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Chapter 3 - Has the MIA Regime proved itself?
Introduction
3.1
The Committee notes that the objective of the Managed
Investments Act 1998 (MIA) is to protect investors’ interests through the
effective management of institution and compliance risk. As the introduction
to the Department of the Treasury’s consultation paper explained:
...the Managed Investments Act 1998...was not designed to
safeguard investors against the risk that their investments might decline in
value because of relatively poor investment strategies or downturns in the
market more generally. Rather the MIA sought to address the shortcomings
evident under the dual trustee/fund manager structure of the former regime and
minimise institutional and compliance risk.[1]
3.2
Collective Investments: Other People’s Money,
Report No. 65, prepared by the Australian Law
Reform Commission and the then Companies and Securities Advisory Committee
(ALRC/CASAC report), described these types of risk thus:
- institution risk—the risk that the operator or scheme would collapse
and scheme assets would not be adequately protected; and
- compliance risk—the risk that the scheme operator would not
adhere to the scheme’s rules or to laws governing the conduct of the scheme or
otherwise would act fraudulently or dishonestly.[2]
3.3
As previously discussed, the ALRC/CASAC report
recommended a single RE structure in which third-party custodianship of
assets was not mandatory. The report proposed measures to promote a strong
compliance culture within the single RE framework. Among the measures proposed
were:
- the requirement for licensing of REs to ensure that sufficient
compliance arrangements were in place;
- the requirement that directors would owe clear duties directly to
investors and that at least half of the RE’s board would comprise non-executive
directors; and
- increased surveillance and auditing of the scheme’s activities by
ASIC and external auditors, the latter having specific reporting obligations to
ASIC.[3]
Key elements of the MIA’s regulatory framework
3.4
Under the previous arrangements, the trustee of
a scheme was intended to act as the investors’ representative and to oversee
the day-to-day activities of the scheme manager. The trustee owed
fiduciary obligations to investors and was the custodian of scheme assets.
3.5
The ALRC/CASAC report concluded that, within the
dual-party structure, the fees payable to trustees often did not generate
sufficient revenue to enable them to conduct their supervisory activities
effectively. The arrangements were also thought to be inflexible and sometimes
in conflict with commercial realities. The ALRC/CASAC report expressed serious
concerns that the arrangements encouraged the displacement of responsibility by
the scheme manager to the trustee. This, the report said, had caused confusion
regarding the accountability of the manager and trustee and so jeopardised the
interests of investors.[4]
3.6
Under the MIA, there is no mandatory
custodianship of scheme property by an independent trustee. Instead, the MIA
vests sole responsibility for the operation of a scheme, including the custody
of scheme property, in the single RE. The MIA does not look to a trustee to
act as the investors’ champion. Rather, it seeks to maximise investor
protection through existing corporate governance requirements buttressed by an extensive
compliance framework and additional measures to minimise the potential for
conflicts of interest. In addition, ASIC has much broader powers and
responsibilities under the MIA.
3.7
Apart from the single RE, the MIA framework
includes requirements for the registration of certain schemes by ASIC.[5] Each scheme must have a
constitution and compliance plan, the latter setting out how the RE will
discharge its statutory obligations to comply with the Act and the scheme’s
constitution. Specific arrangements must be made for the management and
holding of scheme property, internal and external compliance monitoring, and
the maintenance of adequate records.
3.8
In addition, an RE must be a public company and
hold a financial services licence to operate a scheme.[6] The RE must hold scheme property on trust
for scheme members and ensure it is clearly identified and held separately from
other property. ASIC may require scheme property to be held by an agent
appointed by the RE.[7]
3.9
The RE may appoint agents and is responsible for
the acts of its agents even if those agents act fraudulently or outside their
authority or engagement.[8]
The activities of the RE are monitored by an in-house compliance
committee which is either the RE’s board or a separate in-house compliance
committee. [9] A
registered auditor who is separate from the auditor who audits the scheme’s
financial statements must be appointed by the RE to conduct an annual audit of
the scheme’s compliance plan to determine, among other things, that
the RE has complied with the plan.[10]
3.10
The MIA imposes obligations on the RE to report
to ASIC as soon as practicable, any breach of the law that relates to the
scheme and has had or is likely to have a materially adverse effect on scheme
members.[11]
Compliance committee members and the compliance plan auditor are also required
to report matters to ASIC in certain circumstances where there has been or is a
suspicion of a contravention of the law.[12]
3.11
ASIC’s role under the MIA is extensive. It is
responsible for assessing applications for scheme registrations and REs’
licences. It is empowered to conduct surveillance checks of schemes and must
be notified by the compliance auditor in certain instances where contraventions
of the Act have occurred or are reasonably suspected. It is required to take
the appropriate enforcement action in relation to breaches by the RE or others
involved in its operation.
The MIA’s performance to date: an overview
3.12
The Turnbull Review did not draw any firm
conclusions about the effectiveness of the MIA’s compliance arrangements.
