Chapter 4
IOR-ARC
The Indian Ocean has become the focus of increasing strategic
and political attention. Australia should be a pre-eminent country in the
Indian Ocean region, but we've neglected it in favour of the Pacific. We lack a
holistic Indian Ocean policy, despite the fact that we have the largest area of
maritime jurisdiction in the IOR.[1]
The Troika
4.1
India assumed the chair of IOR-ARC in 2011 and is to retain that
position until 2013 when it hands over the reins to Australia. Indonesia will then
take over from Australia in 2015. A number of witnesses agreed with the view
that the troika of India, Australia and Indonesia will provide six years of
strong leadership and opportunities for them to discuss useful initiatives for
pursuing their 'common economic and strategic objectives within the region'.[2]
Having reflected on the optimistic launch of IOR-ARC in 1997 and then traced its
faltering growth, the committee in this chapter considers the possible factors
behind the association's failure to thrive and then considers its future
prospects.
Profile and achievements
4.2
Despite almost 16 years of talks, workshops and meetings and its
impressive membership, including influential countries with observer status,
IOR-ARC remains a little-known and fairly uninspiring organisation. Indeed, on
occasion representatives attending IOR-ARC meetings have urged member states to
work harder at projecting the association's profile not only outside the region
but within their own membership.
4.3
Professor Dennis Rumley, Indian Ocean Research Group, noted that
IOR-ARC, which started out as an economic cooperation grouping, remains a
concept and, in his experience, few Indian Ocean inhabitants, including most
Australians, would have heard of the acronym.[3]
4.4
Although a founding member of IOR-ARC, Australia's level of interest in,
and commitment to driving the organisation toward greater cooperation, has been
tepid. According to Major General John Hartley, Future Directions
International, Australia has tended to look to the north—East Asia, Southeast
Asia and across the Pacific—and traditionally not paid a great deal of
attention to the Indian Ocean rim. He stated further that even when Australia
has given the Indian Ocean a good deal of notice, it has 'waxed and waned over
time'.[4]
Dr Sam Bateman and Dr Anthony Bergin wrote that the Indian Ocean was 'our
neglected ocean'.[5]
Mr Bryan Clark, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), informed
the committee that there was very strong interest in IOR-ARC but that part of
the problem was that the government had 'not necessarily promoted it as a
region'. He explained:
The Asia-Pacific is a commonly spoken of term. We have APEC,
the East Asia Summit and a lot of institutional arrangements which give a media
profile to our general relationships in Asia, but the same sort of dialogue
does not go on with the Indian Ocean. [6]
4.5
Even Australia's former Foreign Minister, the Hon Kevin Rudd, conceded
that at times Australia had been less than attentive to the organisation. At the
2011 Council of Ministers meeting, he acknowledged that he was the first
Australian foreign minister to attend the gathering in 15 years. He then told
the assembled member states:
...I'm not here to preach a lesson. I'm here to confess sins
and then suggest a way forward.[7]
4.6
The lack of familiarity with IOR-ARC became manifestly evident during
the committee's inquiry. For example the representative from the AFP had no
knowledge of the organisation.[8]
Dr Brendan Taylor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, who participated in
the committee's roundtable on the Indian Ocean rim, acknowledged that, though
he had been studying regional architecture for about a decade, he was
embarrassed to say that he had never heard of IOR-ARC before the committee's
hearing.[9]
Such statements are not a reflection on the officers but on the failure of the
association as a whole and Australia in particular to promote the region and
IOR-ARC. Even the recent Asian Century White Paper displayed a blind spot when
it came to the Indian Ocean and its regional association—IOR-ARC. Mr Clark,
from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted that there was
discussion on Asia through the Asian white century paper, but the discussion
still had a heavy emphasis around China and India as single countries rather
than, perhaps, the Indian Ocean rim as a region of focus.[10]
4.7
Professor Rumley observed that the extent of ignorance was not just
within Australia but among partners affiliated with the association.[11]
He observed that at the 2011 meeting in Bangalore the representative from Japan
had no idea at all about why he was there or what IOR-ARC is or does. Another
dialogue partner—from the UK—was equally in the dark about the association.
