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Additional comments by Senator Mark Bishop
1.1
The terms of reference for this inquiry into organised crime by the
Committee highlight the committee's critical role in reviewing the performance
of the commission as well as examining trends and changes in criminal
activities.
1.2
As the Committee's report has noted briefly, this inquiry has canvassed
its terms of reference broadly through public submissions and hearings in the
normal parliamentary committee style. It has gained a considerable amount of
evidence on organised crime, and I concur with the committee's concerns at the
breadth and depth of the issues which face law enforcement agencies.
Responsibility for addressing these issues rests with each state jurisdiction
as well as the Commonwealth, in its own right and as national focal point for
coordinated effort through the ACC, AFP, AIC and other Commonwealth agencies.
1.3
I note the generality of the inquiry's evidence has made it difficult
for the Committee to remain within the inquiry's terms of reference. Essentially,
the reference was to examine future trends of organised crime, recommend
strategies for countering such crime and check the adequacy of legislative and
administrative arrangements in meeting those strategies.
1.4
To that extent, I appreciate difficulties faced by the Committee to make
anything other than general recommendations. For while it heard alarming
evidence on the nature of the issues confronting the national fight against
organised crime, there was insufficient detail to make anything other than
general recommendations.
1.5
The ACC and this Committee have made positive and progressive steps in
overcoming problems which beset its ancestor, the National Crime Authority.
That body was a first attempt to bring a national focus to fighting national crime
across all jurisdictions.
1.6
The ACC governance model, in terms of accountability, is primarily to
its stakeholders viz, from the CEO to the Board, from the Board to the
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), and thence to ministers.
1.7
I note the Committee's role does not seem to be part of that hierarchy.
I suggest a clarification of the Committee's role, which, in light of this
current inquiry, may be far more limited than previously realised. Certainly
that appeared evident from the manner in which this inquiry has been conducted,
and the content of the report.
1.8
Considering the terms of reference set out in Section 55 of the Act it
would seem that while the ACC is not accountable to the Committee, the
Committee is accountable to the Parliament for assessment of the way in which
the ACC operates and the function it performs nationally in accordance with its
charter.
1.9
Hence in taking evidence during this inquiry, important questions are
declined on the basis that this is a matter for government policy.
1.10
An example would be seeking a view as to whether Customs should have
telephone interception powers or not. This is a standard and appropriate
response to a parliamentary committee such as this, but it does not assist the
Committee in its terms of reference where such questions can be important in
assessing the adequacy or otherwise of the means by which organised crime is
being addressed.
1.11
It may be prudent to re-examine the Committee's role as set out in its
terms of reference, and then examine more discrete segments and the way they
are being pursued within the ACC framework.
1.12
These subjects should in the first instance concern those parts of
organised crime which fall more clearly within the Commonwealth's
responsibilities, so avoiding intervention in matters of state responsibility.
The Committee's recommendations in this report on further subjects for scrutiny
(such as communication interception, money laundering, and internet crime)
would be a good starting point.
1.13
Within this role as "systemic mentor" of the ACC model, it may
be necessary for the Committee to approach its work with a modus operandi than
might otherwise be the case with parliamentary committees. This will entail
continuing development of the special relationship of trust with the ACC, and
mutual respect for the complementary responsibilities. None of this, however,
should preclude the Committee from operating as a watchdog of the parliament,
including regular assessment of the operational performance of the ACC model
within its legislative charter.
1.14
In light of the above, I suggest the following matters be addressed:
- The Government, when re-establishing this Committee, consider
whether the task warrants parliamentary committee oversight, whether the
function might be conducted instead by way of an annual review by a retired
judge or eminent lawyer with relevant experience, or whether the Committee
might be assisted from time to time by the latter;
- That the Committee on reappointment in the new parliament, be
tasked with examining its own role, and consider a new modus operandi more
consistent with its legislated purpose and function; and.
- That the Committee examine those matters identified in this
report worthy of more detailed examination, particularly those entailing
Commonwealth function.
Senator Mark Bishop
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