CHAPTER 2
THE COMMONWEALTH GRANTS COMMISSION
2.1
The committee’s second term of reference requires it to examine '...whether
the Northern Territory Government’s expenditure of goods and service tax
receipts accurately reflects the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s (CGC)
funding formula for the expenditure of such receipts by program ...'. This chapter
will consider the functions of the CGC and the basis upon which Goods and Services
Tax (GST) revenues[1]
are distributed to the States and Territories, the CGC’s responsibilities and
its methodologies in assessing the States and Territories shares of GST
revenue.
2.2
The Constitution limits the States' and Territories' taxing
options; they cannot levy excises or customs duties and cannot tax Commonwealth
property. The right to raise income taxes was surrendered to the Commonwealth
in 1942, a temporary wartime expedient which became permanent, and a number of
High Court decisions have further limited their powers. Within these
limitations the States had adopted a range of taxes and charges many of which
were complex and economically inefficient. [2]
2.3
The current Commonwealth/State fiscal system is a product of the
tax reforms that saw the introduction of a goods and services tax collected by
the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth and the States and Territories agreed to a
process whereby a range of state taxes and charges would be removed
progressively in exchange for a guaranteed flow of revenue from the GST.
2. The objectives of the reforms set down in
this agreement include:
(i) the
achievement of a new national tax system, including the elimination of a number
of existing inefficient taxes which are impeding economic activity;
(ii) the
provision to State and Territory Governments of revenue from a more robust tax
base that can be expected to grow over time;...[3]
Thus the GST revenue was to a large extent replacing state
revenue sources over which the States and Territories had had absolute
discretion as to expenditure.
2.4
The distribution of the GST pool is governed by the terms of the Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations 1999 (IGA)
which set out the principles which govern that distribution:
Distribution of GST Revenue:
7. The
Commonwealth will make GST revenue grants to the States and Territories
equivalent to the revenue from the GST subject to the arrangements in this
Agreement. GST revenue grants will be freely available for use by the States and
Territories for any purpose.
8. The
Commonwealth will distribute GST revenue grants among the States and
Territories in accordance with horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE) principles
subject to the transitional arrangements set out below and other relevant
provisions of this Agreement.[4]
The Responsibilities of the Grants Commission
2.5
The role of the Grants Commission is to advise the Commonwealth
Government on the distribution of GST revenue and health care grants. The sole
outcome of the CGC referred to in its Annual Report is the provision of advice
on fiscal equalisation.[5]
The Grants Commission operates under terms of reference given by the
Commonwealth Treasurer, which do not vary significantly from year to year.[6]
2.6
The Commission summarised the 'three pillars of equalisation' as:
(i) The
financial capacities of States, not their performance or outcomes, are
equalised.
(ii) States
are equalised to standards that reflect what they all do on average.
(iii) A
State's own policies or choices should not directly influence its grant.[7]
2.7
In its submission to this committee the Grants Commission Secretariat
stated that its starting point is to assume,
...that to deliver a comparable service a State should spend the
observed average State spending. It would deviate from that average if it faced
inherent State circumstances which would lower or increase its expenditure. For
example, with a younger population it could be expected to spend more per
capita on primary education.[8]
2.8
In view of the wording of the committee’s reference it is
important to clarify the purpose of horizontal fiscal equalisation and the
objectives of the distribution of funds. Horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE)
seeks to equalise the fiscal capacity of State and Territory governments and reflects
the view that:
State governments should receive funding from the Commonwealth
such that, if each made the same effort to raise revenue from its own sources
and operated at the same level of efficiency, each would have the capacity to
provide services at the same standard.[9]
2.9
The second important feature of the distribution of GST revenue
is that it is provided to the States and Territories as untied funding. Thus,
while factors such as the size of a jurisdiction's indigenous population or the
additional costs of providing services to remote communities (or high wages and
salaries and other cost of living factors in major capital cities, for example)
are taken into account by the CGC in assessing each State's expenses, there is
no requirement that the expenditure of the State's share of the GST pool is
specifically targeted to addressing those issues.
Since the funds subject to distribution are untied funds, which
the States can spend as they decide, the basis of distribution can not contain
any implication that the States are required to spend them in a particular way.
The commission has accordingly taken the view that the application of the HFE
principle can not contain any expectation of performance or outcome
equalisation – to do so would constrain the sovereignty of State governments.[10]
2.10
The combination of providing an equalised fiscal capacity and
untied funding can give rise to confusion. The process might best be seen as
trying to balance two objectives through fiscal equalisation. The first is,
...reflecting an entitlement of people, based on their shared
national citizenship, that their State governments should be able to provide
them with similar levels of State services without imposing on them different
levels of State taxes...[11]
2.11
The second principle that the Grants Commission process seeks to
accommodate is that of the sovereignty of the States within a federal system.