This lack of awareness may well stem from the association's overall lacklustre
performance.
4.8
Importantly, those knowledgeable about the association were not
impressed with its achievements to date. Dr Shahar Hameiri, Asia Research
Centre, was fairly pessimistic about the IOR-ARC's prospects as a regional institution:
a sentiment shared by numerous different observers.[12]
Dr Andrew Phillips observed that the association had rarely lived up to modest
expectations while Professor Rumley accepted that its actual impact had been
relatively small.[13]
The Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, doubted whether the association could
achieve effective international governance of issues affecting the region. In
its assessment, the prospects of such an achievement were 'currently very low'.[14]
4.9
Member states also despaired of the organisation's inability to gain traction
and for many years had been searching for ways to inject some vitality into the
association's activities.[15]
Forces hindering a regional organisation
4.10
Witnesses produced a number of reasons for IOR-ARC's inability to make
headway in developing a framework for regional cooperation. Most centred on the
contention that Indian Ocean rim countries as a whole do not yet have a strong
unifying objective: that they have little in common except bordering the Indian
Ocean.[16]
Major General Hartley noted that the Indian Ocean region tended to be much more
a geographical than a political region.[17]
Professor MacIntyre informed the committee that there were subsections around the
Indian Ocean linked to each other and some connected across the ocean, but 'not
much is shared among all of the countries around that rim'.[18]
He explained that people in the region see relationships in a different way:
that while there are connections growing across the rim, they 'are seen very
much through their bilateral prism'.[19]
Dr Phillips spoke of the temptation to try to impose architectural solutions even
when there are doubts about whether a region exists.[20]
Furthermore, the countries in the Indian Ocean rim are widely dispersed and
while they share the ocean, this vast expanse of water also separates many of
the countries.
Diversity
4.11
At IOR-ARC's very inception, member states conceded that the disparities
between them would be a major obstacle to forming an effective and strong
regional cooperative grouping. Indeed, diversity among the Indian Ocean rim
countries is stark and wide-ranging—culture, religion, ethnicity, demography, population,
trade interests, economic development, size of economy, per capita income and political
systems.[21]
For example, India has a population around 1.2 billion people and Indonesia
over 235 million in contrast to Mauritius with a population of almost 1.3
million, Djibouti with 800,000, Coromos just over 700,000 and Maldives with
300,000.[22]
Five countries have a GDP per capita of $20,000 or more while six have a GDP
per capita of between $5,000 and $16,000. Three economies (India, Australia and
Indonesia) dominate the region and account for 63 per cent of the total GDP of
IOR-ARC.[23]
4.12
The differences cut across any number of measures—ease of doing
business, human development and worldwide governance indicators—with countries
achieving performance scores ranging from the very highest to the very lowest.[24]
The region houses both politically and socially stable countries while others are
at the other end of the scale and in critical danger of becoming failed states.
Indeed, some of the poorest and most troubled countries are located in the
Indian Ocean rim.[25]
At the moment, Somalia is rated as no 1 on the failed states index with Yemen
at no 8 and Kenya at 16. With such a broad spread of values and interests, development
challenges and political and regulatory regimes, the difficulty for IOR-ARC is
to develop a shared network of priorities: to forge a regional identity around
a compelling sense of common purpose.[26]
4.13
As a regional association, IOR-ARC not only has to find a rallying cause
for its members, but manage issues that divide or separate them. For example, the
Asia Research Centre noted that 'sovereignty claims driven by natural resource
interests exacerbate the problems of institutionalising international
governance in the IOR.'[27]
Relevance
4.14
Without obvious common ground or mutual interests, members of IOR-ARC,
if they are to invest time and resources in the organisation, need to be
convinced that the organisation offers them some advantage. Thus, to succeed as
a regional based cooperative grouping, the organisation has to be relevant. Professor
Peter Drysdale argued that when IOR-ARC was set up, it had the same problems as
exist today:
It is based on a nice conception, but the substantial
interests in it are not there. It does not mean that there are not substantial
interests across it and around it in various ways...but they are not there in the
association that we are trying to construct.[28]
4.15
For example, the geopolitical orientation of many Indian Ocean regional
states tends to be away from the region.[29]
