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Chapter 8 - The adequacy of cross-jurisdictional databases
Introduction
8.1
Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Australia and throughout the world are
highly dependent upon their ability to store, access, share and manage information
and intelligence, and much of the evidence received by the inquiry concerned
the operability and effectiveness of the databases used by Australian LEAs.
8.2
Many agencies identified limitations in the operation of existing
databases and called for improvements to arrangements for the sharing and
management of information and intelligence by Australian LEAs. Improving the
performance of cross-jurisdictional databases is widely regarded as critical in
combating organised crime, and Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon, Victoria Police,
provided a succinct expression of this view:
...serious organised crime is growing and moving far beyond our
borders and even internationally. As we face this challenge, having better
access to databases and information is important.[1]
Databases in Australia
The difference between information,
intelligence and case management
8.3
In order to understand the committee's consideration of the adequacy of
Australian databases, it is critical to clearly distinguish between information
databases, intelligence databases and case management systems. Each of these is
an essential policing tool, and together they provide an operational capability
that LEAs need to successfully fight organised crime in Australia.
8.4
Information databases are collections of a class or classes of information,
which are sometimes referred to as 'involvements'. For example, DNA databases,
fingerprint databases and child sex offender databases are all information
databases. Information databases therefore provide police access to basic facts
or data that relate to an aspect of operational policing.
8.5
Intelligence databases are more complex collections of data that may
have had some value added by some type of analysis or treatment. Alternatively,
they are systems that allow links to be drawn between pieces of information.
For example, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID), which allows
linkages and associations to be drawn between disparate pieces of information,
is an intelligence database. Intelligence databases therefore allow LEAs to
manage and analyse information that relates to investigations and operational
policing.
8.6
Case management systems are for bringing together offence related
information and intelligence to assist with the investigation of a particular
offence. For example, PROMIS, which is the AFP's case management system, allows
a file to be created for the investigation of, say, a murder. This file allows
investigating police to store and manage on PROMIS any information and
intelligence from other systems related to that murder. Case management systems
are therefore a key operational and investigative tool used by police to
investigate a specific offence.
Adequacy of information and intelligence databases and case management
systems
8.7
Currently, Australia has many separate information and intelligence
databases and case management systems, largely as a result of each Australian
jurisdiction establishing and maintaining its own systems and technologies. This
has led to a common deficiency in the ability of police to access and exchange data
between different jurisdictions and/or technologies. Deputy Commissioner John Lawler,
National Security, Australian Federal Police, noted that the vulnerability of
present databases lies wherever two jurisdictions cannot easily retrieve
relevant information from each other, and this is the central and most
important issue identified concerning the question of the adequacy of Australia's
law enforcement databases.[2]
8.8
The different legislative and technological frameworks of jurisdictions
impact negatively upon what and how data can be shared by police. Assistant
Commissioner Wayne Gregson, Portfolio Head, Specialist Crime Portfolio,
Western Australia Police, highlighted the implications of this:
...different states have different databases designed around their
different legislation, which means that law enforcement tends to be a secondary
consideration of the information holdings...[consequently there] is a large
number of disparate databases holding different tranches of information.[3]
8.9
In light of the national and transnational character of organised crime
groups and their activities, it is self-evident that limitations in access to
and exchange of data between databases will be exploited by organised crime, and
will disadvantage multi-jurisdictional investigations. The Police Federation of
Australia submission cites recent criticisms of Australia's 'jurisdictional
differences', which continue to frustrate the goal of fully operational national
databases.[4]
Information databases
8.10
Table 8.1 shows the major information databases in Australia, their type,
accessibility, funding and operational status.
Table 8.1: Information databases in Australia
|
Database
|
Type of database
|
Agency
|
Accessible by
|
Funded by
|
Status
|
|
National Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(NAFIS)
|
Information. NAFIS also has a data-matching capability
|
CrimTrac
|
AFP, state and territory
police forces.