The intention is, that if there are differences in service
levels in different States, they should be because of outcomes of democratic
processes, not differences in the ability of States to afford to provide
services...[12]
2.12
Thus the wording of the committee's terms of reference does not
reflect the actual basis on which the CGC distributes revenue to the states.
There is no 'funding formula for the expenditure of receipts by program, by
location, and by intended service recipient'.
The Commission's "funding formula" does not contain
any expected, or target, or ideal level of expenditure by State, program,
location or intended service recipient...[13]
2.13
In evidence to the committee the Secretary of the Grants
Commission emphasised that point:
...there is no funding formula used by the Commonwealth Grants
Commission which talks about the level of expenditure of receipts by program,
by location and by intended service recipient for meeting disadvantage or
regional need in relation to the distribution of the pool in the year in which
the states actually get that money.[14]
2.14 The principle that
funding is untied and that expenditure decisions are a matter solely for the
recipient States and Territories has not gone unchallenged. In the Report on
State Revenue Sharing Relativities: 2004 Review the CGC noted that Victoria
had argued that, '...those States that receive above average per capita grants
should be accountable to the broader Australian community for the use of the
funds' and that, '...there should be evidence of disabilities reducing over time
as recipient States apply their larger per capita grant shares to overcoming
the disabilities they face'.[15]
2.15
Thus it has been argued that where a State or Territory received
an increase in its share of the GST pool in recognition of a specific
'disability'[16]
there is an acknowledgement that that jurisdiction requires increased revenue
to address the consequences of that disability, and that it should apply the
revenue accordingly.
2.16
New South Wales and Victoria, while expressing support for the
principle of HFE, believed that its interpretation and application was open to
review. However this position was 'strongly contested by other States and
Territories. The CGC concluded that its approach should be based on the
equalisation principle in place at the time the IGA came into effect - that is,
the 1999 Review principle' and that it had '...indicated to the States that if
governments wished us to undertake a wider review, we would need further terms
of reference that made this clear.'[17]
2.17
The CGC acknowledged that alternative views of what
'equalisation' should mean had been canvassed but did not accept that the
alternative of equalisation directed to equality of outcomes, as proposed by
some States, reflected the practice of State and Territory governments:
...the current objectives of fiscal equalisation are directed
towards the equalisation of State fiscal capacities. They do not have as their objective a fiscal transfer
system directed towards interpersonal equity or community or regional equity.
Within the limits of their current fiscal capacities, States do not themselves
follow policies of interpersonal or community equalisation; for example, by and
large, it is accepted in the policies of states that residents of rural and
remote communities cannot be assured the same level of access to services as
that received by residents of metropolitan areas.[18]
Achieving fiscal equalisation – the CGC processes
2.18
The CGC broadly summarises its task as follows:
The commission measures both the economic and social conditions
in the States as they affect relative costs States incur in providing services
and the relative capacity of States to raise their own revenue. The cost and
revenue estimates are then combined into a single measure; State relativities.[19]
2.19
The starting point for the distribution of the GST pool is to
derive an equal per capita (EPC) figure[20]
which assumes that all States and Territories have the...same revenue raising
capacity, cost of providing services and per capita SPP income.[21]
This figure is derived from the five financial years preceding the year in
which the calculation is made. The actual situation of each jurisdiction with
regard to these three factors is then examined, an estimate of the impact of each
of these factors is derived and the distribution of the pool is adjusted
accordingly.
2.20
It is important to note that the CGC bases its calculations on
actual, historical expenditure. It takes the expenditure for the preceding five
financial years and calculates the States' shares of the GST for the upcoming
financial year from those figures. Thus if there had been a persistent pattern
of under-investment in a particular area the CGC process would reflect the
actual expenditure not the level of expenditure that would be necessary to improve
the particular service.
...the Commission makes no independent assessment of what would
need to be spent to address [a] disadvantage. At an extreme, if the average
policy of the States was to cease assisting a particular disadvantaged group
then the problems of that group would have no impact on the distribution of the
[GST] pool.[22]
2.21
If a service, region or group has been persistently underfunded,
or services have not been provided at all the Grants Commission distribution
will not reflect the funding a jurisdiction would require to overcome that
backlog in service provision. The current Chairman of the Grants Commission
stated this clearly:
Giving [the Territory] the same fiscal capacity as other states
to deliver services to its citizens means maintaining any pre-existing
differentials. If this capacity has to be applied to communities facing very
different circumstances...- and this is what we see in the Territory – outcomes
will not narrow over time. The Territory's financial support does not provide
it with catch up capacity.[23]
Revenue Raising
2.22
Subject to the 1999 Inter-Governmental Agreement the States and
Territories retain the right to raise their own revenues from such sources as
mining royalties, property taxes and conveyancing and payroll taxes. However
there is considerable variation in capacity to raise revenue between the
States. For example, at present Western Australia is benefiting from high
returns from taxes related to the resource industries and, until recently, New
South Wales raised disproportionately large amounts of revenue from property
related taxes because of the housing boom.