Professor Rumley cited the pre-eminence of domestic issues noting that one of
the disappointments of IOR-ARC has been South Africa's apparent lack of
enthusiasm because of its domestic situation and because of its own role, as it
sees it, within Africa itself. [30]
4.16
Moreover, one of IOR-ARC's key objectives is to explore all
possibilities and avenues for trade liberalisation. Dr Hameiri suggested,
however, that one reason for his reservations about the success of IOR-ARC stem
from this issue of trade liberalisation. In his view, this agenda has run into
difficulty all over the world. He explained that although trade liberalisation was
moving forward in some way, it was doing so through 'various bilateral,
multilateral and minilateral trade agreements that are very specific in what
they are trying to achieve'. He argued that multilateral trade liberalisation
has 'run aground not just in the Indian Ocean region'. He noted:
We could say the same about APEC, and of course the
multilateral WTO system has not actually progressed very much in the last 10
years...I do not think that IOR-ARC would be going much further than a lot of
these other organisations that are far more advanced in that respect. What we
see instead is the proliferation of free trade agreements on a multilateral or
a kind of minilateral basis, which in our view tend to have a far more
regulatory nature than previous free trade agreements that we have seen in the
past.[31]
4.17
He did not think that IOR-ARC could make much further progress.[32]
Other regional or subregional
groupings
4.18
Also, countries in the region do not have a tradition of coming together
as a group to promote regional issues. Professor Rumley referred to a lack of groundwork
in regional collaboration among Indian Ocean rim countries with most of the
cooperation occurring at the sub-regional level.[33]
In this regard, countries in the Indian Ocean rim already belong to subregional
and larger regional groupings. They include South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South African Development Community (SADC), Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC). There are also organisations with an issue-specific
focus such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. In many cases the groupings
appear to be the result of a natural coalescence of neighbours with similar
interests or of like-minded countries prepared to expend time, effort and money
to support common goals and participate in shared activities.
4.19
The interests and objectives of these various organisations overlap to
some degree with those of IOR-ARC.[34]
Some of these organisations already figure prominently in the way governments
calculate how they will pursue their interests. According to Dr Hameiri, it is
hard to see a wide Indian Ocean organisation coming in to replace these
organisations, so that is in terms of regional organisations, the prospects are
'not particularly strong'.[35]
4.20
Major Gen. Hartley likewise referred to separate political entities,
such as the GCC or the African Union that have their own internal attitudes and
outlooks. For some countries, those institutions are 'more important and
relevant than the
IOR-ARC'.[36]
The Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, also formed the view that in the
presence of alternative regional associations such as ASEAN and the African
Union, an Indian Ocean organisation with 'real governance capacities is
unlikely to take root easily'.[37]
It noted further that the emergence of a diverse variety of issue-specific, ad
hoc modes of regional governance was more likely than the advent of powerful
regional institutions.[38]
Indeed, it noted that this situation had already occurred particularly within
non-threatening security matters such as irregular migration, environmental
degradation and piracy. While appreciating the useful role that IOR-ARC could
have in the region, Telstra noted the many international bodies serve the same
purpose across different geographies in which the Australian Government
participates including APEC to ASEAN. It then noted that:
The challenge for Australian companies such as Telstra is to
justify the allocation of resources to support such activity in a meaningful
way, for example, through participation in the IOR-ARC Business forum.[39]
4.21
As noted by Professor Rumley there is also the choice between bilateralism
or multilateralism.[40]
Clearly, the challenge for IOR-ARC is to make itself relevant.
Membership
4.22
Major General Hartley suggested that the IOR-ARC probably fails, to a
certain extent, because of its membership, which currently excludes Pakistan.
He indicated that it is difficult to imagine an Indian Ocean entity that does
not include Pakistan, a major country in terms of population, and also Saudi
Arabia. He noted that there may be some question about whether Saudi Arabia can
be classified as an Indian Ocean country but argued that the Saudis see
themselves very much as belonging to the region.[41]
In his view, 'without those two countries being present, the IOR-ARC has a
certain weakness'. [42]
Dr Hameiri likewise pointed out that Pakistan is not a member of IOR-ARC.