Host system for AFMA illegal fishers fingerprints
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the National Criminal
History Record Checking (NCHRC) Service
|
Operational
|
|
National Criminal Investigation DNA
Database (NCIDD)
|
Information. The NCIDD contains DNA profile information and has a data-matching
capability
|
CrimTrac
|
All jurisdictions' forensic laboratories
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the NCHRC Service
|
Operational
|
|
CrimTrac Police Reference System (CPRS): Person
Index
(known as the Minimum Nation-wide Person Profile
(MNPP) Project)
|
Information. General identity information and specific involvement
details relating to persons
|
CrimTrac
|
Accessible by AFP, state and territory police; currently rolled out
to all Victoria Police
|
The MNPP Project is funded from a mix of monies from the federal, CrimTrac
and police jurisdictions
Funding for ongoing support and enhancements to CPRS is yet to be determined
|
Currently being rolled out to all jurisdictions (to be completed by
July 2008)
|
|
Australian National Child Offender Register (ANCOR)
|
Information;case management.
Supports registration, case- management and sharing of information
about registrable child offenders
|
CrimTrac
|
AFP and state and territory
police forces
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the NCHRC Service
|
Operational
|
|
National Names Index (NNI)
|
Information.
Provides a national view of persons of interest
|
CrimTrac
|
AFP, state and territory police
forces, ACC, ICAC, ACS, ASIC, NSWCC, and QCMC. Access to NNI is also
provided from individual police jurisdictions to state-based justice and law
enforcement authorities
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the NCHRC Service
|
Operational.
To be replaced by the CPRS
|
|
National Firearms Licensing and Registration System
(NFLRS)
|
Information.
Enables police to retrieve firearms related information about a
person
|
CrimTrac
|
AFP, state and territory
police forces, ACC, NSWCC, ICAC, ACS, and QCMC
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the NCHRC Service
|
Operational.
To be replaced by the CPRS
|
|
National Vehicles of Interest (NVOI) System
|
Information.
Records and tracks vehicles and driver licence information
|
CrimTrac
|
AFP, state and territory
police forces
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the NCHRC Service
|
Operational.
To be replaced by the CPRS
|
|
Telephone Directory Service (TDS)
|
Information.
Provides searching function by names, telephone numbers and addresses
|
CrimTrac
|
AFP, state and territory police
forces, ACC, NSWCC, ICAC, ACS, QCMC, and ASIC
|
CrimTrac is largely self- funded through the NCHRC Service
|
Operational
|
Improving the adequacy of information databases
CrimTrac
8.11
Australia has recognised the inadequate interoperability of police
databases for some time. The central strategy to improve these databases is to
seek improvements to the sharing of and access to data across the different systems,
rather than to attempt to create a single, monolithic database covering all
types of data across the whole of Australia.[5]
8.12
Accordingly, in 2000, CrimTrac was explicitly established 'to allow
police forces across Australia to share information to solve crimes and catch
criminals.'[6]
CrimTrac is not a repository of information or a database per se, but works by
facilitating the exchange of information across different jurisdictions and
technologies. Mr Ben McDevitt, CEO of CrimTrac, told the committee:
CrimTrac is merely the conduit. We do not put any information
onto the system. All we do is provide the connectivity so...[agencies] can share
the information.[7]
8.13
CrimTrac's central aim is:
...to enhance Australian law enforcement with an emphasis on
information based policing facilitated through rapid access to detailed current
and accurate police information.[8]
8.14
CrimTrac's mandate has been recently expanded to encompass a national
role in promoting and facilitating information sharing:
...under the CrimTrac strategic plan 2007Â10, CrimTrac has been
given a mandate by police ministers to take a leadership role in generating
national approaches to information-sharing solutions for law enforcement
agencies for a safer Australia. It is a fairly fundamental shift. The new
vision takes CrimTrac from being purely an IT shop...to a broker for
information-sharing solutions essentially for police jurisdictions but also
increasingly for broader law enforcement.[9]
8.15
Given its genesis, expertise and charter, the committee considers
