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Chapter 4 - The compliance Committee
Introduction—the compliance plan
4.1
Under the MIA, every registered scheme must have
a compliance plan which sets out adequate measures that the RE is to apply to
ensure compliance with the Act and the scheme’s constitution. The plan must
include arrangements for:
- the identification of scheme property and its segregation from
other property;
- the scheme’s compliance committee where one is required—its
membership, frequency of meetings, reporting, access to relevant information
and access to the auditor of the scheme’s financial statements;
- the regular evaluation of scheme property;
- the auditing of the scheme’s compliance plan; and
- ensuring adequate record keeping of the scheme’s operations.[1]
4.2
The scheme’s compliance plan is the ‘hub’ of the
MIA’s compliance framework and, together with additional requirements specified
in the legislation, provides the model for implementation of in-house and
external monitoring of the RE’s activities.
4.3
While the Committee heard encouraging evidence
about the growth of a strong compliance culture within the managed investments
industry, a number of witnesses alleged there were technical and systemic
shortcomings in the MIA that seriously diminished the effectiveness of in-house
and external compliance monitoring. The most serious allegations questioned
the independence and qualifications of those performing the monitoring role.
4.4
In its Review of Independent Auditing by
Registered Company Auditors, Report 391, August 2002, the Joint
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) examined the meaning of
independence in a corporate governance context. The Committee believes the
following excerpt from the JCPAA report provides a useful definition:
The concept of independence is open to various definitions
depending on the context in which it is used. In a very general sense, being
‘independent’ refers to a person or group being self-governing and
unwilling to be under obligation to others. More specifically, independence
can be seen to have two complementary characteristics:
- a state of mind that allows for opinions to be arrived at without
being affected by external influences; and
- a matter of appearance in that facts and circumstances are
avoided that would lead a third party to conclude that a person’s ability to
arrive at an independent opinion has been compromised.[2]
4.5
The Committee will now consider the evidence on
in-house monitoring. In the following chapter, the Committee will review
external monitoring—the compliance plan audit.
In-house compliance monitors
Eligibility-the meaning of ‘external’
4.6
The RE’s board or a separate in-house compliance
committee is required to monitor the RE’s activities to ensure there has been
compliance with the scheme’s compliance plan. Where less than half of the directors
on the RE’s board are ‘external’, a separate compliance committee having a
majority of ‘external’ members must be established.[3] Clearly the meaning of the
term ‘external’ is central in assessing the independence of those involved in
monitoring the compliance plan of an RE.
4.7
Under subsection 601JA(2) of the Act, a person
qualifies as an external director of the RE’s board if the person:
- is not employed or has not been employed in the
previous two years by the RE or a related body corporate;
- is not or, in the previous two years has not
been, an executive officer of a related body corporate;
- is not or in the previous two years has not
been, substantially involved in business dealings or in a professional capacity
with the RE or a related body corporate;
- does not have a material interest in the RE or a
related body corporate; and
- is not a relative or de facto spouse of a person
having a material interest in the RE or related body corporate.
4.8
With the compliance committee, the concept of an
external committee member is similar to that of an external director and is
defined in similar terms.[4]
4.9
Generally, the criteria specified in the
definition are to ensure that a person will only qualify as an ‘external
member’ if the person is likely to be sufficiently removed from the management
of, or interests in, the RE or a related body corporate so the person can
undertake compliance monitoring with the requisite impartiality.
4.10
Evidence to this inquiry reflected mixed views
about the effectiveness of the definition in guaranteeing the independence of
compliance committee members or of the board when acting as a compliance
monitor.[5]
4.11
Some witnesses identified what they considered
were shortcomings with the definition. They said the definition needed to be
tightened to close loopholes which would otherwise enable non-independent
individuals to serve as compliance monitors.
4.12
In their joint submission, CPA Australia and the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia thought that the definition of
‘external director’ should provide that the relatives of a person ineligible to
be an external director should also be ineligible. They also considered that
the reference to ‘material interest’ should be defined by way of a benchmark
which could be adjusted, as required, in the regulations or otherwise set at a
percentage of the market value of a scheme.[6]
4.13
Mr Paul Dortkamp, Independent Compliance
Committee Members Forum (ICCM Forum), supported the exclusion of relatives and
the two-year restriction in the eligibility criteria for compliance
monitors and commented:
The key characteristic of an external is independence. While it
would be unfortunate if an appropriately qualified person was excluded because
of family ties, this would be a more desirable outcome than an uncritical
member of a compliance committee.