4.23
Professor Rumley also cited membership and the uncertainty about whether
IOR-ARC should be an open or closed regionalism. He noted that certain states,
such as Pakistan, are excluded for political reasons and other states are
included. Even the nature of the process, which is consensus, means that if the
United States wants to become a dialogue partner Iran can potentially say no
because of the consensus basis of the organisation. So changing the membership
is an issue of governance.[43]
(The US has obtained observer status.) In the same context of membership conflicts,
Professor Rumley referred to the exclusion of certain agenda items—'you cannot
talk about security and...we dare not talk about Pakistan, and let us not say
anything about Iran'.[44]
Leadership
4.24
The absence of powerful leaders is another reason suggested for
IOR-ARC's failure to galvanise the region into cooperative action. For example,
Dr Hameiri argued:
There is no power in the Indian Ocean region within the IOR
membership or even within the parties involved or interested in this part of
the world—there is no state—that has the ability to underpin a regional order
in the sense that the United States has done in East Asia through its alliance
system. India certainly has not got the capacity to do that. Also, its
leadership is limited by disputes with Pakistan.[45]
4.25
ACCI noted that IOR-ARC leadership in the past lacked the capacity to
realise the opportunities for the region.[46]
Indeed, Mr Clark told the committee that ACCI had hoped that IOR-ARC might have
been more than it is, 'but on reflection it has not been run by some of the
major economies'.[47]
The Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University argued that there was 'no power in
the region with the ability and interest to enforce a regional association'.[48]
Resourcing
4.26
Active participation in, and support for, a regional organisation such
as
IOR-ARC requires commitment on the part of its members including funds to help
the organisation carry out its work. Professor Rumley referred to resource
commitment noting that 'if you expect very low-income states to participate
fully in an IOR-ARC you are asking a lot'. He noted that some cannot afford to 'function
their own state let alone being regional states as well, so that is a major
issue and not just for Australia'.[49]
He referred to the fisheries research unit in Oman, but observed that it does
not really have the regional support that perhaps the Omanis think it should
have.[50]
4.27
Lack of resources not only places constraints on the ability of member
states to participate in or to fund IOR-ARC activities but poor funding limits
the ability of the Secretariat to serve the association adequately. The matter
of resourcing the secretariat has been a long-running concern within the
association and remains a major drawback. Mr Clark observed that the association
has perhaps languished and failed to realise its potential because its secretariat
is in Mauritius, has not been well funded and a number of its members have not
held the association in high regard.[51]
4.28
Based on Ken McPhearson's evaluation of IOR-ARC, Professor Rumley listed
a number of other factors holding IOR-ARC back from developing into an
effective regional organisation. They included a vague charter; conflicting
visions of what
IOR-ARC is meant to be about; a weak commitment of member states; and an
unclear system of governance. The committee has also mentioned the region's
diversity, competition with other subregional or larger regional organisations,
the apparent lack of drive or leadership and the difficulty finding an issue
that could galvanise the countries on the Indian Ocean rim. The totality of
these factors undercut IOR-ARC's viability as a regional body.
Forces favouring a regional organisation
4.29
While there are numerous factors holding IOR-ARC back from achieving its
objectives and creating common ground for regional economic co-operation, there
are also positive forces with the potential to overcome these constraints.
4.30
Ms Grinceri, Department of State, Western Australian Government, noted
that the Indian Ocean rim is an area of great influence and importance with the
potential to produce an ASEAN or an APEC. She looked at the composition of the
region including countries with substantial growth and other opportunities that
are also located in major regional groupings—Singapore and Indonesia from
south-east Asia; India from South Asia; United Arab Emirates from the Middle
East; and South Africa from the African countries. She then explained that
there is also a third tier of developing countries:
In that mix there is a real opportunity to work together to
achieve things and to put forward projects to be funded from within the IOR-ARC
group.[52]
4.31
There are also powerful countries among those with observer status.
