CHAPTER 5
MEASURES TO AMELIORATE ANY ADVERSE IMPACTS OF GENE PATENTS
5.1
This chapter addresses term of reference (b), which directs the
Committee to identify measures that would ameliorate any adverse impacts
arising from the granting of patents over human genes and genetic materials,
including whether the Patents Act 1990 (the Act) should be amended, in
light of the matters identified by the inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
5.2
As noted in the previous chapter, many stakeholders disagreed with any
proposal for an express prohibition on gene patents, but instead supported
measures to improve the quality of patents and reform the operation of the
patent system more broadly. IP Australia, for example, argued that a range of
reforms and strategies could preserve an appropriate balance between the
incentives and benefits that flow from gene patents and their potential for
adverse impacts on healthcare and medical research. Medicines Australia
expressed a typical view about the goal of such reforms to the patent system:
...any reform of the Australian patent system must embody the
following guiding principles: the system must uphold the globally accepted
balance between the incentive to innovation and a society's right to access
innovative products at a fair and affordable price...[1]
5.3
The Committee notes that, while the recommendations in this chapter are posited
in the particular context of gene patents, the measures identified are in fact
general measures that would apply equally to all patent applications. In taking
this approach the Committee acknowledges that, despite the inquiry's relatively
narrow terms of reference, many of the actual and potential problems relating
to gene patents that were identified arise in relation to the patent system
more broadly.
5.4
The Committee notes that the recommendations contained in this chapter
are to be understood implicitly or explicitly as being made in the context of
the many previous and current inquiries into the issues raised by the inquiry's
terms of reference.
Raising the thresholds of patentability
5.5
Recommendations going to the raising of the thresholds of patentability
are concerned with the first element of patent quality: that is, the legislative
requirements of patentability. The Committee considered evidence going to the
following requirements:
- manner of manufacture;
- inventive step; and
- usefulness.
5.6
Many submitters and witnesses observed that the thresholds of
patentability in Australia have been eroded through judicial and administrative
decision-making. Dr Matthew Rimmer commented that there is a 'general
consensus that there needs to be something done in relation to patent quality'.[2]
5.7
The Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) options paper
observes:
...there are concerns that decision makers have extended the
reach of patents on legal rather than economic grounds. The boundaries of
patentable subject matter have expanded through administrative and judicial
decisions...Venturous Australia (the Review of the National Innovation System)
found the ease with which patents are granted in areas such as software and
business methods may be hampering innovation.[3]
5.8
DIISR and IP Australia acknowledged the incremental changes to
patentability thresholds as a result of decisions by Australian courts, and
observed that, as a result, Australia has lower patentability thresholds than
other jurisdictions.[4]
The DIISR and IP Australia submission suggested that this carries broad
implications for the operation of the patent system in the international
context:
For countries that are a net importer of technology, like
Australia, it is advantageous to have patent thresholds set at least as high as
thresholds set for countries with which we conduct the majority of our
technology trade. Strong and aligned thresholds give Australian innovators
confidence that having satisfied those [thresholds] in Australia they are likely
to satisfy the requirements in their export markets. Aligned thresholds are
also likely to reduce costs for Australian applicants seeking patent protection
overseas. Conversely, differences that make Australia's patent law out of step with major jurisdictions
may adversely affect Australian businesses wanting to develop their inventions
and prosper in a global market place.[5]
Manner of manufacture
5.9
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its 2004 report on gene
patents, Genes and ingenuity (the ALRC report), concluded that aspects
of the manner of manufacture test are ambiguous. It recommended:
The responsible Minister should initiate a review of the
appropriateness and adequacy of the 'manner of manufacture' test as the
threshold requirement for patentable subject matter under Australian law, with
a particular focus on the requirement that an invention must not be 'generally
inconvenient.[6]
5.10
As noted in Chapter 2, ACIP is currently undertaking a review of
patentable subject matter which encompasses the issues outlined in the ALRC's
recommendation above. The ACIP review website notes that in recent years a
variety of concerns have been raised about the sorts of things that can be
patented in Australia, and draws attention to the findings of the ALRC report
that the 'manner of manufacture' test is ambiguous and obscure. The review
includes consideration of:
- the appropriateness and adequacy of the 'manner of manufacture'
test as the threshold requirement for patentable subject matter under
Australian law; and
- the historical requirement that an invention must not be
'generally inconvenient'.[7]
5.11
The submission of Professor Andrew Christie noted that those who object
to the patentability of genetic inventions do so on either economic or social
(non-economic) reasons. The submission stated that economic concerns are
usually based on the view that these patents are overly broad and therefore anti-competitive,
or impact adversely on healthcare and medical research. Concerns about overly
broad patents are able to be addressed through the requirement of usefulness
(discussed below); and concerns about impacts on healthcare and medical
research are able to be addressed through Crown use provisions and development
of a research exemption (also discussed below).[8]
5.12
However, in relation to socially based objections to gene patenting,
Professor Christie observed that the 'manner of manufacture' test is the 'main
mechanism' by which Australia's patent system is able to take account of social
or non-economic considerations in relation to the granting of patents. The question
of how well the current test accommodates or achieves social objectives, such
as those based on moral or ethical concerns, is an important aspect of the current
ACIP review.[9]
5.13
The ACIP options paper on patentable subject matter notes that the
threshold requirements for patentability—manner of manufacture, novelty,
inventive step et cetera—have been described as being a 'rough proxy' for
the benefits of a claimed invention. That is, 'these tests advance the economic
goals of the system'.[10]
5.14
In contrast, the Act contains a number of express exclusions and
discretions to refuse a patent. Human beings and the biological processes for
their generation are not patentable inventions, and the Commissioner of Patents
may refuse a patent where:
- the use of the invention would be contrary to law;
- a substance is capable of being used as a food or medicine and it
is a mere mixture of known ingredients; or
-
the name of a person is used as the name of the invention in a
claim.[11]
5.15
The exclusions and discretions contained in the Act may be considered as
acting to '[filter] out some subject matters where patents may be undesirable,
taking social concerns into account'. Thus 'the threshold tests can be viewed as
chiefly economic in nature, while the filters or exclusions for undesirable
subject matter are predominantly social in nature'.[12]
5.16
In putting forward a number of specific options for reform of the manner
of manufacture test, the ACIP options paper concluded:
...our view is that the legislation must be able to regulate
what can and cannot be patented, as determined both economically and socially.
In addition, the legislation must be logical, compliant and practical. It must
be logical in that it is internally consistent. It must be compliant in that it
is not inconsistent with Australia’s international obligations. And, it must be
practical in that administration of the law is effective and transparent.[13]
5.17
In relation to the options being considered by ACIP:
The options we have devised follow a similar approach, of
economic tests and social filters, to define the field of patentable subject
matter. In addition, there are a number of changes that could enhance the
operation and administration of the law.[14]
5.18
The ACIP options paper offers four mutually exclusive options for reform
of the manner of manufacture test:
A. Retain the
manner of manufacture test. This option retains the requirement that an
invention must be a ‘manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of
the Statute of Monopolies’.
B. Clarify
the language of the definition of an invention, for example by using the NRDC
requirements that an invention must be an artificially created state of affairs
in a field of economic endeavour.
C. Replace
the manner of manufacture test with an alternative test, such as the TRIPS
Agreement language that patents are available for any inventions in a field of
technology.
D. Delete the
requirement for an invention. Under this option, the objective tests of
novelty, inventive step and usefulness would do the economic work of limiting
patentable subject matter.[15]
5.19
A number of submitters supported changes to the Act that fall within the
scope of the ACIP options for reform of the 'manner of manufacture' test, such
as by clarifying the current test or developing a new definition of invention.
For example, Dr Graeme Suthers, from the Royal College of Pathologists of
Australasia, submitted:
The current patent legislation should be implemented using a
rational interpretation of words such as ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’. The
problem principally has been with the interpretation of the law and the
amendment required is one to ensure that this distinction between inventions
and discoveries is made explicit...We must address the anomaly of patenting a
discovery.[16]
5.20
Dr Hazel Moir submitted:
If the Patents Act 1990 were to be amended to provide
guidance to the courts and IP Australia on when a discovery is not an
invention, I would recommend an amendment focusing on these combined
characteristics. This would not only prevent patenting of genetic information
identical to that found in nature, but would also provide sound principles for
future contentious areas.
...[The] policy the Committee might consider for adoption could
be that...to be patentable an invention must be substantially different
from anything found in nature and the differences must contribute sufficient
utility to provide a benefit to the nation.[17]
5.21
Dr Rimmer noted:
...it would be much more worthwhile thinking about some of the
issues in relation to manner of manufacture that need clarification, like stem
cell patent...[The] Metabolite Laboratories case and the Australian case of Grant
against the Commissioner of Patents shows that there are certain areas that do
need clarification, particularly distinguishing between scientific discoveries
and inventions and the scope of abstract ideas and products of nature. So I
think there is a kind of in between position between the extremes of ‘anything
under the sun is patentable’ and ‘we should have broad prohibitions or exclusions
of patentable subject matter’.[18]
5.22
In relation to specific exclusions and discretions to refuse, the ACIP
paper offers three non mutually exclusive options for reform of the Act's
'social filters':
E. Retain the current exceptions
and filters;
F. Add specific exclusions, such
as a list of specific subject matters that are not patentable;[19]
and
G. Add general social filters,
such as excluding inventions that are 'generally inconvenient' and/or 'contrary
to ordre public or morality'.[20]
5.23
The ACIP paper notes that under Option F above it would be possible to
have an exclusion for 'a mere discovery'. In relation to concerns about gene
patents in particular, the Committee notes that this option would allow the
excluding of specific subject matter of this type:
This option...provides a list of things that are not patentable
because they do not benefit society, regardless of whether they are inventions.
Any exceptions would need to comply with Australia’s international obligations.[21]
5.24
Further, the ACIP paper notes that this approach could 'promote greater
certainty' in the patent system, provided interpretation issues can be properly
managed'.[22]
5.25
Given the scope of the ACIP review and its relevance to the issue of
gene patents, Professor Christie submitted:
The appropriate response to the concern about the inherent
patentability of genetic inventions is to determine whether—and, if so, how—the
manner of manufacture test should be reformed. That is the topic of the ACIP
review of Patentable Subject Matter. The appropriate action for the government,
therefore, is to await, to consider and, if in agreement, to implement the
recommendations resulting from that review.[23]
Inventive step
How inventive step is determined in
Australia
5.26
As noted in Chapter 2, the requirement that an invention involve an
inventive step is fundamental to the patent system, as it ensures that a
monopoly is not awarded for knowledge that was obvious or that would have been
available at the time of the patent application.