CrimTrac to be the logical focus of any effort to improve the inadequacy of
current information databases. Mr Mark Burgess, Chief Executive Officer, Police
Federation of Australia, supported this view, saying:
...a real opportunity now exists for CrimTrac to play a more
significant and meaningful role...providing information sharing solutions for law
enforcement right across the country...CrimTrac should be fully developed to
become the key hub for exchanges of law enforcement information between
Australia’s police jurisdictions and broader law enforcement.[10]
8.16
Chief Commissioner Nixon noted that CrimTrac has already contributed to
the inter-jurisdictional capacity for information sharing:
What we have started to see...is the growth of a system to...help us
share information...[CrimTrac] has gone some distance towards helping develop
these national systems in...local police offices...[11]
Minimum Nation-wide Person Profile
8.17
One of the most important CrimTrac systems from an operational policing perspective
is the Minimum Nation-wide Person Profile (MNPP). The MNPP is intended to allow
the sharing of information about persons of interest between all Australian police
jurisdictions. It is currently being rolled out nationally to replace the
National Names Index.[12]
Law enforcement personnel will access the MNPP via in-car or station based
computers to:
- access information about a person of interest from another
jurisdiction; and
- perform nation-wide searches using name and/or other identifying
information.
8.18
As a collection of information related to persons of interest, the MNPP currently
consists of 11 agreed datasets or 'involvements'. These are:
- persons on warrant;
- wanted persons;
- persons subject of a warning;
- persons on bail;
- persons subject of an order;
- escapees;
- persons with an offence history;
-
persons linked to firearms;
- unidentified persons/bodies;
- missing persons; and
- persons on the Australian National Child Offender Register.
8.19
The MNPP is to be accessible across all Australian jurisdictions by the
end of July 2008, and will be the main information source around persons of
interest for operational police.[13]
Mr McDevitt stressed that the MNPP is a valuable tool and a significant
improvement on current capabilities.[14]
Expanding the Minimum Nation-wide
Person Profile
8.20
A number of witnesses suggested that, where gaps in access, sharing or
interconnectivity between databases exist, these should be addressed by the
addition of new datasets to the MNPP. In particular, the committee considered the
possible addition of Aviation Security Identification Cards (ASICs), Maritime
Security Identification Cards (MSICs), explosives licences and ammonium nitrate
licences.
8.21
Mr McDevitt explained that there are no technical impediments to
expanding the number of datasets in the MNPP:
...there would be no reason why technically the MNPP could not
include someone as a person of interest because they were the owner of a pilot’s
licence or because they held an explosives licence or because they had an ASIC
or so on.[15]
8.22
However, it was noted by several witnesses that privacy issues would
need to be resolved before the MNPP is expanded by the addition of new datasets.[16]
Chief Commissioner Nixon argued that, as with any new initiative, a business
case would also need to be developed.[17]
The Department of Transport and Regional Services also referred to this
requirement:
...for the information to be included in the MNPP a policy
justification would be required for the...new elements of information...to be
added. This would need to be approved by policing jurisdictions.[18]
8.23
The Victoria Police observed that cost would also be a factor in
considering what new datasets to add to the MNPP:
...[it is possible to] think of regulated activity across
Australia over all sorts of industries that could add value to a national
information dataset...we could make a list of 100 things that would be of value
to add to CrimTrac—but, at the end of the day, it is all about cost...[19]
8.24
The committee sees much value in continuing to improve the information
available to LEAs to assist their operations in an increasingly complex crime environment,
and considers the MNPP to be the most appropriate database on which new
datasets could be held. The committee acknowledges that a number of policy,
legislative, privacy and administrative issues will need to be addressed as
part of any proposed expansion of the MNPP.
