Chapter 2
The landing of the senior sailors in Singapore
2.1
During Success' deployment between March and May 2009, the
commanding officer (CO) of the ship became aware of reports of a number of
incidents of unacceptable behaviour that eventually caused him to contact Fleet
Headquarters for support and guidance. The response from Fleet Command set in
motion a series of events that eventually culminated in the landing of three
senior sailors in Singapore on 9 May 2009. Rather than resolve problems, this
action attracted widespread and sensational publicity; damaged the good
standing and character of certain crew members; cast doubt on the reputation of
the ship's company; and more broadly damaged Navy's image.
2.2
In its first report, the committee looked at the circumstances that
caused the CO to seek outside help to deal with problems that had been bought
to his attention. It considered the Equity and Diversity (E&D) team that
was sent to assist; the veracity of its damning report on the behaviour of some
crew members; and the subsequent landing of three senior sailors from the ship
in Singapore. In this chapter, the committee provides a summary of events and of
the committee's findings which drew heavily on the contents of Part One of the
Gyles' Report.
Reports of unacceptable behaviour—a cultural issue
2.3
On 26 April 2009, three members of the ship's company—the executive
officer (XO), who was the most senior female officer, and the two senior female
sailors—met the CO, CMDR Simon Brown, to discuss a serious issue that had come
to their attention concerning the general management of Success. The
allegations included 'bullying, the existence of bounties for having sex with
junior sailors, encouragement of female sailors to get drunk and, therefore, be
more susceptible to sexual approaches and predatory behaviour towards female
sailors—specifically being undertaken by some members of the engineering
department.'[1]
Without doubt, the CO of the ship placed a great deal of weight on their
accounts. According to CMDR Brown, this information 'was not firsthand, but had
been reported or told to these members by junior female sailors'.[2]
At this time, the alleged perpetrators were not named as the information had
been provided in confidence, but the CO was told that this behaviour had been
going on for some time and that it was getting worse.
2.4
CMDR Brown was of the view that the problem onboard his ship was a
cultural issue 'not just an unacceptable behaviour issue—there was potential
sexual-related activities, potential criminal activities'.
Outside assistance
2.5
Alarmed by these accounts of unacceptable behaviour and believing that
he had a significant cultural issue onboard Success, CMDR Brown
contacted Fleet Headquarters and outlined the equity and diversity issues of
concern. In an email, dated 30 April 2009, he wrote about his belief that there
was currently a number of 'bounties' placed on very junior female members of
his ship's company, including the one involved in a consensual sex act that
took place onboard Success while in Qingdao. CMDR Brown then went on to
say:
There have been instances of junior female sailors being
abused, intimidated and threatened ashore. The sailors in question are
currently not willing to come forward due to the potential for incrimination
and potential recrimination. This has been brought to my attention through a
number of the more senior females onboard. I believe much of the action/issues
that are occurring are condoned by some [redacted] onboard. A recent incident
which came to light after sailing from Qingdao involved a junior female sailor
and [redacted] in a night club ashore where a sexual act was committed on the
pool table in the bar in the full view of POs and other members of the ships
company. My executive officer has been approached by junior sailors who have
stated that there is a predatory element [redacted] onboard that has been
onboard for a number of years, it has only been brought to commands attention
because there is an understanding that something will now be done about it.
Sir, it is my firm belief that there is a predatory element
onboard that focuses on junior inexperienced females which is led by the
[redacted] department onboard. I am convinced that this has been going on for
some time and is condoned by members of [redacted]. I am also convinced that there
are a [redacted] number of junior sailors onboard who are confident that their
actions are condoned thinking that they have the 'consent' of the senior
sailors onboard, the junior females that are implicated feel that they have
very little recourse and feel that if they speak up there will be consequences.
The members who have brought this to my attention feel they are very much at
risk, but feel that enough is enough.[3]
2.6
This email was the first document recording the allegations.