...There is no doubt that a retired member of a legal or
accounting firm has much to contribute as an external compliance committee
member. Again while the retired partner may be external, my view is that they
seek out compliance committees unrelated to their former firms and the 2-year
period be maintained.[7]
4.14
The evidence heard by the Committee regarding
the definition of ‘external’ was consistent with the arguments raised by ASIC
to the Turnbull Review that:
- the definition of ‘external’ should prohibit relatives of
ineligible individuals acting as compliance monitors; and
- the meaning of ‘material’ in the definition should be clarified.[8]
4.15
Another criticism of the definition was that the
meaning of being ‘substantially involved in business dealings or in a
professional capacity’ was too vague. This, it was alleged, had the effect of
excluding otherwise well-qualified people from membership of compliance
committees.
4.16
In this regard, Mr Russell Stewart, Partner, Minter Ellison Lawyers
(MEL), commented that:
I think a lot of people have had trouble working out how those
rules actually work. I have been involved in discussions about what
‘substantially involved in business dealings’ means. It sounds straightforward,
but in reality the way that you end up having to interpret that is if there has
been almost any kind of business dealing then it means that a particular person
is not suitable as an independent compliance committee member. I do not think
that most organisations find it all that easy to get suitable people...
Similarly, with respect to ‘having a material interest’, maybe
that is in some ways easier to apply. The committee may have heard from others
about those things but in practice people find them vague and difficult to interpret.
Take, for instance, an independent director of a company; a lot of people would
think that if you had an independent director that would be an eminently
suitable person to have on a compliance committee but under these rules it
seems as if that sort of person might be ruled out.[9]
4.17
Similarly, Mr Geoffrey Lloyd, Member, Regulatory
Affairs Committee, Investment & Financial Services Association Ltd (IFSA),
was concerned that the prohibitions on substantial business dealings would
exclude an ex-director of an RE’s custodian. He said:
...one would assume that that person does their significant
business dealing as your custodian and that that, if anything, should more
suitably qualify them in their background and experience to be on your
compliance committee.[10]
4.18
To address the possibility that suitable candidates
might be ruled out, IFSA had proposed to the Turnbull Review that the
‘substantial business dealings’ criterion be qualified by ‘which a reasonable
person would expect to influence the member in performance of their duties’.[11]
4.19
When asked at this Committee’s hearing on
7 August 2002 if ASIC supported IFSA’s proposal, Mr Michael Wall,
Assistant Director, Legal and Technical Operations, ASIC, commented that:
We are talking about the question of what a substantial
involvement in some other capacity actually is. I know that there are divided
views about what ‘substantial’ means. There have certainly been some
submissions from some of the law firms, accountants and so on which have said,
‘We have provided some services in the past and that should not disqualify us
from being a member of the compliance committee.’ While we understand that it
is finely balanced, our view is that, unless the law was changed, we would
probably err on the side of caution and say that the test as it presently
exists would probably prohibit people who have been involved in some
substantial capacity.[12]
4.20
In its submission to the Turnbull Review, ASIC
advised that it had given relief so that a person would not be taken to have
been substantially involved in business dealings, or in a professional
capacity, with a responsible entity because they are or, in the previous 2
years were, an external director of a related body corporate or a member of a
compliance committee of a registered scheme operated by a related body
corporate. ASIC suggested that the legislation be amended to provide for such
persons to qualify as members of compliance committees.[13]
4.21
ASIC’s proposal would seem to be at odds with
the concerns raised by Mr Michael Shreeve, National Director of the
Trustee Corporations Association of Australia (TCAA), who cited the following
as illustrative of problems regarding independence:
...the entity that owns the RE could have a director and that
director could be considered an external member of the compliance committee.[14]
The Committee’s views
4.22
The Committee notes the evidence that the
definition of ‘external’ needs to be tightened to ensure, as far as possible,
that individuals serving in the compliance monitoring role will be independent.
It agrees that the sole qualification for appointment as a compliance monitor,
namely, that the person is an ‘external’ director or member, does not guarantee
that that person will be ‘independent’.
4.23
The Committee notes ASIC’s comments that the
references to a ‘material interest’ in the definitions of an ‘external’
director and member need clarification.
4.24
However, the Committee is not satisfied, on the
evidence, that a clear case has been established to make recommendations
regarding clarification of the term ‘substantially involved’ or to extend
eligibility in terms of the relief presently granted by ASIC (and referred to
above).
Recommendation 1
The Committee
recommends that:
- the definition of ‘external director’ and ‘external member’ in
sections 601JA and 601JB respectively of the Corporations Act 2001 should
be amended to ensure that:
- they are independent;[15]
- relatives and de facto spouses of ineligible individuals are
ineligible to act on the compliance committee (whether as the board or an
external compliance committee)[16];
and
- the meaning of ‘material’ be clarified.
