TABLE OF CONTENTS
The origins
The reference
Conduct of the Inquiry
Issues raised by the Law Reform Commission
At the outset
Part A
Establishment and purpose of the Scheme
The history
Core features of the scheme
Special features
Membership and costs of the PCSS
Disqualification from entitlements
Administrative costs
The trustee structure
Other parliamentary schemes
Public perceptions of parliamentary superannuation
Is the scheme trying to do much?
The tenure of Australian Parliamentarians
The age of parliamentarians
The relative benefits to long and short term members
Superannuation, parliamentarians and the wider community
The nature of parliamentary life
Early pensions
Flexibility, portability and choice
To be or not be funded
Conclusion
The case for reform
Remuneration and representative government
Superannuation as part of parliamentary remuneration
Is an accumulation scheme appropriate?
Disadvantages associated with accumulation schemes
Preservation to age 55
Actuarially reduced pensions
Conclusions and recommendations
Background
Judicial independence: what it is and why it matters
Mechanisms to support judicial independence
A more mobile judiciary?
Restraints on judges' financial affairs before and after retirement
The National Commission of Audit's contribution to the debate
Conclusion
Who do we want as judges?
The judicial pension scheme as a recruitment tool
The effects on judicial recruitment of general changes to superannuation
Future changes to the judiciary?
Authority for the scheme
Some history of Australia's scheme
Features of the scheme
Funding, costs and employer support
A changing judiciary
Golden handcuffs?
Comparison with other schemes
The Canadian scheme
In the UK
Lessons from the history
Vesting
Death and dependants
Recommendation 4.1
Commutation and Choice
Resolving equity between judges
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