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Chapter 7 - The adequacy of administrative and regulatory arrangements
Introduction
7.1
The inquiry revealed that certain administrative and regulatory
arrangements hamper Australia's efforts to tackle serious and organised crime. One
example is the inadequacy of the collection of prepaid mobile phone user
information. The issue of staffing arrangements for law enforcement agencies was
also investigated, as was the need for a comprehensive research effort to
improve future policing strategies and the targeting of policy and resources to
address serious and organised crime in Australia.
Telecommunications
SIM card user registration[1]
7.2
During the inquiry, the committee's attention was drawn to failings in
the current arrangements for registering user information for prepaid mobile
phone SIM cards. These are governed by a telecommunications industry
determination made under a model of self regulation.
7.3
The committee received significant evidence from several law enforcement
agencies about the potential and actual use of SIM cards by organised crime
groups to avoid detection, whereby criminal identities are purchasing SIM cards
in stolen or false names. The Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission
submission notes:
Prepaid SIM cards are regularly purchased and used by target
identities (including in bulk) in false names or in the names of real persons
without the knowledge of the person in question. A number of proprietors of
mobile telephone outlets, and some smaller service providers, have been
implicated in activity of this type. Initiatives by the Commonwealth
Government-sponsored Law Enforcement Advisory Committee (LEAC) have experienced
difficulties keeping pace with criminal activity in this area. This has
tangible and ongoing effects on the ability of agencies to target organised
crime and other related activity.[2]
7.4
Detective Superintendent Kim Porter, Divisional Superintendent, Organised
Crime Division, Western Australia Police, told the committee that where
criminals are aware that the police are tracking them they will change their
cards 'two, three, four times a day', and possibly 'every second conversation'.
There will either be no name attached to the purchase, or the purchaser will
have supplied a false one.[3]
7.5
Ms Elizabeth Foulger, Manager, Intelligence, Queensland Crime and
Misconduct Commission, reported a similar experience, exacerbated for her
agency by the fact that, in the absence of state telephone interception powers,
the commission relies heavily on charge record analysis:
...you can clearly see phones that have been
connected using false names...We see ridiculous names like Will Smith and Bob Marley—clearly names that have
been plucked out of the air. There is no process in place at the moment to
prevent that from happening.[4]
7.6
The Western Australia Police (WAPOL) estimated that 50 per cent of
telephone numbers they investigate have false subscriber details, with the
majority of these false accounts being drug related.[5]
7.7
Detective Superintendent Mark Porter, State Intelligence Division, Victoria
Police, put the use of SIM cards in a commercial criminal context, telling the
committee that the 'churning' of SIM cards emerged around a decade ago. While
briefly restricted to 'top end' criminals, this is now a widespread practice
among the criminal fraternity. Detective Superintendent Porter observed that
the need to communicate is fundamental to any business—legitimate or not.
Accordingly, criminals tend to treat the cost of obtaining secure
communications as a 'business' cost:
So, if...[a criminal goes] in and buy[s] 100 SIM cards, that is a
business cost, because...[their] riskiest point is...[the] point of communication'.[6]
7.8
Further, Ms Foulger told the committee that some organised crime figures
have links to the providers of mobile phones, and are able to obtain phones using
the legitimate details provided by unsuspecting third parties. For law
enforcement, tracking down the actual user of a service becomes very difficult.[7]
In some cases, organised crime groups are endeavouring to establish control
over the commercial supply of SIM cards by establishing, purchasing or
otherwise controlling their own telecommunications companies. Detective
Superintendent Porter told the committee:
Another reason why you need to legislate is...they buy their own
telephone suppliers so that they can get those cards without having to answer
the questions. The situation is that we need to have legislation to make sure
that the actual supplier is required to comply.[8]
100-point identity checks
7.9
The accurate collecting of SIM user information is critical to law
enforcement agencies' ability to investigate serious and organised crime. Detective
Superintendent Porter observed that current arrangements are allowing
criminals to obtain effectively anonymous means of communication:
When you can go into the supermarket and buy quite a number of...[prepaid
mobile services] and you can just make a phone call and claim to be anybody,
then you have anonymous identification that you can use for five minutes, five
days or whatever.[9]
7.10
The Western Australia Police submission notes:
The fact that telecommunication service providers do not require
or impose the 100 point identification check on the purchase of SIM cards makes
identifying the actual user virtually impossible.[10]
7.11
The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) responded to
the evidence received regarding SIM cards and prepaid mobile service
registration. Their submission outlines that the Telecommunications (Service
Provider—Identity Checks for Pre-Paid Mobile Telecommunications Services)
Determination 2000 applies to the sale of prepaid mobile phones, and that
there are established processes for collecting and verifying customer
information.