3.13
This was partly because ASIC had not conducted
compliance surveillance under the previous regime. There were consequently no
data on which comparisons could be based. Furthermore, the review noted that
ASIC’s surveillance outcomes for 2000/2001, although pointing to compliance
breaches in 69 of the 83 schemes surveyed, were not necessarily a reliable
indicator of compliance across the industry. The review attributed this to two
factors. First, ASIC’s surveillance had targeted expected problem areas and,
second, the survey had been conducted during the first year of the regime’s
operation—a period when a higher non-compliance rate would not be
unusual.[13]
3.14
At the Committee’s statutory oversight hearing
with ASIC in June 2002, Mr Ian Johnston, Executive Director,
Financial Services Regulation, confirmed that ASIC’s surveillance results
should not be taken as representative of the industry as a whole. In this
regard, he stated that:
In respect of managed investments, we conduct a targeted
surveillance program, whereby we look on a risk basis at the sort of activity
that is taking place in the sector...there is always a fairly high proportion of
corrective action that has to be taken by the people on whom we carry out
surveillance. But that can create a misleading impression. Over the past couple
of years in respect of our targeted surveillance program, 80 per cent of the
participants on whom we have carried out surveillance have been required to
take some form of corrective action. That seems very high, but that is because
it is a targeted, risk-based program. It is not a random going around the
industry completely every year, but it is actually looking at where we think
the risks are high and at the participants whom we think are more risky than
others. You would expect to see and hope to see a high proportion of corrective
action taken. That goes from everything from collecting disclosure to us taking
away someone’s licence to issuing or launching a prosecution.[14]
3.15
The Investment & Financial Services
Association Ltd (IFSA) offered positive feedback about the MIA. At the hearing
on 12 July 2002, Ms Lynn Ralph, IFSA’s then Chief Executive Officer, commented
that:
...the act is working as originally intended. A strong culture of
compliance has developed in those organisations that are responsible for other
people’s money, and that was the goal of this piece of legislation.[15]
3.16
Mr Geoffrey Lloyd, Member, Regulatory Affairs
Committee, IFSA, added that the MIA had prompted an ‘enormous change’ among
directors of REs who characterised their obligations to investors as
‘fiduciary’. He concluded that:
...the depth, breadth and robustness of the compliance environment
has seen significant change from what, under the old law, was an environment
that allowed dissociation in some instances because of confusion as to where
the obligation started and stopped with trustees.[16]
3.17
Mr Lloyd also considered that reporting
obligations under the MIA had triggered a more active approach among REs
towards identifying and acting on breaches or potential breaches. He commented
that:
[The MIA’s reporting] obligation required people not only to
understand their obligations and carry them out but also to focus on any issue,
be it a breach or a potential breach, in a timely way. So the compliance
environment required that to be identified, flushed up and dealt with in a
senior way across the organisation in as timely a manner as possible, which is
the key.[17]
3.18
At the hearing on 12 July 2002,
Mr Paul Dortkamp advised the Committee that the growing demands of
compliance across the industry had prompted the establishment of the
Independent Compliance Committee Members Forum (ICCM Forum) in 1999. As a co-founder,
he had felt there had been a need to set up a venue ‘for the externals or
independents’ to swap ideas and so encourage the growth of a better educated
and professional compliance sector.[18]
3.19
Mr Dortkamp said the MIA had generated ‘a
very large shift’ in awareness of compliance and risk management among large
fund managers that had filtered down to the small end of the market. He also
noted that the requirement for REs to be licensed had forced them ‘to really go
through and lay out chapter and verse what their compliance regime will be’
when otherwise they would not have done this.[19]
3.20
Mr Dortkamp thought the compliance committee’s
obligation to report breaches or potential breaches to ASIC was a highly
effective compliance tool which kept REs in line. In this regard, he said:
It is a great weapon to have on a compliance committee—the fact
that we have the obligation to take things through to ASIC if we do not feel
they are being dealt with adequately by the RE is a phenomenal threat. In any
time of difficulty, you only have to breathe the word and people become very
efficient at providing material that was slow coming, if I can put it that way.[20]
3.21
In a similar vein, Mr Russell Stewart,
Partner, Minter Ellison Lawyers (MEL), considered the need for REs to maintain
their licences to be a very effective regulatory tool as it provided a real
incentive for REs to comply with requirements and report breaches in a timely
way. He said that:
In practice, what I am seeing quite frequently is that the fund
managers take very seriously the obligation to report immediately to ASIC any
breach. The reason they take that seriously is because, if they fail to do that
and they are caught, that could prejudice their licence. I have come to the
view that that has been the most powerful mechanism within many of the fund
managers for identifying and promptly reporting compliance breaches.[21]
3.22
ASIC was more reserved about the effectiveness
of the RE’s reporting obligations and advised the Committee that while some REs
were diligent about reporting breaches to ASIC, ‘others [were] less
forthright’.[22]
3.23
In relation to the effectiveness of the MIA
regime overall, Mr Johnston, ASIC, was somewhat equivocal. While he
thought the MIA had secured a higher awareness of compliance than was formerly
the case and pointed to the protection offered by in-house compliance monitoring,
he opined that it was perhaps too early to give a ‘strong opinion’ that the new
framework was working completely. He said that:
We have not seen...examples of gross misconduct that we thought
could not have arisen under the earlier model. So as far as we can tell just
now it is working well but we think it is too early to say.[23]
3.24
Before considering submitters’ comments on MIA
regulation in the context of this inquiry’s terms of reference, a logical first
step is to consider whether the MIA has been sufficiently tested by market
stresses to have proved its efficacy.