Recommendation 17
8.25
The committee recommends that CrimTrac be funded to examine the legislative,
administrative and technical aspects to allow the inclusion of additional
datasets to the Minimum Nation-wide Person Profile; particular consideration
should be given to Aviation Security Identification Cards, Maritime Security
Identification Cards, explosives licences and ammonium nitrate licences.
Funding of CrimTrac
8.26
CrimTrac was originally established by a $50 million capital injection
from the Commonwealth Government. This money has been fully expended and CrimTrac
now relies on revenue from its National Criminal Record Checking (NCHRC) service
and subscriptions from jurisdictions for funding.
8.27
A number of witnesses to the inquiry raised concerns over the
sustainability of the current CrimTrac funding model:
...while there was initial funding from the federal government to
establish CrimTrac...by and large, CrimTrac survives on income from criminal
history checks. There is no further major influx of funds, which...we think...is required...[20]
8.28
Commissioner Keelty noted that some of CrimTrac's work is, and should
continue to be, supported from the proceeds of crime.[21]
The rollout of the MNPP, for example, is one such case of funding.[22]
8.29
The CrimTrac submission notes that the organisation aims to be
financially secure and not reliant on the vagaries of police service budgets. The
CrimTrac board is currently considering a new model for delivery of its NCHRC
service, which could have implications for CrimTrac’s funding.[23]
8.30
The committee notes CrimTrac's critical role in improving Australia's
police databases through 'generating national approaches to information-sharing
solutions for law enforcement agencies'.[24]
Given this, the committee is concerned at the potential for the agency's
reliance on self-funding to significantly undermine its ability to deliver on its
services and stated aims, and to undertake forward planning. Because the
current self-funding model could create a range of vulnerabilities, the stable long-term
financial sustainability of CrimTrac is an issue that should be considered and
addressed.
Recommendation 18
8.31
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government review CrimTrac's
current funding model in order to provide it with a greater level of funding
certainty.
National automatic number plate
recognition system
8.32
The committee heard calls for the establishment of a national automatic
number plate recognition system. This would be a form of information database,
with a data-matching facility to enable the system to 'recognise' plates of
interest.[25]
Mr Burgess advised the committee that such a system:
...has the potential to revolutionise policing across Australia,
with huge benefits for crime prevention, reduction and investigation as well as
for national security and border protection activities.[26]
8.33
The automatic number plate recognition system would be comprised of
cameras monitoring movements on roads. Mr McDevitt explained:
[The system would use]...technology that is utilised at the moment
by...safety cam where trucks move between point A and point B too quickly and
then get identified through their number plates...[E]ach organisation would put
up a list of vehicles of interest to them and...when a vehicle of interest to
them crossed one of these sites it would raise a flag.[27]
8.34
Mr Milroy said the system would be a 'valuable' tool for police and that
it would complement and enhance the operation of the ACC's current intelligence
systems:
...intelligence can be drawn from the [automatic number plate
recognition system]...into our database...on vehicle movements which would then
link up with information that we hold on individuals or on vehicles being used
in organised crime. So that connection and the transfer of the data is
something that we will be working on together in relation to the development of
their project.[28]
8.35
The committee notes the allocation of proceeds of crime funding for a
scoping study into a national automatic number plate recognition system, and
supports the development of such a capability. Such a system could provide
significant benefits to all Australian police services and law enforcement related
agencies for crime prevention, detection and reduction.
Recommendation 19
8.36
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth, state and territory
governments implement a national number plate recognition system.
Intelligence databases
8.37
Table 8.2 shows the major intelligence databases in Australia, their
type, accessibility, funding and operational status.
