Report
The Inquiry
1.1
The Aged Care (Bond
Security) Bill 2005, Aged Care (Bond Security)
Levy Bill 2005 and Aged Care Amendment (2005 Measures No. 1) Bill 2005 were
introduced into the House of Representatives on 8 December 2005. On 8 February 2006, the Senate, on the
recommendation of the Selection of Bills Committee (Report No. 1 of 2006),
referred the provisions of the Bills to the Committee for report.
1.2
In recommending the reference of these Bills to the
Committee, the Selection of Bills Committee stated that the reason for referral
was that the residential aged care provider sector is unsure of the potential
liability arising as a result of these Bills.
1.3
The Committee considered the three Bills at a public
hearing on 2 March 2006.
Details of the public hearing are referred to in Appendix 2. The Committee
received eight submissions relating to
the Bills and these are listed at Appendix 1. The submissions
and Hansard transcript of evidence may be accessed through the Committee's
website at https://www.aph.gov.au/senate_ca
The Bills
1.4
On 15
September 2005, the Commonwealth announced that it would strengthen
the existing protection surrounding aged care residents' accommodation bonds by
establishing a scheme to guarantee the repayment of bond balances if a provider
defaults and by introducing new prudential regulatory arrangements.[1]
This
suite of three Bills provides the legislative framework to strengthen the
protection of aged care residents' accommodation bonds.
1.5
The purpose of the Aged Care (Bond Security) Bill 2005
is to establish a scheme to guarantee the repayment of aged care residents'
bond balances in the event that an approved provider becomes insolvent and is
unable to meet their obligation to repay residents' bond balances. This Bill enables the Commonwealth to pay to a person
an amount that is equal to a bond balance, and interest, owed to the person by
an approved provider.[2]
1.6
The purpose of the Aged Care (Bond Security) Levy 2005
is to enable the Commonwealth to impose levies on approved providers in order
to recover any costs (including administrative costs) incurred by the Commonwealth
as a result of repaying accommodation bonds to residents in the event that an
approved provider becomes insolvent and defaults.[3]
1.7
The purpose of the Aged Care Amendment (2005 Measures
No. 1) Bill 2005 is:
-
to amend the Aged
Care Act 1997 (the Act) to give effect to the establishment of new
prudential regulatory arrangements to improve the management of residents'
accommodation bonds and entry contributions;
-
to amend the provisions in the Act relating to
the timing of when a bond must be refunded and when a bond must be refunded in
the event that a care recipient has died; and
-
to consequentially amend the Act to ensure that
all of the new rules relating to accommodation bonds apply to all services
holding bonds whether they are residential care services or flexible care
services.[4]
1.8
The Aged Care Amendment (2005 Measures No. 1) Bill 2005
will, after an initial three year period where the Commonwealth will meet the
costs of the new prudential arrangements, have a direct financial impact to
industry if an approved provider becomes insolvent and the Commonwealth has to
pay outstanding bond balances to residents.
1.9
The Commonwealth will have the legislative capacity to
recover costs from approved providers holding bonds in a series of instalments
over a number of years. The magnitude of costs will depend on the monetary
value of the outstanding bond balances (including interest) repaid by the
Commonwealth on behalf of the defaulting approved providers and the
administrative costs incurred.[5]
1.10
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Health
and Ageing commented:
The new arrangements set
out in the three bills will improve both the security of bonds and the
management of bonds by the sector. The introduction of these protections
demonstrates the coalition government's commitment to a world-class system of
aged care that provides high-quality, affordable and accessible services to
meet the individual needs and choices of older Australians.[6]
Background
1.11
The Review of
Pricing Arrangements in Residential Aged Care (the Hogan Report) released
in May 2004, recommended a tightening of the prudential requirements as they
relate to accommodation bonds. The report noted that:
The accommodation bond
has been an important source of funding in low care residential facilities.
This funding approach is also found in high care Extra Service places. The
large sums of money held in these bonds and the lack of a comprehensive
arrangement for the monitoring and supervision of the management of these funds
is a major source of concern...Given the mechanisms by which the fundraising
through these bonds is provided for within the legislation, the government may
be deemed to be exposed to moral hazard. This possibility should not be set
aside lightly even though no substantial concerns have arisen in recent years.
There is an obligation on government to ensure these funds are not exposed to
risk of any loss. The position as it currently stands is that where sole
traders and partnerships go bankrupt or companies go into liquidation, there is
little protection for those entitled to reimbursement of bond monies paid.[7]
1.12
The Government response to the recommendations within
the Hogan Report provided $0.8 million to establish a provider funded guarantee
fund and implement processes to improve the existing financial protections
provided to residents.[8]
Issues
1.13
Most submissions supported the Commonwealth's
initiative to strengthen prudential arrangements surrounding accommodation
bonds, including the COTA Over 50s Alliance, Catholic Health Australia (CHA)
and the Aged Care Association Australia (ACAA). The Association of Independent
Retirees (A.I.R) stated that 'these Bills are of tremendous importance to
retirees contemplating entering residential aged care facilities and those
already in care'.[9] However, a number of concerns were also
raised. These issues will be addressed as they relate to each Bill.