Criticisms of the in-house compliance monitoring model
4.25
Apart from the doubts expressed about whether
the definition of external was consistent with the concept of independence, a
number of witnesses also identified a number of problems with the reliability
of in-house monitoring as a check on the RE’s activities.
4.26
These concerned:
- the appointment and removal of committee members;
- insurance cover for Committee members;
- duties and functions of members of the RE’s board when acting as
the compliance monitor;
- the role of an external corporate entity; and
- the qualifications and experience of compliance monitors.
The Committee examines each of these concerns in order.
Appointment and removal of committee members
4.27
Under the MIA, the RE has power to appoint and
remove compliance committee members but is not required to notify ASIC of
appointments or removals.
4.28
The Turnbull Review thought this omission left
the way open for conflicts of interest. The review consequently recommended
legislative amendments to correct this by:
- requiring the RE to inform ASIC and scheme members of the
identity of compliance committee members and when they are appointed, removed
or retire; and
- conferring powers on ASIC to remove a compliance committee member
for inadequate performance or otherwise where it would be inappropriate for the
member to continue to serve on the committee.[17]
4.29
However, the Turnbull Review stopped short of
recommending that ASIC be given the power to approve the appointment of
members.
4.30
Evidence heard by the Committee about the RE’s
powers of appointment and removal was largely consistent with the findings of
the Turnbull Review.[18]
Witnesses were concerned that the RE’s powers seriously threatened the
independence and thus the integrity of compliance monitoring.
4.31
Mr Shreeve, TCAA, commented that compliance
monitoring lacked ‘genuine independence’ and pointed out that:
...REs, external directors and all compliance committee members
are appointed by, paid by and may be removed by the RE.[19]
4.32
The Trust Company of Australia Limited (TCAL)
echoed these sentiments. It stated that the tenure of compliance members was
insecure because ‘[t]here are no real sanctions to stop the RE removing anyone
in the compliance committee.’[20] The TCAL proposed amendments
to enhance the independence of the corporate compliance entity by ensuring that
‘compliance committee members could operate without fear of summary removal if
they [did] not toe the line.’ It wanted to see:
- guaranteed tenure for the independent compliance entity
(recommended that all compliance committee members should have a minimum three-year
tenure, provided their performance was satisfactory)[21];
or
- mandatory disclosable reasons for dismissal.[22]
4.33
Ms Gai McGrath, General Counsel & Company
Secretary, Perpetual Trustees Australia Limited (PTAL), and appearing with the
Trustee Corporations Association of Australia, agreed that there were no checks
on the RE’s powers to dismiss committee members, and proposed ways in which the
RE might be made more accountable when exercising these powers. She commented
that:
REs have the capacity to remove compliance committee members,
and no grounds need to be given to any person for that removal. In a case of
the removal of an auditor of a public company, the auditor has to get ASIC
permission to retire from that position, and an explanation has to be given to
ASIC as to why that auditor is being changed. In the case of compliance
committee members, I do not see any reason why the same regime should not
operate, which would give them some protection and ASIC would know what is
behind the removal of the member.[23]
4.34
Mr Paul Dortkamp, ICCM Forum, saw
similar problems with the current arrangements and outlined possibilities for
improvement:
There are some smart things you could do there. I think the way
to guarantee your independence would be to make it hard to get rid of you, to
add the bureaucratic overlay, such as requiring approval by ASIC. ASIC would
then send you a letter...asking, ‘Are there any circumstances you would like to
bring to our attention before we consent to your removal?’ That would be a very
simple mechanism.[24]
4.35
The Department of the Treasury was concerned
about the lack of transparency regarding the membership of compliance
committees. This, the Department considered, provided scope for REs to
exercise their powers of appointment and removal arbitrarily. As well as
removing diligent members, REs might find it in their interests to retain under-performing
members. The Department proposed amendments to correct these shortcomings:
...we think that ASIC should be able to remove an under-performing
member or someone they think is not suitable. At the moment they do not have
that power. In fact, at the moment ASIC is not even informed of who compliance
committee members are, which seems a bit of a gap in the legislation. The
recommendation in the report is that members and ASIC should be informed when
compliance committee members are appointed, are removed or retire. Hopefully, that
will promote more transparency so that members themselves might want to have a
bigger say about who is on the compliance committee.[25]
4.36
These amendments, the Department opined, would
have the added benefit of bringing potential problems to ASIC’s attention:
...if there was a RE that was constantly removing people or there
was a great turnover in a compliance committee of a particular RE, it might
send a signal to ASIC that perhaps there was something untoward going on at the
RE and it might be grounds for them to conduct further inquiries.[26]
The Committee’s views
4.37
The Committee accepts that, if the RE is to have
powers to appoint and remove compliance monitors, the legislation should ensure
that these powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily.