Ms Grinceri noted that in 2011, China, as a guest member, committed several
million dollars towards the operations of IOR-ARC. He noted that this amount was
much more than Australia had committed to the grouping of which it is the
deputy chair. In her view:
There is an opportunity there to help shape it and grow it so
that it becomes very effective.[53]
4.32
Dr Hameiri thought that if anything of real value were to come out of
IOR-ARC, it would be around bringing interested parties together to discuss
issues of common concern.[54]
Common ground
4.33
The committee has highlighted the great diversity in the Indian Ocean rim
but, as Drs Bateman and Bergin recognised, there were also similarities. They
noted that:
All IOR countries enjoy a tropical or temperate climate and
tend to have similar fauna and flora, ecology and types of natural disasters, especially
tropical storms and drought. They have similar endowments of natural resources,
including hydrocarbons. Some have large exclusive economic zones that are rich
in fish.
Also much of the world's trade in energy crosses the Indian
Ocean.[55]
4.34
Major General Hartley conceded that it was very difficult to find areas
of common interest to all countries in the region but referred to security of
the lines of communication, which is important for most of the countries.[56]
Professor Rumley agreed that it was a big ask to develop a regional
association, but argued that if 'we shy away from tasks that are too big then
we may as well pack up our kit and go home'. Although he would not underestimate
the difficulties establishing a regional cooperation organisation, in his view,
it was a challenge that needed to be taken up, suggesting further that:
...because there are so many issues of common concern around
the ocean itself and in the ocean, under the ocean and all the rest of it, it
is essential that we at least try to do that.[57]
4.35
Professor Rumley acknowledged that identifying key priorities was
perhaps the way to go and that DFAT had attempted to pinpoint some such areas
in which collaboration could take place—for example, the fisheries area.[58]
The ocean itself
4.36
The committee has noted the lack of a unifying force in the region
capable of mobilising the countries in the region to join forces under a common
cause. Countries throughout the Indian Ocean rim, however, depend on marine
resources and thus have a deep and shared interest in the sustainable
development of these resources. They recognise that maintaining the integrity
of the regional environment is a most important common concern.[59]
Indeed, Professor MacIntyre noted that the ocean itself and its management is the
thing that connects the countries on the rim.[60]
For example, Indian Ocean littoral states share an interest in the ocean as an
important breeding ground for climatic events that have a profound effect over
the El Nino and La Nina events.[61]
They also have a vested interest in tsunami warning systems, the ecological
health of coastal zones and ocean biodiversity, the need to protect vital fish
stocks and the responsible exploitation of the rich seabed.
4.37
Professor Drysdale agreed with the view that the most productive thing for
IOR-ARC would be to focus on the ocean itself: its management, the eco-systems
and the handling of environmental disaster scenarios which are important to the
littoral states around the ocean.[62]
In this regard, Australia recognises that the countries around the Indian Ocean
'share a truly great resource':
There is a common responsibility to care and manage this
resource to ensure that countries develop the resources of the Indian Ocean in
a manner compatible with the principles of sustainable development. There is
also a need to harness the resources of the ocean in a way that does not
inflict irresponsible damage on the marine environment.[63]
4.38
There is also the question of trade routes and their security.[64]
The Indian Ocean ranks amongst the busiest trading thoroughfares for global trade
linking major world centres and, as such, is critical for international maritime
long-haul cargo. It is in the interest of all rim countries to cooperate in
ensuring that the region remains stable and provides a safe passage for cargo
and other ships.[65]
In particular, the ocean will continue to be a vital means for transporting the
world's energy sources and thus security and protection of sea lanes and
associated choke points is of paramount importance to the region.[66]
Clearly, the Indian Ocean itself has the potential to be the unifying element needed
to give IOR-ARC the focus and incentive to become an effective regional
organisation. For Australia, in particular, the Indian Ocean is of growing economic
importance:
Australia is increasing its reliance on imported crude and
petroleum products to meet growing demand, partly as a result of declining
domestic oil reserves. This leaves Australia increasingly dependent for
supplies on long and vulnerable sea lanes, many of which pass from the
geopolitically unstable Middle East through the Indian Ocean.[67]
4.39
The IOR-ARC has identified security, disaster risk management and
fisheries management among its six priority areas.