Table 8.2: Intelligence databases in Australia
|
Database
|
Type of database
|
Agency
|
Accessible by
|
Funded by
|
Status
|
|
Australian Criminal Intelligence (ACID) database
|
Intelligence. ACID allows information reports to be searched and
analysed for links and associations
|
ACC
|
ACC, AFP, state and territory police forces and agencies
|
Commonwealth
|
Operational
|
|
Australian Identity Fraud Protection Register
(AIFPR)
|
Intelligence. The AIFPR collects information on fraudulent identities
and victims of identity theft
|
ACC
|
ACC, AFP, state and territory police forces and agencies
|
Commonwealth
|
Operational
|
|
Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (ViCLAS)
|
Intelligence. ViCLAS allows the collection and analysis of
information on violent crimes
|
ACC
|
ACC, AFP, state and territory police forces and agencies
|
Commonwealth
|
Operational
|
Improving the adequacy of information databases
8.38
Table 8.2 shows that the ACC administers the Australian Criminal
Intelligence Database, the Australian Identity Fraud Protection Register and
the Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System.
8.39
The ACC stands as Australia's premier effort in recent times to improve
the creation of, access to and exchange of intelligence data across all
Australian jurisdictions. The ACC annual report for 2005-06 notes that the
commission 'aims to bring together all facets of intelligence gathering'
through its role in collecting, analysing and disseminating criminal
intelligence.[29]
Contribution by state and territory
jurisdictions to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database
8.40
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) is a 'secure,
centralised, national repository for criminal intelligence',[30]
and is the 'major system for sharing intelligence between Commonwealth, state
and territory law enforcement agencies'.[31]
The committee heard that, because contribution to ACID is inconsistent, it is
not functioning at its optimum potential. The Australian Transaction Reports
and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) submission notes:
The intelligence value of ACID is limited in that only a small
number of law enforcement agencies within Australia place intelligence onto the
system.[32]
8.41
The input of some jurisdictions to ACID is high, and these jurisdictions
have recognised the operational value of fully utilising and continuing to
expand ACID's capacity. The NSW Police Commissioner, Mr Ken Moroney, told the
committee:
...the NSW Police Force seeks to enhance its own capacity and the
capacity of the ACC to improve the range and volume of data capable of being
uploaded into...ACID.[33]
8.42
Similarly, Mr John Visser, General Manager, Intelligence, AUSTRAC, told
the committee that AUSTRAC found ACID highly useful, and that it would be
improved by increasing contributions to it:
...we find...[ACID] very useful in our analysis of our own data...[T]he
more criminal intelligence that finds its way to [ACID]...would benefit us to
discern the financial players we observe as leaning more towards the criminal...[W]e
would find great value in more criminal intelligence being available to us.[34]
8.43
The Attorney-General's Department agreed that the 'utility of existing
databases depends upon the extent to which participating agencies upload
information', but advised the committee that the issue is currently being
addressed:
...work is underway to improve the use of existing databases
across the law enforcement community, most notably [ACID]...While the use of ACID
is substantial and growing each year, it could be better utilised by some
agencies, and work is underway to address this. Better utilisation of ACID will
improve the sharing of intelligence with immediate effect...[35]
Cultural issues
8.44
A number of witnesses identified 'cultural issues' as the reason for the
under-utilisation of ACID. The committee was informed that the Wheeler review
into aviation security recommended that a comprehensive examination of
Commonwealth, state and territory law and practices be undertaken to ensure
that there were no inhibitors to the exchange of information and intelligence
between agencies. Mr Keith Holland, First Assistant Secretary, Security and
Critical Infrastructure Division, Attorney-General’s Department, told the
committee:
[The review concluded]...that primarily the inhibitor to the
exchange of information was a cultural one rather than a legislative one...[and] that
there were cultural inhibitors...such as the reluctance of agencies to share
information either because of a silo mentality or because of their concern
about how the information that they exchanged would be dealt with...[36]
8.45
Mr McDevitt agreed that cultural inhibitors around information sharing reflected
unresolved key issues, such as security and privacy concerns around how information
is stored and shared:
The most onerous challenges are...cultural ones associated with
individual and organisational stances on the sharing of information and on