5.27
In Australia, whether an invention involves an inventive step is judged
by a comparison with the state of knowledge in the field relevant to the
invention, referred to as the 'prior art base'. Section 7(2) of the Act
provides:
For the purposes of this Act, an invention is to be taken to
involve an inventive step when compared with the prior art base unless the
invention would have been obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art in
the light of the common general knowledge as it existed in the patent area [ie
in Australia] before the priority date of the relevant claim, whether that
knowledge is considered separately or together with the information mentioned
in subsection (3).
5.28
The Act defines 'prior art base' as including:
- information in a document that is publicly available, whether in
or out of the patent area (ie anywhere in the world); and
- information made publicly available through doing an act, whether
in or out of the patent area (ie anywhere in the world).
5.29
Section 7(3) of the Act then provides that the information for the
purposes of Section 7(2) is (a) any single piece of prior art information; or
(b) a combination of any two or more pieces of prior art information:
...being information that the skilled person mentioned in
subsection (2) could, before the priority date of the claim, be reasonably
expected to have ascertained, understood, regarded as relevant and, in the case
of information mentioned in paragraph (b), combined as mentioned in that
paragraph.
Criticisms of current approach
5.30
Many submitters and witnesses objected to the grant of certain gene
patents for the reason that they did not contain sufficient inventiveness to
warrant the grant of monopoly. However, the Law Council of Australia questioned
whether the level of inventiveness required for the granting of a patent is too
low, observing that there have been 'very few challenges to the validity of
granted gene patents'.[24]
5.31
With particular reference to the inquiry's terms of reference, Dr
Palombi called on the patent system to be adjusted to:
...increase the inventive step threshold so that uses of such
materials in applications that are routine and standard, such as in
diagnostics, will no longer be patentable.[25]
5.32
However, IP Australia submitted that a number of common misconceptions
operate in respect of the requirement of inventive step. In particular, it
emphasised that inventive step is determined against the state of knowledge or
prior art base at the time a patent claim was lodged:
Some researchers query the validity of patents for isolating
and determining the function of particular genes, as techniques to accomplish
this are now quite routine and well-known. However, a misconception can arise
from the application of hindsight and taking into account the knowledge base
that exists now compared to when the patent application was assessed. Although
isolating the gene sequence might be routine now, Inventive Step is assessed as
at the 'priority date' of
the patent claims, which could be many years in the past.[26]
5.33
IP Australia also pointed to a common misconception that patents are
granted only for 'ground-breaking inventions':
This misunderstanding is most often voiced by researchers.
That belief is inconsistent with recent High Court authority which affirms that
only the smallest level of inventiveness (i.e. a scintilla of inventiveness) is
needed for the grant of a patent. Inventions as defined by patent law can be,
and often are, incremental advancements over what has been done before.[27]
5.34
Despite any prevailing misconceptions, IP Australia supported changes to
raise the threshold for inventive step. It noted:
...lower inventive threshold requirements in Australia raise
the question whether Australian law strikes the correct balance between the
scope of monopolies and access to innovation and new technology.[28]
5.35
An IP Australia consultation paper on reforms to the IP system noted
that too low a threshold for inventive step could also involve a greater
potential for the development of 'patent thickets', whereby overlapping sets of
patent rights act as a barrier or disincentive to innovation.
5.36
IP Australia also pointed to trends in overseas jurisdictions towards
the raising of inventive step thresholds. Similarly, Dr Rimmer noted:
The approach of the United States Supreme Court...has been very
interesting in terms of raising the standard of novelty and inventive step in
applying a slightly higher threshold in terms of what is required. That is
being applied in terms of biotechnological inventions...[and] I think that has
been a very productive approach...[29]
Potential reforms affecting
inventive step
5.37
In a recent discussion paper on possible reforms to the patent system,
IP Australia identified three particular elements of the requirements of
inventive step which are 'set at a lower level than those of other
jurisdictions or of international norms':
-
common general knowledge;
- prior art; and
- threshold test for inventive step.[30]
Common general knowledge
5.38
The IP Australia consultation paper on possible reforms to the patent
system observes that the restriction of the prior art base to 'common general knowledge
in the relevant art in Australia' is out of step with international approaches:
[Australia's approach]...restricts common general knowledge in
a way that it is not restricted in our major trading partners and under the
PCT, where when assessing inventive step, common general knowledge anywhere in
the world can be taken into account. Such a restriction is also at odds with
deliberations in international forums...where there has been a consistent move to
global concepts of prior art and validity on the basis that information that
invalidates a patent in one jurisdiction should also invalidate patents in
others. It also does not take account of the global research, information and
innovation environment that exists today.[31]
5.39
Accordingly, IP Australia has proposed that the Act be amended to remove
the limitation that common general knowledge be confined to that existing in
Australia at the time a patent application is lodged.
5.40
The Committee notes that previous inquiries have considered this issue.
The Ergas Report recommended that the prior art base for determining inventive
step be expanded to include all information, including common general
knowledge, anywhere in the world.
5.41
However, Dr Moir commented:
Personally I consider that using a global standard for 'common
general knowledge' would have almost no impact on the quantum of inventiveness
required for a patent monopoly. The many rules and procedures about decisions
on patent grant are each slanted in favour of the applicant. As the US Federal
Trade Commission said in respect of the USA, a 'plethora of presumptions and
procedures tip the scales in favor of the ultimate issuance of a patent, once
an application has been filed' (US FTC 2003: 8). Australia uses many of the
same rules, but excludes even more existing knowledge from decisions on
inventiveness. In my view far more radical proposals are needed to set the patent
system back on a path where it delivers benefits to the nation.[32]
Prior art
5.42
As noted above, the 'prior art base' against which inventive step is
assessed is defined as including:
- information in a document that is publicly available, whether in
or out of the patent area (ie anywhere in the world); and
-
information made publicly available through doing an act, whether
in or out of the patent area (ie anywhere in the world).
5.43
Such information may be considered as part of the prior art base if it
is information that a skilled person in the relevant art could be 'reasonably
expected to have ascertained, understood, regarded as relevant and...[if involving
a combination of any two or more pieces of prior art information] combined'.[33]
5.44
The IP Australia consultation paper on reform of the patent system notes
that Australia's approach places limitations on how prior art information can
be considered that 'do not exist elsewhere':
In Australia prior art information must be such that a
skilled person in the art could be reasonably expected to have ascertained,
understood and regarded [it] as relevant. This approach has led to
circumstances where the Federal Court has found that information in US patents,
although highly relevant and readily understood, would not have been ascertained
in certain circumstances.[34]
5.45
In comparison, other jurisdictions did not have a requirement that the
skilled person would have ascertained, or 'looked for and found the [relevant]
prior art' information. IP Australia considered that this approach 'is more
aligned with the global innovation environment that exists today where there is
more ready access to information via the internet and electronic means'.[35]
5.46
Further, the need to establish that a skilled person would have found a
relevant citation was not a feature of patent systems in other major countries.
Parties seeking to challenge an Australian patent would need to carry the
evidentiary burden on this question, which could increase the uncertainty and
costs of patent litigation:
The Federal Court also noted that when the ability of the
skilled person to ascertain relevant prior art is in doubt it is necessary to
have evidence to resolve the dispute. This has the potential to introduce
significant additional costs to litigating patent disputes.[36]
5.47
IP Australia advised that it was currently considering changes to the Act
to remove the requirement that prior art information for the purposes of inventive
step must be that which could be reasonably expected to be 'ascertained'.[37]
Threshold test for inventive step
5.48
Dr Rimmer advised the Committee that there were concerns with the level
of inventiveness credited to the person skilled in the art when assessing
inventive step:
A lot of commentators have...emphasised the role of a person
skilled in the art. A great problem in terms of the judgments in relation to
novelty and inventive step has been that a person skilled in the art is
credited too little creativity. Some commentators...argue that [for] the
reasonable person test, the person skilled in the art, you must attribute a
greater level of creativity to them.[38]
5.49
In Australia, the threshold test for inventive step is formulated as an
inquiry as to whether an invention lacks an inventive step, or in other words
is obvious. IP Australia's consultation paper on reform of the patent system
notes that the test for obviousness is to ask whether or not the skilled person
in the relevant art would be led directly as a matter of course to try a
particular approach with a reasonable expectation of success.[39]
5.50
IP Australia was proposing that Australia adopt a test for obviousness
similar to that which is employed by the European patent community, where the
test is to ask: Would the invention have been obvious to try with a reasonable
expectation of success? Specifically, IP Australia proposed that the inventive
step test be revised so that a claimed invention is obvious if it was 'obvious
for the skilled person to try a suggested approach, alternative or method with
a reasonable expectation of success'.[40]
5.51
IP Australia argued that under such a test it would be easier to argue
obviousness than under current Australian law, as it would account for
'situations where it is routine to conduct testing or combine particular
approaches in order to solve a problem or find a better way of doing things'.[41]
5.52
In relation to such an approach, the ACIP options paper on patentable
subject matter observes:
The US Supreme Court has recently reinstated a similar test
in that country. A submission to the Senate Gene Patent Inquiry by several US
Law Professors has suggested that these developments in the US law are likely
to call the validity of many patents for gene sequences into question, now that
the methods of DNA isolation are conventional.[42]
Usefulness
5.53
The Committee heard that the usefulness of an invention is assessed both
explicitly and implicitly under the Act.[43]
5.54
First, section 18(1)(c) of the Act requires that an invention be
'useful'. However, IP Australia advised that this requires only that an
invention produce the result or effect that the patentee claims it can achieve:
To satisfy the patentability criteria an invention must be
useful. This does not mean the invention has some usefulness to society or that
it is commercially viable or successful. Rather Usefulness under patent law