7.12
Under the determination, purchasers of SIM cards are required to produce
identity documents either when purchasing a prepaid mobile phone (option A) or
when activating a prepaid mobile service (option B). The submission,
acknowledging the shortcomings of the present approach, continues:
Industry’s preference would be to use option B above, but
transition to this process has been consistently thwarted by the lack of access
to original sources for verification of customer provided information. As a
result, option A is used, with suboptimal outcomes, including:
- incomplete or no collection and verification of customer
data at some retail outlets
- differences between the information collected from the
purchaser and the user (e.g. if the mobile is a gift)
- incomplete and unverified data in the IPND,[11] as this data is collected from the user at service activation.[12]
7.13
The AMTA submission also explains proposed improvements to the
collection of SIM purchaser information:
AMTA members are developing a standard form for pre-paid mobile
phone services in order to seek more accurate and consistent data capture at
point of sale. To complement the development of the new pre-paid mobile phone
service form, AMTA is developing an overall continuous improvement process that
consists of comprehensive guidelines for retailers and an education program
upon roll out of the new form.[13]
7.14
AMTA suggests that the identity checks could be undertaken at the point
of activation (option B above), and suggests that the government’s proposed
National Document Verification Service (NDVS) could be used to support such an
approach.[14]
The NDVS is a part of the National Identity Security Strategy developed by the
Council of Australian Governments; a national prototype was tested in 2006. The
NDVS:
...will be a secure, electronic, on-line system accessible by all
key Australian Government, State and Territory agencies, and potentially by the
private sector. Agencies authorised to use the DVS will be able to check in
real time whether a document presented to them as a proof-of-identity by an
individual applying for high value benefits and services was issued by the
relevant agency, and that the details on the document are true and accurate.[15]
Implications of a deregulated
market
7.15
While the committee notes AMTA's willingness to assist with the support
of the NDVS, there is no indication of when the database will become
operational. In AMTA's view, the 100-point check is an 'outdated' form of
identification, specifically because the deregulated telecommunications market
has resulted in there being less control over call records. This makes it
difficult to ensure that complete and accurate records are created.
7.16
This was also noted by Ms Catherine Smith, Assistant Secretary,
Telecommunications and Surveillance Law Branch, Attorney-General's Department,
who told the committee:
Because it is a deregulated telecommunications market, the
obligation has been placed upon industry to come up with how that area is
regulated.[16]
7.17
Ms Smith referred to the telecommunications determination of 2000,
identified above, and continued:
The difficulty is that there is no regulation of who can sell
those SIM cards. Even though an obligation may be placed on the main
telecommunications providers who provide them, they are sold at the local
garage, at Woolworths and so on, so the obligation might fall upon a checkout
person, who is very busy, to take down certain details and that sort of thing...In
the Law Enforcement Advisory Committee, which is chaired by ACMA, we have been
working very hard for a number of years to come up with a better system. We
expect that—I think in July this year—AMTA will be putting out a new draft way
to deal with these prepaid SIMS. So something is being done.[17]
Implications
for commercial and consumer interests
7.18
The committee considers that prompt and serious attention must be given
to ensuring that reliable records of mobile phone users are created and kept.
Apart from data and information acquired through telecommunications
interception under warrant, law enforcement agencies rely heavily on this data
from telecommunications companies. While the committee recognises the potential
for greater regulation to be a considerable impost on telecommunications
providers and consumers, the lack of access to reliable SIM user information is
seriously undermining the ability of police to detect, investigate and
prosecute organised crime groups. The advantages of a deregulated
telecommunications market must therefore be tempered by a system of obtaining
accurate SIM user information. The committee's support for stricter
proof-of-identity requirements is given with recognition that, ultimately, the
success of any system will be judged by how well commercial and consumer
interests are preserved within a system that achieves comprehensive and
accurate SIM card user registration.
7.19
The committee acknowledges that any changes to the current model for
obtaining registration of SIM card users have the potential to affect the
administrative and commercial performance of telecommunications providers.
Stricter requirements around purchasing SIM cards could add to the length and
cost of transactions and potentially affect sales.
7.20
Equally, additional inconvenience and expense could adversely affect
individual consumers, and the committee notes the significant practical
considerations that would arise with a requirement to provide 100 points of
identity documentation for purchase or activation of SIM cards. Young people in
particular might find tougher requirements difficult to satisfy, if not an
outright barrier to ownership, and the effect on consumers of any proposed changes
should be directly addressed in establishing a more effective system.
Recommendation 9
7.21
The committee recommends that the government seek to expedite the
telecommunications industry's adoption of option B of the Telecommunications
(Service Provider—Identity Checks for Pre-Paid Mobile Telecommunications
Services) Determination 2000, so as to require 100 points of identity
documentation upon activation of prepaid mobile phone services.
Voice over Internet Protocol
7.22
The committee heard that rapid technological change in the
telecommunications industry is a continuing threat to the ability of law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) to capture telecommunications information. In
particular, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) does not require billing
records. Mr Christopher Keen, Director, Intelligence, Queensland Crime and
Misconduct Commission, described the nature of the problem and how it impacts
upon the usual lines of inquiry:
...through things like voice-over-internet protocol, we do not
know where...[a call] went. You just pay your $50 up front and, therefore, they
no longer need billing records...[I]t is having an impact on us being able to
salvage networks, links and then, from there, perhaps taking some other action.[18]
7.23
Ms Smith advised the committee that, because the relevant Acts in this
area—the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the Telecommunications
Act 1997—are 'technology neutral', carriers have the same reporting
obligations around VoIP as they do for fixed line services.[19]
Nevertheless, Ms Smith acknowledged that there are 'challenges' to be addressed
arising from the need to deal with and rely on the many players making up the
telecommunications industry, such as smaller and overseas providers. These, as
well as technological issues, are being examined.[20]
7.24
The committee is concerned that technological developments will make it
more difficult for LEAs to identify and pursue criminal identities, and will
monitor the department's initiatives for dealing with this area of concern.
