APPENDIX 3 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ALLARS REPORT

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APPENDIX 3 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ALLARS REPORT

INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF PITUITARY DERIVED HORMONES IN AUSTRALIA AND CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE

Index

1. Scientific Knowledge of Risks and Benefits

2. Treatment, including Information Provided to Patients and Informed Consent

3. Manufacture of Hormones and Collection of Pituitaries

4. Response by Department and Others on Cessation of Program

5. Tracing, Identification, Counselling and Support

6. Regulation of Medical Programs

7. Consent

8. Priorities for Research

The purpose of the Inquiry was to examine the operation of the Australian Human Pituitary Hormone Program (AHPHP) and to report on issues arising from that examination. Under the AHPHP human growth hormone (hGH) was supplied for the treatment of growth hormone deficiency and human pituitary gonadotrophin (hPG) was supplied for the treatment of infertility, to approximately 2,100 patients in Australia. The following provides a summary of the findings and recommendations of the Inquiry in respect of each of its terms of reference.

1. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF RISKS AND BENEFITS

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to examine and report on the decisions taken to establish and continue the AHPHP in the light of scientific knowledge of the risks and benefits at the relevant times (See particularly Chapter 5 and also Chapter 4) The decisions taken in the 1960s to establish the AHPHP are examined in pare 3(b) below. The program was administered by an expert committee of medical practitioners established by the Minister for Health in 1967, called the Human Pituitary Advisory Committee (HPAC) and by its three Subcommittees, the Fractionation Subcommittee, the Human Growth Hormone Subcommittee (HGH Subcommittee) and the Follicle Stimulating Hormone Subcommittee (FSH Subcommittee). The decisions to continue the AHPHP until 1985, taken by HPAC and the Fractionation Subcommittee, in the light of scientific knowledge, are summarised here.

Developing knowledge of CJD. The Inquiry found that from the first description of CJD as a disease in 1920. knowledge of CJD grew as a result of research, chiefly conducted from the late 1960s in relation to other spongiform encephalopathies, in particular kuru. Transmissibility of CJD by inoculation of chimpanzee brains was reported in 1968, and the first suspected iatrogenic person-to person transmission by corneal transplant was reported in 1974. In 1974 warnings appeared in the literature regarding the need for special precautions beyond routine sterilisation procedures in order to inactivate the CJD infective agent. The 1977 Nobel Prize winning paper of Gajdusek contained warnings of the possible general implications of current knowledge of transmission of kuru and CJD. The first confirmed case of iatrogenic person-to-person transmission of CJD was also reported in 1977. [paras 5.01-5.37]

No link made by neuropathologists and little knowledge of other specialists. Nevertheless this knowledge about CJD was very specialised, falling within the field of neuropathology. Neuropathologists, including Gajdusek, did not make a link between their knowledge of the transmissibility of CJD and the use of pituitaries in growth hormone programs. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, pathologists and members of the medical community generally in Australia, took great interest in Gajdusek's investigations into kuru in Papua New Guinea. However, there was little understanding of the mode of transmission of the disease. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s paediatric endocrinologists and obstetrician gynaecologists who treated patients under the AHPHP knew little or nothing about CJD. [paras 5.38-5.561]

Two avenues for ensuring safety. From the commencement of the AHPHP, CSL and members of HPAC believed there were two avenues for ensuring the safety of the hormone product from viral contamination. The first was through criteria excluding the collection of glands from certain cadavers. The second was the method of processing the pituitaries.

Exclusion criteria, With regard to the first avenue for ensuring safety, HPAC established criteria excluding from the collection program pituitaries from cadavers affected by certain diseases. These exclusion criteria are described in paragraph 3(a) below. HPAC members were aware in 1971 of the danger of pituitaries infected by slow viruses (which would have included CJD) and amended the criteria accordingly. For a period of time from 1977 the criteria did not clearly exclude cadavers infected by neurological diseases. In 1983 CJD was expressly included in the criteria. However, in general during the operation of the AHPHP, HPAC and Commonwealth Serum Laboratories Ltd (CSL) failed to communicate the exclusion criteria to pathologists and mortuary attendants. Even if the exclusion criteria had been effectively communicated and monitoring for compliance attempted, this first avenue for securing safety from contamination by the CJD pathogenic agent was a crude and unenforceable means of screening. Given the long incubation period for CJD prior to the appearance of symptoms, it was always possible for an infected pituitary to be collected and processed. Statistically in a sample of 10,000 unscreened glands, at least one and as many as ten glands would have come from patients either dying from or incubating CJD.

