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Chapter 2 - Inquiry background and objectives
Introduction
2.1
The Managed Investments Act 1998 (MIA)
introduced a new structure for managed investment schemes so that a single
responsible entity (RE) would carry full responsibility for a scheme and any
liability for losses. The Act took over from the prescribed investments system
(dual-party system) in which funds management was shared by a fund
manager and trustee, with the lines of accountability to investors unclear.[1]
2.2
The chief object of the legislation was to
increase investor protection in an era of unprecedented growth in managed
investment schemes. The trend overall was buoyed by the deregulation of
financial markets in the 1980s, which saw a proliferation of collective
investment vehicles—from the largest commercial property and management trusts
to small one-off schemes such as pine forests, ostrich and yabby farms. The Government’s support for self-funded
retirement, following the introduction of compulsory superannuation in 1992,
further stimulated growth in this sector during the 1990s.
2.3
However, the commercial property crash at the
end of the 1980s drew attention to the regulation of managed investments. In
particular, the collapse of Estate Mortgage in 1989 highlighted the
deficiencies of the dual-party structure, with fund managers and trustees
in dispute about their liability for fund failure. Shortly after, another
investment scheme, Aust-Wide, also collapsed. The resulting loss of
investor confidence, with requests for redemption continuing to outstrip
applications for unit trusts, suggested that a comprehensive review of the
regulation of collective investment schemes was required.[2]
2.4
Responding to the situation, the then Attorney-General,
the Hon. Michael Duffy MP, commissioned the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC) and the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (now the
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee) to inquire into the regulation of
managed investments.
2.5
The report, Collective Investments: Other
People’s Money, Report No. 65 (ALRC/CASAC report), was presented
in 1993. It found that the dual-party structure of managed
investment schemes was fundamentally flawed. The report recommended that, for
every scheme, there should be a single RE in which the functions of both the
trustee and the fund manger would be vested.
2.6
In 1995, the Labor government released draft legislation for
discussion. Its proposal to reform managed investments regulation also
provided for single RE arrangements but included a mandated requirement for a
separate custodian to hold scheme funds.
2.7
In March 1997, the single RE proposal was
endorsed by the Financial System Inquiry (FSI). Recommendation 89 of the Financial
System Inquiry Final Report (Wallis Report) advised that regulation
of managed investment schemes and superannuation should be harmonised ‘to the
greatest possible extent by bringing the structure of collective investments
into line with that for superannuation funds, by introducing a requirement for
a single responsible entity’.[3]
The Wallis Report did not comment on custodianship of scheme assets, however.
2.8
Following these findings, the Liberal
government, in consultation with key industry participants, drafted new
legislation to reform the regulation of managed investments.
The Managed Investments Bill 1997
2.9
The Managed Investments Bill 1997 was introduced
into the House of Representatives on 3 December 1997 and the Senate on 5 March
1998. The recommendations in the ALRC/CASAC and Wallis reports, as well as the draft legislation put forward in
1995, influenced the form and content of the Bill.
2.10
In his second reading speech on the Bill, the
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, Senator the Hon. Ian Campbell,
explained that the new Bill dispensed with the requirement for a mandatory custodian
by imposing statutory duties on the RE with respect to the property of any
schemes managed. These duties would ensure that:
- scheme property was clearly identified as such; and
- scheme property was held separately from the property of the
responsible entity or of any other scheme.
2.11
The RE of a managed investment scheme would have
the choice of determining how these requirements would be met. Senator
Campbell noted, however, that the Government expected many REs would find it
more convenient to appoint a custodian to hold scheme assets. The Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC—then the Australian Securities
Commission) would be given powers to require the appointment of a custodian on
a case-by-case basis.[4]
2.12
Under the regime, REs would be subject to a
comprehensive and rigorous compliance regime, overseen by ASIC. The Bill
contained provisions requiring that:
- a managed investments scheme had to be registered with ASIC if a
scheme had, among other things, more than 20 members;
- an RE had to be a public company and was to meet stringent
compliance requirements to be licensed by ASIC;
- as part of the licensing requirements, the RE had to lodge with
ASIC a compliance plan detailing the measures the RE had in place to operate
the scheme to ensure compliance with the law and the scheme’s constitution
(these measures would include arrangements for the custody and protection of
scheme property);
- an RE had to satisfy compliance requirements by having a board of
directors, half of whom were independent, or by setting up a compliance
committee, with half the membership being independent; and
- a member of a registered scheme who suffered loss or damage
because of the RE’s contravention of legal requirements could seek damages in a
civil action against the RE.
