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Supplementary Remarks to the Report by the Joint
Select Committee on the Retailing Sector
Senator Andrew Murray : Australian Democrats : August
1999
This
postscript to the Report is written because the Committee as a whole has gone
as far as it could, and I thought it appropriate to indicate some additional
conclusions that I have come to. This should not however be taken as an
expression of dissent.
I
support the Main Report, which is unanimous and has my endorsement as a member
of that Committee.
I
wish to thank the Chair, Deputy Chair, and Secretariat for the professional and
thorough way in which this inquiry has been conducted.
A. SUMMARY AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CONSIDERATION
1. The market
This
inquiry has been dominated by a war of words between the supermarket
superpowers of retailing, and the opposing coalition of independent supermarket
and independent wholesaler interests. However, the terms of reference refer to
all retail sectors, and it is important that the Main Report’s recommendations,
and these recommendations, are seen in that light.
To
a single supermarket owner in a country town, the market is that town,
and its catchment area. To one of the major chains, the market ranges from
that very town to the whole country. Along with these geographical
distinctions go sectoral distinctions. The various specialist categories of
retail compete with each other in each retail sector, be they butchers or
florists. They also compete with multi-sectoral retail conglomerates covering
all retail categories.
The
evidence before the Committee was persuasive – that in certain markets and
retail sectors, the independent retail sector is under threat. Without
detracting at all from the strengths, professionalism and consumer benefits offered
by the major retailing chains, we have to face the fact that if a viable
independent sector is to be retained in each of the retailing sectors, then
competition policy must be tightened up.
I
accept the evidence that in a few regional markets within the supermarket
sector, the expansion of major retailers has probably reached saturation
point. In one or two regions it might even have exceeded it. In other
regional markets it is also evident that there are still opportunities for the
major retailers to expand. On the evidence before the Committee, it is
difficult to argue that the national market is saturated by the majors, with
the logical corollary therefore that national country-wide divestiture
of the major supermarket chains is required, or that there should be no
opportunity for their further growth in any regional market.
However,
to deal with any retail market concentration problem the regulator needs to
have an ability to appropriately define the retail market. The Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), has made it clear that the Trade
Practices Act (TPA) makes the definition of a market somewhat difficult.
Section 50 of the TPA does for instance clearly state that the market can be
determined for Australia as a whole, or by State or Territory. Under that
definition, a few hundred thousand people in the Northern Territory or Tasmania
can be easily categorised as a market. A defined retailing market in smaller
geographical areas such as Darwin or Hobart or any sizeable country town, or
even areas with very large populations such as defined areas of Melbourne and
Sydney do not, strictly speaking, fall within Section 50’s definition. This
does not make sense for retail markets. Retail markets always relate to
particular catchment areas or regions, and market definitions should attend to
that fact.
The
Main Report provides a very helpful recommendation to address this problem.
It
is essential the retail industry markets are identified both geographically and
sectorally as those where substantial impacts of competition can be readily
identified.
2. A Viable Independent Retail Sector
In
designing competition policy we have to determine a set of values and
principles which should guide our laws and behaviour. First amongst these
should be the recognition that monopolies or oligopolies inherently contain
within them a capacity for the abuse of market power, and should usually be
resisted where they emerge, or monitored where they already exist. Therefore a
situation such as we have in the Australian supermarket industry, where an
oligopoly is present, has to be acted upon.
Secondly,
we must acknowledge that a viable and thriving independent sector in the retail
industry is desirable of itself and that it has an economic and social value
that should not be lost.
In
retailing, this independent sector is most at threat in Australia in the
supermarket sector, where the critical mass essential to its survival is under
threat. However the trend is also emerging in non-supermarket retail sectors,
and that problem needs to be addressed to prevent such crises emerging there
too.
The
Main Report addresses these points, but does not include a formal
recommendation. It is desirable that the Government find a device -
legislative, regulatory, or a direction of some sort - to formally require the
ACCC to address the need for a viable independent retail sector, when
considering issues relevant to that need.
Recommendation
One
That
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission be required to include in
its considerations: to ensure the preservation of a viable independent sector
in retailing.
3. Market Power - (horizontal integration or market concentration).
Market
concentration entails the dominance of the market by the few. In other words
fewer competitors result. At the heart of this trend lies the danger that the
destruction of competitors will result in the destruction of competition.