Stress-testing by the market
3.25
The Turnbull Review adverted to the difficulties
in assessing the effectiveness of regulation under the MIA in a time of
relative buoyancy in financial markets. It did not refer to the events of
11 September 2001, possibly because these were not regarded as exerting
sufficient stresses on the market to constitute a credible test.
3.26
The Department of the Treasury, when asked at
hearings about whether the September 11 market shock had been a
significant test for the MIA, appeared to think not and responded that:
...we would concur with Mr Turnbull’s findings that it is quite
early days, that a lot of funds did not transition to the new regime until the
latter half of 1999 to early 2000 and that in some ways we need to allow some
time to pass to be able to form any considered views. It is certainly the case
that the sorts of stresses that led to the policy change have not occurred.[24]
3.27
Contrary to the Department’s conclusions, IFSA
referred to the events of September 11 as ‘quite a major shock’ from which
the MIA had emerged with ‘a pretty good report card’.[25]
3.28
Mr Lloyd, IFSA, commented that, in contrast to
what the situation would have been with the former dual-party structure,
the MIA had enabled REs to respond to the September 11 crisis in an
effective and timely way. As a result, investors’ funds could be protected.
In this regard, he said:
I wonder what would have happened in the old environment to get
out an answer as fast as that (for September 11)...[Under the old regime] you had
two parties trying to understand what their obligations were and where the
deeds started and stopped...It was very difficult to get a timely answer. It was
because not one party but two parties had to make that decision. They had
their own internal questions...and they obtained their own external opinions.
With September 11 we saw a timely, appropriate response from the market that,
even with the benefit of hindsight, cannot be second-guessed.[26]
3.29
Mr Michael Shreeve, National Director of the
Trustee Corporations Association of Australia (TCAA), asserted that the events
of September 11 did not test MIA arrangements, because:
What essentially happened was that redemptions were suspended,
and a genuine stress test to us is when large scale redemptions actually
occur—only then do you see if purported assets are really there and the values
claimed.[27]
3.30
Mr Jonathan Sweeney, Managing Director, the
Trust Company of Australia Limited (TCAL), agreed with the TCAA that the
response of the managed funds sector to September 11 was not a sufficient
test to prove the MIA’s effectiveness. In this regard, he commented that:
...the system has to be put under stress to find out. When the
going is good, there are no problems, because markets are rising. Rising
markets hide problems; falling markets do not. You need a real stress, a real
shock to the system, to test it. The effects of September 11, when you
look at them, lasted for only a couple of weeks and then the markets came
back. Sure they have drifted off recently, but a lot of the funds froze, so we
do not really see that as a stress either.[28]
3.31
Mr Sweeney referred to an aspect of the MIA
which he considered encouraged systemic weaknesses in the industry. He commented
on the falling numbers of smaller funds entering the market which he attributed
to raised barriers to entry brought about by the MIA. This, he said, had
promoted the growth of large funds and correspondingly greater opportunities
for abuse because:
...scale enables you to hide mistakes more easily...you have a wider
pool of assets to amortise them across, and they are less material.’ [29]
3.32
Continuing on this theme, he added:
...the whole point of funds management is that you are going to
get some things wrong and...some things right...The consumer protection element of
the Managed Investments Act...was to stop malfeasance and to stop other people’s
money being taken illegally, inappropriately, unethically...A shock can cause
commercial pressure to make that decision harder and harder to avoid in some
organisations that are stressed...To me, the market move stresses are secondary.
Really, once you get to a size and a position of control, it increases the
opportunity for someone to work the system harder for their benefit.[30]
The Committee’s views
3.33
The Committee notes ASIC’s evidence that it is
too early to draw any definite conclusions that the MIA regime is working
well. Certainly, on the basis of evidence provided during the inquiry, the
Committee is not persuaded that market conditions, including the
September 11 crisis, have exerted sufficient stresses on the managed
investments industry to test the MIA’s effectiveness.
3.34
The TCAL’s suggestion that the MIA has favoured
large fund managers, is of some concern to the Committee because of the
potential impact this could have on fund diversity, fees paid by investors and
protection of investors. These issues are touched on in Chapter 8, Costs and
Fees.
3.35
Nonetheless, the Committee notes the evidence
that the MIA has prompted the growth of a vigorous compliance culture and is
encouraged by the contribution in this area made by the ICCM Forum.
3.36
The following chapter looks closely at
compliance requirements under the MIA.
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