (accessed 21 May 2021).
  • 13
    AIHW, People with Disability in Australia 2020, p. 255.
  • 14
    AIHW, People with Disability in Australia 2020, p. 255.
  • 15
    AIHW, People with Disability in Australia 2020, p. 255.
  • 16
    Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers, 2010, p. 51.
  • 17
    OECD, Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers, 2010, p. 50.
  • 18
  • 19
    DSS, Payment Demographic Data for June 2021 (accessed 23 September 2021).
  • 20
    For example, see: ACTCOSS, Submission 56, p. 9; and AFDO, Submission 118, p. 75.
  • 21
    For example, see: Name withheld, Submission 36, [p. 7]; and Inclusion Australia, Submission 94, p. 7.
  • 22
    For example, see: Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 80, p. 2; Legal Aid Queensland, Submission 82, p. 9; and ACTCOSS, Submission 56, p. 9.
  • 23
    Springvale Monash Legal Service, Submission 78, [p. 7].
  • 24
    Inclusion Australia, Submission 94, p. 7.
  • 25
    Children and Young People with Disability, Submission 96, p. 8.
  • 26
    For example, see: Catholic Social Services Australia, Submission 6, p. 4; Children and Young People with Disability, Submission 96, p. 8; and First People’s Disability Network Australia, Submission 57, p. 1.
  • 27
    Ms Mary Sayers, Chief Executive Officer, Children and Young People with Disability Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 25. Ms Sayers also told the committee nearly half of young people with disability aged 15 to 24 rely on income support payments, compared to 14 per cent without disability.
  • 28
    Carers NSW, Submission 61, p. 3. See also Professor Karen Soldatic, Western Sydney University, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 31.
  • 29
    For example, see: Mx Giancarlo de Vera, Senior Manager of Policy, People with Disability Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 27; and Ms Mary Sayers, Chief Executive Officer, Children and Young People with Disability Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 25.
  • 30
    Ms Matilda Alexander, Chief Executive Officer, Queensland Advocacy, Committee Hansard, 16 November 2021, p. 15.
  • 31
    For example, see: Carers NSW, Submission 61, p. 3; and First Peoples’ Disability Network Australia, Submission 57, Attachment 1, p. 9.
  • 32
    Cystic Fibrosis Community Care, Submission 5, [p. 3].
  • 33
    ME/CFS Australia, Submission 95, p. 26.
  • 34
    Disability Council NSW, Submission 24, [p. 4].
  • 35
    For example, see: Legal Aid Queensland, Submission 82, p. 7.
  • 36
    The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 5.
  • 37
    For example, see: Disability Council of NSW, Submission 24, pp. 2–3; ME/CFS Australia, Submission 95, p. 27; The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 16; Inclusion Australia, Submission 94, p. 19; and Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 88, p. 5.
  • 38
    DSS, Submission 29, p. 14.
  • 39
    ME/CFS Australia, Submission 95, p. 27.
  • 40
    ME/CFS Australia, Submission 95, p. 27.
  • 41
    The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 16.
  • 42
    Disability Council NSW, Submission 24, [pp. 3–4].
  • 43
    Ms Kristin O'Connell, Research and Policy, Antipoverty Centre, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 33.
  • 44
    Disability Council NSW, Submission 24, [p. 2].
  • 45
    Disability Council NSW, Submission 24, [p. 3].
  • 46
    Legal Aid Queensland, Submission 82, p. 9.
  • 47
    Ms Jenny Davidson, Chief Executive Officer, Council of Single Mothers and their Children, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2021, p. 3.
  • 48
    DSS, Submission 29, p. 8.
  • 49
    Name withheld, Submission 36, [p. 3].
  • 50
    Social Security Rights Victoria, Submission 90, p. 13.
  • 51
    Economic Justice Australia, Submission 92, [p. 20].
  • 52
    Australian Federation of Disability Organisations (AFDO), Submission 118, p. 61.
  • 53
    People with Disability Australia, Submission 116, pp 55–56.
  • 54
    Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Submission 68, p. 7.
  • 55
    DSS, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2021 (received 16 December).
  • 56
    DSS, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2021 (received 16 December).
  • 57
    Mr Troy Sloan, Group Manager, Pensions, Housing and Homelessness Group, DSS, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 56.
  • 58
    The Salvation Army Australia, Submission 4, p. 11.
  • 59
    The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 7.
  • 60
    The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 7.
  • 61
    Karen Soldatic, Michelle Fitts, Liam Magee, Gerard Thomas, Submission 42, [p. 12].
  • 62
    ACOSS, Submission 68, pp. 7–8.
  • 63
    Karen Soldatic, Michelle Fitts, Liam Magee, Gerard Thomas, Submission 42, [p. 12].
  • 64
    AFDO, Submission 118, p. 66.
  • 65
    AFDO, Submission 118, p. 66.
  • 66
    For example, see: Ms Linda Forbes, Economic Justice Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, pp. 20–21.
  • 67
    Sacred Heart Mission, Submission 67, [p. 6].
  • 68
    Victoria Legal Aid, Submission 93, p. 25.
  • 69
    Victoria Legal Aid, Submission 93, p. 25.
  • 70
    Brotherhood of St. Laurence, Submission 80, p. 2.
  • 71
    Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand, Submission 86, p. 12.
  • 72
    Council of Single Mothers and their Children, Submission 55, p. 11. The Council of Single Mothers and their Children submission notes that 71 per cent of its members surveyed said that they did not find employment programs really helpful for people on the DSP.
  • 73
    The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 6.
  • 74
    The Whitlam Institute, Submission 26, p. 7.
  • 75
    DSS and Boston Consulting Group, Mid-term Review of the Disability Employment Services (DES) Program, August 2020, p. 5.
  • 76
    DSS and Boston Consulting Group, Mid-term Review of the Disability Employment Services (DES) Program, August 2020, pp. 5–6.
  • 77
    DSS, New Disability Employment Support Model (accessed 6 January 2022).
  • 78
    DSS, New Disability Employment Support Model (accessed 6 January 2022).
  • 79
    Ms Benedikte Jensen, First Assistant Secretary, Labour Market and Workforce Policy Division, Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 46.
  • 80
    Inclusion Australia, Submission 94, p. 15. ADEs are generally notforprofit organisations that provide supported employment opportunities to people with moderate to severe disability across Australia. For further information, see: DSS, Supported Employment (accessed 24 January 2022).
  • 81
    Ms Catherine McAlpine, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusion Australia, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2021, p. 38.
  • 82
    First People’s Disability Network Australia. Submission 57, Attachment 1, p. 23.
  • 83
    Orygen, Submission 38, p. 2.
  • 84
    Western Australian Association for Mental Health, Submission 58, [p. 3–4].
  • 85
    Orygen, Submission 38, Attachment 1, p. 1.
  • 86
    Productivity Commission, Mental Health: Productivity Commission Inquiry Report Volume 1, No. 95, 30 June 2020, p. 78.
  • 87
    Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability, Issues Paper: Overview of responses to the Employment Issues paper, March 2021, p. 13.
  • 88
    First Peoples Disability Network Australia, Submission 57, Attachment 1, p. 12.
  • 89
    Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability, Issues Paper: Overview of responses to the Employment Issues paper, March 2021, pp. 13–14.

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