finding the balance between need-to-know and need-to-share principles...There is...a
general recognition that the question is no longer whether to share or not to
share; rather, it is what to share and how to share.[37]
8.46
Mr Milroy suggested that perceived cultural barriers might also be
attributed to a lack of appropriate training and knowledge among the
individuals who collect and input data into a given database:
[Cultural issues]...probably have more to do with that fact that...there
are processes that have to be put in place, because the greatest failure is the
human failure. It is the inability of individual intelligence collectors to
understand what they are collecting, how it should be collected and how it
should be then inputted into a database.[38]
8.47
Assistant Commissioner Tony Harrison, Crime Service, South Australia
Police, acknowledged that 'territorialism' and a silo mentality within LEAs had
contributed to under-utilisation of intelligence databases, but noted that such
cultural barriers have diminished in recent years:
...I have also detected in the last two or three years far more
cooperation, which is probably induced by the approach to terrorism. Agencies
are working better together and more closely to exchange information.[39]
8.48
The committee notes the recent substantial changes to the law
enforcement environment. The establishment of the ACC and CrimTrac has contributed
not only to greater cooperation and sharing around intelligence but also to keener
appreciation of the value and importance of intelligence to responding
effectively to serious and organised crime. Legitimate operational and privacy
concerns aside, the committee feels that the present inter-agency arrangements
around intelligence sharing are adequate and improving. While the committee
will continue to take a close interest in the cooperative aspects of police
culture, present arrangements appear to be assisting with the removal of the
adverse cultural factors identified.
Privacy issues
8.49
The committee received a submission from the Privacy Commissioner, Ms Karen
Curtis, advising that the ACC's intelligence holdings are exempt from the
provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The submission notes:
...the Privacy Act includes exceptions that allow for intelligence
collection that recognises the appropriate balance between privacy and...the
safety and security of the community.[40]
8.50
Ms Curtis suggested that the ACC should consider using the principles of
the Privacy Act 1988 to govern its handling of data. The Privacy
Commissioner submitted that such an approach would strike an appropriate
balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and privacy:
...consideration should be given to ensuring that an appropriate
balance is struck between the need to collect personal information to
facilitate security and safety and an individual’s general right to control the
collection and handling of their personal information.[41]
8.51
The committee observes that the adoption of the protocol suggested by
the Privacy Commissioner is an appropriate means of ensuring that the ACC,
although exempted from the Privacy Act 1988, ensures appropriate
protection of intelligence data wherever possible.
Recommendation 20
8.52
The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission give
consideration to the extent to which its information handling protocols
incorporate, and could be enhanced by, the principles of the Privacy Act
1988 (Cth).
Case management systems
8.53
Table 8.3 shows the major case management systems in Australia, their
type, accessibility, funding and operational status.
Table 8.3: Police case management systems in Australia
|
System
|
Type of system
|
Agency
|
Accessible by
|
Funded by
|
Status
|
|
PROMIS
|
Case management
|
AFP
|
AFP, ACT Police and Northern Territory Police
|
State
|
Operational
|
|
LEAP
|
Case management
|
Victoria Police
|
Victoria Police
|
State
|
Operational
|
|
QPRIME
|
Case management
|
Queensland Police Service
|
Queensland Police Service
|
State
|
Operational
|
|
COPS
|
Case management
|
New South Wales Police
Service
|
New South Wales Police
Service
|
State
|
Operational
|
|
IMS
|
Case management
|
Western Australia Police
|
Western Australia Police
|
State
|
Operational
|
|
ORS
|
Case management
|
Tasmania Police
|
Tasmania Police
|
State
|
Operational
|
|
PIMS
|
Case management
|
South Australia
|
South Australia Police
|
State
|
Operational
|
Improving the adequacy of case management systems
8.54
Case management systems are a critical investigative and operational
tool for police. These systems allow the bringing together in a single file of separate
pieces of information or intelligence related to an offence. Mr McDevitt
stressed the critical role of these systems in day-to-day policing:
...case management systems...[are] the backbone [of policing]...It is
about: ‘I’m going to a burglary. This is so-and-so’s house. There is a car
outside. I want to know about the car. I want to know about the people and all