requires that the claimed invention be capable of achieving the result(s) that
the patentee promises it can achieve.[44]
5.55
The ALRC report explains:
...the usefulness criterion does not require that an invention
be useful in the sense that it is worthwhile or commercially viable; only that
if a particular result is claimed, it must be achievable.[45]
5.56
Professor Andrew Christie observed that this interpretation of
usefulness was more limited than that which is applied in other jurisdictions:
...the concept of ‘useful’ in Australian patent law is quite
different from – and, in particular, is much more limited than – the concept of
‘utility’ in US patent law and the concept of ‘industrial application’ under
the European Patent Convention.[46]
5.57
Second, along with the explicit requirement that an invention be
'useful' under section 18 of the Act, the 'manner of manufacture' requirement is
also understood as containing an implicit requirement that an invention be
useful. The ALRC report observes:
In NRDC, the High Court stated that to constitute a
manner of manufacture an invention must be one that offers some advantage which
is 'material' and 'its value to the country is in the field of economic
endeavour'.[47]
5.58
Third, the usefulness of an invention is also considered indirectly
pursuant to the requirement in section 40 of the Act that a complete
specification fully describe the use of the invention and how the result
claimed can be achieved. The ALRC report explains that 'if a use for the
invention described in the claims is not reasonably supported by the description,
the claims in the patent application may not be fairly based'.[48]
5.59
Despite the various ways in which usefulness is currently considered
under Australian patent law, the usefulness of an invention does not operate as
an express requirement for examination of an Australian patent application. The
ALRC report explains:
Usefulness is addressed at the examination stage only as an
aspect of the manner of manufacture test and through the disclosure
requirements. The Commissioner of Patents does not have to be satisfied that an
invention is useful under s 18(1)(c) before accepting a patent application. ‘Lack
of utility’ (as the objection is phrased) can be raised as an express objection
only in revocation proceedings. It is not a separate basis upon which a patent may
be opposed or re-examined. There may, however, be scope to raise the usefulness
of an invention claimed in an accepted application in opposition proceedings on
the basis of failure to satisfy the manner of manufacture or disclosure
requirements.[49]
5.60
IP Australia advised that it was proposing reforms which would introduce
usefulness as an express requirement for examination, beyond the limited sense
in which it is currently considered:
IP Australia is proposing a number of changes to the
Usefulness requirement under the Patents Act...Under the proposals, Usefulness
would become a ground for consideration in examination and it would be
clarified that the claimed invention would have to demonstrate 'specific, substantial and
credible utility' similar to requirements in the United States. These
changes are the same as those proposed by ALRC Report 99, recommendations 6-3
(a) - (c).[50]
5.61
The Committee notes that the proposal for the inclusion of usefulness as
a requirement in patent examination was recommended by the ALRC in its 2004
report. The report also recommended that an invention only satisfy the
usefulness requirement where a patent application discloses a 'specific,
substantial and credible use'; that the question of usefulness be decided on
the balance of probabilities; and that 'lack of usefulness' be available as a
basis upon which a patent application may be opposed.[51]
5.62
This approach was endorsed in the ACIP options paper on patentable
subject matter, which noted that the requirement that an invention have a specific,
substantial and credible utility 'will provide additional clarity to the law'.[52]
The paper described how these elements might apply to a patent application:
[A requirement that an invention have a specific, substantial
and credible utility would mean that]...an invention would need to be:
-
specific – the use is specific to the subject matter of the invention
and not a generic use;
-
substantial – no further research is required to identify a real or
specific use;
-
credible – the use is logical and consistent with the state of the art.[53]
5.63
IP Australia also commented on the expected scope of the new usefulness
requirement:
Concerning [stricter] requirements to prove an invention's
usefulness at examination and require experimental results showing that the
patented invention has utility...These changes to utility will not go so far as
requiring applicants to demonstrate their invention's efficacy in humans (as
has been suggested by some comments to the Inquiry) as that level of
experimental evidence is unrealistic at the early stage of seeking patent
protection.[54]
5.64
Professor Christie observed that the requirement of usefulness was
connected with the question of overly broad patent claims, which were
specifically identified as an issue in relation to gene patents.[55]
He explained:
Some stakeholders are of the view that patents are being
granted for genetic inventions that are ‘too wide’, in the sense that the
claims of the patent cover subject matter that goes beyond the actual invention
made by the patentee. Because the exclusive rights of a patent apply to the
subject matter of the claims of the patent, if the claims are too wide then the
exclusive rights granted by the patent will also be too wide. [The requirements
that a claimed invention is useful are] primary mechanisms for ensuring that
the claims of a patent are not too wide...
The appropriate response to the concern about the width of
the exclusive rights provided by patents for genetic inventions is to require
that the claims of the patent do not go beyond the actual invention made and
disclosed by the patentee.[56]
5.65
Mrs Beattie acknowledged that the proposed usefulness requirement could
operate to limit overly broad patent claims:
...some of the initial patents did have broad claims that may
not have been supported as well as they could have been, but patent reforms
that we are proposing would limit the scope of those claims to the extent that
you would have to demonstrate utility. So we would be examining for specific
utility and it would have to be specific, substantial and credible. To that
effect you would not be able to say that a particular nucleic acid has a
therapeutic effect, full stop. You would have to be very specific about the
nature of the therapeutic effect that you expected this to have and provide some
support for those claims. So, yes, I think some of the original patents that
were broader may have been granted...[57]
5.66
Mrs Beattie noted that some patents granted in the past may have been
refused if subject to the proposed new test:
In terms of what we are proposing with the patent reforms
some of those [overly broad] patents may have failed. If we were able to, for
example, examine on utility, they may have failed on specific, substantial and
credible.[58]
5.67
The ACIP options paper observes that the usefulness requirement also
bears on the issue of distinguishing between inventions and discoveries in
determining patentability of subject matter:
Both the ALRC and IPCRC considered that the requirement for
usefulness has taken on greater importance in some new technologies, where the
dividing line between mere discovery and invention has become difficult to
define. This option would also require patent examiners to assess, and report
on, the usefulness of an invention as a separate requirement.[59]
5.68
In relation to gene patents in particular, the paper noted the view of
the IPCRC that the requirement of a specific, substantial and credible utility
'would exclude the mere identification of a gene sequence from patentability'.[60]
5.69
Dr Rimmer noted that the proposed usefulness requirement had effectively
operated to exclude certain gene patents in the US:
The other very important thing on questions of patent quality
is introducing the US standards in relation to utility, for there to be a substantial
specific and credible utility. There is a big biotechnology case in the United
States in re Fisher dealing with the patentability of expressed sequence tags
in relation to maize. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the
particular patent application by Monsanto...on the grounds of utility.[61]
Full description and fair basis
5.70
IP Australia advised that it was considering reforms to section 40 of
the Act which could also help to address concerns about the granting of overly
broad patents. Section 40 requires that a patent specification provide
sufficient detail to describe an invention, and that a claim is 'fairly based
on the matter described in the specification'. IP Australia's consultation
paper on patentability standards explains:
It is a fundamental basis of the patent system that the
patentee describe their invention fully and that the scope of protection
obtained does not go substantially beyond what has been described [in the
patent specification] (ie is 'fairly based').
This is the quid pro quo that forms the basis of the
patent system: the patentee is given a time limited monopoly in exchange for
public disclosure of their invention and detailed information about how to make
and use the invention.[62]
5.71
The IP Australia consultation paper notes that 'there is a notable
difference between full description and fair basis requirements in Australia
and requirements in the US, Europe and Japan'. In these jurisdictions a patent
specification must provide 'sufficient details of the invention to enable the
reader to produce anything across the full scope of the invention claimed'. In
contrast, the requirement in Australia is 'simply that there is sufficient
detail to produce something, potentially only one thing, within the scope of
the claim'. In relation to 'fair basis' requirements:
This fair basis requirement has come to be understood as one
of consistency between the specification and the claims. It is not a test [of]
whether the description of the invention and technical detail in the body of
the specification is sufficient to support the scope of the invention that is
claimed...[63]
5.72
The consultation paper concludes that the lower Australian requirements
in relation to full description and fair basis 'allows a patentee to monopolise
a greater field than they have disclosed to the public', raising issues as to
'whether an invention may be afforded substantially broader protection in
Australia than could be obtained in other jurisdictions'.[64]
5.73
IP Australia was proposing that section 40 of the Act be amended to:
...introduce descriptive support requirements analogous to
those applied in other jurisdictions including that the whole scope of the
claimed invention be enabled and that the description provide sufficient
information to allow the skilled addressee to perform the invention without
undue experimentation.[65]
5.74
IP Australia expected that raising the threshold for disclosure
requirements in this way would 'limit the reach of claims so that the
protection given to an inventor is not disproportionate with what has been
described'.[66]
OTHER MEASURES
5.75
Apart from suggestions for reform of the patent system that went to the
legal requirements for patentability, the Committee received numerous
suggestions for reform going to other aspects of the Act, such as the Crown use
and compulsory licensing provisions, and the lack of an explicit research
exemption. Yet other suggested reforms went to what might be termed external
measures or strategies to improve the operation of the patent system more
generally, and in this way address particular concerns around gene patents and
their actual and potential impacts.
Crown use provisions
5.76
A number of submitters and witnesses suggested that the existing Crown
use provisions in the Act (ss 163-170) could be employed to ameliorate any
potentially adverse impacts of gene patents on the healthcare and medical
research sectors. Regarding the scope and operation of the Crown use provisions
IP Australia advised:
The Crown Use provisions of the Patents Act permit certain
government entities to use, and to authorise others to use, patented
inventions, without permission from the patent owner in certain circumstances.