Members
of the independent supermarket and independent wholesale sector have argued
that a cap should be put on the majors acquiring any further market share in
the supermarket sector. This is a difficult concept to accept because no-one
is able to determine the precise percentage of market share, after which the
critical mass essential for the survival of the independent sector is lost. It
is also the case that in some markets the majors are under represented and in
others possibly over represented. It is only through attention to the Main
Report’s recommendation for a proper retail market assessment by appropriate
geographic and population markets, that excessive concentration could be
identified.
Competition
in any retail sector is best served by a diversity of competitors and a
lowering of real barriers to entry. Barriers to entry include the difficulty
independents have in securing prime sites, particularly in regional shopping
centres.
Creeping
acquisitions have allowed the majors to achieve a market size which might have
been prohibited by the ACCC if those acquisitions had been aggregated into one
purchase, which could therefore have fallen foul of existing merger provisions
in the TPA.
The
corollary of the ACCC power to prevent mergers, has to be a power to order
divestiture. Divestiture is already accepted as a trade practices principle
(for instance, in Section 50 of the TPA). However, the ability for the ACCC or
the Courts to order a major to divest in just one over concentrated retail
market region, as opposed to within an entire state, is missing. Of course any
such action would not prevent the Majors continuing to have the opportunity for
further expansion in under represented market areas.
Recommendation
Two
That
the TPA be amended to specifically empower the ACCC to order divestiture in
regional markets which are overconcentrated. (In this regard the Main Report’s
recommendation on market definition will need to be accepted.)
Retailing
industry sectors need a ‘trigger’ market share percentage at which the ACCC
takes formal and public note of potential danger, similar to that used in
Europe. Such thresholds do not constitute an automatic declaration of market
dominance. Nor are they an automatic signal as to the existence of
anti-competitive prices, or of an abuse of power. They act instead as a
trigger to the regulator to maintain a watching brief on the company concerned.
I
consider the figure of 25% used under the United Kingdom Fair Trading Act, as
constituting a fair market power measure. If such a measure were adopted in
Australia, the ACCC would thereafter notify a company so identified that it
needed to keep the ACCC advised on all market acquisitions activity, with a
specific requirement to report to the ACCC annually, on the concentration of
market power in the markets it operates in. The ACCC could then, on its own
volition, review the company or the industry concerned. (ie the UK model).
Recommendation
Three
That
the ACCC be given a power similar to that in the United Kingdom Fair Trading
Act, to keep a specified ‘watching brief’ on companies that reach 25% market
share in substantial retail markets.
4.
Secrecy of pricing of retail space
Running
right through the evidence by retail witnesses was a theme of leasing
arrangements with landlords, and how that affected market behaviour.
I
am concerned at the existence of secret markets in Australia, namely secrecy of
the pricing of retail space made available by landlords, particularly in
shopping centres. Landlords, who may also be described as ‘retailers of
space’, often have absolute market knowledge as sellers, in contrast to the
buyers of their products, who are generally in the dark.
A
prospective consumer of almost any product can take himself or herself to the
market place for the goods they are considering purchasing, and easily obtain
the different prices of the various different products that are on offer. A
customer in a shoe shop is made aware of every price of all the shoes in the
shop. In contrast, a retailer customer wanting to rent a shop almost always
has no idea at all of the prices at which space has been sold to other
retailers in the centre.
Open
access to pricing information does not exist in the market place for retail
space. That market is the very antithesis of an open and transparent market
place, and the consequences are typical of closed and controlled markets – high
returns to the sellers, and inequitable pricing practices.
Rental
pricing has two parts; rent and outgoings. Rent is nearly always secret, a
matter between that particular tenant and landlord, while outgoings are often
on a common formula basis and are therefore also known to all tenants of that
landlord. Concern with pricing and with secrecy has to deal separately with
these two areas.
A
problem arises where landlords distinguish between the pricing of their premises
to tenants on an arbitrary basis. Discrimination in prices of retail premises
are profitable to the landlord discriminator where he or she possesses market
power, can distinguish classes of possible customers/tenants who can be obliged
to pay more than others or where that customer/tenant may find it difficult or
impossible to relocate elsewhere. The net result is inevitably an increase in
rents, which are in turn inevitably passed on to consumers.