Equity and Diversity (E&D) team
2.7
After some consideration at Fleet Headquarters, CDRE Daryl Bates, Chief
Combat Support Group (CCSG), decided to send an equity and diversity team, made
up of two personnel, to come onboard to conduct workshops. The team comprised
the senior equity adviser of Fleet Command, Lieutenant Diane McArthur, and the
Assistant Equity and Diversity Coordinator of Fleet Command, Warrant Officer
(WO) Melville Harker. They were directed not to conduct an investigation or a
quick assessment. According to CDRE Bates, he made clear to the CO that the
team was being provided to:
-
assist him informally in exploring whether he did in fact have
any inappropriate behaviour or culture occurring in the ship; and
-
provide E&D presentations in order to assist him in
rectifying a poor E&D culture should that exist.[4]
2.8
Even so, uncertainty surrounded the role and function of this team. Crew
members were informed that the team had arrived 'to conduct cultural awareness
and Equity and Diversity presentations'.[5]
The E&D Health Check had no clear terms of reference or Defence regulations
or instructions to guide its conduct. This confusion contributed to a breakdown
in communication with those onboard Success who had no reasonable understanding
of the purpose of the so-called 'cultural awareness and Equity and Diversity
presentations'. Furthermore, Mr Gyles described their activity as a
'quasi-investigation' which was undertaken by people with no training or
experience in conducting such inquiries. Clearly, the appointment of the
E&D team and the tasks assigned to it meant that its report provided a
potentially dubious foundation for any future actions.
2.9
The E&D team joined the ship in Hong Kong on 4 May 2009 prior to the
vessel sailing for Singapore and conducted their workshop onboard during that
period.[6]
Lieutenant McArthur and WO Harker agreed to present separately to different
groups simultaneously.[7]
These group E&D sessions encouraged 'open discussion about instances of
unacceptable behaviour'. In some instances, alleged perpetrators were named.[8]
The E&D team noted:
As the workshops were conducted within peer groups, some of
the ship's crew felt comfortable enough to openly talk in the group format.
Most groups raised similar issues, including the use of steroids and drugs
onboard, the closed off cultur[e] within the MT branch, inequality in
punishments when it came to the MT branch, and the level of inappropriate
relationships that occur onboard.[9]
2.10
The team also held private sessions that provided an opportunity for
individuals or small groups to speak to the E&D team in confidence about
what they perceived as the unacceptable behaviour of fellow crew members.[10]
In this hot house environment, it was only natural that rumours spread throughout
the ship about the purpose of the E&D team and what was being reported to
them.
E&D Health Check Report
2.11
On 8 May 2009, after conducting its so-called 'health check', the
E&D team presented its report to the CO. In compiling the E&D report,
the authors recorded the comments or observations made to them about the type
and level of unacceptable behaviour. The report referred to allegations about
the use of drugs, inappropriate relationships, sexual act in public, the use of
alcohol ashore, random breath testing (RBT), equality of punishment, leadership
and mentoring, and predatory culture, particularly within the marine technical
department.[11]
In more detail, the E&D team recorded that:
-
most groups raised the issue of the use of steroids and recreational
drugs by some junior sailors and it appeared common knowledge throughout the
ship that steroids were found in the trash onboard Success;
-
a common perception existed that random drug testing was not
conducted as it was too hard and therefore culprits continued to use drugs—a
number of individuals had come forward and provided the names of those
allegedly using steroids, some of the users were experiencing steroid rages;
-
female junior sailors 'almost unanimously agreed that it was
easier to give in and agree to have sex with a sailor, than continually fight
off their persistent attention'—when asked why they gave in, the common
response was that 'some of the sailors were big and scary, and they intimidate
to the point where you just give in to get it over and done with, particularly
some of the MT sailors';
-
it appeared to be no secret that some of the female sailors were
having inappropriate relationships with male sailors and a number of
individuals stated they were aware of inappropriate relationships between
female junior sailors and male junior officers;
-
it appeared to be common knowledge across the ship that some sort
of public sex act occurred recently in a bar in Qingdao;
-
a number of individuals came forward and provided the names of
two POs who were present when the public sex act was alleged to have occurred
and the name of the ABMT [able seaman, marine technician] who allegedly had sex
with an unknown female;
-
most of the groups acknowledged that the consumption of alcohol
while ashore was excessive and unhealthy and that it was a major contributing