4.40
Overall, the International Editorial Board for the Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region concluded that, given its regional and global social, environment,
geopolitical and economic importance, the very existence of the Indian Ocean
'should be a key catalyst for collaborative interest in research and
policy-making'.[68]
4.41
While the Indian Ocean and matters associated with the management of
marine resources and the safe passage of ships through the region is one area
where all countries around the ocean have a common interest, there are also
others areas where the countries could benefit from close cooperation. For
example, all have a significant interest in establishing an environmental
security agenda, which addresses basic survival matters, for the region. They
include food, water and resource security which affects all member states and
therefore are regional and shared problems 'with the potential for promoting a
peaceful and extremely necessary dialogue'.[69]
Membership
4.42
The committee has noted that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are not members
of the IOR-ARC. Some viewed their absence as a weakness. Even so, as noted by
Mr Michael Shoebridge, Department of Defence, the IOR-ARC's 20 members include
key states such as India, Indonesia, Iran, the UAE and South Africa, who will
be 'influential shapers of the Indian Ocean security environment'.[70]
The committee agrees that the membership at the moment provides a solid enough
basis on which to expand the association.
People-to-people links
4.43
Although countries across the region lack strong connections, there are
some historically deep and more recent emerging and significant relationships.[71]
India and East Africa and India and South Africa have a long history of
migration but less so to other parts of the Indian Ocean rim. Even then, there
has been some migration in the past between India and South-East Asia. Professor
Jha observed:
India has a comparative advantage in terms of human-to-human
contacts—family contacts, business contacts...—in the western part of the Indian
Ocean Rim countries, and Australia has more of a comparative advantage in the
more eastern part, to the east of India. So there is a natural complementarity
between the two.[72]
4.44
Over the past decade significant numbers of people from the region have
settled in Australia. According to DFAT, 2006 statistics record that approximately
615,000 Australian residents had been born in Indian Ocean rim countries, an
increase of around 480,000 in 2001 representing a growth of over 28 per cent.
As at 30 June 2010, over 1 million of the Australian Estimated Resident Population
had been born in the top 12 Indian Ocean rim countries.[73]
4.45
The Government of Western Australia reported that settlers from South
Africa accounted for the largest share of migrants to the state followed by
India and Malaysia.[74]
The NSW Government noted that, based on 2006 census figures, NSW was home to
over 200,000 people born in the Indian Ocean rim region, which represented one
third of the immigrants to Australia from this region.[75]
4.46
The 2011 census showed that the most common countries of birth differed
according to when migrants arrived in Australia. For longer-standing migrants
(those who arrived before 2007) almost a quarter were born in the United
Kingdom. The pattern, however, has changed for recent arrivals (those who
arrived between 2007 and census night in 2011) with India being the leading birthplace
for this group (13%). Between 2001 and 2011, the number of India born residents
in Australia increased by up to 200,000. As at the 2011 census, 5.6% of Australian
residents born overseas came from India (295,400), 2.8% from Africa (145,700) and
2.2% from Malaysia (116,200).[76]
4.47
The number of student visa holders from the Indian Ocean rim countries
also demonstrates another area where critical people-to-people links are forged
between Australia and the region. In 2012, in excess of 50,000 Indian students
in Australia held student visas, over 15,200 Malaysian and 11,400 Indonesian students
and more than 11,800 from Thailand.[77]
Myriad networks are also developing between Australian and Indian Ocean rim
research institutes and especially with Indian scientists collaborating on
joint projects focused, for example, on the Indian Ocean. (See chapter 9 for
more details).