Staffing of intelligence and law enforcement agencies
Targeting of human resources to organised crime
7.25
The committee heard evidence that police efforts to combat organised
crime are still vulnerable to compromise by traditional policing
responsibilities. Investigation of organised crime is typically complex, labour
intensive and long term, and it can be interrupted by the requirements of
day-to-day policing—particularly when resources are urgently directed to ad hoc
high-profile cases or investigations.
7.26
To an extent, Australia has taken the first important steps to separate
these two areas of policing with the creation of specialist crime and
corruption bodies such as the ACC. As the Corruption and Crime Commission of
Western Australia (CCCWA) has observed:
Within Australia a number of Royal Commissions have been
established to investigate and report on organised crime. Emerging from these
commissions has been the recognition that traditional policing methods were
inadequate and new arrangements for combating organised crime were needed.[21]
7.27
The CCCWA endorsed Australia's current model for dealing with organised
crime, which enables resources and effort to be dedicated to long-term
strategies:
Establishing alternative working arrangements offers government
an opportunity to ‘quarantine’ resources for the long-term protracted
investigations that are the trademark of effective organised crime
investigations, rather than having these resources dispersed, responding to
day-to-day policing issues.[22]
Staff retention, expertise and
inter-jurisdictional mobility
7.28
The inquiry identified a present tendency for law enforcement agencies
to experience high staff turnover and lose valuable professional experience and
corporate knowledge. This problem is particularly acute given the increase in
technology enabled or facilitated crime, and the rapidity with which criminals are
exploiting new technology. Professor Rod Broadhurst, appearing before the
committee in a private capacity, explained:
We do have a terrible shortage of expertise. The kind of expertise
that you are talking about is hard to keep. We have had entire forensic
computing sections of police forces get up and resign and go and work in
private enterprise. We have people who are trained poached by the big IT
security firms.[23]
7.29
Commissioner Ken Moroney, NSW Police Force, described one of the factors
behind staffing movements as competition for skills from certain industries or
sectors:
Certainly in some of our highly specialised information
technology areas we are losing police officers, ironically, to the
Commonwealth, which perhaps is in a position to offer better salaries, better
salary packages and a diversity of work away from strict law enforcement. One
of our senior IT police officers has recently been employed by the Department
of Defence. A range of issues were taken into account in that career
path—different opportunities and salary were certainly key issues. Those are
salaries that, in one sense, I cannot compete with. We are losing them also to
the private sector.[24]
7.30
Mr Mark Burgess, Chief Executive Officer, Police Federation of Australia
(PFA), indicated that police skills are a useful, marketable and valuable
commodity in the current employment market.[25]
7.31
Mr Burgess advised that, while inter-jurisdictional mobility is
desirable within an integrated and coordinated national approach to policing
organised crime, there is a need for a more systematic approach to staff
secondment and transfers. This would ensure that state agencies are not
continually affected by shortages of labour and/or skill.
7.32
The PFA warned that Australia requires the recruitment of some 13,000
new officers to meet the existing commitments of state and territory police
forces.[26]
While the PFA did not endorse a central recruiting pool as the way to manage
staffing nationally, it did support the funding of a 'national police workforce
planning study' to ultimately form the basis of a national police workforce
strategy.[27]
The PFA believes that such a coordinated approach could secure effective
national management and planning of police staffing levels, while maintaining
the positive aspects of inter-jurisdictional mobility within the service, and
respecting the self-determination of individual police agencies.
7.33
Commissioner Mick Keelty, Australian Federal Police (AFP), pointed to
both individual factors and general international trends as causing staffing
pressures on Australian police forces:[28]
In terms of...overall policing numbers...retaining staff is an issue
at the national level. There are various reasons why police organisations do not
retain staff. I have spoken to Commissioner Paul White in the Northern
Territory and we have talked about the difficulties of policing in the Northern
Territory—the remoteness of it and the lack of familial connections. I have
talked to my counterpart in Queensland, Bob Atkinson. Bob unashamedly will tell
you that a lot of police want to come and work in Queensland. Some of it is the
social demographics of Australia. In Western Australia, despite the perception
that the AFP has stolen their staff, a lot of the police staff have actually
gone to the mining industry.[29]
7.34
Commissioner Keelty observed that, although staff movements occur in all
directions between state and territory forces and the private sector, the AFP
does not experience the staff retention problems of the state and territory
police forces.[30]
This is due to the diversity of work that the AFP undertakes, which offers
greater professional choices to staff.[31]
While the AFP does not actively recruit members of state and territory police
forces, there is a natural gravitation toward its ranks.
7.35
Mr Tony Harrison, Assistant Commissioner, Crime Service, South Australia
Police, while acknowledging the value of inter-agency mobility for skills
development and cross-pollination of ideas, observed that the preponderance of
such movements is from state or territory to Commonwealth agencies, notably the
AFP and the ACC.[32]
7.36
The committee believes that, without adequate recognition, planning and
effort, police can expect to continue to encounter shortages of skills and
personnel.