Extraction method With regard to the second avenue for ensuring safety, the extraction method at CSL was understood by members of HPAC to exclude viral contamination. On account of their higher molecular weight, viruses and bacteria were regarded as coming off the fractionation column first, leaving the smaller sized hormone particles free from contamination. However, in 1980 Prusiner published research demonstrating the small size of the infective agent in unconventional slow viruses. This research raised the possibility that not all "viruses" would be removed in the Ferguson process. Some members of HPAC became aware in the late 1970s, through their attendance at scientific meetings overseas, that a study was being conducted by Dr Alan Dickinson to test the capacity of the process used in the United Kingdom growth hormone program to eliminate the CJD infective agent. In early 1980, following a discussion about slow viruses with the Director of the United Kingdom growth hormone program, Professor Lazarus, the Chairperson of HPAC, promptly brought the issue to the attention of the Fractionation Subcommittee and HPAC at their subsequent meetings.

HPAC fails to respond appropriately to the knowledge of the risk The Fractionation Subcommittee and HPAC took the view, incorrectly in the light of scientific knowledge in 1980. that a slow virus is not positively linked with a disease present in the community. Instead of re-assessing the program or seeking expert advice, the Subcommittee and HPAC assumed that since the technology did not exist for direct detection of slow viruses, acknowledgement of the potential dangers was all that was possible. However, other options were available [paras 5.77, 5.78, 5.99].When the results of the Dickinson study became known informally in 1982. HPAC members took comfort from the fact that infectivity had been removed in the processing of hGH in the United Kingdom. However, the Dickinson study was conducted upon a more sophisticated processing method than that used by CSL, with two additional purification steps.

HPAC failed to choose options which were appropriate with regard to the risks of treatment with the hormones in the light of scientific knowledge in 1980. [paras 5.57-5.114]

2. TREATMENT, INCLUDING INFORMATION PROVIDED TO PATIENTS AND CONSENT

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to examine and report on the treatment aspects of the program, particularly the information provided to patients so as to allow informed consent. (See generally Chapters 4 and 8)

Treatment regime. The Inquiry found that the treatment regime for hGH was similar throughout Australia, and patients were approved according to Guidelines applied by the HGH Subcommittee. Patients treated with hPG were also approved according to Guidelines applied by the FSH Subcommittee, although treatment regimes using hPG differed from one centre to another.

Use of hormone in breach of Guidelines. From 1963, prior to the establishment of the AHPHP in 1967, patients in Sydney Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth were treated with hGH and hPG manufactured in an unregulated fashion in research centres.

During the AHPHP, generally only patients approved by the HGH Subcommittee in accordance with Guidelines for Assessment of Patients formulated by the Subcommittee were treated with hGH. The Inquiry has received no evidence of any Australian medical practitioner providing hGH to an athlete who was not approved for treatment on account of growth hormone deficiency. However, there are instances of some use of hGH as a "research allocation" approved by HPAC in growth hormone deficient patients and in non growth hormone deficient people as part of research studies.

During the AHPHP, the Guidelines for approval of patients for treatment with hPG, established by the FSH Subcommittee, required that female patients be anovulatory. HPG was used in some cases in breach of these Guidelines, in particular for stimulating ovulatory women to recover eggs in IVF programs in Melbourne from the early 1970s, and in Sydney for cervical mucous infertility. Some of the hPG used in the IVF programs in Melbourne was processed independently of the AHPHP within a hospital laboratory in the late 1960s and early 1970s, whilst some was the CSL product, supplied to researchers in the "Egg Project" under a "research allocation" approved by HPAC.

Batch sharing and left overs. In the case of both hGH and hPG, medical practitioners often used an allocation of part of a batch of hormone intended for one patient to treat other patients. The practitioners regarded this as necessary when hGH was in short supply. In the case of hPG, when patients became pregnant, the medical practitioner often used the left over supply of hPG for stimulation tests in new patients, or for a patient who was awaiting a supply from CSL. Particularly in stimulation tests, some practitioners used hPG which was beyond its two year shelf-life.