When
looking at land pricing and rental practices, it is helpful to regard landlords
not as a special commercial category, but as another type of retailer.
Landlords are in fact simply retailers of space. Their goods are square metres
and the services that go with them. Landlords are just one more supplier to
tenants, but a supplier with unusual power.
As
a principle, secret pricing is generally a stratagem which allows the vendor
(in this instance the landlord), and those with unusual or exaggerated market
power, to maximise their returns and to unjustifiably discriminate between
similar buyers with similar needs, but differing abilities to negotiate or
pay. If those same pricing stratagems were used against customers buying
houses, cars, financial services, white goods, consumables and so on – there
would be political, social and regulatory uproar. The prices of such goods and
services is rightly non-discriminatory and public. The market badly needs the
methodology of rent pricing to also become open and widely understood. It
needs an end to secret pricing.
The
morality of land or space pricing must catch up with established moral pricing
standards of other goods and services. The very essence, the very nature of a
market, is that the range of goods and prices on display are publicly available
and known. When rent reviews are under way it is nonsense to talk of a rental
market or market values, when the market’s prices are secret. Tenants are not
even aware of other rents in the same shopping centre, never mind elsewhere.
I
endorse the comments and recommendation in the Main Report concerning tenancy.
However, that recommendation needs to be taken further.
Recommendation
Four
That
open and transparent market principles be applied to the retail property
sector, just as they do for Australian markets in general. Through the Council
of Australian Governments, the States should consider measures to implement
provisions for prospective tenants to have access to relevant tenancy schedules
of shopping centres. These should show the total occupancy costs for each
tenant in the centre and the value of any concessions or rebates given, for the
purpose of informing prospective retailer customers, for valuing retail
property, or providing advice on market rent reviews.
5. Predatory Pricing and reversing
the onus of proof under section 46 of the TPA
The
Committee received significant evidence as to the difficulty in bringing a
successful action under section 46 (which deals with misusing market power) for
predatory pricing. Witnesses consistently complained of the difficulty in
proving predatory pricing. I refer to paragraphs 6.28 to 6.35 of the Main
Report for a summary of some of the evidence received on this issue. I would
like to reiterate the comments of Professor Allan Fels, Chairman of the ACCC,
on the merits of the reversed onus of proof test. Professor Fels said:
There may be
scope for some further strengthening of section 46 in terms of that kind of
thing; that, if the effect can be shown, then there is a reverse onus of proof
on purpose. That would essentially keep it to purpose. There is a problem at
the moment with the test, in that the Commission or private litigants have to
embark on a cops and robbers type search for purpose in particular cases. They
are just not going to succeed in that, even though one has a fair idea that the
purpose is anti-competitive. So there is a case for reversing the onus without
departing from the underlying notion that, in the end, it would be a purpose
test.[1]
Despite
the fact that reversing the onus of proof is not uncommon in Australian law,
under both this Government and its predecessors, I understand that it may still
be seen as a big step to reverse the onus of proof in cases brought under
section 46. However, the nature of the claims of predatory pricing are
invariably going to take the form of a small retailer alleging misconduct on
the part of a major retailer. Proving that the purpose of a corporation is to
damage a competitor or prevent entry into a market requires a person to prove a
state of mind on the part of the directors or employees of a corporation. That
is exceptionally difficult, and results in people of such persuasion being able
to ignore the present law as of no effect.
I
would like to emphasise that a reversal of the onus of proof would only occur
after a plaintiff/applicant had established that the defendant has a
substantial degree of market power.
In
recognition of the fact that there may be apprehension as to potential for
abuse of this measure, I would see it as appropriate that the reversal of the
onus of proof would only occur in cases brought by the ACCC. That should abate
concerns that the provision could be used by vexatious or frivolous litigants
to merely put the defendant to the expense of defending the claim without
substantive wrong having been committed.
The
Committee has decided to reconsider this issue at the time of a possible review
in three years. The question is, what is expected to occur during the next
three years to either confirm or deny the need for strengthening section 46, or
that will alter the evidence the committee already has? There is nothing to
suggest that the predatory pricing practices will change or that the number of
claims of predatory pricing will decrease, or that it will somehow become
easier to prosecute a claim.
Legislating
for reversal of the onus of proof in cases brought by the ACCC will provide a
substantial disincentive for retailers to engage in that conduct whilst at the
same time ensuring that retailers are not the subject of frivolous claims.