2.13
The new arrangements were commended to the
Senate as containing measures to ensure a ‘high level of compliance’ and being
a significant improvement on the previous system. A two-year
transitional period would apply for existing schemes to comply with the
proposed new regime.[5]
The Committee’s report on the Bill
2.14
During debate on the Bill, concerns were raised
about:
- ASIC’s significantly increased responsibilities under the new
regime and the difficulty—without knowing what would be in the relevant policy
statements and regulations—in assessing how ASIC would implement the
legislation and whether it would have the resources to do so effectively; and
- the lack of a mandatory requirement for a custodian.[6]
2.15
This Committee, then known as the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities, initiated an inquiry into the
Bill and produced its report in March 1998. With only a short time to inquire
into and report on the matter, the Committee concentrated on the key issues of
investor protection, the use of custodians, management and administration
costs, increased flexibility, and ASIC issues relating to resources and policy.
2.16
The majority report of the Committee found that:
- the single RE arrangements were an improvement on the previous system;
- it was reasonable to assume that the streamlined arrangements
introduced by the Bill would result in savings for investors; and
- the single RE arrangements would encourage innovation in the
managed investments industry.
2.17
The report noted that the Government had made
commitments to adequately fund ASIC to carry out its new responsibilities but
that it would draw Parliament’s attention to any shortfall, as part of its
ongoing scrutiny of ASIC. The Committee also suggested that ASIC’s policy on
capital adequacy and the use of separate custodians should be considered in the
review to be conducted by the Department of the Treasury at the end of the two-year
transitional period.
2.18
With these factors considered, the Committee
majority recommended that the Bill should be passed in its current form. The
Australian Democrats, however, submitted a minority report on the Bill. In the
minority report, Senator Andrew Murray emphasised that an independent custodian
was a minimum international requirement for investor protection. He
recommended that, if a trustee was not to be part of a scheme, an independent
custodian should be required, unless exempted by ASIC. He argued that small
business would be disadvantaged under the new arrangements and proposed that investors
have a choice about what system they operated under. The Australian Democrats
also requested that capital adequacy amounts be provided in the Bill and that
the Bill be reviewed five years after assent.
Commencement of the Managed Investments Act 1998
2.19
The Managed Investments Bill 1997, with
amendments, received assent on 29 June 1998. The amendments, moved
by Labor and Democrat Senators with the support of the Greens, included
provisions for capital adequacy amounts to be specified in the legislation.
The other principal amendment, at section 3 of the Act, called for a review of
its operation. It provided that the Minister must cause a review to take place
as soon as possible after the third anniversary of the Act’s commencement. The
review was to be tabled in Parliament within six months of that anniversary.[7]
2.20
The Managed Investments Act 1998 commenced
on 1 July 1998. It inserted Chapter 5C into the Corporations Law[8], replacing the dual-party
provisions with the new regulatory arrangements. Other amendments to the
Corporations Law effected changes relating to the licensing of scheme operators
and the appointment and removal of auditors of managed investment schemes. The
Company Law Review Act 1998 commenced at the same time as the MIA. It
inserted companion provisions into the Corporations Law, which revamped company
law and included provisions relating to the meetings of scheme members.[9]
2.21
The following table shows the scope of
regulatory and operational changes for managed investment schemes under the new
legislation.