Recommendation 10
7.37
The committee recommends that the Ministerial Council for Police and
Emergency Management—Police consider a more strategic and national approach to
recruitment and retention of sworn police officers across all jurisdictions;
and that consideration be given to enhancing cross-jurisdictional mobility,
including secondments, of sworn police officers and other police service
personnel.
Numbers of sworn Australian Federal Police
7.38
The PFA also raised concerns about the numbers of sworn police officers
in the AFP, as only sworn officers can undertake the full range of policing
activities. Mr Burgess considered that this could affect an agency's capacity to
fulfil its responsibilities and that, despite recent increases in the AFP's
staffing budget and overall numbers, the proportion of sworn AFP officers has
declined. In light of the increases in AFP responsibilities, such as
anti-terrorism activities and investigations, there is an expectation that
fully sworn officers will attend to matters of serious and organised crime.
7.39
In reply to the PFA's suggestions, Commissioner Keelty advised the
committee that the increase in unsworn staff recruited to the AFP is properly
viewed as a reflection of the type of skills required by the organisation. In
particular, the AFP has increased the size of its intelligence area, in which
it is suitable for unsworn staff to be employed.[33]
7.40
Commissioner Keelty raised the related issue of police pursuing
partnerships with community and private sector groups. This approach is in use
or being considered by countries overseas, such as the US and UK. The use of
'enthusiastic' and properly skilled people to free-up sworn officers to
undertake critical tasks could help with the management of staffing and skills
pressures.[34]
Developing evaluation and research to inform policy and policing strategies
Evaluation
7.41
Attempts to address the impact of serious and organised crime
effectively are held back by reliance on an unstructured and almost reactive approach
to considering policy design and funding choices for law and order regimes. Improved
systems of measuring outcomes will allow Australia to bridge the chasm between
the political concerns that so often shape policy development and the practical
imperatives of a system of laws that is effective against organised crime.
7.42
Professor Adam Sutton, appearing in a private capacity, identified the
Productivity Commission as the agency best placed to undertake such an inquiry:
...I would argue very strongly for the Productivity Commission.
Most areas of government now, quite rightly, are tied to those kinds of
[Productivity Commission] performance objectives. I do not think we are doing
that in the law enforcement area...partly because of this idea of intelligence data
being privileged, secretive et cetera.[35]
7.43
The Productivity Commission is an independent Commonwealth agency that
acts as:
...the Government’s principal review and advisory body on
microeconomic policy and regulation. It conducts public inquiries and research
into a broad range of economic and social issues affecting the welfare of
Australians.
The Commission’s work covers all sectors of the economy. It
extends to the public and private sectors and focuses on areas of Commonwealth
as well as State and Territory responsibility.[36]
7.44
The committee considers that there is a need for evaluative research to
quantify the effectiveness of current policy and legislative and administrative
arrangements for serious and organised crime, as currently exists in other
areas of large public investment.
7.45
The committee has also commented in previous inquiries on the
difficulties of establishing performance objectives for law enforcement that
adequately reflect its work and outcomes. Accordingly, the committee would
support a Productivity Commission inquiry into the effectiveness of current
arrangements to address serious and organised crime.
Recommendation 11
7.46
The committee recommends that the Productivity Commission inquire into
the cost effectiveness and benchmarking of law enforcement bodies and current
national arrangements to address serious and organised crime.
The importance of research in
fighting organised crime
7.47
In bringing together policymakers and legislators, LEAs, academics and
research bodies, the inquiry demonstrated the value of multidisciplinary or
collective approaches to examining and assessing the character and activities
of organised crime. Mr Alastair Milroy, Chief Executive Officer, Australian
Crime Commission, observed:
The ACC values the important dialogue that has arisen through
this inquiry. It is through this varied and informed debate involving law
enforcement agencies, academia, politicians, the legal community and concerned
citizens that Australia can better arm itself to combat the continuing scourge
of serious and organised crime.[37]
7.48
Mr Milroy called for a greater involvement and contribution by academia
to the body of research informing Australia's policy and operational choices in
fighting organised crime:
...academia has done some work that looks at the characteristics
of organised crime. But even our partners in the UK have acknowledged that a
lot of that work needs to be done by others to give us better advice on what
can be done from a government point of view in tackling organised crime.[38]
7.49
Mr Milroy pointed to certain areas of potential research where better
understanding is needed:
...a lot more work could be done to fill in some of the gaps...[such
as] the value of organised crime markets, which is about the revenue derived by
organised crime in pursuit of illegal activity...To deal with organised crime, to
assist in forming policy and to have better operational responses, you have to
look at the problem itself and understand organised crime markets.[39]
7.50
Experiences under the current national policing arrangements for
organised crime have shown that the best strategic and tactical options can
only be selected when police can accurately identify the groups and actors
causing the greatest levels of threat and harm in the community, and the markets
and activities in which they are involved. Given the acknowledged flexibility
and opportunism of organised crime groups, research is also required to support
analysis of successful policing strategies. This would allow police to better
anticipate new markets or criminal strategies:
...with organised crime, once you are successful in targeting
specific groups, they learn from it and change their methodology. It is an
ongoing cycle of us trying to learn from their various operations, looking at
the intelligence, identifying the methodology that they are using and looking