4.38
Issues relating to the independence of in-house
compliance monitoring which are of particular concern to the Committee are
that:
- there is no oversight of the RE’s appointment or removal of
compliance monitors; and
- the RE might fail to remove under-performing or partial
compliance monitors.
Recommendation 2
The Committee recommends that the RE be required to:
- report all appointments, retirements, resignations or removals
of compliance monitors (whether as members of the board or of a separate
compliance committee) to ASIC within a specified period (e.g. 5 business days);
- disclose annually to scheme investors the names of all current
compliance monitors; and
- disclose annually to scheme investors the names of compliance
monitors who have retired, resigned or been removed in the previous year and
the reasons for all resignations and removals.
Recommendation 3
The Committee recommends that ASIC be empowered to remove a member
of a compliance committee where ASIC forms the view that the member is not
performing adequately or otherwise should not be on the committee. The removal
would be subject to reasonable notice requirements and rights to administrative
review of ASIC’s decision.
Insurance cover for members of compliance committees
4.39
There was some discussion during the inquiry about
whether compliance committee members should have to pay for their own insurance
cover, the rationale being that this would bolster the members’ independence.
4.40
Subsection 601JG(1) prohibits an RE or a related
body corporate from paying the insurance premium of a compliance committee
member in respect of a liability the member has incurred for a wilful breach of
the member’s duties in section 601JD. The prohibition does not extend beyond
this.
4.41
For Mr Dortkamp, ICCM Forum, the fact that
compliance committee members were included in the RE’s insurance cover was
irrelevant to their independence. He did not consider insurance prohibitions
were an effective tool for maintaining independence and commented that:
The prospect of different types of cover through different
insurers seems...to go against the core principle of MIA being the concept of a
single responsible entity.[27]
As an individual I would rather have us all in the same bucket;
I would not like to see my insurance company fighting the RE’s insurance company.[28]
4.42
Mr Dortkamp advised that most compliance
committee members relied on insurance cover provided by the RE. He said the
most commonly used policy was designed specifically for the MIA regime and was
expressly intended to include compliance committee members. When commenting on
the availability of insurance cover for members individually, he said:
I am not aware of any compliance committee members who continue
to have [their own] cover for their compliance committee roles. One external
compliance committee member who did have cover last year, has been unable to
renew. The reason given by the insurers was that cover is evaluated on a
responsible entity basis and not an individual [basis].[29]
4.43
ASIC’s advice in relation to the RE’s payment of
committee members’ insurance premiums was that:
It is a practice
that does not overly concern us. I think it is better that there be insurance
made available to members of compliance committees. My understanding is that
the law does not prohibit the payment of the premium by the RE; it only
prohibits it in the case of wilful neglect of duty or wilful breach of duty.
There may have been a misunderstanding earlier in other evidence. The law does
not restrict the payment of the premium by the RE; it in fact contemplates that
that can happen. It is only in the case of wilful breach that the RE cannot pay
the premium, and that would not be permitted in any event.[30]
The Committee’s views
4.44
Although the Committee heard evidence that it is
accepted practice for REs to pay the professional indemnity insurance premiums
for compliance monitors, the Committee does not consider that this constitutes
a threat to the independence of those members. In this regard, the Committee
defers to the evidence of Mr Dortkamp and ASIC.
Duties of members of
compliance board
4.45
As noted earlier, an RE is not required to have
a compliance committee if half of its board members are external. The
Committee will now look specifically at the functions and duties of an RE board
when acting in the compliance monitoring role (the compliance board).
4.46
ASIC expressed concerns in its submission to the
Turnbull Review, about the failure of the MIA to spell out compliance
monitoring functions and duties for the compliance board. ASIC said it had
seen instances where:
...board members did not consider that they had any obligation to
monitor compliance with, or adequacy of, the compliance plan.[31]
4.47
ASIC argued that the legislation should be
amended to apply the same duties and functions to the compliance board that
applied expressly to compliance committee members, which are:
- to monitor the RE’s
compliance with the compliance plan and report its findings to the RE;
-
to report to the RE actual or
suspected breaches of the Corporations Act or the scheme’s constitution;
- to report to ASIC if the RE
does not address reported breaches appropriately; and
- to regularly assess the
compliance plan and to make recommendations to the RE about any changes that it
considers should be made.[32]
4.48
Furthermore, ASIC referred to legislative
requirements that compliance plans contain adequate arrangements relating to
compliance committee membership, meetings, reporting and so on. It was
concerned that some boards were not giving compliance monitoring issues
sufficient prominence at general board meetings. To remedy this, it proposed
legislative amendments to the contents of the compliance plan to cater for
compliance boards, in particular:
- to require separate compliance meetings;
- to stipulate frequency of compliance meetings; and
- to set out reporting arrangements.[33]
The Turnbull Review endorsed ASIC’s proposals.