Recommendation
Five
Section
46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 should be supplemented to
provide for a reverse onus of proof test where, once the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission has established that the firm with a substantial degree
of market power has used that power, on the motion of the ACCC the onus of
proof shifts to that firm to prove it did not use that power for a prohibited
purpose (as prescribed).
6.
Divestiture
I
have not adopted the suggestion by NARGA that there should be a cap on the
market share of the major retailers.
However,
I do believe that there is value in giving the ACCC a power to break up retail
monopolies which substantially inhibit competition, or (as is more likely in
the Australian market situation), to reduce their market power in particular
regional markets by requiring limited and selective divestiture. I take the
view that this power is a natural corollary to and extension of the ACCC’s
power under Section 50 of the TPA to prevent acquisitions which would result in
a substantial lessening of competition.
The
power should however be regarded as largely a reserve power, and as
international precedents indicate, would be seldom used. Its great virtue is
as a cautionary power, making oligopolies careful of abusing their market
power.
The
Committee remarks that:
The Committee
is therefore of the view that the break up of economies of scale and scope,
such as an order for Woolworths, Coles or Franklins to divest stores, would
lead to an unpredictable result, and may undermine the benefits and
efficiencies brought about by vertically integrated chain stores.
This
statement is presented as a concluding statement and as some sort of reason as
to why a power of divestiture is not appropriate. In my view, there is no
possibility whatsoever that a power of divestiture, such as is proposed here,
would result in the break up of the economies of scale and scope of Woolworths
or Coles.
Recommendation
Six
That
the ACCC be given the power to order divestiture where an ownership situation
exists which has the effect of substantially inhibiting competition.
7.
Trading hours
The
Committee received a substantial amount of evidence in relation to the
deregulation of trading hours. This issue has played a major role in making
the independent sector vulnerable and less viable. The theme was that small
independent retailers are being pushed out of the grocery retailing market as
the majors extend their trading hours and the public gravitate towards the
majors away from the small independents.
What
is more, the Majors have been leaders in the lobbying campaign for deregulated
trading hours, expressed at its most extreme by the push for twenty-four hour
seven day trading.
There
is also a considerable social impact to the extent that owner/operators of
independent grocers are forced to maintain longer hours just to keep up with
the major retailers.
It
should not pass unnoticed that the State with the largest independent sector,
Western Australia, has managed the issue of trading hours better than the rest
of Australia. In my view, there is a clear link between the dominance of the
majors, and the extent of trading hours deregulation.
State
governments need to take much greater account of the social and economic
impacts of deregulated trading hours than has previously occurred.
B. SOME SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS
TO THE MAIN REPORT, ON COMPETITION
The
Main Report itself has very useful analysis of many components of competition
theory and practice. Consequently these supplementary remarks are confined to
a number of discrete areas, and of course, remain supportive of the Main
Report.
The
role of competition in the market place is not just the improvement of prices,
products and choice, but the preservation of a diversity of competitors, even
where some are identifiably less efficient than others. Economists, such as
those of the University of Chicago[2],
tell us that “societies that promote vigorous competition among private
companies have lower prices, better products, and greater consumer choice”[3].
These characteristics are not altruistic, but arise from enlightened self
interest. Those same economists also accept that not every successful
competitor needs to be at the same standard of economic efficiency.
Lower
prices are an effort on the part of a company to gain new customers or retain
existing customers through offering goods or services at cheaper prices than
their competitors. Better quality products, or new products are an effort on
the part of the company to maintain their present customer base or obtain new
customers through a reputation for quality service or product. Greater choice
is the product of competition in any given market, with a number of companies
offering a range of products or services in an attempt to attract and satisfy
the customer.
While
the most important measure of effective competition is whether the market
satisfies the needs of the consumer, that can in some circumstances be provided
by a benevolent monopoly. However, society as a whole would be very much the
poorer if it did not have the diversity and opportunity that many competitors
bring to the market place.
When
one company begins to dominate any given market, or when a small group of
companies work themselves into a position of dominance, this is not necessarily
an example of market failure in the formal sense of that phrase, but it can
still be an undesirable social and economic outcome. Dominance of a market
occurs when a company, or a group of companies, are able to exercise excessive
market power.