sorts of things. I want to know about fingerprints and DNA.’ So ultimately
everything links into the case management system...[42]
8.55
Mr McDevitt told the committee that each Australian jurisdiction currently
has its own case management system, and that these systems 'do not talk to each
other in any sort of concerted way'.[43]
Deputy Commissioner Lawler outlined the consequences of having separate case
management systems:
Where we have...an active ongoing investigation...between two
jurisdictions...[and] the jurisdictions put their information into...separate
investigational databases, that is a potential vulnerability...[44]
8.56
A number of witnesses highlighted the need for a single or centralised
national case management system to give police officers on the street access to
nationally comprehensive information. Mr Burgess stressed the importance of
national consistency:
...the constable on the street...in Canberra...[should be able to]
access...information that is vital to them, in the same way as the constable on
the street in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne or anywhere else around Australia.[45]
8.57
Mr Burgess offered an example of the consequences of national case
management data not being readily available to law enforcement officers:
[One example is]...the shooting of offender William Watkins at
Karratha in Western Australia in early 2005...Watkins had three days earlier
murdered sisters Colleen and Laura Irwin in Melbourne. He had then driven 5½
thousand kilometres...to Western Australia, where he came under the notice of Senior
Constable Shane Gray at Karratha for failing to pay for petrol. When Gray did
a check on Watkins via the Western Australian police computer system he was not
shown as wanted or a suspect on the system. Unfortunately, of course, he was on
the Victorian police system, but that was not accessible through the Western
Australian system. Watkins attacked Gray and tried to get hold of his firearm. Gray,
the senior constable, was seriously injured in the incident, and Watkins was
eventually shot and killed.[46]
8.58
The committee heard that the failings of having multiple case management
systems are most pronounced at jurisdictional borders. Mr McDevitt provided the
following example:
...if you have a single burglar who lives on a border—it could be
Albury-Wodonga or somewhere up north, Tweed Heads-Coolangatta—they could be
moving back and forth across the state border committing crimes. Despite the
best efforts of police...there is not a single case management system nationally
which automatically would ensure that that information was shared.[47]
8.59
The committee believes that the development of a single national case
management system should be given the highest priority, and is particularly
concerned by the suggestion that, even if a commitment by all jurisdictions to a
national case management system were secured, its development and
implementation could take as long as a decade.[48]
The committee considers that the Commonwealth Government should provide funding
to enable a comprehensive feasibility study to be conducted into the priority development
of a single national case management system.
Recommendation 21
8.60
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government provide
funding for a feasibility study into the development of a single national case
management system.
Recommendation 22
8.61
The committee recommends that the Ministerial Council for Police and
Emergency Management—Police give consideration and support to the development
of a single national case management system.
Conclusion
8.62
Information and intelligence databases and case management systems
provide distinct capacities that are crucial for the ability of law enforcement
to combat organised crime. Information systems allow police to store and search
systematically particular classes of data to determine, for example, whether a
suspect has prior offences. Intelligence systems allow data to be managed and
analysed in order to increase its investigative or operational value, such as
by identifying links between crime groups. Case management systems are the
critical system for operational police, allowing information and intelligence
relevant to individual offences to be brought together and managed on a single
system. The committee concurs with Chief Commissioner Nixon as to the value and
importance of national policing data information systems:
National policing data information systems...provide a wall of
protection for the citizens, so if we have ways and means to share that data
that are efficient then...that adds to our protection and to prevention of crime.[49]
8.63
Australia's federal system has given rise to jurisdictions employing
different and/or incompatible databases and technologies. These incompatibilities
between jurisdictions benefit organised crime and undermine the ability of
police to store, share and manage data that is critical to investigating and
prosecuting serious and organised crime in Australia.