4.49
At the hearing on 12 July 2002, Ms McGrath,
PTAL, supported ASIC’s proposal to clarify compliance boards’
responsibilities. She commented that:
There is a question mark over what those external members [on
the RE’s board] are supposed to be doing in this compliance area. There was a
suggestion in the Turnbull review that some of the functions of the compliance
committee should be imposed on the board of REs where the choice has been made
not to have a compliance committee. I commend that suggestion. [34]
4.50
Ms McGrath pointed to another factor which she
thought militated against the compliance board’s independence, namely that,
while the balance of power for compliance committees favoured external members,
this was not the case for compliance boards which only required half their
members to be external.[35]
4.51
As noted previously, a separate compliance
committee is not required unless fewer than half of the RE’s directors are
external.[36]
On the other hand, a compliance committee must comprise at least three members,
a majority of whom must be external members.[37]
4.52
The TCAA did not think the Turnbull Review’s
recommendations got to ‘the heart of the problem’ and argued that ‘reliance on
“self-compliance” (whether by the board or compliance committee) [was]
unacceptable, particularly when many billions of dollars of investors’ funds
are at risk’.[38]
4.53
In evidence to the Committee, Mr Shreeve,
TCAA, was critical that a compliance committee separate from the RE’s board was
not mandatory and argued that independence of external board members was not
guaranteed:
...a compliance committee is an option; you do not need to have a
compliance committee if half of your board members are what they called
‘external’, which has a different definition to ‘independent’...[39]
The Committee’s views
4.54
The Committee notes ASIC’s observations that
some boards undertaking the compliance monitoring role appear not to have a
good grasp of their responsibilities or do not give these the necessary
prominence at board meetings. The Committee believes that the failure of the
legislation to spell out the procedural requirements and the responsibilities
to be observed by the board should not go uncorrected.
Recommendation 4
The Committee recommends that the Corporations Act 2001 be
amended to ensure that:
- the requirements in the compliance plan dealing with the
arrangements which a compliance committee must make regarding membership,
holding of meetings and so on, as far as appropriate, be expressly applied to
the board when acting in the compliance monitoring role; and
- the functions and duties applicable to the compliance
committee, as far as appropriate, be expressly applied to the board when acting
in the compliance monitoring role.
4.55
The Committee is concerned that the RE’s board
can conduct compliance monitoring if only half of its directors are external
and notes that a separately constituted compliance committee requires a
majority of external members.
4.56
In the interests of ensuring the independence of
compliance monitoring, the Committee believes that, unless the RE’s board has a
majority of external directors, a separate compliance committee should be
established.
Recommendation 5
The Committee recommends that the Corporations Act 2001 be
amended so that the RE of a registered scheme must establish a compliance
committee if a majority of its directors are not external directors.
Appointment of an external corporate compliance entity
4.57
The Committee heard proposals for the
appointment of an external corporate compliance entity either to conduct the
compliance monitoring itself or to act as an external member on a compliance
committee. This proposal was advanced for two reasons:
- to ensure compliance monitors had the necessary expertise to
discharge their functions properly; and
- to ensure independence in the compliance monitoring function.
4.58
The Turnbull Review considered the problems
which schemes based in rural or regional areas might have in accessing suitably
qualified and experienced people to conduct compliance monitoring. The review
saw some appeal in allowing an external corporate entity to act as a compliance
monitor to remedy this problem but decided against the proposal on the grounds
that:
- smaller, less sophisticated REs would be more likely to outsource
the compliance monitoring role to an external compliance entity and this could
lead to the abrogation of their compliance responsibilities by those REs;
- a large compliance entity might come to dominate a smaller RE;
- the provision for an additional form of compliance monitor would
add to the complexity of the legislation;
- certification of compliance entities would be necessary and any
tendency by the entity to delegate its responsibilities to staff lacking the
requisite skills would have to be guarded against; and
- ASIC’s surveillance statistics had identified the use of external
service providers as a source of non-compliance. The outsourcing of the
compliance monitoring role to an external corporate entity could add to
non-compliance.