The
ACCC, in their submission, defined market power as:
“The ability
of a firm to behave persistently in a manner different from the behaviour that
a competitive market would enforce on a corporation facing otherwise similar
cost and demand conditions. That is, market power is the ability of a firm or
firms profitably to divert prices, quality, variety, service or innovation from
their competitive levels for a significant period of time[4].
This
type of market power, in a situation of dominance, is beyond the reach of other
competitors in the market, leaving them at a serious disadvantage.
There
are three areas in which market dominance and the exercise of market power can
be exercised, one relating to the competitors in the market, one to the
suppliers, and the other relating to the consumers.
With
regard to competitors, the dominant group or company in a marketplace can
wipe-out or buy-out its smaller competitors, and effectively eliminate their
competition, creating a situation of market monopolisation, or in the case of a
group, market oligopoly. In other words, they don’t just eliminate
competitors, but in the end they can eliminate competition itself.
With
regard to suppliers, in a market where market power exists, suppliers face
problems when the company possessing market power uses this power to demand
selective discriminatory discounts on purchases. Small or vulnerable suppliers
may fall victim to changes in contract or trading terms with little to no negotiation
in the process.
With
regard to consumers, with the elimination of competition and the establishment
of monopoly or oligopoly, the benefits of competition of lower prices, better
products, and greater choice that flow on to the consumer are eliminated or
reduced. This is because the monopolist “can restrict output and raise prices
so as to increase their own profitability at the expense of consumers”[5],
who are left with little choice but to purchase from the monopolist.
Looking
at this scenario, dry economic theorists might claim that this is the market at
work, with inefficient players being eliminated and the more efficient
companies expanding their share of the market as they defeat their
competition. In their eyes, any dominance or monopoly that one player is able
to exert in the market is purely temporary because the high profits that they
are able to extract from an anti-competitive market will attract new
competitors[6].
They
would also claim that market forces serve to eliminate “firms that are
inefficient or fail to respond to the changing wants and needs of consumers
(which) will be replaced through the entry of more efficient and responsive
firms”[7].
Under
this theory, free markets will themselves erode monopolies, and serve to keep
the market efficient through the elimination of those companies that cannot
capitalise on efficiency gains and adapt to the changing needs of the market.
The
Chicago theorists make the further claim that a company may not actually seek
to raise prices once they have established a dominant position, because this
would attract other competitors to the market. (Over the long run that may
indeed occur, but in the real world barriers to entry act to stop or delay this
happening.) They may instead seek to forestall competition by setting prices,
which while still high, might still be as though they were engaged in a
competitive market[8],
thus not obviously disadvantaging the consumer.
Perfect
competition, as expressed in economic theory, does not exist in markets such as
those subject to this inquiry.
The
abuse of market power can result from predatory or intimidatory pricing, to fix
pricing levels in a particular market. Then there is the practice of demanding
prices and terms from suppliers which results in a forced differentiation
between their retail customers, a differentiation the supplier would otherwise
not have contemplated. Suppliers themselves may charge retail customers of
similar standing different prices for goods of like grade or quality[9].
The questions that are posed by Ann Everton, law lecturer at Leeds University,
become especially relevant in instances of dominance and excessive market power
in the marketplace:
“Should or
should not free competition be encouraged to the point that it leads to the
further increase of an already sizeable monopoly, and hence to the very
destruction of competition? Secondly, should or should not some limit be set
to the promotion of free competition in order to ensure that the competition
also be fair?”[10]
Governments
in various countries have found it necessary to adopt one of three possible
broad policy approaches when dealing with the problems of market power and
dominance within the marketplace. In contrast to other industries in
Australia, it could be argued that retailing has mostly been subject to the
laissez-faire approach – to mostly leave the market well alone. This can
result in situations of dominance and subsequent oligopoly or monopoly, as well
as disparities in wealth and income distribution. It leaves markets free, but
it opens the door to them quickly becoming unfair.
The
public supervision approach has lost favour in Australia, where strict
regulation of key or sensitive markets, possibly through government ownership
of key industries, has declined. Industries such as electricity, water, or
telecommunications, are in this category, and restricted licensing systems
such as for pharmacies and liquor.