2.23
The Northern Territory is assessed by the CGC as having a below
average revenue raising capacity and received an adjustment of $75.3 million
above EPC as a result. Income from mining royalties, of the various categories
of revenue, exceeds the national average capacity by a significant margin while
gambling taxation is close to average. The Northern Territory is not at a
significant disadvantage in revenue raising terms; for example the ACT adjustment
is $138.4 million and Tasmania's $432.9 million.[24]
Cost of Service Provision
2.24
In deriving a jurisdiction's expenses the cost of service
provision is analysed under nine headings covering all areas of government
activity. It is in the cost of service provision that the Northern Territory's
relative disadvantage becomes clear. The Territory's overall cost of providing
services is assessed at 250% above the average for all jurisdictions.
Significantly the largest areas of expense within state and territory budgets,
health and education, are 192% and 196% above average, while community service
provision is 516% above average.[25]
2.25
The CGC Update notes that,
The community services group, which includes welfare services,
housing services and services to Indigenous communities, made the largest
contribution to the Northern Territory's above average costs ... Indigenous
people used these services more extensively than non-Indigenous people and the
proportion of Indigenous people in the Northern Territory's population was well
above the national average.[26]
2.26
As a result of the redistribution of funds within the GST pool
resulting from this analysis the Northern Territory was assessed as requiring
$1.88 billion above its EPC figure to have an equal capacity to deliver
services.
2.27
The CGC provides an alternative analysis of the relative position
of each State and Territory which is particularly useful to the committee's
inquiry. The CGC uses the concept of expense disabilities (see above, footnote 16)
to allow for 'Differences between the States in the characteristics of their
population, in the cost of inputs...and the ability to access economies of scale...'[27]
which have an impact on their relative costs.
2.28
There are nine categories of 'disabilities', including Indigenous
influences, other socio-demographic composition influences, wage levels, scale
of service provision and population dispersion. In breaking down the
redistribution from the GST pool in terms of these disabilities, the influence
of the Northern Territory's Indigenous community on its share of GST revenue
becomes clear.
2.29
In 2008-09 the total redistribution above EPC with regard to
expenses to the Territory is $1.88 billion. 'Indigenous influences' was by far
the most important single factor in increasing the Territory's share of the GST
pool, assessed at $858.7 million or 46%.[28]
Other significant factors were population dispersal, $404.3 million, scale of
service provision, $205.5 million, the physical environment, $169.4 million[29]
and 'other socio-demographic composition influences', $107.6 million.[30]
2.30
While the additional cost imposed by those factors which are not
specific to the Indigenous community cannot be attributed solely to the needs
of the Territory's Indigenous population, many of them clearly relate disproportionately
to the needs and location of that population. Similarly, other
socio-demographic factors, particularly age, cultural and linguistic diversity
and income are matters that have particular impacts on the delivery of services
to Indigenous communities.
2.31
It should be noted that Indigenous people comprised approximately
30.4% of the Territory's population in 2007 - a much higher proportion than any
other jurisdiction.[31]
Importantly a very high proportion of the Indigenous population - approximately
81% - live in remote or very remote areas,[32]
and the proportion of the total Territory population living in these areas is
much higher than for other jurisdictions. Approximately
60% of residents classed as living in remote or very remote areas in the
Territory are Indigenous and 80% of those in very remote areas are Indigenous. Thus
the 'population dispersal' factor is disproportionately a response to the
Indigenous community. [33]
2.32
Similarly the limited opportunities to access economies of scale
in service provision, while generally influenced by the Territory's small total
population is also influenced by the need to provide services to small groups
living in remote locations – again predominantly the Indigenous population.
2.33
The socio-demographic factors are also heavily influenced by the
characteristics of the Indigenous population. It is significantly younger than
the general population and literacy and numeracy rates are lower thus adding to
the cost of education. Similarly, the Indigenous population is located
overwhelmingly in the lowest percentiles of income.[34]
Specific Purpose Payment Income
2.34
The third factor considered by the CGC in determining allocation
from the GST pool is the level of Specific Purpose Payments (SPP) received by
each jurisdiction. SPPs are defined by the Commission as:
-
specific
purpose payments shown in Australian Government budget papers; and
-
other
payments by Australian Government departments or agencies to the States for the
provision of services that are normally the responsibility of State
governments.