at how their businesses are structured.[40]
7.51
Mr Frank Costigan QC, who appeared before the committee in a private
capacity, emphasised that a research effort would need to be ongoing in order
to inform and develop appropriate police responses to the opportunism and
continuing evolution of organised crime:
There is no clear-cut answer to these things; it is a continuing
fight. As new methods of attack are found, there will be new methods of getting
around the system.[41]
7.52
Professor Margaret Mitchell, Director, Sellenger Centre for Research in
Law, Justice and Policing, School of Law and Justice, Edith Cowan University,
supported the analyses of Mr Milroy and Mr Costigan. So too, Dr Toni Makkai,
Director, Australian Institute of Criminology, observed that 'one of the
difficulties or challenges for...[the Australian Institute of Criminology] is
getting our research to influence policy and practice'.[42]
This has serious implications for the development of policy and effective
practical and legislative strategies in Australia:
...if we do not have these linkages, if we are not able to get
policymakers and practitioners to take notice of the research and the evidence
base, we will not be able to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in terms
of our responses to serious and organised crime in Australia.[43]
7.53
Professor Mitchell identified this failure to incorporate research into
policy and policing strategies as international in nature, and called for a
'careful and comprehensive overview, analysis and synthesis of the nature of
the problem', observing:
Despite real concern over the increasing threat from organised
crime, there is very little rigorous analysis of its nature, scale and impact.[44]
7.54
Professor Sutton noted the need for improved evaluation of organised
crime, and for research to be informed by police operational information. This
would allow research to inform and thereby improve the strategies and direction
of police agencies:
I do not see that there is any reason that, if you could link
police intelligence with research, you could not actually measure that and use
that in a feedback loop in order to guide your operation.[45]
7.55
The committee endorses the argument that, without sound research on the
precise nature and effects of organised crime, policymakers and practitioners
will be hampered in producing efficient and effective responses to organised
crime.
Current research collaboration in
Australia
The Australian Institute of
Criminology
7.56
The committee received evidence showing some important, if nascent,
collaborative efforts between police and information and/or research agencies,
such as the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) and CrimTrac.
7.57
Dr Makkai explained that the AIC has a 'close working relationship' with
bodies such as the ACC and the Attorney-General's Department, whereby the AIC
both informs and comments on intelligence matters from a research perspective.
Notably, the AIC provides input, by way of confidential comment, to the ACC's Picture
of criminality in Australia report.[46]
7.58
Putting this in context, Dr Makkai explained that much of the AIC's work
is commissioned or contracted, with it having to carefully allocate its $5.3
million budget to other projects.[47]
The recent and current projects of the AIC show its work to be highly relevant
to the matters central to the committee's inquiry. These include high-tech
crime, implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism
Financing Act 2006, online child pornography, drug analysis of detainees
and emerging illicit drug trends.[48]
7.59
Currently, links between research and police agencies are largely
informal. However, the AIC is assiduous in the number and variety of methods it
employs to promote closer links:
We have been trying to...[collaborate] through the informal
exchange of information and knowledge...We have been locating our analysts in
policy and in the operational environments so that they get better informed and
they can then inform the people they are working with about the latest research
and what it is showing.
We have run a series of closed roundtables so that law
enforcement in particular can come together and talk about things in a
confidential way, not in the public arena. We also run open public conferences
on issues. We do the standard thing of publishing our material. We also have
moved towards trying to do shorter facts sheets...which are much shorter, we
hope, easier to read and more targeted on a specific issue and, therefore, they
will be more likely to be picked up, particularly by practitioners but also by
busy policymakers.[49]
7.60
In addition, the AIC has considerable professional affiliations with
national and international bodies:
[The AIC sits] on a number of national boards and councils, such
as the Australian National Council on Drugs and National Crime Stoppers. We
participate internationally through the program network institutes of the UN
and we attend the UN Crime Commission meetings as part of the delegation led by
the AttorneyGeneral’s Department.[50]
7.61
Despite these efforts to establish more extensive and valuable
collaboration, Dr Makkai stated that there is still the need for improved links
between LEAs and the research sector:
...[The AIC does] not have routine access to either Commonwealth
or state and territory criminal justice databases. To a certain extent, our
capacity to produce new and innovative research is dependent on these agencies
enabling access to the relevant materials.[51]
7.62
Mr Bob Bottom, appearing in a private capacity, identified the lack of a
formally structured research program designed specifically to marry relevant
research with policy and policing outcomes as a significant weakness in addressing
organised crime in Australia. Mr Bottom pointed to the UK, where the Serious
and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has developed an annual public document
outlining the nature of organised crime in that country.[52]
SOCA has also established a research program designed to provide objective
support for the development and pursuit of SOCA's policing and policy
strategies.[53]
7.63
Mr Bottom argued that Australia needs a similar program 'to provide
research evidence to support the development of policy and practice relating to
the [reduction] of organised crime’.[54]
This need is heightened by the existence of the ACC, which, operating with a truly
national structure and focus, requires a substantial foundation of information,
knowledge and analysis from which to plan and coordinate its activities, and by
which to assess and measure the success of its performance.