Opportunities—Troika
4.48
Professor Rumley noted that IOR-ARC has not been a success but appeared
to be 'in a revival phase', which he attributed in part to the efforts of India
and Australia.[78]
Dr Phillips noted that one of the great advantages with IOR-ARC at the moment
was the sequencing of the position of chair—India, 2011-12; Australia,
2013-14; Indonesia, 2015-16—and the possibility to use IOR-ARC as a vehicle to
leverage strategic relationships important to Australia. In his view, this
arrangement—three democracies with very serious maritime concerns—provided
Australia with 'a very wonderful opportunity' to use IOR-ARC as a basis for
building that trilateral relationship.[79]
He explained:
Its real value may be less as a basis for building some kind
of regional security architecture or regional cooperative architecture...But the
real opportunity there would be to potentially forge stronger trilateral
cooperation through the vehicle of operating through IOR-ARC.[80]
4.49
Ms Sonia Grinceri, Western Australian Government, who has attended
IOR-ARC meetings in an observer capacity, agreed with the view that IOR-ARC has
'a long way to go until it hits its straps'. She believed, however, that since India
had taken over as chair, with Australia as the deputy chair, there had been greater
willingness and commitment. Having observed the difference in just two years, she
could see scope for the association to gain momentum.[81]
Her colleague,
Mr Giles Nunis, similarly noted that these three G20 nations were the biggest
economies in IOR-ARC and that, if the association were to be revitalised, it was
up to them to be proactive and lead the way. He concluded that 'IOR-ARC's
future depends on how Australia harnesses the window of opportunity'.[82]
4.50
ACCI likewise suggested that Australia should take the leadership role
very seriously and 'attempt to drive an ambitious advancement of the agenda for
this group'.[83]
Mr Clark, ACCI, informed the committee that his organisation considered that
there was promise ahead, with India as the chair and Australia as vice-chair
and with Australia rotating into the chair at the end of 2013, followed by
Indonesia. He informed the committee that ACCI had been trying to encourage the
government to make sure that there was strong momentum as it took on chair of IOR-ARC.
He recognised that Australia has very strong linkages with Indonesia.[84]
ACCI would like to see Australia take up the reins and a leading role in
reinvigorating the organisation broadly, so that over the next 12 months:[85]
...there is a ramp-up of activity—we would encourage that—and
that we use our opportunity as the chair for two years to host increased
dialogue, inbound trade missions from the region into Australia, to have
broader ambition for it and by the time Australia has handed it over that maybe
there will also be some stronger institutional bonds.[86]
4.51
Telstra suggested that Australia's forthcoming role as chair of the
IOR-ARC provides a chance to develop strategies together with the Australian
business community and other sectors such as arts and education, to make the
best use of the forum.[87]
Dr Phillips also noted Australia's pending leadership of IOR-ARC and the
'outstanding and time sensitive opportunity' for it to promote the development
of a 'more effective regional security architecture'.[88]
Collaboration with India
4.52
From Dr David Brewster's perspective, the primary value of IOR-ARC for
Australia was providing an opportunity to work with India—'the only forum available
for it to do so'. He suggested that as long as Australia can be seen as
supportive of India as a regional leader, IOR-ARC could be of 'huge value to
Australia'.[89]
4.53
Dr Auriol Weigold thought that IOR-ARC presented an excellent chance for
Australia 'to focus on becoming something that India can see is more important'
and for Australia to work together with India. She noted:
Don't forget IOR-ARC last time had 'grand plans' and they all
fell away because of a lack of interest. This attempt at revival should be
given every chance to work. India is engaged very deeply with Indonesia at the
moment, and...we should follow on in there. I think a prime role for Australia in
leading IOR-ARC is to establish our credentials in India a bit more. The
bilateral relationship has been a one-step-forward, two-steps-back event for a
long time now, and I see this as a good opportunity—a great opportunity, in
fact.[90]
4.54
Professor Andrew MacIntyre, ANU, found the principal pay-off for
Australia from IOR-ARC and Australia's upcoming role as chair would be the chance
to do something with India at a government to government level. He spoke of the
importance of engaging in 'appropriately consultative dialogue' with India well
in advance. In his view, 'if the Indians do not want to play ball, then I guess
the association slides down my list—at least for me'.[91]
4.55
AusAID recognised that India is critical to the relationship of IOR-ARC,
especially as the current chair. It noted the importance of Australia thinking
about how it will engage with India in development cooperation terms as well as
in the much broader relationship that Australia has in trade and investment, scientific
cooperation and a whole lot of other arrangements.[92]
4.56
Mr Mark Pierce, DFAT, stated that when Australia becomes chair in
November, it wants to extend that range a bit—India as the past chair of