Source of hormone, risks and doctor/patient relationship. Most hGH recipients were informed, through their parents, of the source of the hormone and how the treatment would work. Almost all hGH recipients or their parents interviewed by the Inquiry described their doctor/patient relationship as an excellent one, spanning many years.

The accounts given by hPG recipients were very different. Most said that they were not told that the source of the hormone was pituitary glands collected at post-mortems. Those who were told or who enquired, received confusing and conflicting accounts of the source of the hormone from nurses and other patients. Most medical practitioners did not mention the alternative of human postmenopausal gonadotrophin (hMG). Although hMG was equally efficacious, it was expensive, not being listed as a pharmaceutical benefit. Most hPG recipients were told of the risk of multiple births. Some were told of the risk of hyperstimulation, but few understood that this was a life-threatening condition. When hyperstimulation occurred. the patient usually did not realise how serious the condition was. At many busy ovulation induction clinics, the medical practitioner relied upon the nursing sisters to provide detailed information about the treatment and to deal with the concerns of the patients on a day-to-day basis. A significant number of hPG recipients had poor doctor/patient relationships and felt that they could not ask questions. The treatment regime was a stressful one and many patients felt a lack of support.

Common law duty of disclosure. The common law duty of medical practitioners to disclose information to patients requires that patients be advised of material risks in the treatment they receive. The risk of CJD was not known to paediatric endocrinologists and obstetrician gynaecologists at the time of treatment. In the case of hGH treatment there were occasional risks for some patients, which could be avoided by careful management. and these were normally disclosed.

In the case of hPG recipients, the risks of multiple births and hyperstimulation were material, could not necessarily be avoided by careful management, and ought to have been disclosed. In view of these risks the alternatives to hPG treatment merited discussion. The alternative of clomiphene citrate had normally always been tried before hPG treatment commenced. However, the options of no treatment, delaying treatment or adoption required discussion. Whilst the range of alternatives may have been presented at the initial consultation, for most women there was no moment of decision presented at the later stage when the hPG treatment was entered into. It was "the next step" in what developed as an inevitable progression of treatment for their infertility.

The source of the hormone was a matter associated with risk. Most treatment was given prior to the knowledge of transmission of HIV/AIDS. Treatment ceased when the link was made between the knowledge of CJD and pituitary hormone treatment. However, the risk of infection from treatment with a product derived from cadavers at post-mortem was always a material one in view of other known transmissible diseases such as hepatitis. The source of the hormone should have been disclosed to recipients. For many it would have made a difference to their decision to enter into the treatment.

3. MANUFACTURE OF HORMONES AND COLLECTION OF PITUITARIES

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to examine and report on the rules and guidelines relating to the manufacture of the hormones and the collection of pituitaries. The Inquiry's findings are set out in Chapters 3, 6 and 7 of the Report.

(a) Collection of Pituitaries and Processing (Chapters 3 and 6)

Processing prior to AHPHP. The Inquiry found that pituitaries were collected by individual medical practitioners from as early as 1959. During the early 1960s processing of hormones took place at CSIRO and in research centres in hospitals and universities in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane. ,The hormone produced by these researchers was used in the treatment of patients. One research group, the Victorian Pituitary Group, processed glands collected in Australia, Nova Scotia, Singapore and New Zealand. [paras 3.01-3.02, 3.11, 3.67-3.69]

Collection of glands through contact with pathologists and some importation From 1966 the informal committee which preceded the official HPAC encouraged pathologists to collect pituitary glands for the proposed national program. Throughout the period of the AHPHP from 1967 to 1985, members of HPAC approached pathologists on a personal basis. Hospitals where the rate of gland collection was lower than expected were pressured to increase the rate of collection. The glands processed by CSL were collected mainly from hospitals and morgues in Australia, with the exception of some glands imported from New Zealand in the mid-1970s, a small number of glands from Mauritius in 1972 and 1973 and possibly some glands from Papua New Guinea in 1966. The total number of glands collected by CSL roughly equals the total of glands which would have been required to produce the batches used in the AHPHP. [paras 3.03-3.24, 3.74]