Aged
Care (Bond Security) Bill 2005
1.14
The ACAA commented that clearer definitions were
required for events that would cause the Minister of the day to declare an
insolvency situation and the administrative rules surrounding the recovery
provisions from the industry in the event of a failure by an aged care provider
to repay bonds.[10] The Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) provided a clear explanation that the Bill proposes the Minister may only make a
default insolvency event declaration when the approved provider is an externally
administered body and there is at least one bond balance outstanding.[11] The intent of this proposal is to guarantee
bond monies when a technical insolvency event has not occurred but the provider
is under administration and unable to repay bond balances to residents.
1.15
The ACAA also suggested that further specificity and
rationale needs to be provided for the time period set in Clause 6 (2). This
clause relates to the refund obligations of approved providers and states that
approved providers will have been given the set of obligations ten days before
the default event declaration was made and at that time the bond balances
became outstanding bond balances.[12]
1.16
The Department
explained in determining the ten day period in Clause 6, it was trying to
account for three different scenarios:
- where
new people come into the sector after a default event has been declared;
- where
people leave the sector after a default event has been declared but before a
levy has been imposed; and
- where
people remain in the sector but who might change their arrangements in relation
to their bonds to attempt to avoid paying the levy.[13]
1.17
The ten day default event allows for two situations
where approved providers will not be liable to pay a Commonwealth imposed levy.
These two situations involve an approved provider who begins operating in the
aged care industry after the default event, therefore missing the ten day period
before the default event and approved providers who cease operating after the
default event but before a levy is imposed.
1.18
The Department explained that even though it is
possible for approved providers leaving the industry to declare a potential future
liability in their financial reports, this declaration does not enforce
liability to pay a levy on new approved providers entering the industry.
However, if a new approved provider buys an existing business and remains
trading as the same legal entity, the corporation remains liable to pay a levy
imposed by the Commonwealth.
1.19
Regarding these two situations, the Department stated:
It is not the
Government's policy intent that newcomers to the industry (following a default
event) be required to contribute to the levy imposed as a result of a default
event that occurred prior to the involvement of the newcomer in the sector. A
principle of the new guarantee system is that providers holding bonds at the
time of a default event share the risk and the cost of the default event, as
they have benefited from the guarantee of their bond liabilities up to that
point. Industry has been consulted on the fact that people who enter the
industry after a default will not be subject to any levy in respect of that
default and agree that this approach is the most appropriate.[14]
When the ownership of a
corporation that is an approved provider changes hands, there is no change to
the legal entity. Such a corporation is not a newcomer to the industry. If a
corporation held bonds 10 days before the day on which a default event
declaration is made and continues to be an approved provider on the day a levy
is imposed, the corporation would be liable to pay the levy, even if, in the
intervening period, all the shares in the corporation had been purchased by
outside interests and new directors appointed.[15]
1.20
The ACAA also questioned the form of the written
notification under Part 3 Clause 9 (1). This clause requires that written
notification be given by an approved provider to the Secretary by the end of
the first business day after an insolvency event occurs. The Department advised
that detailed guidelines, which approved providers will find helpful with the
requirements in this Clause, are being prepared in consultation with industry.[16]
1.21
CHA and UnitingCare raised the issue of the unknown
potential liability applying to providers from this scheme. UnitingCare stated
that there is a 'lack of data or financial modelling available to indicate what
the levies on providers are likely to be in the event they are responsible for
bonds unable to be paid by a defaulting provider'.[17] CHA recognised that estimating the potential
liability is problematic as 'to date, there has been no failure to refund
Bonds. Any attempt to forecast future default possibilities could not be
accomplished with any degree of accuracy'.[18]
1.22
The Department stated that, in order to estimate the
likely costs to industry, PricewaterhouseCooper had been commissioned to
analyse the financial risk profile of the residential aged care industry. Based
on this analysis the Department indicated that:
Estimates that in any
given financial year the average value of accommodation bonds that may need to
be repaid by the Guarantee arrangements, and consequently recovered from
providers would be in the order of 0.2 per cent of the value of the industry's
accommodation bond holdings...The Department also estimates, on the above very
conservative assumptions, that the size of the levy on the industry would only
exceed 0.8 per cent of bond holdings once in every twenty years.[19]
1.23
CHA stated that the Commonwealth has not discussed the
process of recovering the full cost of bonds from approved providers and as a
result the CHA has reservations on how this recovery will be achieved.