7.64
Throughout the hearings, the committee explored the notion of
underpinning law enforcement efforts with complementary research projects. In
general, witnesses supported such an approach. For example, Mr Keen advised:
[A targeted research effort]...certainly is conceptually a very
good idea. Whichever agency or person comes up with it, there is going to be
the need for a fair amount of academic rigour, so you are probably almost
looking at a special project to do that.[55]
7.65
The committee supports the provision of comprehensive research to support
law enforcement in the area of organised crime, and believes that the AIC is
well placed as a Commonwealth statutory authority to undertake this role.
Recommendation 12
7.66
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government increase
funding to the Australian Institute of Criminology.
Recommendation 13
7.67
The committee recommends that a formal relationship be established
between law enforcement agencies, government departments and the Australian
Institute of Criminology to enhance the provision of data, information and
research; and that particular emphasis be placed on the removal of any
legislative impediments to the provision of data to the Australian Institute of
Criminology by Commonwealth, state and territory departments and agencies.
Research and education
7.68
The committee believes that the establishment and use of a research
effort to complement and inform the priorities, strategies and outcomes of law
enforcement efforts can provide a base from which to coordinate education
activities around crime and organised crime, such as in the area of illicit
drugs.
7.69
The committee heard evidence that there is still a gulf between social
attitudes toward some drugs, nominally 'recreational', and the serious harms
that can flow from even casual instances of illicit drug use.[56]
As part of a future crime prevention strategy, Mr Keen identified the need for
a coordinated research effort to provide targeted and well-designed educational
programs:
...what we need...[is] a short, sharp, shiny description of what to
look for and what the impacts are—and try to get some of those out [in
education campaigns]...[T]here is an enormous part of the market that we are not
even touching as far as education goes.[57]
7.70
Some witnesses saw education as an important tool in the area of
high-tech crime. Where technology is employed or taken advantage of in
furtherance of criminal activities, better education of technology users is
needed to complement enforcement initiatives. In this respect, Mr Rob McCusker,
a research analyst in transnational crime for the Australian Institute of
Criminology, observed:
The difficulty...in all approaches to tackling technology
involving crime is that we still have a massive gullible public who make the
job extremely difficult. Until we can tackle that issue through education
campaigns and so forth, law enforcement efforts in this area will be constantly
scuppered.[58]
7.71
The committee notes that the Commonwealth Government has invested
substantially in drug education.[59]
However, in light of the detrimental effects of serious and organised crime in
other sectors of society, it is the committee's view that investment in public
education in areas related to high-tech crime is necessary.
Recommendation 14
7.72
The committee recommends that public education programs about emerging
criminal activities, such as credit card fraud, banking fraud, identity theft
and internet-based criminal activity, be given a higher priority and increased
resources.
Picture of criminality in Australia report
7.73
Calls for 'a more coordinated approach to research on organised crime in
Australia' were consistently made throughout the inquiry.[60]
In particular, some witnesses called for this to be established around the
annual preparation and public release of a declassified version of the ACC's Picture
of criminality in Australia (PoCA) report. The PoCA is 'a
confidential high-level strategic intelligence report on the relative harms of
each crime type, emerging issues in the criminal environment and strategic
threats from various issues in the surrounding region', and is the ACC's
central strategic document.[61]
Mr Bottom expressed bemusement and some disappointment there had been no
implementation of a recommendation on this issue in this committee's report on
the ACC's 2004-05 annual report.[62]
That recommendation was:
...that the Australian Crime Commission consider the release of
public versions of key research, including a declassified version of the
Picture of Criminality [in Australia report].[63]
7.74
Mr Bottom told the committee that release of a declassified version of
PoCA is desirable because it would act as a focus and anchor for public
information and debate about crime going into the future. Mr Bottom observed
that the PoCA's substance goes to the very heart of the committee's current
inquiry, and it could be an invaluable resource.[64]
7.75
Mr Bottom explained that a declassified version of PoCA could ensure
that an appropriately Australian perspective was maintained when considering
and designing responses to crime and the anticipated requirements of LEAs.
There was, he said, an over-reliance on overseas data and European
perspectives, both in Australia generally and, in particular, in much of the
evidence that had been received by the inquiry:
...I refer to the submission from the Australian Institute of
Criminology...[N]ot one of its 16 references credited...is from Australia; indeed,
not even from the AIC itself, which in recent years, to its credit, has
produced two of the best academic or research based assessments of organised
crime within Australia. The tendency, therefore, of academics to ignore such
local research and point you to Europe is, to put it mildly, an unfortunate
example of academic naivety.[65]
7.76
Apart from the obvious benefits of basing Australian strategies on
Australian experiences and data, Mr Bottom pointed to the fact that Australia
has been a leader in the establishment of ACC type bodies, and has, for
example, provided the model for the establishment of the Serious and Organised
Crime Agency in the UK. To look to overseas models therefore appeared to him
retrograde and unlikely to provide many meaningful comparisons or insights.[66]
7.77
The committee notes that the previous recommendation for a declassified
or public version of the PoCA is still awaiting a response by the government;
this was also noted in the committee's June 2007 report on the ACC annual
report for 2005-06. As stated there, the committee looks forward to receiving
the government's response to this recommendation.
7.78
Mr Milroy took the opportunity of appearing before the committee to
address the issue of the delayed release of a declassified version of the PoCA:
The ACC...wishes to respond to criticism concerning the release of
the public version of the ACC’s picture of criminality in Australia. We are in
the final stages of developing a paper, which is termed Organised crime in Australia,
following extensive consultation with our partners and this will be delivered
to the ACC board this month for their consideration for release to the public.[67]
7.79
The committee commends the ACC on this development.