Exclusion criteria. According to exclusion criteria developed by HPAC in 1966, glands were not to be collected from cadavers with known viral infections, particularly viral hepatitis, or with obvious pathology of the pituitary gland. In 1971 a pathologist member of HPAC warned of the danger of slow viral infection of the pituitary glands. The exclusion criteria were amended so as to exclude glands from cadavers affected by neurological diseases of the central nervous system due or possibly due to viral infection. The criterion of "neurological diseases" was by oversight omitted from the exclusion criteria in 1977. The exclusion criteria were amended in 1983 to exclude expressly "presenile dementia (CJD)". The 1985 criteria excluded AIDS and "dementia of any type". In general HPAC revised the exclusion criteria in a reactive and slow fashion as possible sources of infection came to light. [paras 3.25-3.38]

Failure to communicate exclusion criteria. HPAC and CSL did not develop a coordinated and effective method for making the exclusion criteria known to pathologists and mortuary attendants. Most of the pathologists and mortuary attendants contacted by the Inquiry were unaware that any written exclusion criteria issued by HPAC existed. CSL representatives who dealt directly with mortuary attendants, paying them a fee of 20 cents in the early years and later 50 cents per gland collected, did not provide copies of the successive versions of the exclusion criteria. Criteria for exclusion of glands from cadavers were verbal and self-imposed by the pathologists. [paras 3.39-3.46]

Processing. Processing at CSL was done using the Ferguson method' and from late 1984 the Chapman method. The removal of contamination was regarded as achieved by the gel filtration method which separated the higher molecular weight substances. such as bacteria and viruses, from the lower molecular weight hPG and hGH, and by the final filtration step in the purification process. [paras 3.70-3.101]

Lawfulness of collection in 1960s and 1970s. The lawfulness of collection of the pituitaries in the 1960s and 1970s depended either upon the common law or early human tissue legislation applying in some States. Removal of pituitary glands for therapeutic purposes was illegal in Queensland. In States where the common law applied' authorisation by the deceased's executor should have been obtained. In several States it was necessary for the hospital authorities to make due inquiry or to have no reason to believe that relatives objected. In the absence of records indicating the steps taken by hospital authorities to seek the views of relatives, the Inquiry has not been unable to reach a firm conclusion as to whether the bulk of the collection occurred lawfully or unlawfully. [paras 6.38-6.46]

Lawfulness of collection under uniform human tissue legislation. Following the Law Reform Commission's report in 1977, uniform human tissue legislation was enacted in each State during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Under this legislation consent by a coroner, hospital authority or senior next-of-kin to a post-mortem is sufficient authority for use "for therapeutic purposes, medical purposes, or scientific purposes" of tissue removed "for the purposes of the post-mortem examination". Under this legislation lawful use of pituitaries for therapeutic purposes is conditional upon the pituitary having been removed for the purpose of the post-mortem examination. Glands needed for diagnostic purposes were taken by the pathologists for histological examination. From information provided by pathologists and mortuary attendants, the Inquiry has found that glands were generally removed by mortuary attendants with little supervision, without inspection by the pathologist. Sometimes when the pathologist required the gland for histological examination it had already been removed by the mortuary attendant and stored in an unlabelled container for collection by CSL. The Inquiry has formed the conclusion that glands were generally removed not for the purposes of the post-mortem examination, but for the purpose of supply to CSL. The use of the glands during the period of the human tissue legislation was therefore unlawful. [paras 6.49-6.50]

(b) Law and Policy applying to Manufacture (See generally Chapter 7)

Standard. Compliance with a standard was legally required from 1970 for goods for therapeutic use supplied as pharmaceutical benefits. Although the National Biological Standards Laboratory (NBSL) within the Commonwealth Department of Health was responsible for testing for compliance with a standard, it did not test the hormones for compliance. The reasons were the absence of an official standard, the difficulty of developing a standard and poor communication and coordination within NBSL. Following initial contact in 1966, further discussion was delayed pending development of improved assay methods. There was no further contact between NBSL and HPAC until some minimal contact occurred regarding labelling in 1979 and closer contact in 1984 as a result of serious production difficulties at CSL. The Inquiry has found that NBSL should have attempted to take steps to address the practical difficulties associated with compliance with the legal requirement and should have renewed the issue of a standard with HPAC when the initial difficulties with development of a standard were, at a later stage, apparently removed. [paras 7.145-7.154]