For convenience, the Commission refers to, and treats, all such
payments as specific purpose payments (SPPs).[35]
2.35
SPPs are paid to the States and Territories for a variety of
purposes. Broadly speaking, if an SPP is a payment to fund the provision of a
'state-type' service then it is treated as part of the State's or Territory's own
revenue raising capacity and is included in the calculations for distribution
from the GST pool. If the payment is 'through' the State or Territory,
for example to local government or non-government organisations or is a payment
for a service 'normally provided by the Australian Government', then the
payment is excluded.
2.36
For 2008 some $119 million of SPPs was included in the Northern
Territory's equalisation calculation which had the effect of reducing that
allocation. The outcome of the application of the three factors – revenue
raising capacity, cost of service provision and SPPs – produced a final outcome
of $1.83 billion above an equal per capita share of the GST pool for the
Territory.[36]
2.37
The Grants Commission recommended that the appropriate relativity
for the Northern Territory when determining the distribution of the GST pool
was 4.52, i.e. that the Northern Territory receive 4.52 times what it would
receive if the pool was divided on a strict per capita basis.[37]
Grants Commission Assessments and Actual Expenditure
2.38
Comparisons made between actual expenditure by the Territory
government on particular services and assessments by the Grants Commission of
the amount that would need to be spent to provide an average level of service are
at the nub of this inquiry.
2.39
In its submission to the committee the Northern Territory Council
of Social Services (NTCOSS) used these comparisons to highlight specific areas
where, it claimed, there had been significant under-expenditure by the Northern
Territory Government when compared with Grants Commission assessments.
2.40
The President of NTCOSS, Mr Hansen, summarised the matter in
evidence to the committee,
The issue is that [the NT government] have money that is
assessed and allocated on a certain basis by the Commonwealth Grants Commission
and they have clearly not spent it in those areas because, in the reported
expenditure in those areas, underspending is quite clear. The consequence is
that those key social areas have a deficiency of service, which promotes
inequality, lower life expectancy, higher antisocial behaviour, more violence
and more illness.[38]
2.41
Northern Territory Shelter commented in its submission to the committee
that,
The Commonwealth Grant Commission Reports identify the level of
funds allocated to the NT over successive years and although never enough to
meet the increasing backlog of need, the figures also highlight a significant
level of under-spending year after year despite the growing inequality in the
housing delivered for Indigenous Australians....[39]
2.42
The Central Land Council put the view that:
Commonwealth Grants Commission figures suggest that in the year
2006-07, the NT Government received $1.985 billion in untied GST grants yet
underspent allocations across social service areas by $543 million. When
balanced against the need identified by the NT Government above, further
interrogation of these figures is required.[40]
2.43
In its submission to the Committee the Grants Commission
addressed some of the comments made in the Northern Territory which gave rise
to this inquiry. Specifically it warned that '...caution needs to be exercised in
comparing actual expenditure data and the Commission's assessment...'.[41]
2.44
It is understandable that confusion may arise when the CGC
publishes tables which compare their assessed expenses, with actual expenditure
by government in a particular area. Actual expenditure is the States' reported
expenditure; assessed expenditure is the Commission's calculations of what each
State would have required to have the fiscal capacity to provide the average
level of service.
2.45
However the caveats entered by the Grants Commission are
important. In comparing actual and assessed expenditure it must be recognised
that,
-
Assessments are based on average efficiency of service delivery
whereas actual expenditure reflects actual efficiency;
-
Reliable data may not be available to measure inherent
differences between States;
-
Commission assessments '...are made at very different points in
time, with different information and for very different purposes'; and
-
State budgets are framed independently of each other thus they
deviate from the average.[42]
2.46
In comparing allocations from the GST pool and actual and
assessed expenditure, it is particularly important to note that there are two
distinct phases involved in forming Grants Commission advice. With regard to
financial year 2008-09 the CGC made its recommendations with regard to the
division of the GST pool in February 2008. The recommended relativities were
derived from the actual and assessed expenditure for the preceding five completed
financial years – 2002-03 to 2006-07.
2.47
The Commission's recommendation for the next financial year does
not contain any assessment of '... what States might spend or how much revenue
they might raise in the coming year...' nor does it '...form a view of what average
State spending might be in different areas, eg on education, [or] different
sets of residents'. It is based solely on the analysis of historical
expenditure and is obviously made without knowledge of State and Territory
budgets for the coming year or fiscal outcomes for that year.