8.64
The committee notes that LEAs are increasing efforts to share
information and that this has been facilitated by the opportunities for
collaboration and the culture of cooperation offered by the ACC and CrimTrac. Also
notable are a number of technical and development initiatives to facilitate
exchange of data across systems. Table 8.4 shows current information and
intelligence related initiatives and/or projects that can be expected to
promote national access to databases.
Table 8.4: Information and intelligence related
initiatives and projects
|
Project or initiative
|
project or initiative type
|
Agency
|
Purpose
|
Funding
|
Status
|
|
CrimTrac Police Reference System (CPRS) Development
Programme
|
A broad project to improve national access to policing data. The CPRS
at present encompasses the MNPP Project and ANCOR
|
CrimTrac
|
To enhance law enforcement by provision of rapid access to national
operational policing data
|
CrimTrac is largely self-funded through the NCHRC
|
Ongoing
|
|
Automated Number Plate Recognition Project (ANPR)
|
ANPR project is a scoping study which aims to identify possible
options for the technology to be given to law enforcement agencies
|
CrimTrac
|
National capability for detection of vehicles of interest to law
enforcement agencies
|
ANPR has received proceeds of crime funding of $2.2m to deliver
scoping study
|
New initiative: scoping study to be delivered by end 2008
|
|
Standard Intelligence Exchange Format
|
Project to improve inter-connectivity of information, intelligence
and case management systems
|
ACC
|
To establish a standard form for information and intelligence to
facilitate their exchange between different jurisdictions and technologies
|
Common-wealth
|
Ongoing
|
|
Australian Law Enforcement Referencing and Targeting
project (ALERT)
|
Project for the enhancement of ACID
|
ACC
|
To improve ACID's intelligence handling capacities such as by adding
geocoding of information and charting of criminal associations capabilities
|
Common-wealth
|
Ongoing
|
|
Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network
(ALEIN)
|
ALEIN is a national intranet used by all police services, the New
Zealand Police, state crime commissions and a number of government agencies
|
ACC
|
To provide intelligence dissemination and real-time exchange and
cooperation capabilities
|
Common-wealth
|
Active
|
8.65
The committee recognises that these efforts are committed to improving
databases in Australia, particularly the ability to locate and retrieve
information, intelligence and case management data across multiple jurisdictions
and systems. In coming to the recommendations contained in this chapter, the
committee seeks improvements that will complement current initiatives, and
provide practical benefits for police on the street—especially those with the
difficult task of fighting organised crime.
8.66
The priority task in improving Australia's databases is the
harmonisation of the many complex legal, technical and policy factors across
different jurisdictions, because it is in this multiplicity of arrangements
that vulnerabilities for police and opportunities for organised crime to escape
detection exist. Following many years of slow progress, the establishment of
the ACC and CrimTrac has seen a growing convergence of policy and some promising
improvements to database performance and interoperability. However, the
committee wishes to stress the importance of a committed national and
cross-jurisdictional policy effort to hasten the continuing work on national
databases. A shared and concerted policy approach by governments will enable
remaining legal and technical impediments to be removed more swiftly than has
been possible in the past. For example, coordinated purchasing decisions could
negate the need for developing time-consuming and expensive technical solutions
for harmonising disparate technologies:
...the technical challenges in integrating information from
disparate systems developed at different times using different technologies can
be quite complex...[T]he procurement of IT systems by the police should be
reviewed to ensure that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered to
national problems.[50]
8.67
Finally, the committee wishes to acknowledge the professionalism and
dedication of Australia's police and LEAs, and the many people who work to
combat serious and organised crime. The ongoing effort to coordinate and enhance
Australia's information and intelligence databases and case management systems is
fundamental to ensuring they provide comprehensive and, above all, effective
assistance to police in their day-to-day as well as long-term policing
responsibilities. The growing spirit and practical measures of cooperation in
this area bode well for future efforts to combat organised crime in Australia.
Senator the Hon. Ian
Macdonald
Chair
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