factor towards the unacceptable behaviour that goes on ashore;
-
female junior sailors admitted that they drank too much when
ashore, and get caught up in drinking games;
-
some of the male junior sailors admitted that 'depth charging'
female sailors' drinks without their knowledge was common practice and was used
to get them drunk more quickly;
-
a number of individuals stated that when RBTs were being
conducted, one POMT 'told his boys to stay down the hole' if they thought they
were going to blow over, and he would cover for them;
-
individuals stated that on two occasions two personnel had blown
over and the paperwork has been mysteriously misplaced;
-
some of the groups referred to an incident that was alleged to
have occurred in Cairns, where two Success sailors assaulted police
officers and the perception amongst the ship's crew was that the two sailors
did not receive a punishment as they belonged to the 'protected pack' of MT
sailors;
-
there was a common perception among junior ranks that not all
senior sailors and officers set a good example or act as good role models,
particularly in the areas of alcohol consumption, inappropriate relationships
and dress and bearing while ashore;
-
a number of individuals came forward and explained how they had
on occasions escorted officers to bed because they were too intoxicated to get
to their messes; and
-
there was a general consensus among Petty Officers (POs) that
some Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) were missing in action in that they were
neither available as mentors, nor set an example as mentors. This view was also
shared by officers but not apparently so by the POMTs.[12]
2.12
The report also provided detailed information on what the E&D team
termed predatory behaviour in the MT department, including the use of stand
over techniques, intimidation and bullying, even threats of physical violence.[13]
2.13
Relying on the contents of the discussions in the group and private
meetings, Lieutenant McArthur concluded in her report that:
-
it was difficult to confirm if the bounty theory...was true and
that although people talked about it, there was no real evidence to suggest
that it existed;
-
a predatory culture existed within the marine technical
department whereby some of the male senior sailors and junior sailors actively
sought out young female junior sailors and coerced or bullied them into having
sex while ashore;
-
a sexual act between a female junior sailor and a male junior
sailor took place in a public area and marine technical senior sailors watched
on and encouraged marine technical junior sailors to also watch on; and
-
threats had been made against certain members of the crew if they
spoke out about the nature of the unacceptable acts being carried out.[14]
2.14
The report did not make any recommendations.[15]
2.15
Although supposedly an E&D health check, in some places, the report
recorded allegations as though proven. Thus, despite the E&D team not
undertaking an investigation and operating outside any legal or administrative
framework, they drew conclusions that clearly elevated some allegations to the
level of fact: individuals were named as though guilty of unacceptable
behaviour. For example, the report stated that 'the two members had been
threatened with physical violence and with being posted off this ship'.[16]
This statement is not couched in terms of an allegation yet to be tested but as
a matter of fact. Furthermore, as noted by Mr Gyles, the evidence did not
support the conclusion that two crew members had indeed made such an
allegation. The report named the Chief Petty Officer (CPO) who was alleged to
have made the threats. Somehow, the CO gained the impression from Lieutenant
McArthur that two Petty Officers (POs), who were identified, were also involved
with these threats of physical violence. The information provided to the
E&D team made no such connection.
2.16
Based on their accounts, the members of the E&D team made no attempt
nor intended to substantiate the truth or otherwise of the allegations. Those
said to be involved in the alleged incidents were not approached to give their
version of events. Indeed Lieutenant McArthur assumed that an investigation
would follow.
Committee view
2.17
In part one of its report, the committee concluded that the E&D team
was correct to record the views, observations and concerns of crew members to
enable it to inform the commanding officer and Fleet Command about possible or
even likely inappropriate conduct. In the committee's view, however, the E&D
team went well beyond its remit by naming individuals as though guilty of
unacceptable behaviour. It is irrelevant that the members of the E&D team insist
that they did not conduct an investigation, because whatever way the report is
read, it presented some of its most critical findings as though proven.
Decision to land sailors in Singapore
2.18
Despite the deficiencies in the E&D report, no one in authority
appeared to question the basis for its findings with both the CO and Fleet Command
accepting the report's assumptions at face value. They did not question or seek
to corroborate the information contained in the report.