IOR-ARC, Australia for the next two years and, after that, Indonesia. Australia
wants to set up a sort of troika arrangement where it can take advantage of
advice and guidance not just from the Indians but from the Indonesians as well.[93]
DFAT observed:
We will have six consecutive years of large, powerful, dynamic
economies managing IOR-ARC. While we are in the chair, we want to use that
troika arrangement to discuss immediate IOR-ARC business and a wide range of
other issues as well which are of interest to us and Indonesia. Are there
issues in maritime security we can pick up running through the maritime
security forum the Indians are going to organise later in the year? There have
also been proposals from Singapore for another forum. Are there issues about
what we do together in the Indian Ocean?[94]
4.57
DFAT noted that it has a number of plans working up to November, but all
depend on effective cooperation with India. It noted that there are big
economies around the rim of the Indian Ocean—Australia, Indonesia, India and
South Africa, but DFAT always think about the agenda of work—the work
program—as a collaborative effort with India to begin with. [95]
4.58
ACCI understood that the larger economies in IOR-ARC now occupied a
dominant position and would be able to provide greater impetus and a stronger agenda
for the association. It held reservations, however, about capitalising on this
opportunity. Mr Clark explained that the anticipated momentum had not necessarily
happened. For example, ACCI had hoped that the most recent meeting in India would
have been 'more of a success'. Mr Clark reported that in the end, the Indian
side did not necessarily place the emphasis on it that ACCI had hoped for. He
noted further that the Australian Government 'is not entirely focused on the
IOR-ARC and the opportunities which might come from it'.[96]
Working with like-minded countries
in the region
4.59
The committee has noted that the various sub regional groups and the
larger regional groupings may well serve the interests of individual countries
in the Indian Ocean rim better than IOR-ARC. The existence of these grouping,
however, does not necessarily mean they are rivals and compete with IOR-ARC:
that IOR-ARC has no future as a regional association. IOR-ARC's challenge is to
find ways to complement, support or augment their objectives while establishing
its own relevance. Indeed, there may be activities that IOR-ARC is better
suited to take over.
4.60
Dr Taylor took the view that rather than working through a number of
these very institutionalised, formal groupings Australia should look for
particular areas of pressing concern and then try to work with like-minded
countries to address those functional issues and cooperate on those. He gave the
region's response to the Indian Ocean tsunami as an example of effective
collaboration. Thus, according to Dr Taylor:
...in a very practical and pragmatic way, make the group fit
the issue, get together with those who are interested in cooperating on that
particular issue, rather than try to work with other existing groups that may
not necessarily have that same interest or degree of impetus going forward,
even if that means those groupings are temporary and fleeting and, once the
issue has been addressed in some way, they then melt away.[97]
4.61
ACCI used existing trade arrangements as an example of prior agreements that
'should lend themselves to the development of an Indian Ocean regional trade
agreement'. He referred to 'perhaps using the step wise precedent of the
Trans-pacific partnership agreement which had allowed an initial 'nucleus of
interested countries to begin negotiations with other parties coming in as the
discussions matured'.[98]
Greater involvement of NGOs
4.62
Professor Rumley recognised that IOR-ARC held regular meetings, such as
the council of ministers meetings, but in his view there needed to be 'a much
greater grassroots involvement of NGOs and others in the process of identifying
areas in which collaboration could actually take place'. He believed that there
was 'a great will for greater collaboration' and some states around the region,
not in IOR-ARC, that would like to be in IOR-ARC and should be encouraged to do
so.[99]
The committee has drawn attention to the growing diaspora of Indians, Africans
and Malaysians in Australia—fertile ground for growing strong people-to-people
links across the ocean.
Conclusion
4.63
There are factors that work against the IOR-ARC becoming a successful
and effective regional organisation. The lack of a unifying force due in large
measure to the wide range of diversity among its membership is the most obvious.
The committee has also mentioned other challenges confronting IOR-ARC—competing
subregional and regional organisations that may appear to have greater
attraction, gaps in the association's membership and a lack of leadership and
commitment reflected in the poor resourcing of the association's secretariat.
4.64
Even so, the committee has noted the potential within the region to
overcome such difficulties: that indeed despite their diversity the countries
in the Indian Ocean share mutual interest and common purposes. The question
before the committee is whether it is worthwhile for the members of IOR-ARC,
and in particular Australia, to invest time and resources in the association.
In the following chapter, the committee explores the possibilities ahead for
IOR-ARC.
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