Viral contamination. The pituitary hormones were dealt with in a manner inconsistent with the normal procedure for listing and testing of pharmaceutical benefits. NBSL failed to test the pituitary hormones for viral contamination. The Director-General of Health failed to insist that advice from NBSL on viral contamination be provided prior to making the recommendation to the Minister that the hormones be listed. [paras 7.155-7.156]

Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee and Special Arrangements. Although the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) made recommendations in 1964 and 1967 for listing of the hormones, it appears to have largely been circumvented as negotiations proceeded directly between members of HPAC and the Director-General of Health and the Minister. The Guidelines for approval of patients for treatment with hPG and hGH were determined by HPAC and its Subcommittees, and PBAC and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Branch of the Department do not appear to have even "rubber-stamped" the initial Guidelines or the amendments made to the Guidelines over the years.

The hormones were listed as pharmaceutical benefits distributed in accordance with "special arrangements" under section 100 of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth). Through this means it was sought to confer power upon HPAC and its Subcommittees to administer the AHPHP and determine the conditions for use of the drugs in accordance with the Guidelines and the expert judgment of committee members. However, the legislative intention behind section 100 was to make special arrangements for the provision of pharmaceutical services to persons living in isolated areas, or where convenience and efficiency indicated that pharmaceutical benefits could not be supplied in accordance with the general provisions. Section 100 makes no mention of a role for an expert committee. In other cases of use of section 100, the convenience and efficiency has been established on account of geographical difficulties, physical factors or the need for emergency supply of an antivenom. The pituitary hormones were the only section 100 benefits to be supplied in accordance with the determinations of an expert committee. The Inquiry has found that the decision to list the hormones under section 100 involved an abuse of power and was legally invalid. [paras 7.161-7.162]

Australian Drug Evaluation Committee and Adverse Drug Reactions Advisory Committee. There was no legal requirement for evaluation and recommendation by the Australian Drug Evaluation Committee (ADEC) for the CSL product since it was not an imported drug. Later, under the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), locally manufactured products were made subject to this process. However, because the hormones were pharmaceutical benefits, ADEC could have played a role, and PBAC could have requested ADEC to play a role. The Adverse Drug Reactions Advisory Committee (ADRAC) could also have played a role had it received a report of an adverse reaction, such as hyperstimulation or a multiple birth. However. no report was received by ADRAC. [paras 7.163-7.171]

"Research allocations" of hormone. Throughout the operation of the AHPHP, HPAC and its executive approved the supply of hormone for a variety of research projects. Some of these projects involved the clinical use of hGH and hPG in breach of the Guidelines for approval of patients. HPAC approved, inter alia, allocations of hPG for use in early IVF research in the "Egg Project", and of hGH for studies in malnourished Aboriginal children, a project which would have proceeded but for administrative difficulties encountered by the researcher. In approving these supplies of hormone, HPAC did not insist upon submission of a research protocol. Only from 1978 did HPAC pay attention to approval by institutional ethics committees. With minor exceptions, HPAC did not seek to reassure itself that the consent of the subjects of research had been obtained in accordance with the NHMRC Statement on Human Experimentation which was in place from 1966. [pares 7.81-7.126]

HPAC regarded this supply of hormone as authorised by an Order in Council of the Governor General made in 1969 under section 9 of the National Health Act, empowering HPAC to approve the issue of hormone for research purposes. However, this provision in the National Health Act is concerned with research services for the improvement of health or prevention of disease, and is not intended to make provision for the distribution of a pharmaceutical benefit otherwise than in accordance with the other provisions of the Act. The Inquiry has concluded that the Order in Council was made in excess of power and the research allocations of hormone were unlawful.

The HGH and FSH Subcommittees. Some decisions of the Human Growth Hormone Subcommittee (HGH Subcommittee), and to a greater extent the Follicle Stimulating Hormone Subcommittee (FSH Subcommittee), are open to criticism on ethical grounds. The HGH Subcommittee performed a difficult task of deciding upon applications for a drug which was in short supply. However. the Subcommittee introduced a scheme by which a lower dosage of hGH was permitted for patients resident in one group of states than for patients resident in the remaining states. The intention was to ascertain by a comparative study the minimum effective dosage. This scheme stepped across the line between making clinical observations and conducting a research study.