The Committee notes that the ACC has prepared a public
version of it picture of criminality in Australia and recommends
Recommendation 15
7.80
The committee notes that the Australian Crime Commission has prepared a
public version of the Picture of criminality in Australia and recommends
that the ACC Board make this report available at the earliest possible date.
Reporting online fraud
7.81
A related issue to emerge from the committee's consideration of the
question of establishing a complementary research effort for Australian police
agencies was that of the reporting of online fraud in Australia. A number of
witnesses saw the current approach to reporting online fraud as being
inadequate.
7.82
Dr Makkai advised the committee that, in respect of technology-based or
high-tech crimes, a lack of reliable data and 'data infrastructure' means that
research in this area is not well developed, especially in comparison to
traditional types of crime, such as property and violent crime:
Certainly from a research perspective we would like to know the
data...[High-tech crime] is, for example, one of those crimes that we know is
grossly underreported to police and, as a consequence, we do not have any idea
of the size of the problem. As researchers, we would welcome much better data.[68]
7.83
Mr Alexander Webling, Senior Adviser, E-Security Strategy, Critical
Infrastructure Protection Branch, Attorney-General’s Department, advised the
committee that, although the Attorney-General's Department could not provide
'specific information' on the level and incidence of e-fraud against financial
institutions, 'general threats to anybody on the internet, whether that is a
user...or a company, are increasing.'[69]
7.84
Mr William Boulton, Examiner, Australian Crime Commission, explained
that, despite online fraud being a fairly recent development, it is generally
true that it is a 'very big growth area', and that the extent of this class of
fraud is 'probably much greater than people realise'.[70]
7.85
Although banks and financial institutions have traditionally absorbed
fraud-related losses, online vulnerabilities are generally ascribable to 'the
interaction between the user and their computer and the bank'.[71]
The committee is concerned that, if financial institutions decide in future to
adopt a fault-based or stricter approach to apportioning liability for online
losses, the cost to consumers will be significant.
7.86
The committee heard some evidence that banks are already passing online
fraud related losses onto consumers.[72]
Such claims raise important issues around accountability and the question of
who is bearing, and who should bear, the burden of risk in cases of online
fraud. This is particularly so if it is true that, as the submission from Mr
Stephen Palleras QC, Director of Public Prosecutions for South Australia,
asserts, most cases of online fraud are described as 'identity theft' or
'identity fraud' when in fact they are offences effected through entirely
fictitious identities.[73]
The lack of compulsory reporting of online crime means that banks could be
passing on, or could in the future pass on, online crime costs to consumers based
on a flawed description of an occurrence of fraud.
7.87
The committee was unable to secure the direct participation of the
Australian High Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC), a body whose responsibility and
expertise is directly related to such issues. Nevertheless, the committee was
able to refer to the public comments of Mr Kevin Zuccato, the director of the
AHTCC, on this subject.
7.88
On 24 June 2007, Mr Zuccato participated in ABC radio's Background
Briefing story on the apparent vulnerability of the internet to high-tech
crime and fraud. A major theme of the story was the claim that the true level
of internet crime is under-reported because banks fear the negative
consequences of consumers knowing bank security has been compromised. The
internet, it was reported, has delivered massive profits to banks through new
business models; they therefore prefer to absorb losses from fraud rather than
publicise their own failings and potentially damage their reputation.[74]
Mr McCusker also suggested that financial institutions are sensitive about
the reputational risks of publicising such data.[75]
7.89
Professor Broadhurst agreed that reporting of fraud is a 'sensitive
area' and that banks are reluctant to report and thereby advertise instances of
fraud perpetrated against them for fear it will damage their reputation.[76]
However, he believed there is a danger that an approach premised on a false
sense of security could ultimately see the problem worsen:
...if we let the mantra become, ‘We need to look like everything
is fine...we are running the risk of actually being run over.[77]
7.90
However, Mr Zuccato told Background Briefing that, despite
'hundreds of millions of dollars being defrauded', systematic disclosure of
incidents of fraud is not useful for the average consumer, because it does not
enable or help people to understand that there are risks associated with the
use of the online environment:
You and I don't really need to know the extent of the crimes,
the hundreds of millions of dollars being defrauded, because it doesn't
help...Speaking of how much is being lost doesn't really take us anywhere in
relation to explaining to people that there is a risk.[78]
7.91
Further, Mr Zuccato considered that privacy issues prevent the
publicising of data on the incidence of online fraud:
...it would be remiss of us to publicise victims' names. So we
wouldn't do that. What we try and do is basically understand what's happening,
work with people to try and understand the level of the problem and then send
the right messages to people so that they can take the appropriate action.[79]
7.92
However, this position was not supported by Professor Broadhurst, who
argued that the vulnerability of the internet to fraud requires a balance to be
struck between allowing the productivity and commercial benefits of the
internet and ensuring that the system is sufficiently protected against
criminal misuse:
I think there is a balance. We do not want to overregulate the internet
market. It is a hugely important market. It is growing so fast. It is going to
provide huge energy for productivity et cetera.