4.59
The review suggested that the proposal might
warrant further consideration if ASIC’s surveillance figures for the next few
years indicated there was a need to review compliance mechanisms.[40]
4.60
When invited to comment on this proposal at the
hearing on 7 August 2002, ASIC advised that it had not yet identified
major problems in the operation of compliance committees. In addition, it was
not sure that the problems identified during its surveillance activities would
be remedied by the substitution of a corporate compliance entity in place of
the existing arrangements.[41]
4.61
IFSA could not see any advantage in the
proposal. Ms Ralph commented that, if an RE needed specific skills and
experience, there was nothing to stop the RE from appointing the individuals
having the appropriate background to the RE’s board or compliance committee.
She commented further that:
We do not necessarily see enormous advantage in having the
option of placing a corporate entity on either the compliance committee or the
board, but we do see some potential downsides.
When you put an individual in a position of responsibility, that
is when the heat really gets applied and the regime becomes effective...
We would also have a concern if a responsible entity said, ‘I
can now just outsource my entire compliance regime to someone else’.[42]
4.62
Mr Dortkamp, ICCM Forum, shared IFSA’s view that
appointments to the compliance committee should be on an individual basis.
This was because it engendered a sense of personal responsibility. He also
considered that appointment of a corporate compliance entity could make the
compliance committee ‘dysfunctional’ because it provided scope for breaks in
continuity of those representing the corporate entity. Mr Dortkamp
outlined the potential problems thus:
The risk, as I see it, is that the people will be rotated
through the committee. Really, you meet every two or three months; that seems
to be about where we have settled. On the basis of the worst case, they are
only meeting four times a year. If you were to change the person, the dynamics
of the meeting would be changed. If I am on a committee and a new person comes
on board there is a learning period, and there almost isn’t time for that. You
really want people on the committee to be aware of all the issues—and you are sort
of kept up to date during the quarter anyway. Having a corporate person—the
actual individual in the meeting—changing from meeting to meeting is the worst
case and it is unlikely that that would happen. That would be very
dysfunctional. My comment on the period is more from the point of view of
functionality. I also think that if you are sitting there as the representative
of a corporate rather than as an individual, you could believe that to some
extent you are shielded by your corporation from the full effects of your
decisions. There is nothing like being totally exposed on a personal basis to
really focus your brain. We do not trivialise things; we do not gloss things
over. It stops here.[43]
4.63
Other respondents strongly supported the
proposal for an external corporate entity on the grounds that it would enhance
the independence and professionalism of compliance monitoring.
4.64
Mr Jonathan Sweeney, Managing
Director, Trust Company of Australia Limited (TCAL), commented that the
conclusions of the Turnbull Review not to proceed with a corporate compliance
entity were akin to saying, ‘Lets wait for disaster’ before taking action. He
contended that the appointment of an external corporate entity for compliance
purposes was a ‘sensible reform that would offer no additional cost or
inconvenience to the existing structure’ but would bring ‘quite strong’
advantages.[44]
4.65
He argued that an external corporate compliance
entity would relieve conflicts of interest and referred to factors within the
MIA which, in his view, created such conflicts:
[The] compliance committee meets three or four times a year and
is audited twice a year. It is comprised of individuals who might have other
roles and obligations in other jobs and who are being paid between $20,000 and
$30,000 for this role. They are appointed by the responsible entity, they can
be removed by the responsible entity at any time and their insurance is given
to them by the responsible entity—there is a lot of pressure there not to rock
the boat. If they resign or are removed, my understanding is that there is no
need to give a reason for that resignation or removal to ASIC. So you never
find out why people go; they just go. It makes much more sense to me to put in
an independent corporate body which will not have all those sorts of pressures.[45]
4.66
In addition to improving compliance monitoring,
Mr Sweeney argued that a corporate compliance entity would provide investors
with a vastly larger insurance pool from which to claim compensation in the
event of fund losses.[46]
Professional indemnity insurance would be more readily available and premium
costs would be more reasonable for a corporate member.[47]
4.67
The TCAA supported the concept of a corporate
compliance entity and argued that it would complement, rather than diminish,
the single RE framework. The TCAA responded to each of the Turnbull Review’s
objections as follows:
- smaller REs or those likely to focus less on compliance issues
were the ones most in need of an independent, external compliance entity;
- there appeared to be no concerns about REs using large audit
firms or other service providers so the argument about REs being dominated by a
larger corporate compliance entity was questionable. Also the RE had power to
dismiss the entity;
- concerns about complexity in the legislation were not relevant
and were outweighed by the benefits offered by a more independent structure;
- the need for ‘certification’ arrangements would merely put the
compliance entity on a par with other service providers such as auditors,
custodians and IT specialists; and
- outsourcing would improve, rather than impair, compliance. If
the RE is unable to manage outsourcing effectively, this should raise questions
about the RE’s ability to operate a managed fund.[48]
4.68
Mr Stewart, MEL, remarked that, in his experience,
the quality of compliance committee members varied enormously in terms of
expertise and capability. He considered that companies, such as trustee
company subsidiaries, with corporate backup and professionalism, would
considerably strengthen the compliance function.[49] He stated:
I have been involved in
trying to find, for a client, appropriate people to be compliance committee
members. I have found it a somewhat disconcerting experience because of the
great variety of people who are filling that role—some of them I know; some of
them I do not know. But there is certainly an enormous variation in the
different types of people, their backgrounds and the quality of them. I cannot
help thinking that there would be no loss, and probably a bit to be gained, if
you were able to have a corporate member of a compliance committee which would
be required then to provide—and in the nature of things, you would expect that
they would provide—a particular individual who would attend the meetings. They
would also have recourse to training, expertise and backup which a lot of
independent individuals do not have. I know that they are trying to develop
their training, their professionalism and skills and so on, but I still think
that there would be nothing lost by allowing companies to fulfil that role.[50]
The Committee’s views
4.69
The Committee is concerned that some schemes may
not have reasonable access to sufficiently competent individuals to act as
compliance monitors and consequently sees merit in the proposal for the
appointment of a corporate compliance monitor. The Committee notes the
objections raised by the Turnbull Review to this proposal but is more inclined
to accept the arguments raised against these objections by the TCAA.
4.70
Having said this, the Committee has identified
two factors of possible concern.
4.71
First, ASIC’s surveillance statistics indicate
that outsourcing may encourage non-compliance. On the other hand, the
TCAA has argued that an RE, if it is supposedly competent to operate a scheme,
should have the competency to properly manage its outsourcing. Ideally, this
should be the case.
4.72
The Committee considers that possibilities for
non-compliance can be overcome if a corporate compliance entity is only
allowed to act as a member of a compliance committee and not as the committee
itself. Indeed, the Committee considers the advantages of this are that the
entity would have the resources and backup to enhance its performance as a
compliance monitor. In this regard, the Committee notes Mr Stewart’s observations
that a representative of a corporate compliance entity acting as a committee
member ‘would...have recourse to training, expertise and backup which a lot of
independent individuals do not have’.[51] There are downsides, however,
and this is the second factor which the Committee will now consider.
4.73
Mr Dortkamp commented that, to optimise
performance, it was important to have continuity in the membership of the
committee. With a corporate compliance entity as a committee member, this
continuity is less likely. Furthermore, both Mr Dortkamp and IFSA argued
that representatives of a corporate compliance entity were less likely to
approach their responsibilities with the same level of personal commitment as
individuals. As Mr Dortkamp put it, ‘there is nothing like being totally
exposed on a personal basis to totally focus your brain’.[52]
4.74
The Committee accepts that lack of continuity
could present problems but believes these can be ameliorated by proper record-keeping
and—in the case of the entity itself—comprehensive hand-overs upon
changes in personnel.
4.75
Furthermore, the Committee believes that the
threat of removal for incompetence is likely to provide a sufficient additional
incentive for a corporate compliance entity and, indeed, all committee members,
to discharge their responsibilities with the necessary diligence. In this
regard, the Committee has recommended that ASIC should have powers to remove a
member either for inadequate performance or otherwise where ASIC considers it
would be inappropriate for the member to continue in the compliance-monitoring
role.
Recommendation 6
The Committee recommends that the Corporations Act
2001 be amended to allow a corporate compliance entity to act as a member
of a registered scheme’s compliance committee.