1.24
The Department stated that the need for, and the size
of, a levy will depend on the circumstances of the bankruptcy or insolvency and
the consequent ability of the Commonwealth to recover funds from the aged care
provider/s concerned. The cost to an approved provider (the levied provider)
will depend on:
- the likelihood that default events will
occur in that financial year;
- the likely size of those events, if they
should occur;
- the
amount the Australian Government can recover from the defaulting providers in
respect of those default events; and
- the
share of the industry's total accommodation bond holdings that are held by the approved provider who is being
levied.[20]
Aged
Care (Bond Security) Levy Bill 2005
1.25
Professor Hogan suggested that there was a need for clarification
of the meaning of 'classes of providers' in Clause 9 and stated that
discriminatory practices by regulation should not be 'opaque'.[21]
1.26
The Department explained that this clause provides the
Minister of the day with the discretion to deal with circumstances that may
exist where one type of approved provider may need to be dealt with
differently. This discretion is a regulation-making power and as such is
subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the Commonwealth. The example
was given of an approved provider running a smaller operation with ten or fewer
funded beds. The Department stated:
What we do not want to
do by imposing a levy to recoup costs is to cause any interruption in the
delivery of care in other services to residents. This gives the Minister of the
day the capacity to recognise that there might be classes of approved providers
that need to be dealt with differently.[22]
Aged
Care Amendment (2005 Measures No.1) Bill 2005
1.27
Schedule 3 proposes Prudential Standards that provide
for the protection of accommodation bonds, sound financial management and the
provision of information about the financial management of approved providers. CHA
and ACAA requested a clear definition of what is meant by the term 'corporate
governance' in Subdivision 57-4 (2) (b).
1.28
The Department, in response to this request, stated:
The reference to
corporate governance is part of an indicative list of potential prudential
standards that might be developed. We had anticipated that if a need arose for
a prudential standard on corporate governance that would be as a result of
ongoing discussions with industry that identified the need for that sort of
standard and therefore the definition would be developed collaboratively with
the sector as the need arose. We are not even saying at this point in time that
there is a need for it, so we certainly did not want to go so far as to define
what it would be.[23]
1.29
The ACAA also questioned the need and appropriateness
of the additional inspectorial processes given the existing process of auditing
financial accounts.
1.30
The Department indicated that it held the responsibility
to ensure the legislative framework is implemented as intended by the
Commonwealth and it can not rely solely on third party auditing. The suite of
monitoring and compliance activities that would be expected of any regulatory
regime will be utilised for this scheme. The Department went on to comment that
it did not expect any significant additional compliance costs to industry as a
result and DoHA will work with industry to minimise any
additional costs.[24]
1.31
UnitingCare raised an issue of discrepancy with the
time period of 14 days for approved providers to refund bond monies in the
event of a resident's death. UnitingCare stated that the 'legal requirement of
a provider having to wait to refund the amount until probate has been obtained'
creates potential difficulty.'[25]
1.32
Professor Hogan provided the following clarification on this
issue. The Department, during the enquiry, indicated that they supported Professor Hogan's statement:
The only way in which, in
the event of death, the bond can be repaid is through the formal and legal
recognition of where that bond is due for repayment. The 14 days give the provider
time to make judgments on this matter. If the argument is that the provider needs
to check that the request is in fact a valid one and that the provider would
wish to seek advice from that provider’s legal advisers, then an argument could
be made that it should not be 14 days but 21. But all of those things seem
quite reasonable to me.[26]
Other
issues
1.33
Over Fifties Mutual Investment Group (OFM) generally supported
the Commonwealth's policy of strengthening the existing protection. However it
recommended modification to the rules to permit an 'income bond' to hold
accommodation bond monies.
1.34
The OFM stated that such a modification would have the
following advantages:
- Government would not be required to 'step in' to guarantee
accommodation bond balances (as the bonds would already be protected from
creditors);
- Aged care providers would receive competitive returns on
accommodation bond monies (further enhancing the resident care fees and
Government subsidies they receive); and
- Aged care residents’ accommodation bond balances would be
swiftly repaid on death (increasing the benefits to their beneficiaries).[27]
1.35
The Department outlined a number of issues of concern
with the proposal including, the cost of administration, a level of risk associated
with the income bond holder and an inability of approved providers to have
access to the capital while placed in an income bond.[28] OFM also conceded that its proposal would
leave unprotected a resident whose bond was misused or misappropriated prior to
the purchase of an income bond.[29]
1.36
The Committee asked the ACAA to comment on the OFM
proposal and after examination stated the proposal would be highly inefficient
on two counts, the first being the administrative cost involved and the second
being the operational requirements of the scheme. The ACAA concluded that: 'In
our opinion, therefore, the OFM scheme is inferior and more costly to that
being proposed by the Government in the Bills before the Senate'.[30]
1.37
Professor Hogan
also provided commentary on the OFM proposal and raised a number of
considerable issues. These issues include approved providers seeking higher
investment returns rather than investing prudently, the ability to readily
transfer bond monies when residents move facilities and the problematic
situation of refunding bond monies to nominated recipients rather than estate
beneficiaries. The proposal will also accrue additional administrative costs
and prevent approved providers from using bond monies to fund expansion of
capacity in residential and domiciliary services. Professor
Hogan concluded 'The proposal for
introduction of an income bond is redundant in light of the proposals embodied
in the legislation now before Parliament and being considered by the Senate
Community Affairs Committee'.[31]
Recommendation
1.38
The
Committee reports to the Senate that it has considered the Aged Care (Bond Security)
Bill 2005, the Aged Care (Bond Security) Levy Bill 2005 and the Aged Care
Amendment (2005 Measures No. 1) Bill 2005 and recommends that the Bills be
passed without amendment.
Senator Gary Humphries
Chairman
March 2006
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