But, of course, it is a superhighway that does not have many patrol cars on it,
and a lot of the vehicles—the PCs and so on—that we use to drive on it do not
have the appropriate safety equipment, if I can use that analogy.[80]
7.93
Mr McCusker observed:
The corollary of [a reluctance to report online fraud]...of
course, is that law enforcement cannot effectively fight this type of fraud and
this kind of online activity unless they are made aware.[81]
Initiatives for the reporting and
prevention of online fraud
7.94
The committee heard that, despite the apparent lack of compulsory
reporting of online fraud, there are moves afoot to furnish relevant police
agencies with data on the incidence of such offences. Mr Webling explained:
The government has taken a very holistic view...in that it is
trying to work with both the banks, as the owners of large systems which are on
the internet, and with the users, as in you and me on the internet, and also
small and medium enterprises.[82]
7.95
Dr Dianne Heriot, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Criminal Justice
Division, Attorney-General’s Department, observed that the current approach to
reporting online fraud offences is a collaborative one based on 'government-industry
engagement at an operational and policy level around the range of the issues'.[83]
7.96
Dr Makkai described the AIC's plans, following a specific-purpose grant
drawn from the proceeds of crime, for a survey that will rectify some of the
present gaps in knowledge:
In order to improve our understanding of high-tech crime, the
institute recently received funds from the proceeds of crime to examine the
extent and impact of computer security incidents across all Australian industry
sectors. This will be the first random survey of this scale and depth in Australia.
We have completed our pilot and are now proceeding to conduct the main survey,
which will be of approximately 20,000 businesses, but it will be another year
before that is finalised and completed and ready for release.[84]
7.97
The committee notes that the ACC is collecting information on banking
fraud, following the establishment of protocols or working arrangements that
address the commercial concerns of banks. The ACC is able to compel the
provision of such information, overcoming the lack of explicit reporting
requirements on banks and financial institutions. Mr Boulton told the
committee:
...in the last few months the examiners have issued a number of
notices to banks, insurance companies and the like, seeking under compulsion...instances
of fraud perpetrated against those bodies. We are getting a lot of information
coming back. The banks and insurance companies like this method because, even
though it is compulsory, it is also confidential. We see that as a very big
growth area...The extent of it is probably much greater than people realise.[85]
7.98
Mr Jeff Pope, General Manager, Commodities, Methodologies and
Activities, ACC, outlined the recent process of collecting data on online
fraud, and its high value to the ACC's investigations into, and assessments of,
organised crime:
...we have formed some very productive relationships with
financial institution and...issued numerous notices in cooperation with these institutions.
As a result...we have access...to over 200,000 [anonymous] data sets that are
previously unreported incidents of fraud committed against those organisations.
When added to our current intelligence holdings and systems this significantly
enhances our ability to gain an understanding of individuals’ criminal
activities, serious and organised crime groups’ presence in the financial
sectors...and...diversification of their activities and, essentially, footprints of
organised crime in areas that were previously either undetected or that we only
had anecdotal evidence of. We are finding it to be a very powerful and
successful way in which we can value-add to our intelligence holdings, but more
importantly our understanding of organised crime in that area.[86]
7.99
The committee believes that the area of online banking fraud is expanding
and will continue to at a significant rate. This growth will in part be due to
the increasing numbers of consumers taking up and using this form of banking
and the greater opportunities for criminal groups and individuals to engage in
fraudulent activities in a relatively risk-free environment. While the
committee appreciates that it is arguably not in the banks' best interests to
publicly report online fraud, it is ultimately consumers who are required to
pay for the rectification of this problem. Therefore banking consumers should
be made fully aware of the potential associated risks.
Recommendation 16
7.100
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government seek to ensure
the comprehensive and public reporting of online fraud, particularly within the
banking and finance industry.
Conclusion
7.101
The inquiry has identified a range of administrative and regulatory
practices that undermine current efforts to address serious and organised crime.
Weaknesses were found in the area of telecommunications, particularly in the
inaccurate registration of mobile phone SIM card users and the ability of VoIP
to obscure the identity of its users.
7.102
The committee is concerned about the apparent instability of staffing in
Australia's police forces and the loss of skilled sworn personnel to the
private sector. There appears to be an opportunity for all jurisdictions to
take a more coordinated and collaborative approach to the recruitment and
retention of skilled personnel.
7.103
This chapter also highlighted the need for a sound research and
evaluation base in addressing organised crime. The committee is concerned that
online fraud is greatly under-reported, which appears to contradict principles
of transparency and compulsory reporting of crime that are well accepted in
other areas of the law and policing. If LEAs do not have a clear picture of the
extent of online banking fraud then their task of policing such activities is
rendered more difficult. Equally, if banking consumers are not advised as to
the full extent of risk around online services they are unable to make
adequately informed assessments and choices about which services and
technologies to use. The committee notes that informed consumer choice is often
a powerful driver for companies to improve or make more secure their products
and services.
7.104
Ultimately, the committee is concerned to ensure that LEAs, regardless
of jurisdiction, are well supported and equipped to tackle serious and
organised crime. By addressing the administrative weaknesses identified, the
committee hopes that LEAs will be assisted and made more effective in their
fight against serious and organised crime.
7.105
The following chapter examines the adequacy of current databases and
suggests potential areas of improvement.
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