Qualifications and experience of compliance monitors
4.76
In its consideration of the adequacy of
selection criteria for compliance monitors, the Turnbull Review noted that, as
long as a person met the criteria to qualify as ‘external’, the legislation
prescribed no other criteria such as those requiring certain levels of
competency or skill to carry out the requisite duties. The review moved to rectify
this by recommending that standards should be developed relating to
qualifications and experience of compliance committee members.[53]
4.77
During the Committee’s inquiry, the evidence
indicated that there were limited formal training opportunities to assist
compliance monitors to develop or acquire the relevant knowledge to properly
discharge their duties. Mr Dortkamp advised that, in contrast to other
professional areas, there were no set courses for the purpose. He said that
the ICCM Forum had worked with the University of New England to present a
course on two occasions at the University. He said this course had been supported
more by compliance professionals than by the compliance committee members it
had been designed to help.[54]
4.78
The Committee was also told of the links the
ICCM Forum had forged with ASIC which Mr Dortkamp indicated had had a positive
influence on the industry. In particular, he said that:
One of the things we have done with the forum, too, is to get
ASIC to come along each month, which has been quite effective. The mainstream
fund manager and the independent compliance committee people know the people in
ASIC personally. We also go to the IFSA conference and run a separate stream
each year—it is in Brisbane again this year—so there is a bit of interaction
between the externals and ASIC in an industry sense, and there are some pretty
clear channels. Because of my self-appointed position, I also get a few phone
calls from people exploring what I call difficult issues. Because we have very
clean links through to ASIC, I think people are pretty comfortable about taking
their concerns there on an unofficial basis.[55]
4.79
Mr Lloyd, IFSA, agreed with Mr Dortkamp
that the ICCM Forum’s activities had been beneficial for the compliance
industry and had assisted individual compliance monitors to gain a full
appreciation of their roles. He observed:
I think it is fair to say that the roles, nature and capacity of
independent compliance committee members have really been evolving over the
past two years and that group has obviously been contributing to that process
in terms of clarifying the roles, responsibilities and the sorts of
qualifications, behaviour and conduct that are expected. I think you will
continue to see that grow and evolve. A lot of progress has been made...It is
also possible that we still have to see further improvements in the
understanding of those roles and the sorts of qualities of the people that are
going into those roles, but I think we have gone a long way to achieving what
was envisaged for that role.[56]
4.80
At hearings, the Committee raised the
possibility that best practice criteria and guidelines could be developed to
ensure all those connected with the governance of managed investment schemes,
including compliance monitors, were of optimum quality, independence and
integrity.
4.81
In this regard, Ms Ralph advised the
Committee that IFSA had developed a ‘blue book’ on corporate governance for
listed company entities. She said this had produced positive changes in
conduct and behaviour which had had an impact on the composition of boards over
the previous few years. She thought that a similar set of guidelines for RE
boards and compliance committees would be a ‘useful tool’ and would be best
developed through consultation.[57]
4.82
Mr Dortkamp thought the development of
guidelines would be worthwhile and suggested this could be achieved through
ASIC’s ‘policy statement methodology’.[58]
4.83
Ms McGrath, PTAL, shared this view and thought
the experience and expertise requirements set out in ASIC’s
Policy Statement 146 Licensing: Training of financial product
advisers would provide a useful precedent.[59]
4.84
ASIC’s view was that it would prefer to see the
ICCM Forum develop draft standards as a basis for future discussion.[60]
4.85
The Committee notes recent developments in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia to improve corporate
governance standards.[61]
Of particular interest to the Committee is the emphasis given by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the need for a company’s
auditing compliance monitors to have the necessary expertise to properly
perform their role.[62]
The Committee’s views
4.86
The Committee is concerned that, other than the
‘external’ requirement, there is no ‘quality control’ of compliance monitors.
While the Committee applauds the initiatives of the ICCM Forum to provide for
the exchange of ideas and improvement of standards within the compliance industry,
it believes more should be done to set minimum standards of competency and
integrity. This is particularly so given the compliance committee’s
fundamental position within the MIA framework. However, having said this, the
Committee is aware of the need to accommodate segments of the managed
investments industry based outside metropolitan centres when formulating its
recommendations.
Recommendation 7
The Committee recommends that the Corporations Act 2001 be
amended to require:
- the compliance plan of a registered scheme to set out detailed
minimum standards of competency and integrity which each compliance monitor
must meet;
- any amendments to the compliance plan regarding these minimum
standards must be approved by a majority of compliance monitors before
lodgement of the amendments with ASIC. The copy lodged with ASIC should also
be signed by the compliance monitors; and
- the RE to disclose details of the minimum standards annually,
preferably at the same time as details of compliance monitors are disclosed.
4.87
The Committee envisages that standards of
competency for compliance monitors could vary depending upon the scheme
involved. However, the Committee considers it would assist industry if a body
of benchmarks was developed to complement the legislation. In this regard, the
Committee notes that ASIC, IFSA, PTAL and Mr Dortkamp, ICCM Forum, were
supportive of such a proposal.
4.88
ASIC should develop model minimum standards to
be used where a registered scheme compliance committee does not wish to develop
its own.
Recommendation 8
The Committee recommends that ASIC, in consultation with industry,
develop guidelines and model minimum standards for competency and—if considered
necessary—integrity, for in-house compliance monitors.
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