The use is only permissible where such use is for the [proper provision of] services
of the Commonwealth, the State or a Territory. The government would have to pay
the patent owner or exclusive licensee remuneration for that use, in accordance
with the Patents Act.[67]
5.77
A 2005 ACIP report on the Crown use provisions notes:
The ultimate purpose of the provisions is to ensure that
governments in Australia can balance the grant of exclusive patent and design
rights to IP owners, with the needs of the Australian public.[68]
5.78
Professor Christie noted that the Crown use provisions had potential to
address concerns about the effect of gene patents—notably that in some situations
a patent for a genetic invention has been, or will be, used to preclude wide
public access to that invention, such as in the case of the BRCA genes and the
attempt by Genetic Technologies to enforce its exclusive right to conduct BRCA
testing in Australia. Professor Christie submitted:
It must be noted...that the Australian patent legislation
contains a mechanism by which the government can compulsorily acquire a right
of access to an invention: the Crown use provisions.[69]
5.79
IP Australia submitted that :
These provisions might be able to assist government bodies
where they can establish that such use is necessary for the proper provision of
government services within Australia.[70]
5.80
However, Dr Palombi submitted that there was 'no evidence of the
exercise of Crown use [provisions]', and questioned whether these provisions
would be effective to address issues around exclusive patent rights:
There is no evidence that...Crown use provisions—which would
be useful in ameliorating some of the worst excesses of the patent system in
this instance—have [ever] been effectively used. So we are unfortunately in a
situation where, as with the BRCA1, we have an Australian company that, had it
acted within its rights, could have actually sought injunctions to close down
all of the public testing in this country for breast and ovarian cancer.[71]
5.81
IP Australia acknowledged that there was some uncertainty around the
operation of the Crown use provisions, commenting that, 'to IP Australia's knowledge, these provisions
have been rarely litigated and interpreted by the courts'.[72]
5.82
The Committee notes that in its 2004 report the ALRC made a number of
recommendations to ensure that the Crown use provisions are sufficient to
specifically address health issues, and that the circumstances justifying their
use are sufficiently well defined. The ALRC recommended:
- that the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council develop a
policy regarding the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for the
Commonwealth or a state to exploit a patented invention under the Crown use
provisions for the purposes of promoting human health;
- that the Department of Health and Ageing develop a policy regarding
the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for the Commonwealth to
acquire a patent for the purposes of promoting human health;
- that the Act be amended to clarify that, for the purposes of the
Crown use provisions, an invention is exploited ‘for the services of the
Commonwealth or of a State’ if the exploitation of the invention by a
Commonwealth or State authority (or by an authorised person) is for the
provision of healthcare services or products to members of the public; and
- that the Act be amended to provide that, when a patent is
exploited under the Crown use provisions, the remuneration that is to be paid
by the relevant authority must be paid promptly and must be just and reasonable
having regard to the economic value of the use; and that the Act be amended to
ensure that remuneration for an acquired patent is paid promptly, and is just
and reasonable.[73]
5.83
In relation to the ALRC's recommendations, Dr Rimmer observed:
I think they [the ALRC] need to go further and pick up the
requirements under the TRIPS Agreement to adequately have domestic and export mechanisms
to deal with essential medicines.[74]
5.84
Professor Christie noted that ACIP had also conducted a review of the
Crown use provisions:
The scope and operation of the Crown use provisions was the
subject of a review by the ACIP in 2004-2005. That review concluded that
entitlement of the Crown to access an invention in the public benefit should be
maintained, but that the provisions should be amended to ensure a more
transparent and accountable process for their utilisation. The government has
not, as yet, implemented these recommendations.[75]
Compulsory licensing
5.85
IP Australia advised that 'a compulsory licence can be sought where the
patent holder fails to meet the reasonable requirements of the public or where
they engage in anticompetitive conduct (ss 133-140)'.[76]
The Act sets out the circumstances where, for the purposes of granting a
compulsory licence, the 'reasonable requirements of the public with respect to
a patented invention' are to be taken not to have been met. These include:
- where an existing trade or industry in Australia, or the
establishment of a new trade or industry, is unfairly prejudiced, or the demand
in Australia for the patented product, or for a product resulting from the
patented process, is not reasonably met, because of the patentee's failure:
- to manufacture the patented product to an adequate extent and
supply it on reasonable terms; or
- to grant licences on reasonable terms.[77]
5.86
Dr Charles Lawson noted that the purpose of the compulsory licensing of
patents is 'to encourage the licensing and working of inventions sooner,
serving as an effective incentive for patent holders to grant a licence
voluntarily and on their own terms'.[78]
5.87
Dr Lawson observed that:
...compulsory licensing is one of the very few avenues
available to limit patent abuse and misuse, and has become (potentially) increasingly
important with the lowering of the patent threshold standards of subject matter
and obviousness.[79]
5.88
Many submitters and witnesses identified the compulsory licensing provisions
of the Act as having the potential to ameliorate any adverse impacts of gene patents
on healthcare and medical research. The ALRC submitted:
...the key factor in ensuring both the accessibility of quality
health care and the facilitation of further research is the smooth functioning
of the system regulating licensing and use.[80]
5.89
Professor Ron Trent, University of Sydney, noted that he had not
witnessed significant problems arising from gene patents per se, but identified
exclusive licences as having the potential to adversely impact on the availability
and quality of healthcare:
To me, [exclusive licensing] is the real key issue in terms
of the sorts of patents that we have. In the breast cancer example, if an
exclusive licence is given to one company...I have concerns that this will impact
negatively on both the availability of the test as well as the quality of the
test.[81]
5.90
Similarly, Dr Suthers submitted:
For existing gene patents, our principal concerns would be
addressed by ensuring that the patents do not provide a monopoly on medical
testing. Gene patents must be broadly licensed so that laboratories are free to
perform the test and improve on it as required. However, unrestrictive
licensing is not the whole solution.[82]
5.91
Dr Gillian Mitchell, Director, Familial Cancer Centre, Peter MacCallum
Cancer Centre, also called for compulsory licence provisions to be used to
ensure that patent holders did not use their rights in such a way as to slow
the delivery of healthcare services, such as diagnostic tests, and the
development of research.[83]
5.92
With particular reference to the BRCA gene patents, Dr Rimmer observed:
...once patents are granted there will be some patents—for
instance, the BRCA 1 patent—which might still be valid in some form but that
you might think have some negative consequences in terms of...social impact. If
you really want to better control the behaviour of patent holders, it is very
important to have a strong, modern and efficient compulsory licensing regime.[84]
5.93
Dr Rimmer emphasised, however, that the compulsory licence provisions
were important in a range of different contexts:
Compulsory licensing...is very important in a range of
different contexts—biotechnology patents for pharmaceutical drugs, especially
in the context of access to essential medicines. Interestingly enough, in
relation to clean technologies as well at the moment there is a great deal of debate
in the lead-up to Copenhagen.[85]
Reasonable requirements provisions
5.94
Despite the apparent ability of the compulsory licence provisions to
ameliorate any actual or potential adverse impacts of gene patents, the
Committee heard that the reasonable requirements provisions have not been
successfully used for the grant of a compulsory licence. IP Australia advised:
IP Australia has only been able to identify three
applications for compulsory licences in Australia since 1903; none under the Patents
Act 1903, two under the Patents Act 1952 and one under the Patents
Act 1990...
In each case a compulsory licence was sought to enable use of
a patentee’s invention in order to satisfy perceived unmet 'reasonable
requirements of the public' for the patented invention. No compulsory licenses
were granted.[86]
5.95
However, IP Australia submitted that 'the mere availability of this
option lends strength to prospective licensees in private negotiations'.[87]
Similarly, the Law Council of Australia commented that the few or no cases of
use of the compulsory licence provisions did not necessarily indicate that the
provisions were ineffective, given the fact that their potential or threat did
in some cases act as an incentive for patent holders to negotiate commercial
arrangements providing access to a patent.[88]
5.96
In contrast, Dr Charles Lawson submitted that 'in [their] present form
the compulsory licensing provisions in the [Act] are effectively a barrier to
the working of inventions in Australia'.[89]
5.97
Dr Lawson provided a textual analysis which argued that the threshold
criteria for the grant of a compulsory licence in s 133(2)(a)(i) to (iii) are 'practically
uncertain and probably very limited' in meaning:[90]
...it is apparent that the uncertain meanings impose significant
thresholds for evidence (proof), qualifications, discretions, expense and uncertain
access to the know-how necessary to actually exploit the invention. The conclusion...must
be that the uncertain meanings, evidentiary requirements, and the likely
considerable expense with little prospect of gauging the likely success of an
application are unlikely to encourage a potential applicant. Rather, these
thresholds appear as a likely barrier to a potential applicant and undermine
any incentive the provision might hold for a patent holder to license and work
the invention sooner.[91]
5.98
Dr Lawson concluded that significant reform of the compulsory licence
provisions was required:
...to satisfy its policy objectives the meaning of the
compulsory licensing provisions should be clear, so that patent holders really
are 'incentivised' to
license and work their inventions earlier and potential compulsory
license applicants can structure their affairs so as to avoid the unnecessary expense
of pursuing uncertain license grants.[92]
5.99
Dr Rimmer noted that there was also potential for reform of the
compulsory licensing provisions in relation to essential medicines:
...the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties said two years ago
that it would modernise the compulsory licensing regime in line with TRIPS to
deal with the issues in relation to access to essential medicines, especially
in relation to the export of essential medicines. I think it is very important
that our compulsory licensing regime adequately deals with concerns about
competition and public non-commercial use, but also about health concerns and
health crises [such as SARS], which can cross over into the field of gene
patents...[93]
5.100
The Committee notes that in its 2004 report the ALRC concluded there was
significant potential for anti-competitive exploitation of biotechnology
inventions due to their unique nature and 'possible lack of substitutability'.
Accordingly, it proposed certain reforms to the compulsory licence provisions
to address those 'circumstances in which there is a public interest in enhanced
competition in a market, and the patent holder has not met reasonable
requirements for access to the patented invention'.[94]
Specifically, the ALRC proposed that the Act be amended to clarify the scope of
the ‘reasonable requirements of the public test’, in particular the
circumstances in which the reasonable requirements of the public are taken not
to have been satisfied.[95]
Competition based test
5.101
In addition, the ALRC recommended that the competition-based test
recommended by the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (IPCRC)
be inserted into the Act as an additional ground for the grant of a compulsory
licence.[96]
This recommendation was based on the IPCRC's view that intellectual property
laws and competition policy are 'largely complementary', because the former
promotes innovation 'which is a key form of competition'.[97]
5.102
The IPCRC had originally recommended that the competition-based test
replace the 'reasonable requirements of the public' test and contain the
following conditions:
-
access to the patented invention is required for competition in
the (relevant) market;
- there is a public interest in enhanced competition in that
market;
- the reasonable requirements for such access have not been met;
-
the order will have the effect of allowing these reasonable
requirements to be better met; and
- the order will not compromise the legitimate interests of the
patent holder, including the patent holder’s right to share in the return society
obtains from the owner’s invention, and to benefit from any successive
invention, made within the patent term, that relies on the patent.[98]
5.103
In response to the IPCRC report, the Government indicated in-principle
support for making the compulsory licence regime subject to a competition test.
However, it argued the competition based test should be additional to the
existing reasonable requirements test, on the grounds that in some
circumstances:
- the competition based test might not apply; or
- could be harder to satisfy than the existing test.[99]
5.104
In 2006, the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 2006
amended the Act to provide that a compulsory license may be granted where the
patentee has been found guilty of any proscribed anti-competitive conduct under
the Trade Practices Act 1974. Section 133(2)(b) now provides that a
person may apply for a compulsory licence on the grounds that:
...the patentee has contravened, or is contravening, Part IV of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 [to do with restrictive trade practices] or
an application law (as defined in section 150A of that Act) in connection with
the patent.