2.19
At that time, the CO's knowledge of events derived mainly from the discussions
he had had prior to the arrival of the E&D team, for example, the
conversation he had with the three senior female officers on 26 April; the
E&D report; and his brief exchange with Lieutenant McArthur on 8 May. The
CO's decision to remove the three sailors on 9 May rested principally on those
sources, especially the E&D report. Moreover, the CO stated that he formed
the view that the sailors should be removed from the ship because they posed a
threat to the safety of the ship's company.
2.20
CMDR Brown made clear that he landed the sailors not because of the sex,
or the drugs—'it was about my concern for the safety of the ship's company
based on threats of physical violence and in accordance with my direction to maintain
a safe working environment'.[17]
In his statement on his intended course of action sent to Fleet Command on 9
May, he stated:
The report has highlighted a number of issues that have
reinforced my belief that a number of my ship's company are in potential danger,
particularly if they speak about the incidents that have occurred. This is indicated
by the threats of physical violence from [redacted] should they talk to
the E&D team or 'spill the beans'. There is a real fear onboard that if
anything is raised while the main protagonists are onboard then nothing will be
done and they would be in danger of physical violence.[18]
2.21
It should be noted that in the case of the three senior sailors, the
evidence that they were involved in threatening two members of the crew with
physical violence if they spoke to the E&D team was erroneous. Yet it was
on these grounds that they were removed from the ship. Furthermore, to convey
his concern about the leadership of this alleged unacceptable behaviour, the CO
used highly emotive language. For example, in his intended course of action he
suggested that:
...there is a small group at the centre of these activities,
who feel they are untouchable because of their position onboard. They have
resorted to Mafia style actions to carry out their activities which are in some
cases criminal in nature.
...
It is my strong opinion and that of the E&D team that
with the 'ring leaders' removed there will be a flood of information put
forward to substantiate the concerns held by Command.[19]
Circumstances and manner of the landing
2.22
Fleet Command fully supported the CO's proposal to land the three
sailors. Thus, on 9 May 2009, he ordered the three senior sailors to appear
individually before him in his cabin where he provided each with a letter. The CO
addressed each sailor by reading from the letter and providing him with the
flight details of his return to Australia. The letter was brief and to the
point. It stated that certain allegations had come to the CO's attention that
were of great concern to him 'in terms of the operation of HMAS Success,
including matters possibly affecting the safety and welfare of personnel'. The
letter went on to state:
These matters concerning you have been reported up the chain
of command for further investigation and lead me to land you temporarily from
HMAS Success immediately.
You will be returned to Australia as soon as possible and be
employed at HMAS Kuttabul. You are to report to OIC FSU SYDNEY ... [The
CPO's letter had different wording that allowed for him staying in Singapore to
holiday with his family].
As soon as you leave my office I direct you not to contact by
any means or to return contact by any means with any member of the ship's
company of HMAS Success, except the MEO [the marine engineering officer],
as required.[20]
2.23
Although, at least two of the sailors sought further information from
the CO, nothing was forthcoming and all three remained in the dark about the
nature of the allegations against them. According to the coxswain, the CO did
not elaborate on the nature of the allegations responding with words to the
effect of 'certain allegations'. The CO then directed them to return to their
mess.[21]
2.24
Once they left CMDR Brown's office, the sailors were escorted to their
mess decks 'to ensure that they didn't interact with the ship's company on the
way...and to ensure that mess members did not come and disturb them while they
were packing their bags'.[22]
The MEO, the only crew member permitted to speak to the sailors, could offer
them no further information on the reasons for their removal.