Much
of the work of the ACCC and Australian Governments covers the regulatory
approach, where the government recognises the imperfections of real markets,
and takes responsibility for ensuring that competition among the private firms
within the market is sustained. Yet the government does not interfere with the
decisions of price and output.[11]
The
stated purpose of the Trade Practices Act 1974 is to promote competition
and fair trading within the marketplace, as well as providing some form of
protection for consumers.
The
approach adopted in Australia is very similar to that of other OECD economies,
in that many countries may possess laws that have ‘monopolisation’, ‘abuse of
dominance’ or ‘misuse of market power’ provisions which do not directly
prohibit monopolies or the possession of market power, but the abuse of this
privileged position[12].
At
the OECD Competition Policy Roundtables in 1996, the preamble to the United
States paper stated that:
“Size or power
alone is not illegal, the firm must have engaged in certain monopolistic or
anti-competitive conduct; and some monopolies will escape condemnation under
the statute because they were a consequence of success in the market, untainted
by impermissible conduct”[13].
However,
there is an important underpinning to this statement. While size or power
alone are not only not illegal, but are highly desirable because of economies
of scale, nevertheless size alone is a signal to be alert to the
potential for an abuse of market power.
Section
46 of the TPA specifically states that any corporation with a substantial
degree of power in a market shall not take advantage of that power for any of
three enumerated purposes:
(a) Eliminating or substantially
damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a body corporate that is related
to the corporation in that or any other market;
(b) Preventing the entry of a
person into that or any other market; or
(c) Deterring or preventing a
person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other market.[14]
Section
50 of the TPA prohibits acquisitions that have the effect or likely effect of
substantially lessening competition[15].
By this means, the Act is attempting to curb the elimination of competition in
the marketplace through the acquisition of competitors. In determining the
extent to which the acquisition lessens competition in a market, a number of
matters must be taken into account, such as:
- Entry barriers to the market;
- Market concentration levels;
- The power of competitors in the
market;
- The likelihood the acquisition
would result in the acquirer attaining market power;
- Market dynamics, such as growth,
innovation and differentiation of product;
- Whether the acquisition would
remove a substantial market competitor; and
- The nature and extent of vertical
integration in the market[16].
When
the level of concentration is taken into account, ACCC guidelines state that
where the post merger market share of a merged firm is 15% or more, and the
share of the four or fewer largest firms is 75% or more, the Commission will
want to investigate the merger further before being satisfied it does not
result in a substantial lessening of competition[17].
Mergers
are therefore readily dealt with under this law, and under ACCC guidelines.
Small accumulative incremental or ‘creeping’ acquisitions, which have the same
effect as mergers in reality, are not.
The
United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (OFT), in their Competition in
Retailing report suggest that when trying to analyse questions of
competition in retailing, a certain framework should be taken[18].
The
United Kingdom, under its Fair Trading Act 1973, empowers the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT) to investigate monopoly situations in one of two possible
monopoly situations, these being:
- Scale Monopoly – one person or
firm controls 25% of the supply or acquisition of goods or services of a
particular kind; and
- Complex Monopoly – where a number of
firms together make up 25%.
These
25% thresholds do not indicate market dominance in themselves. Instead they
act as a trigger for the OFT to refer the matter for investigation by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission into the ramifications of the market share
that a company holds, and whether it results in negative effects on competition
or the consumers[19].
The
use of national market share data is less commonplace in the United States,
where competition authorities take a more local and regional focus when
considering market concentration levels following the merging of companies[20].
This
is markedly different from the approach of the ACCC, which has indicated in its
submission that, in the retailing sector at least, the major chains are
national competitors, and ACCC decisions are made at a national level. The
result of the ACCC stance with regard to the major chains is that the market is
defined nationally, as opposed to any statewide, regional or local definition[21].
That is a failing.
NARGA
has called for a market cap. NARGA has said that in their view a market cap
would be modelled on “United States anti-trust-style sanctions”[22].
However, United States anti-trust laws do not create artificial barriers to
market expansion using market share as the only or main measure of competition
levels. The point of the US anti-trust laws, as interpreted by the US courts,
is to prevent unreasonable and unfair methods being employed by companies
establishing a position of market power. A practice is deemed illegitimate if
it restricts competition in some significant way and has no overriding business
justification, as activities which are likely to harm consumers through
increased prices, reduced availability of goods or services, lowered quality or
service, or stifled innovation[23].
Senator
Andrew Murray
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