5.105
An analysis of this provision by Dr Lawson, however, suggests that in
practice the competition based test may be of little effect:
...[The analysis shows that] the discretion [to award the
compulsory licence] may not be exercised for reasons that may be outside the
knowledge of an applicant, that the scope of a compulsory license order is
limited, that there are significant difficulties with treaty interpretation,
and that there are particular difficulties with the restrictive terminology and
other provisions in the Patents Act limiting the scope of any compulsory
license order.[100]
5.106
Dr Lawson concludes:
...the 'competition
test' amendment is unlikely to be a practical remedy for contravention
of Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act because of the limited scope of a
compulsory license order under the Patents Act. These hurdles seem
unattractive when the same, or an arguably superior, remedy is already
available under the Trade Practices Act.[101]
5.107
Dr Rimmer also observed that the competition amendments to the
compulsory licensing regime 'are minor, and will do little to address the
policy issues raised by the [ALRC]',[102]
while noting that a competition based approach was still a potential strategy
in relation to ameliorating the potential adverse impacts of certain patents:
..it would be useful to have a regulator who had a greater
purview of some of the [competition] impacts of some applications of certain
patents. Interestingly enough, in relation to non-coding DNA patents, Myriad
Genetics accused GTG of anti-competitive conduct in their initial skirmish
before they reached a settlement.[103]
Research exemption
5.108
Much of the evidence to the inquiry concerned the need for Australia's
patent system to contain an explicit research exemption. A 2009 IP Australia
consultation paper on exemptions to patent infringement provided the following
summary of the present status of such an exemption in Australia:
...the Patents Act 1990 does not contain a specific
research or experimental use exception and IP Australia is not aware of any
legal cases in Australia where experimental use was argued as a defence against
infringement litigation. As a consequence it is unclear whether an experimental
use exemption exists in Australia, and if it does, the extent to which it
applies. Experiences in other countries where there are no statutory
experimental use provisions indicate that courts have struggled to ascertain
the scope of the experimental use defence or have applied restrictive tests
that are potentially detrimental to research.[104]
5.109
Many submitters and witnesses raised concerns about the impact of the
uncertain status of the research exemption on research both in relation to
human genes and genetic material and more broadly. With reference to gene
patents, the Committee notes the conclusion of the ALRC that the uncertain
status of the research exemption for patent infringement in Australia is:
...unhelpful to the research community and commercial
organisations. It has the potential to result in under-investment in basic
research; and to hinder innovation if researchers become concerned that their
activities may lead to legal action by patent holders.[105]
5.110
There was widespread support for an amendment to the Act to introduce an
explicit research exemption into Australia's patent law. Dr Cudmore advised:
...where possible, the intellectual property environment should
operate such that researchers can conduct their research in good faith, with a
minimum level of encumbrance from the law...
The ability to conduct research on the gene sequence, without
necessarily using a proprietary, therapeutic or diagnostic downstream
development from that gene sequence, is something that we believe would
significantly enhance researchers’ comfort zones in the area that we are
discussing, simply because they would have confidence that working on the gene
itself does not give rise to legal liability.[106]
5.111
Professor Christie encouraged the Committee to consider 'making a
recommendation in relation to a clear and express exemption for experimental
and research purposes'.[107]
He observed:
The appropriate response to the concerns about patents for
genetic inventions retarding innovation by precluding follow-on research is to
ensure that Australian patent law recognises that acts done for experimental
purposes do not infringe a patent. This requires that the patent legislation be
amended, by introducing an express experimental use defence to infringement.[108]
5.112
The Law Council Australia also indicated that it supported a 'specific
and express experimental use exception in the law'.[109]
5.113
Dr Cudmore suggested that any amendment to support a research exemption
could take the form of a specific provision for academic licensing:
...a specific provision for academic licensing in the law would
more likely than not be a stimulant to desirable medical research activities.
The way that we would see that provision being constructed is that it would
allow activities in particular environments—NHMRC accredited environments or
something similar to that—and would constitute a protection for research.[110]
5.114
The Committee notes that a number of inquiries into gene patents or
aspects of the patent system have supported the introduction of a research
exemption into Australian patent law. In its 2004 report the ALRC recommended
that a research exemption be incorporated into the Act:
The Commonwealth should amend the [Act]...to establish an
exemption from patent infringement for acts done to study or experiment on the
subject matter of a patented invention; for example, to investigate its
properties or improve upon it. The amendment should also make it clear that:
(a) the exemption is available only if study or
experimentation is the sole or dominant purpose of the act;
(b) the existence of a commercial purpose or objective does
not preclude the application of the exemption; and
(c) the exemption does not derogate from any study or
experimentation that may otherwise be permitted under the Patents Act.[111]
5.115
Dr Rimmer indicated that the ALRC's was the 'best' of the suggested
approaches to implementing a research exemption in Australia.[112]
5.116
The Victorian government indicated that it supported a consideration of
'the feasibility of implementing the ALRC...[recommendation for a] statutory
exemption for patent infringement in the case of non-commercial experimental
use (as applies in some jurisdictions internationally).'[113]
5.117
ACIP has also recommended that the Act be amended to include an explicit
experimental research exemption, following its inquiry into this issue in 2005.
It suggested the following provision be introduced to the Act:
The rights of a patentee are not infringed by acts done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention that do
not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent. Acts done
for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention
include:
-determining how the invention works;
-determining the scope of the invention;
-determining the validity of the claims;
-seeking an improvement to the invention.[114]
5.118
In addition, ACIP made a number of recommendations intended, inter alia,
to clarify the interpretation and application of the research exemption by IP
Australia and to harmonise the Australian exemption with international
practice.
5.119
The NHMRC supported the ACIP proposal for a research exemption. Dr Clive
Morris, Chief Knowledge and Development Officer, stated:
The NHMRC, in its submissions to the Australian Law Reform
Commission in 2003 and, I think, subsequently to this committee, has spoken
about the researchers’ exemption and the need for clarity which researchers
have expressed. We have said recently that we support the position of the
Advisory Council on Intellectual Property that this should be made more clear in
legislation.[115]
5.120
In contrast, Cancer Council Australia, which supported an express
prohibition on gene patents, argued that the recommendations of the ALRC and
ACIP on a research exemption would not offer sufficient protection:
While we commend the Advisory Council on Intellectual
Property and the Australian Law Reform Commission for proposing an experimental
use exemption for patented genes in some medical research, in our view the
recommendations are not sufficiently extensive. For example, exemption should
also apply to research on the patented tests for identifying certain genes, to encourage
continuous improvement; just because a commercial interest discovered a particularly
gene or developed a test for its isolation does not mean that the test could
not be improved (e.g. made more accessible and affordable) by a separate
research entity. There are numerous other examples where exemption for
experimental use would not be sufficient. Applying for the exemption could also
impose administrative burden for not-for-profit and academic institutions
involved in medical research.[116]
5.121
In its recent consultation paper on exemptions to patent infringement,
IP Australia has also set out the broad intent of the research exemption
it is proposing:
A person may, without infringing a patent, do any act on a
patented invention which is solely for the purpose of:
- determining how the invention works
- seeking an improvement to the invention
- testing the validity of a patent
- determining the scope of the patent claims
- determining whether an act or product infringes a patent
or
- obtaining the information required for regulatory approval under
Australian law or the law of any other country that regulates the manufacture,
construction, use or sale of the patented invention.
The statutory exemption will not apply where the invention is
used in, but is not the subject of, an experiment.[117]
5.122
IP Australia submitted that its suggested approach:
...would clarify the current situation and clearly delineate
that research on the patented invention is allowed, for example: to determine
how the invention works; to seek improvements to the invention; to determine
unknown and useful properties of the invention; and to undertake trials for the
purposes of obtaining regulatory approval for its exploitation.[118]
5.123
However, Dr Moir criticised IP Australia's proposal as being overly
narrow:
IP Australia recently circulated their discussion paper on
the research exemption and they framed it quite narrowly. They said the
exemption should apply where the sole purpose was research. But purposes are
very rarely sole. For example, a university undertaking research might also be
undertaking education, and I can tell you that a patent lawyer would say,
‘Well, that means that it is not solely for research and therefore you cannot
claim the exemption.’ So I would look very closely at propositions in regard to
the long-awaited research exemption and make sure it is very tight and very
broad, because it is that cumulative research that is very important.[119]
5.124
Dr Palombi also criticised the scope of the research exemption suggested
by IP Australia:
...the test that is proposed by IP Australia is completely
unworkable. They use a sole purpose test. If the sole purpose of the
experimentation is experimentation, non-commercial, then it is exempted. How
many universities, how many people, these days actually do experimentation
solely for the sake of experimenting? They don’t. Everything is applied,
everything has got a commercial link. It is so easy to get around that
exemption that it is hardly worth the trouble of even making it legislation.[120]
5.125
Similarly, Dr Rimmer commented:
I share...concerns about the very narrow way in which IP
Australia has put forward their proposal in relation to a defence of
experimental use. The sole purpose test I think is used in the Netherlands and
has not proved to be a very effective way of dealing with that scope.[121]
Inclusion of anti-avoidance provisions in Patents Act 1990
5.126
A number of submitters and witnesses discussed the issue of patent
drafting and the extent to which creative drafting of patent claims had
contributed to the broadening scope of patentable subject matter in the past.
Dr Moir offered the following example to indicate the prevalence and impact of
creative legal drafting in the patent system:
In my recent in-depth study of 72 Australian business method
patents, 50 of the 72 applications were amended during negotiations with the
examiner, and in many cases it was the amendment that was instrumental in
allowing the grant...[The] triviality of these amendments indicates the problem
of clever legal drafting.[122]
5.127
Professor Drahos indicated that the problem of creative legal drafting
was widespread:
...if you look at the effect of exclusions in the European
Patent Convention you see that there are a number of exclusions to do with, for
example, the patentability of computer programs, the patentability of plant
varieties and so on. I can show you in the European Patent Office many thousands
of patents—probably tens or hundreds of thousands of patents—on computer programs
and on plant varieties.[123]
5.128
Professor Drahos noted that the problem arising from creative legal
drafting would also be relevant in the event that specific exclusions of any
sort were introduced into the Act in future. He explained:
Unfortunately, I think it is unlikely that you will ever
achieve very clear statutory language. Most patent attorneys will tell you that
there is not an exclusion they cannot draft around. So essentially the patent
attorney profession you should think of as a bunch of tax evaders. Tax evaders
always think of new ways to get around our tax laws...Relying on the words of the
statute alone probably will not be enough.[124]
5.129
Dr Moir commented:
Legal semantics in patent law is the parallel of crafting
financial products to avoid paying tax; it involves using words to provide a
veneer of inventiveness to something that would not otherwise merit a patent
monopoly.[125]
5.130
Professor Drahos suggested that the inclusion of anti-avoidance
provisions in the Act could be a suitable remedy to the problem of creative
legal drafting. In simple terms, anti-avoidance tax provisions operate to
ensure that artificial or blatant schemes cannot be used to avoid paying tax,
even where such a scheme might be otherwise in conformity with the legal
requirements of the tax legislation. Professor Drahos explained:
[Tax acts]...contain provisions that encourage courts to look
at the substance of the particular tax scheme. Is it really a tax minimisation scheme
or is it an anti-avoidance scheme? So what we need in our [patent] statute is
language that encourages courts to look beyond the claiming format, because
what we have to remember is that patent offices accept particular claiming
formats...What they are worried about is the form of the words. They do not worry
about effects.[126]
5.131
Dr Moir also supported this approach:
...the patent system has been heavily under-mined by those
using it. It is rife with legal pretence: that software is not software; that
methods of medical treatment are patentable despite longstanding traditions
that they are not; and that minimal difference equates with inventiveness even
if that difference is in the words not the substance. Without a parallel to the
anti-avoidance principles now used in the tax acts, legal drafters will simply
work round this and any other amendments the Committee proposes.[127]
Inclusion of objects in Patents Act 1990
5.132
Some submitters and witnesses commented on the fact that the Act does
not set out specific objects, as is common in much legislation. Dr Moir
suggested that the inclusion of objects may be desirable to provide guidance to
courts in interpreting the Act:
It might also be useful to write an objective into the Patent
Act, because there is no objective at present. I understand that lawyers are
very much divided as to whether or not they think it is useful to write
objectives into a statute. But it is not surprising that when there is not a stated
objective the courts can misinterpret the parliamentary intent.[128]
5.133
The ACIP options paper on patentable subject matter also notes briefly
that it 'may be desirable for an express statement of objectives to be included
in the legislation'.[129]
5.134
The government of South Australia supported this approach to provide a
guide to patent examiners.[130]
'PBS' style approach
5.135
With respect to the potential for gene patents to restrict the
availability and affordability of healthcare, such as gene-dependent diagnostic
tests or gene therapies, a number of submitters and witnesses suggested that
such impacts could be effectively managed through regulatory measures. A common
example was the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), through which the
Government subsidises the cost of medicines that would otherwise be
unaffordable for many people. IP Australia submitted:
The Committee may also wish to take advantage of non-patent
policy levers. For example, healthcare and ethical issues respectively have
been managed via the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme to ensure affordable access
to cost-effective drugs, while stem cell research is currently regulated to
uphold ethical and community standards in that area.[131]
5.136
Professor Christie noted that, in respect of the concerns raised about
the BRCA patents' actual or potential impacts on the provision of healthcare, a
pricing mechanism akin to the PBS or Medicare would be an effective and
appropriate measure:
The Australian government is rightly concerned to ensure that
medical treatment is available to each individual who requires it, irrespective
of the individual’s financial means. This is the motivation behind the
government’s subsidisation of the cost of medical treatment, through the
Medicare system. It is also the motivation behind the government’s
subsidisation of the cost of pharmaceuticals, through the Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme (PBS). It is noteworthy that most of the top-selling pharmaceuticals
subsidised by the PBS are pharmaceuticals in respect of which patents exists.