Table 1: Changes to the operations of
managed investment schemes[10]
Old law
|
New law
|
Manager—public company, usually with securities licence
Trustee approved by the ASC
|
Single responsible
entity—public company with
securities dealer’s licence; financial and capacity requirements are more
stringent than for a general dealer’s licence. Prescribed minimum capital
requirements.
|
Scheme assets held by the trustee
or sub-custodian appointed by the trustee
|
Scheme property may be held
by the responsible entity or another entity as custodian, depending
on the adequacy of arrangements for holding scheme property and the amount of
net tangible assets. In either case, the single responsible entity is
ultimately accountable for safeguarding scheme assets.
|
Scheme registration not
required
|
Scheme must be
registered by ASIC
|
Approved deed with statutory covenants placing obligations on the
manager and trustee
|
Constitution with no implied covenants, but the law requires it
address certain matters and imposes responsibilities on the responsible
entity
|
No specified compliance arrangements
|
Mandatory compliance arrangements, including an
audited compliance plan and a board or compliance committee with external
members
|
No compliance with
related party provisions of
Corporations Law (prior July 1998) but some restrictions on related party
transactions
|
Compliance with
provisions for related party
transactions under Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act 2001
|
2.2
The commencement of these arrangements coincided
with the launching of the new regulatory framework for the Australian financial
sector. The Australian Securities Commission became the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC). ASIC took on responsibility for market
regulation and consumer protection across the financial system, including for
investment and superannuation products.[11]
2.3
ASIC’s regulatory responsibilities increased
significantly under the new regulatory regime. More particularly, changes to
the Corporations Law conferred specific discretionary powers on ASIC to allow
the flexibility necessary to cater for scheme diversity.[12]
2.4
The emphasis on ASIC’s supervision of the single
RE arrangements under the MIA was the main catalyst for Opposition amendments
requiring a review of the MIA after its third year of operation. Senator the
Hon. Peter Cook, in his second reading speech in May 1998, stated that the
review was intended to determine whether the new regime was in fact delivering
increased investor protection, and whether ASIC had the capacity to fulfil its
mandate as regulator of managed investment schemes.[13]
Review of the Managed Investments Act
2.5
The review undertaken by Mr Malcolm Turnbull
commenced its work in August 2001. The results of the review were presented to
the Treasurer on 3 December 2001.[14]
The review inquiry attracted 31 submissions from industry participants,
professional advisers, consumer and investor representatives and members of the
public.
2.6
Senator Campbell, when releasing the Turnbull
Review on 19 December 2001, announced that the findings of the review
indicated that, overall, the regulatory arrangements for managed investments
were working effectively. However, the Senator also announced that some
matters would be the subject of further consultation between ASIC, the
Department of the Treasury and industry participants and stakeholders.[15]
2.7
The review commented that time constraints had
limited the review’s capacity to make definitive statements about the regime’s
effectiveness in certain areas, for example, those relating to costs.[16]
2.8
Nonetheless, the Turnbull Review expressed an
overall confidence in the integrity of current arrangements. It made a number
of recommendations designed to clarify the legislation but rejected proposals
for the appointment of corporate compliance committee members and for
legislative clarification of the roles and duties of agents appointed by the
RE. As indicated previously, it did not examine whether there was a need for
mandatory custodianship of fund assets.
Committee’ s inquiry into the review
2.9
When the Committee reported on the Managed
Investments Bill 1997 in March 1998, it recommended that the Bill be
passed. Even so, it expressed one overriding concern—that the Government take
care to ensure that the concurrent restructuring of ASIC and the introduction
of the new regulatory arrangements for managed investments would not weaken
‘actual investor protection and perceived investor protection’.[17]
2.10
The Turnbull Review did not examine in any depth
the fundamental elements of the new arrangements. Rather it focused on the
effectiveness of the implementation of the new regime. As noted earlier, the
timing of the review inquiry process was also tight—only four months—as against
the six months allowed under the legislation.
2.11
The Committee considers that the significant
changes introduced by the MIA should be closely examined, especially given the
continued and growing economic importance of the managed investment sector.
2.12
Since the introduction of the MIA, the assets
held in managed investment schemes has almost doubled to $175 billion. Three
million Australians have now invested in managed funds.[18]
2.13
Large-scale corporate failures in the past
two years have destabilised domestic and overseas financial markets and
prompted widespread initiatives for reform. In particular, they have raised
questions about the independence of company directors and auditors and how
conflicts of interest might be most effectively addressed.
2.14
Given these factors, the Committee believes
there is a need for further consideration of the regulatory arrangements for
managed investments to ensure they are able to meet the consumer-protection
objectives of the MIA.
2.15
An analysis of the issues raised in the inquiry
follows in the body of this report.
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