2.48
The second process involving 2008-09 occurs after the end of that
financial year. The CGC collects the details of actual expenditure and then
calculates the assessed expenditure for that year. The assessment is backward
looking. Figures for 2008-09 will be included as one of the five base years for
calculating relativities for the distribution of the GST pool from 2010-11.[43]
2.49
The CGC's recommendation for the coming financial year may differ
quite considerably from the results obtained by analysis of actual expenditure
after it has occurred. For example in the current financial year, with the
global financial crisis, State and Territory relativities based on actual
revenue and expense in 2008-09 may be very different from the averages derived
from the preceding five financial years. The Commission's processes involve
constant updating of information and recalculation of relativities as more and
better data become available for each if the five years on which the current
assessment is based.
2.50
The committee noted above that Grants Commission assessments are
not designed to be used as a guide to actual expenditure on specific programs,
nor are they intended to be taken as an indicator of any preference for a
particular policy or expenditure. At best, the CGC assessment can be used as a
general indication of the level of expenditure which would be required by a jurisdiction
to achieve an average level of service in a particular area should that be its
objective.
2.51
The Northern Territory, in a supplementary submission to the
committee, argued that, particularly with regard to the Territory, there were
significant limitations in the CGC's approach particularly that in the '...national
average spending in each expenditure category...the practices and priorities of
the larger states have an overwhelming influence on the outcome'.[44]
2.52
A specific expenditure assessment raised both in submissions and
at the committee's hearings related to the CGC category 'Services to Indigenous
Communities'.[45]
In CGC working papers the assessed expenditure in this category 2006-07 is
$217.89m for the Northern Territory while the actual expenditure is $110.33m –
a significant difference. However this is a category that brings together a
range of methodological issues. Most particularly that the range of State and
Territory expenditures is so great that an 'average' has very little meaning.
The ACT and Victoria registered no expenditure, NSW had $4.05 per capita while
the figure for the Northern Territory was $518.46 and the average across all
jurisdictions was $14.65.[46]
The committee has been advised that this category is insufficiently robust and it
is unlikely that it will be included in the CGC's assessments after 2009-10.[47]
2.53
It should also be noted that the various service classes used in CGC
assessments – education, health community services, etc. – are standard
classifications developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). All
States and Territories provide details of expenditure to the CGC within these
standard classifications. Thus in terms of actual expenditures the CGC is
comparing like with like.
2.54
However the ABS classifications do not necessarily coincide with
the administrative arrangements within State and Territory governments. For
example expenditure which is included in the ABS health classification, may
appear in a State's Community Services portfolio. Thus care needs to be taken
in comparing the CGC assessment with actual State and Territory budgetary
outcomes.
Conclusion
2.55
A significant proportion of the large transfer to the Northern
Territory from the GST pool is, directly or indirectly, a reflection of the funds
that would be needed by the Territory government to be able to provide services
to the Indigenous community at a national average standard. As discussed in
paragraphs 2.24 to 2.33, the expense disabilities making the largest
contributions are either specifically related to the cost of providing services
to Territory's Indigenous population or heavily influenced by it. However, it
is not possible to put a precise figure on that proportion.
2.56
As untied funding, distribution of the GST pool is part of the
general revenue of the States and Territories. The funding received by a
jurisdiction as a result of the CGC assessment process is not 'earmarked' and
cannot be followed through the budgetary process from receipt to a specific
outcome.
2.57
For a range of methodological reasons considered above any direct
comparison of CGC assessments and actual expenditure must be made extremely cautiously.
As has been repeatedly pointed out by the Grants Commission, its '... assessments
are made at very different points of time [from state budgets], with different
information and for very different purposes'.[48]
2.58
An important consideration is that where service levels in a
jurisdiction are heavily influenced by historical underfunding or, indeed,
non-provision of services the CGC process '...makes no independent assessment of
what would be need to be spent to address that disadvantage'.[49]
Thus its assessments do not equip States or Territories to deal with backlogs
in service or infrastructure provision.
2.59
It is also important to recognise that the Commonwealth Grants
Commission is not a policy making body, that its assessments do not represent
an indication of where it believes revenue should be expended and that it does
not have a view on the outcomes achieved by the various jurisdictions.
2.60
Following from this, if the Commonwealth Government or the
Council of Australian Governments wishes to identify and address areas of need
in Indigenous communities – particularly the backlog in services and
infrastructure – and make specific financial provision to address them using
funding from the GST pool then the CGC can only take that into consideration in
its calculations if it is directed to do so, with the agreement of all
Australian governments.
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