Thus, the government has found a mechanism by which it can facilitate wide
access to pharmaceuticals, while leaving in place the availability of patent
protection for those pharmaceuticals.
In the event that it is found that patents on genetic inventions
are unduly restricting patient access to diagnostic tests or other medical
treatment, the Australian experience with pharmaceuticals suggests that the
remedy to the access problem lies with a pricing mechanism, not with removing
patent protection for these inventions.[132]
5.137
Mrs Jennifer West, Secretary, Australian Marfan Foundation, was
supportive of establishing a PBS-style arrangement for genetic testing, noting
that availability of testing for a syndrome such as Marfan was essentially
dictated by availability of funding, which was inconsistent:
I would gladly welcome a system where people with Marfan
syndrome, suspected Marfan syndrome or a known history of Marfan syndrome had
access to that genetic screening like they do for other genetic abnormalities at
the moment.[133]
5.138
Dr Suthers, however, cautioned that any such approach would likely need
to be more responsive than the current PBS in order to adequately account for
the development and management of gene patents:
My big concern is that the PBAC [Pharmaceutical Benefits
Advisory Committee, which assesses applications for listing of medicines on the
PBS] has been a superb and innovative mechanism for Australian health, but it
is slow. When we look at the rapidity with which gene tests are added,
modified, improved, changed, et cetera, in Australia at the moment we find that
no vehicle of that ilk would be able to respond quickly enough. When we did
this national survey looking at genetic testing across Australia in 2006 with
projections into 2007 we found that the diversity of genetic testing increased
by seven per cent just in that period. This is a very rapidly moving field, and
we would need to have a very responsive mechanism if that were to be successful.[134]
5.139
Professor Bowtell noted that public funding through PBS-style
arrangements could see an increasing burden being placed on the taxpayer, given
the level of public funding going to health and medical research.[135]
External accountability/patent quality mechanisms
5.140
A number of submitters and witnesses expressed the view that the IP
system operates too far in favour of commercial interests, and that this is
reflected in the low thresholds for patentability that have allowed human genes
and genetic materials to be patented with relative ease in Australia. Dr
Suthers commented:
What is one-sided about [the IP system]...is that the framework
has been set up principally as a commercial IP issue where the principal
players involved in running those processes are members of the IP industry
rather than professional service providers, such as ourselves, patient groups,
ethicists, health economists and so on.[136]
5.141
The submission of Professor Peter Drahos also pointed to the dominance
of commercial interests and patent industry 'insiders' in the patent system:
Patent systems in their present form represent deep
concentrations of power and dominance in which networks of big business, patent
attorneys and patent offices co-operate to produce an insider governance of the
system.[137]
5.142
Professor Drahos concluded that patent offices had 'abdicated their
responsibilities to their respective publics under their respective national
patent social contracts';[138]
and that the 'densely technocratic' nature of the patent system was acting as a
barrier to reform of the patent system to promote a proper balance between the
economic and social interests which underpin the patent social contract:
The patent system is so densely technocratic that politicians
do not take the lead on patent policy unless an industry lobby dictates a clear
direction...The real accountability of patent offices lies with the private
governance network of the large businesses that dominate patent applications.[139]
5.143
In light of these issues, Professor Drahos called for the development of
external accountability mechanisms to operate as a counterweight to the
established interests in the patent system.[140]
The rationale underlying the development of such bodies was that:
General accountability mechanisms such as ministerial
responsibility cannot provide the kind of close oversight that is needed of
patent office decision-making. Instead, there has to be a long term strategy
based on building a counter network to the private governance network that has
absorbed patent offices. This counter network should be guided by the
separation of powers principle...The basic idea is to contest the power of the
private network at every point where key decisions are made and where possible
to create veto rights or checks over patent office decisions.[141]
5.144
Professor Ian Olver, Chief Executive Officer, Cancer Council Australia,
also called for a greater involvement of broader interests in the operation of
the patent system:
...one of the things that we would be encouraging in this whole
debate is that, if there is going to be reform, the people who should be
involved should be more than patent lawyers. We should look at the scientists,
the clinicians and the consumers—the patients—who have a stake in that.[142]
5.145
Dr Palombi called for an extensive system of external oversight of IP
Australia and the patent profession:
Third, that there be the Office of the Regulator of
Intellectual Property established to monitor, audit and ensure that IP
Australia and patent attorneys and lawyers act lawfully.[143]
External patent audit committee
5.146
In specific terms, Professor Drahos proposed the establishment of an
external patent audit committee. Such a body could act as a counterweight to
commercial dominance of the patent system by providing to government an
independent source of credible advice and information in relation to patents
and the patent system:
Legislators and ministers in many countries generally do not
understand the extent of the regulatory capture of patent offices and tend to
be excessively reliant on them for advice, advice that tends to be of a
predictable kind. External audit mechanisms for patent offices would catalyse
different information flows about patents to legislators, something needed in
many, if not most, countries.[144]
5.147
Professor Drahos offered the following description of how such a body
might be comprised, and the scope of its interests and activities:
I hasten to add this committee would not have formal powers,
it would not be a formal regulator; rather, it would be an information
gathering body. It would be staffed by scientists of considerable stature, of
independence, of integrity, who were concerned about the public interest
dimensions of patents in particular areas. They would, on perhaps a yearly or biannual
basis, with the assistance of members of the profession perhaps or legal
expertise at any rate, conduct an independent audit of a selection of patents. ...They
would essentially conduct an independent audit of the quality of patents that
were being granted in [a chosen area]...and then...report to whatever body was thought
suitable. That would be one way in which we would have independent information
about what was going on in patent offices.[145]
Advisory panel to Commissioner of
Patents
5.148
The Committee notes that ACIP, as part of its current review of
patentable subject matter, was considering recommending the establishment of an
advisory panel to assist the Commissioner of Patents and patent examiners to
decide on matters of social policy.[146]
The ACIP paper notes that such a panel 'may be particularly valuable if a
general social exclusion was introduced [to the Act]'.[147]
5.149
However, the ACIP paper also acknowledges potential problems with such
an approach:
Arguments advanced against having such a panel relate to
difficulties of implementation and the potential for additional costs and
delays to the processing of patent applications. There are also concerns about
the composition of a panel and the possibility that inconsistent positions may
be taken by differently constituted panels.[148]
5.150
The government of South Australia supported the use of expert advisory
panels to assist with the assessment of gene patent applications.[149]
Patent pools
5.151
IP Australia identified the development of patent pools as a possible
strategy to overcome problems arising from fragmented patent ownership. In
relation to gene patents in particular it was suggested that the number of
separately owned patents relating to human genes and genetic materials could
act as a disincentive to research due to increased transaction costs and
uncertainty (see Chapter 3). IP Australia advised:
Patent pools can be defined as an agreement between two or
more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another
and/or third parties. The key benefit of patent pools is in reducing
transaction costs for users having to identify relevant patents and then seek
cross licensing arrangements with multiple individual patent holders. Patent
pools are particularly beneficial in cases where the relevant technology is
subject to fragmented patent ownership.[150]
5.152
Dr Trevor Davies, Councillor, Institute of Patent and Trade Mark
Attorneys of Australia (IPTMAA) also suggested that patent pools could overcome
some of the difficulties around patents relating to human genes and genetic
material:
In areas where there have been a large number of patent
applications filed or patents granted, one way of moving forward is...patent
pools...I would not be surprised going forward in the area of biotechnology that there
will be more examples of patent pools in which technology is cross-licensed so
that ultimately it will made available to the public.[151]
5.153
IP Australia noted that, while the establishment of patent pools tended
to be 'driven by industry on a voluntary basis', government could 'play an
important role in incentivising the creation of patent pools', particularly
through providing an 'appropriate institutional framework'. However, given the
lack of government experience in this area, IP Australia suggested any action
on this front 'should be contingent on further analysis'.[152]
CONCLUSION
5.154
The inquiry received a range of evidence going to term of reference (b),
which asked the Committee to identify measures that would ameliorate any
adverse impacts arising from the granting of patents over human genes and
genetic materials. However, given the predominant focus of the inquiry on the
question of whether gene patents should be expressly prohibited, and the
relatively narrow focus of the inquiry on the impacts of gene patents on
healthcare, medical research and the health and wellbeing of Australians, the
Committee notes that it did not conduct an exhaustive consideration of potential
reforms to the patent system. In relation to the measures discussed above, the
Committee has focussed on those suggestions that appeared to have particular
relevance to the issues of concern to the inquiry, that have been prominent in
the reviews conducted in the past and currently, or which highlight areas of
potential reform that in the Committee's view appeared to merit further
consideration.
5.155
While there was in some cases a clear and broad consensus about the
benefits of instituting a specific reform, such as in the case of the
'usefulness' requirement for patentability, in many cases there were differing
views on the specific form, scope and effectiveness of a suggested reform. In
yet other cases, the evidence presented concerning the specific form, scope and
effectiveness of a suggested measure was limited, in that it was relatively
brief or was not commented on by a range of stakeholders.