Whilst the FSH Subcommittee played a valuable role in restricting the use of hPG whose misuse by an unfamiliar practitioner could result in the death of the patient, members of the Subcommittee were in a position of conflict of interest in being approved practitioners themselves. The Subcommittee failed to pay sufficient regard to ethical considerations in: approving the use of outdated hPG in spite of a disclaimer of responsibility by CSL for its use; failing to apply adequate sanctions in cases where medical practitioners treated patients without approval or without submitting treatment forms; failing to treat hyperstimulation as a central concern of the Subcommittee rather than a matter to be left to the treating medical practitioner; failing to respond in a decisive manner to cases of multiple births or congenital abnormalities by assessing the treatment regime and laboratory facilities of the treating medical practitioner; and failing to consider cases of maternal deaths when details become available.

Regulatory failure and conflict of interest. Although the expertise of the medical practitioners who comprised HPAC and its Subcommittees made them eminently qualified to provide advice on clinical and research issues. their expertise disqualified them from serving in the role of regulator. Moreover, they failed to recognise the limits of their expertise in relation to unconventional slow viruses.

4. RESPONSE BY DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS ON CESSATION OF PROGRAM

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to examine and report on actions taken by the Commonwealth Department of Health and others, following cessation of the program, in response to reports of deaths from CJD of patients on similar programs overseas and subsequently of Australian patients.

Suspension and cessation of AHPHP. The Inquiry found that the AHPHP was suspended on 29 May 1985 following a flurry of activity from 2 April 1985 involving extraordinary meetings of HPAC and its Subcommittees and regular contact with administrators of growth hormone programs in the United States and the United Kingdom. who were in the midst of making similar decisions to halt their programs. [paras 9.01-9.19]

From 1986-1988. When the news of the suspension of the program was released, there was little information available for recipients who made telephone enquiries to the Department. A study was conducted by Dr Chapman and Professor Masters to test the capacity of the Chapman fractionation process to eliminate CJD infective agent by processing infected glands and inoculating mice with the hormone product. The result, available in 1988, showed an extremely low risk of infectivity in the final product but that did not exclude the possibility of cross-contamination within the laboratory where the processing was done. However, the test was not performed on the Ferguson method which was used throughout most of the period of the AHPHP, until 1984.

An epidemiological study of pituitary hormone recipients was commenced, but was gradually abandoned on account of lack of resources. [paras 9.20-9.38]

From 1988 to May 1993. The first death of an hPG recipient from CJD occurred in August 1988. The Department and former members of HPAC became aware of the first case during the recipient's illness. Although this first case was reported during 1989 at two professional meetings of clinical pharmacists and possibly at a neuropathology meeting' a proposed letter to The Lance' was never sent. and the case did not become widely known in the medical community until its publication in a journal in August 1990. Three more deaths of hPG recipients occurred between May 1989 and January 1991. In the first and second cases of deaths. the link between the CJD and the hormone treatment was made by medical practitioners at the time of diagnosis. In the third and fourth cases the link was made years later. Only the third and fourth cases were the subject of news releases by the Department in early 1993.

As enquiries by recipients increased in response to media attention to the issue, a CJD Unit was set up within the Department to respond to telephone calls and written requests for confirmation as to whether treatment had been received under the AHPHP. [paras 9.39-9.75]

Tracing by medical practitioners. When the AHPHP was suspended in 1985, treating medical practitioners were notified of the suspension. and requested to advise their current patients of the deaths overseas. HPG treating medical practitioners were also requested to verify a Departmental list of patients believed to have been treated by them. In November 1990 treating medical practitioners received the first request by the Department to trace and counsel their former patients. Although many were initially reluctant to do so, medical practitioners began to contact patients, particularly when they received advice from the Department that patients should be advised not to donate blood or tissue. The process of compiling mailing lists was slow. Medical practitioners had no additional resources to perform the task. Some were retired. Some took on the task on behalf of a deceased or departed colleague. They struggled to devise their own tracing methodologies, Assistance through Medicare records came too late. Many patients learned of the risk through the media and contacted their former medical practitioners first. Some of the letters sent contained incorrect information and were otherwise poorly drafted. Some of the telephone calls received by recipients caused great shock. [paras 9.76-9.134]