2.25
One of the sailors was given the opportunity to remain in Singapore
because he had planned a holiday there with his family over that period. He was
directed to arrange accommodation for himself. The CO approved his request to
make a phone call to do so.[23]
2.26
The decision to remove the three sailors from the ship had far reaching and
damaging implications for them. They had no forewarning of the CO's intentions,
no knowledge of the allegations made against them except that that they were
serious and possibly affected the safety and welfare of the ship. One sailor
stated that he did not have any idea why such serious actions were being taken
against him, 'especially with the tone and manner in which the CO notified me.'[24]
All three were shocked, confused and distressed by the decision to land them in
Singapore.[25]
2.27
The sailors were given 30 minutes to pack their belongings and were then
escorted from the ship to a taxi waiting alongside. While being escorted from
the ship, the coxswain 'walked aft in K passageway and said words to the effect
of 'Clear the area',' in a raised but clear voice'. He stated that he had made
arrangements for the gangway to be cleared to provide a degree of privacy to
the members.[26]
Two of the sailors, however, were of the view that they were shown neither
dignity nor respect. According to one, the coxswain shouted, 'clear the
passageways and do not look at this person'.[27]
The other told the Commission that the coxswain:
...was shouting at members of the ship's company words to the
effect of, 'Clear the passageway,' and 'Don't look at these people.' I found
this to be extremely humiliating as I felt that I was being treated as guilty
before I even knew what the allegations were against me.[28]
2.28
The third sailor, however, told the Commission that he did not believe
that the coxswain was saying this 'in any derogatory way but in an attempt,
albeit rather clumsily, to protect our dignity and privacy'.[29]
2.29
According to one of the POs, no one from the ship stayed with them or
contacted them after the taxi dropped them at the airport. He stated further
that on arrival in Sydney no representative from the Navy was there to meet
them and he arranged and paid for a taxi to take him home. Furthermore, he
indicated that when they reported for duty at Fleet Support Unit (FSU), no one
there was aware of their landing. He said:
To compound our embarrassment and the indignity of being
landed, no-one at FSU was able to answer our inquiries...[30]
2.30
The committee found that the senior sailors were denied natural justice
by not being informed about the allegations against them in a timely way; that
their landing from the ship and transfer arrangements to HMAS Kuttabul
in Sydney showed a disregard for their mental well-being, legal situation and
professional standing in the Navy. They were not provided with the protections
that should have been afforded to persons yet to undergo due process that would
determine guilt or innocence. Clearly, they did not receive appropriate support
in the period immediately after their removal from the ship and their welfare
had not been taken into account properly. It should be noted that the three
sailors did not receive an account of the allegations relied on to remove them
from the ship until September 2009, four months after they were landed in
Singapore.[31]
This delay is discussed in chapter 4.
2.31
Finally, while crew members gave different versions of the exact words
used by the CO when informing them of the sailors' removal, The committee
accepted the evidence that he used words to the effect that 'there was a rotten
core on this ship and the core has now been removed'. In this regard, it is
difficult to determine whether the various addresses by the CO to the ship's
company prejudiced any subsequent inquiries. Even so, the committee believes
that CO's reference to the removal of a rotten core certainly had the potential
to bias future inquiries.
Conclusion
2.32
The E&D report and the subsequent landing of the senior sailors triggered
a series of administrative and disciplinary processes that are the focus of
this report. Before considering the events that followed the removal of the
sailors from Success, the committee notes the following decisions and
actions that would influence future developments:
-
although the ship's company were informed that an E&D team
had joined the ship to conduct 'cultural awareness and Equity and Diversity
presentations', the presentations or so-called workshops took on a very
different form and actively encouraged crew members to report cases of
unacceptable behaviour;
-
even though not 'an investigation' and conducted outside any
recognised or formal legal or administrative process, the E&D health check
went beyond merely recording allegations of unacceptable behaviour, and in some
instances presented them as fact: as though proven;
-
some of the allegations could be categorised as notifiable
incidents such as the sexual act that took take place in a public area; steroid
use and physical assaults;[32]
-
the CO of Success made clear that he had landed the senior
sailors because he feared for the safety and wellbeing of members of the ship's
company and not about the sex and drugs matters;
-
aside from a general reference to concerns about the safety and
welfare of the ship's crew, the sailors, despite requests for information, were
not provided with reasons for their removal; and
-
the sailors were left with a strong sense that they had been
denied the right to know the allegations against them, that they had not been not
appropriately supported during their removal from the ship and return to
Australia; and overall were treated poorly by the CO, including his reference
to the removal of 'a rotten core'.
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