Ensuring that the Government responds
to past and current inquiries
5.156
The Committee notes also that much of the evidence it received in
relation to term of reference (b) referenced the work of past and current
inquiries into the patent system and gene patents. In particular, many of the
recommendations from the ALRC's 2004 review of gene patents, and of reviews of
elements of the patent system conducted by ACIP, were identified as being
capable, if implemented, of addressing specific concerns with the impacts of
gene patents on the specific areas of healthcare and medical research.
5.157
Further, the work of current reviews being conducted by ACIP, into
patentable subject matter, and IP Australia, into the patent system more
generally, was also identified as relevant to the concerns underpinning the
inquiry's terms of reference. In both cases, these bodies have put forward
proposals for reform of the patent system that it is claimed will improve the
quality of patents and the operation of the patent system, and therefore
address many of the specific concerns about the impacts of gene patents on
healthcare and medical research. The Committee understands that the ACIP and IP
Australia processes should be completed by the end of 2010.
5.158
The Committee notes in particular that the 2004 ALRC report on gene
patents had not received any formal response from Government at the time of
preparing this report. Given the importance of the issues addressed in that
report, and the continuing relevance of much of its analysis and
recommendations, the Committee considers the lack of a Government response to
be a serious failure that must be addressed with particular urgency.
5.159
However, given the current reviews being conducted by ACIP and IP
Australia, the Committee agreed that it would make sense for the Government to commit
to a consolidated response addressing the three reports as well as the
Committee's report, following the completion of the ACIP and IP Australia
reviews. The fact that there is likely to be a high degree of overlap across
the issues raised in these four inquiries and reviews will allow the Government
to provide a single response addressing the multiple inquiries.
5.160
The Committee agreed that it will maintain a watching brief over the
area of gene patents, particularly in light of its recommendations for improved
systems of data collection and transparency, and national and international
legal developments relating to the patentability of isolated genetic materials.
The Committee intends that, by ensuring a comprehensive Government response to
the reviews conducted in relation to gene patents and the patent system more
generally, any future inquiry by the Committee will be informed by that
response. Accordingly, the Committee agreed that, at an appropriate time
following the publication of the review of ACIP and IP Australia, the Senate
should require the Committee to inquire into the Government's response to and
implementation of the recommendations arising from both those reviews and this
report.
Recommendation 4
5.161
The Committee recommends that the Government provide a combined response
addressing the Committee's inquiry into gene patents; the 2004 report on gene
patents by the Australian Law Reform Commission; the review of patentable
subject matter by the Australian Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP); and
the review of Australia's patent system by IP Australia. The Committee recommends
that the response be provided not later than mid-2011 or three months after the
release of the findings of all reviews.
Recommendation 5
5.162
The Committee recommends that, at an appropriate time following the
release of the ACIP review of patentable subject matter and the IP Australia
review of the patent system, the Community Affairs References Committee be tasked
with inquiring into the Government's response to, and implementation of, the
recommendations of those reviews, as well as the recommendations of the
Committee's report on gene patents.
Amendments relating to 'inventive
step', 'full description' and 'fair basis'
5.163
In relation to measures going to the raising of the thresholds of
patentability, the Committee considers that a comprehensive set of reforms to
the patent system in this area could substantially address many of the concerns
raised about the impacts of gene patents on healthcare and medical research,
particularly in relation to inappropriate grants of patents over human genes
and genetic material and the granting of overly broad patents in relation to
such subject matter.
5.164
The Committee heard that social—that is, moral and ethical—concerns
about the granting of gene patents could be addressed through reform of the
'manner of manufacture' test, which governs the scope of patentability; and reform
of the specific exceptions contained in the Act, which may be used to 'filter
out' certain subject matter on the basis of social objections. The Committee
notes that the current test is regarded by some as 'ambiguous and obscure', and
it was the view of some submitters and witnesses that the Act was not operating
to exclude subject matter that should not be patentable, such as gene patents.
5.165
The Committee heard that these issues are currently under consideration
as part of the ACIP review of patentable subject matter, which has proposed a
number of different options for reform of the manner of manufacture test. Of
the four options put forward (one of which is to retain the existing approach),
the Committee considers that only the proposal to clarify the definition of
'invention' could act to prevent the patenting of human genes and genetic
materials. However, this would require a definition that offered some guidance
on the invention/discovery distinction in relation to materials isolated from
nature. While such an approach is not apparently precluded by ACIP's proposal,
it may also recommend just that 'invention' be defined to reflect the current requirements
that an invention must be an artificially created state of affairs in a field
of economic endeavour, which have not operated thus far to preclude the patenting
of human genes and genetic materials in an isolated or purified form.
5.166
Of the three options put forward by ACIP in relation to reform of the
express exceptions contained in the Act (one of which is to retain the existing
approach), the Committee notes that one of these is to include specific
exclusions to patentable subject matter in the Act. If this option were
pursued, governments could in future consider an express exclusion relating to
gene patents, provided that any such exclusion could be sufficiently well
crafted to avoid any adverse impacts on innovation in healthcare and research,
as well as other fields of technology.
5.167
While the Committee acknowledges that some of ACIP's reform proposals could
potentially exclude gene patents, and thus in theory ameliorate any actual or
potential impacts of gene patents on healthcare and medical research, there was
no indication given to the Committee as to which of these proposals ACIP is
likely to endorse in its final report. Given the closeness of the issues under
review to the question of whether the Act should expressly exclude gene
patents, and the Committee's concerns about this approach as outlined in
Chapter 4, the Committee considered that it would be prudent to make no
recommendation in relation to reform of the manner of manufacture test and
specific exceptions contained in the Act. However, given the longstanding
nature of concerns about the operation of Act in relation to patentable subject
matter, the Committee urges the Government to promptly consider and respond to
the ACIP review, once the review has reported its findings.
5.168
In relation to the inventive step threshold, the Committee acknowledges
that care must be taken not to apply current standards of knowledge and
technology to assessing the objective inventiveness of a patent, as the
inventive step requirement must be assessed as at the time of the patent
application. Despite this, it is also clear that the inventive step threshold
in Australia is lower than in comparable jurisdictions, which is in part due to
the definitions of 'common general knowledge' and 'prior art base', and the lower
threshold test for inventive step relating to the 'obviousness' of a claimed
invention.
5.169
The Committee outlined above a number of reforms proposed by IP Australia
intended to bring the elements of Australia's inventive step requirements into
line with international settings, and in so doing increase the inventive step
threshold. The proposed change to the test for inventive step in particular was
identified as potentially making it harder to claim patents over gene sequences,
given the current state of knowledge and technology in relation to the
isolation of human genes and genetic materials. Reforms to the tests or
standards associated with the assessment of inventive step were also suggested
to ensure that patents are only granted where there is sufficient
inventiveness, as judged by reasonable standards of 'common general knowledge'
and 'prior art information'.
5.170
IP Australia's proposed reforms also include changes to the 'full
description' and 'fair basis' requirements of the Act, which may address
concerns about overly broad patents.
5.171
The Committee regards the reforms suggested by IP Australia as having
the potential to improve the operation of the patent system in relation to the
grant of patents for inventions that are not sufficiently inventive or contain
overly broad claims, and notes that the proposed reforms will also serve to
bring Australia's requirements for patentability into conformity with other
patent jurisdictions. Given this, the Committee regarded the proposed reforms
as uncontroversial and relatively straightforward in terms of their intended
and expected impact on the operation of Australia's patent system, and endorses
their implementation.
Recommendation 6
5.172
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended so
that the test for obviousness in determining inventive step is that a claimed
invention is obvious if it was 'obvious for the skilled person to try a
suggested approach, alternative or method with a reasonable expectation of
success'.
Recommendation 7
5.173
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended to
remove the limitation that 'common general knowledge' be confined to that
existing in Australia at the time a patent application is lodged (that is, that
'common general knowledge' anywhere in the world be considered).
Recommendation 8
5.174
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended to
remove the requirement that 'prior art information' for the purposes of
determining inventive step must be that which could reasonably have been
expected to be 'ascertained' (that is, that the 'prior art base' against which
inventive step is assessed not be restricted to information that a skilled
person in the relevant field would have actually looked for and found
(ascertained)).
Recommendation 9
5.175
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended to
introduce descriptive support requirements, including that the whole scope of
the claimed invention be enabled and that the description provide sufficient
information to allow the skilled addressee to perform the invention without
undue experimentation.
Raising the thresholds of
patentability: 'usefulness'
5.176
In relation to the evidence received concerning the requirement of 'usefulness'
under the Act, the Committee notes that there was widespread and consistent
support for an amendment to the Act to introduce the concept of 'usefulness' as
an express ground for consideration in patent examination; and that this
require a claimed invention to demonstrate a 'specific, substantial and
credible utility'.
5.177
The Committee notes that the suggested amendment could address concerns
going to the granting of overly broad patent claims; and could be of greater
importance in relation to gene patents or other technologies where the
distinction between mere discovery and invention is less clear.
5.178
Given the broad support for the proposals going to 'usefulness' and
their apparent effectiveness in other jurisdictions, the Committee supports the
introduction of 'usefulness' as a requirement in the examination of a patent;
and for this requirement to be satisfied where an application discloses a 'specific,
substantial and credible use'. The Committee notes and endorses the ALRC's
comprehensive recommendations on this issue in its 2004 report, which also
covered inclusion of 'usefulness' as a ground for examination of an innovation
patent; inclusion of 'lack of usefulness' as a basis for opposing patents; defining
the relevant standard of proof for establishing 'usefulness'; and the
development of guidelines by IP Australia to assist patent examiners in
applying the 'usefulness' requirement. Specifically, the Committee endorses
Recommendations 6-3 and 6-4 of the ALRC report as follows:
Recommendation 6–3
The Commonwealth should amend the Patents Act 1990 (Cth)
(Patents Act) to:
(a) include 'usefulness' as a requirement in the
examination of an application for a standard patent and in the certification of
an innovation patent;
(b) provide that an invention will satisfy the requirement of
'usefulness' only if the patent application discloses a specific, substantial
and credible use;
(c) require the Commissioner of Patents to be satisfied on
the balance of probabilities that the requirement of 'usefulness' is made out
in order to accept an application for a standard patent or to certify an
innovation patent; and
(d) include 'lack of usefulness' as a basis upon which an
accepted application for a standard patent may be opposed, in addition to its
current role as a ground for revocation...
Recommendation 6–4
IP Australia should develop guidelines, consistent with the
Patents Act, the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) and existing case law, to
assist patent examiners in applying the 'usefulness' requirement. The
guidelines should outline factors relevant to determining whether a use
disclosed in a patent application is specific, substantial and credible to a
person skilled in the relevant art...[153]
Recommendation 10
5.179
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended to
provide that an invention will satisfy the requirement of 'usefulness' in
section 18(1) only in such cases as a patent application discloses a 'specific,
substantial and credible' use; the Committee recommends that such amendments
incorporate the full set of recommendations on this issue from the Australian
Law Reform Commission's 2004 report, Genes and ingenuity
(Recommendations 6-3 to 6-4).