May 1993 to present: CJD Task Force. With the establishment of the CJD Task Force within the Department in May 1993, the pace of response improved markedly. A publication. CJD News, was issued to provide further information to recipients and medical practitioners. The out-dated Departmental database of recipients was replaced, enabling the Task Force to gain a better picture of the progress of tracing as medical practitioners advised the Department which patients had been contacted. Counselling services were established in 1993 through Marriage Guidance Australia and a National Advisory Group was established to assist in the establishment of support groups. [paras 9.220-9.240]

Duty of Department. The Inquiry has found that the Department had a moral duty to take steps to ensure that recipients were made aware of the risk when the AHPHP was suspended in 1985. Such a response would have been in accordance with the fundamental "right to know" of patients which finds its legal manifestations in freedom of information legislation and the common law duty of disclosure of medical practitioners. The Inquiry has found that in circumstances such as these, recipients should not have been left in the dark because they did not request information. The Inquiry has also found that the Department should have provided assistance in 1985 to medical practitioners through a coordinated program of tracing in connection with the epidemiological study. [paras 9.132-9.134]

Duty of medical practitioners. The common law duty has not yet recognised the extension of the duty of medical practitioners to disclose risks to cover the situation where the person at risk is no longer a patient. However, the Inquiry has taken the view that medical practitioners ought to recognise that they have such a moral duty, and has recommended accordingly a revision of NHMRC Guidelines, below at para 7(ii). [Chapter 13]

5. TRACING, IDENTIFICATION, COUNSELLING AND SUPPORT

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to make recommendations on further actions which the government might take to identify people in Australia who received the pituitary derived hormones and to provide counselling and support to them. The Inquiry has recommended:

(i) That the CJD Task Force.

Medical records. The Inquiry found that many recipients experienced serious difficulties in gaining access to their medical records. The Inquiry has recommended:

(ii) That the Commonwealth Department of Health initiate and coordinate the development of a uniform federal/state approach to access to medical records and their disposal, which

Secrecy provision in National Health Act. The Inquiry found that Departmental officers were unduly guarded in their responses to recipients who sought information about their treatment. They also declined to provide information to recipients directly, requiring that they receive information about their own treatment through a nominated medical practitioner. The Inquiry found that the responsiveness of Departmental officers to members of the public was adversely affected by the fear officers had of acting in breach of section 135A of the National Health Act, which imposes severe penalties for disclosure of medical information to third parties. This restrictive approach appeared unnecessary in the light of the unproblematic procedures for access to information followed in many state hospitals in accordance with the spirit of freedom of information legislation. [paras 9.135-9.175]

The Inquiry has recommended:

(iii) That section 135A of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) be amended; and

Counselling and support groups. Steps have already been taken by the Task Force in this area.

The Inquiry has recommended:

(iv) That the counselling service for recipients provided by Marriage Guidance Australia continue to be funded.

(v) That the National Advisory Group be replaced by an Advisory Committee with the functions of providing advice to the Task Force on:

6. REGULATION OF MEDICAL PROGRAMS

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to make recommendations on whether additional measures are necessary to regulate medical programs in the light of the experience of the pituitary hormone program and the current regulatory procedures. The Inquiry has recommended:

(i) That section 100 of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) be repealed and replaced by a provision which specifies clearly the circumstances where by reason of physical and similar factors associated with the distribution of a pharmaceutical benefit "special arrangements" are appropriate.

(ii) That the NHMRC

7. CONSENT

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to make recommendations on any measures which should be taken to strengthen the rules and guidelines relating to informed consent in similar medical programs. The Inquiry has recommended:

(i) That the NHMRC Code of Practice for Transplantation of Cadaveric Organs and Tissues be revised to set out the procedure by which hospital authorities should obtain consent from relatives for removal from cadavers of organs and tissue for therapeutic medical or scientific knowledge including for the purposes of research and medical education. The Code should include a consent form for signature by the relatives, itemising the organs and tissue to be removed and the purpose for removal in each instance.

(ii) That the NHMRC review the General guidelines for medical practitioners on providing information to patients to ascertain whether they are adequate in the light of the response made by medical practitioners to the cessation of the Australian Human Pituitary Hormone Program and the deaths of hormone recipients in Australia.

8. PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH

Terms of reference. The Inquiry was requested to make recommendations on priorities for research into matters related to CJD and its transmission. The Inquiry has recommended:

(i) That research funds be allocated for:

(ii) That the Advisory Committee monitors the approval and conduct of such research to ensure compliance with counselling procedures and with ethical standards.

June 1994

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