Strengthening Crown use provisions
and government policy
5.180
In relation to the issue of Crown use provisions, a number of submitters
and witnesses noted that the current provisions in the Act provide a means for
governments to use, and to authorise others to use, patented inventions in
certain circumstances—that is, governments may compulsorily acquire a right of
access to an invention where such use is 'necessary for the proper provision of
government services within Australia'.
5.181
However, the Committee heard that there were few if any cases of the
Crown use provisions being exercised in relation to gene patents. Further, the
provisions had been rarely litigated and interpreted by the courts, suggesting
there may be some uncertainty about their scope and effectiveness.
5.182
The Committee notes that governments need access to a range of options
to address potential impacts of not only gene patents but also patents more
generally, particularly where patents impact on areas of critical importance to
social and human welfare, such as healthcare. While the apparent under-use of
the Crown use provisions, at least in relation to the areas of healthcare and
medical research, may reflect a lack of suitable occasion for their use, the
Committee notes that it may also be due to potential uncertainty around their
application.
5.183
The Committee notes that in its 2004 report the ALRC produced a broad
set of recommendations going to clarifying the application of the Crown use
provisions in circumstances involving the provision of healthcare service or
products to the public; establishing clear government policies regarding the
circumstances in which it may be appropriate for governments to acquire a
patent under the Crown use provisions for the purposes of promoting human
health; and ensuring that just and reasonable remuneration is paid promptly
where a patent is acquired under the Crown use provisions. The Committee
endorses the ALRC's recommendations on clarifying the application and use of
the Crown use provisions in relation to healthcare delivery, specifically
Recommendations 26-1 to 26-3 as follows:
Recommendation 26–1
The Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council should
develop a policy regarding the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for
the Commonwealth or a State to exploit a patented invention under the Crown use
provisions of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (Patents Act) for the purposes of
promoting human health. Similarly, the Department of Health and Ageing should
develop a policy regarding the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for
the Commonwealth to acquire a patent for the purposes of promoting human
health. Decisions about Crown use in specific cases must be made on their individual
merits.
Recommendation 26–2
The Commonwealth should amend the Patents Act to clarify
that, for the purposes of the Crown use provisions, an invention is exploited
‘for the services of the Commonwealth or of a State’ if the exploitation of the
invention by a Commonwealth or State authority (or by an authorised person) is
for the provision of healthcare services or products to members of the public.
Recommendation 26–3
The Commonwealth should amend the Patents Act to provide
that, when a patent is exploited under the Crown use provisions, the
remuneration that is to be paid by the relevant authority must be paid promptly
and must be just and reasonable having regard to the economic value of the use.
Similarly, the Act should be amended to provide that, when a patent is acquired
under the Crown acquisition provisions, compensation must be paid promptly and
must be just and reasonable having regard to the economic value of the patent.[154]
5.184
The Committee agrees that any guidelines or amendments to the Act in relation
to the exercise of Crown use provisions should require the Government to
consider, as a relevant factor, the extent to which public funding contributed
to the invention that is the subject of the patent for which it is contemplated
that the Crown use provisions will be exercised.
Recommendation 11
5.185
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended toclarify the circumstances in which the Crown use provisions may be
employed; and that the Government develop clear policies for the use of the
Crown use provisions. The Committee recommends that the Government adopt the
Australian Law Reform Commission's recommendations on this issue from its 2004
report, Genes and ingenuity (Recommendations 26-1 to 26-3).
Clarifying the operation of
compulsory licence provisions
5.186
In relation to compulsory licensing, there was significant support among
submitters and witnesses for the use of compulsory licences to ameliorate
potentially adverse impacts arising from certain patents.
5.187
The Committee heard that there have been few if any grants of compulsory
licenses in Australia, which may suggest that the provisions are not operating
effectively. In contrast, it was argued by some parties that this may be an
indication of the effectiveness of the provisions as an incentive for parties
to successfully negotiate license arrangements.
5.188
The Committee notes that the 2004 report of the ALRC into gene patents
called for the Act to be amended to clarify the scope of the 'reasonable
requirements of the public test' on which the grant of a compulsory licence may
be based; and the introduction of a competition based test to make a compulsory
licence also available where a patentee has engaged in anti-competitive conduct
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). Specifically, recommendation
27-1 stated:
Recommendation 27–1
The Commonwealth should amend the provisions of the Patents
Act 1990 (Cth) relating to compulsory licences by:
(a) inserting the competition-based test recommended by the
Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee as an additional ground
for the grant of a compulsory licence; and
(b) clarifying the scope of the 'reasonable requirements of
the public' test.[155]
5.189
The Committee found that there remains considerable doubt as to the
operation of the compulsory licence provisions. In particular, the threshold
criteria for the grant of a compulsory licence relating to, inter alia, the 'reasonable
requirements of the public' are uncertain and possibly limited in effect, and
may in fact be operating as a barrier to applications under these provisions.
Further, the Committee notes that the recently introduced competition based
test requires review by the Government to ensure that it is working effectively,
particularly in relation to its interaction with the TPA.
Recommendation 12
5.190
The Committee recommends that the Government amend the Patents Act
1990 to clarify the scope of the 'reasonable requirements of the public'
test, taking into account the recommendation of the Australian Law Reform
Commission on this issue in its 2004 report, Genes and ingenuity
(Recommendation 27-1); the Committee recommends that the Government review the
operation of the competition based test for the grant of a compulsory licence,
with particular reference to its interaction with the Trade Practices Act
1974.
Including a broad research
exemption in the Act
5.191
In relation to a research exemption, the Committee heard that it is
unclear whether there is any such common law exemption under Australian patent
law; and there is no such exemption expressly provided for in the Act. Despite
the apparent widespread reliance by Australian researchers on a research
exemption, the Committee found that the existence and, if it does exist, scope
of any such exemption is very uncertain; and that this uncertainty could be
acting to hinder innovation and investment in research.
5.192
The Committee notes there was widespread support for the inclusion of an
express research exemption in the Act; and that various bodies such as the
ALRC, ACIP and IP Australia have previously examined, or are currently
examining, this issue and have proposed particular approaches to formulating a
research exemption. Concerning these suggested approaches, some submitters and
witnesses objected strongly to formulations of a research exemption in which
the exemption will apply only where the otherwise infringing act is for the sole
purpose of research or experimentation. It was argued that the sole purpose
test is overly restrictive, particularly in the modern environment where
research is increasingly undertaken with commercial motives.
5.193
The Committee supported calls for the inclusion of an express research
exemption in the Act. However, the Committee believes that any such exemption
must be carefully designed to ensure that it is not overly restrictive. The
Committee notes the terms of the exemption proposed by IP Australia in its March
2009 paper, 'Exemptions to patent infringement':
A person may, without infringing a patent, do any act on a
patented invention which is solely for the purpose of:
- determining how the invention works;
- seeking an improvement to the invention;
- testing the validity of a patent;
- determining the scope of the patent claims;
- determining whether an act or product infringes a patent or
- obtaining the information required for regulatory approval under
Australian law or the law of any other country that regulates the manufacture,
construction, use or sale of the patented invention.
The statutory exemption will not apply where the invention is
used in, but is not the subject of, an experiment.[156]
5.194
The Committee agreed that an appropriately generous and broad research exemption
could be modelled on the words proposed by IP Australia, with the removal of
the word 'solely' and, possibly, with the removal of the final paragraph.
Recommendation 13
5.195
The Committee recommends that the Patents Act 1990 be amended toinclude a broad research exemption.
Inclusion of anti-avoidance and
objects provisions in the Act
5.196
In relation to other potential amendments to the Act to ameliorate any
actual or potential impacts of gene patents, the Committee was asked to consider
the introduction of anti-avoidance provisions into the Act; and for the
inclusion of specific objects. It was argued that both of these approaches
would assist the courts and patent examiners in interpreting and applying the
Act, and ensuring that the patent system achieves a proper balance between its
economic and social objectives. The Committee believes that such approaches
merit consideration by Government, as part of developing a suite of strategies
to promote the effective operation of the patent system.
Recommendation 14
5.197
The Committee recommends that, to assist courts and patent examiners
with the interpretation and application of the Patents Act 1990, the
Government consider amending the Act to include anti-avoidance provisions.
Recommendation 15
5.198
The Committee recommends that, to assist courts and patent examiners
with the interpretation and application of the Patents Act 1990, the
Government consider amending the Act to include objects provisions.
Developing external
accountability/patent quality mechanism
5.199
In relation to external measures to improve the operation of the patents
system, the Committee received a number of notable suggestions which clearly would
have potential to ameliorate any actual or potential impacts of gene patents. A
number of submitters and witnesses endorsed consideration of a PBS or Medicare
style approach to the funding of medicines, therapies or techniques that may
rely on genetic inventions. The Committee notes that the ALRC considered these
issues in some detail in its 2004 report on gene patents, and made a
recommendation that the Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council (AHMAC)
conduct a broad examination of 'options for using government funding and
purchasing power to control the cost of goods and services that are subject to
gene patents and used in the provision of healthcare'.[157]
Specifically, recommendation 19-2 stated:
Recommendation 19–2
AHMAC should examine options for using government funding and
purchasing power to control the cost of goods and services that are subject to
gene patents and used in the provision of healthcare.[158]
5.200
The Committee offers in-principle support for a broad-ranging inquiry on
such terms, and expects that the long-awaited Government response to the ALRC's
recommendations will offer a considered response to this recommendation.
5.201
In relation to calls for the establishment of some form of external
mechanism to provide oversight of the patent system, the Committee heard a
variety of suggestions, ranging from an apparently comprehensive patent system
regulator, in the form of an Office of the Patent Regulator, to a more limited patent
audit committee with specific expertise and interests in issues of patent
quality in emerging and challenging fields of technology. The Committee
believes that the establishment of such a body would be an important step to
address many of the concerns relating to gene patents and, indeed, the patent
system more broadly, and to establish an objective source of advice and guidance
for governments in relation to, for example, the impact of patents in emerging
or complex fields of technology, patent quality and the exercise of Crown use
and compulsory licence provisions. The Committee therefore agreed that the
Government should establish a patent audit committee as described by Professor
Drahos. Whether there is a need for a more comprehensive Office of the Patent
Regulator is a question that could be re-examined at an appropriate time in the
future, and the Committee acknowledges that such an approach would need to be
fully examined in terms of its regulatory impacts.
Recommendation 16
5.202
The Committee recommends that the Government establish a patent audit
committee.
Senator
Rachel Siewert
Chair
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