Chapter 20
Safety and welfare on deployment
20.1
The very nature of a peacekeeping operation brings with it increased
risks to the health and safety of personnel.[1]
In this chapter, the committee focuses on the practical measures taken to
promote the health and safety of Australians when deployed on a mission. It is primarily
concerned with ADF and AFP personnel and is particularly interested in:
- available health care services—provisions for medical emergencies
and for rest and recreational leave.
Operational environment
20.2
On many occasions, the UN has expressed concern about the number of
peacekeeping personnel who are injured or killed while serving on a peacekeeping
mission. For example, in January 2005, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations noted the challenge that acts of violence posed to UN field
operations and called for the utmost priority to be given to enhancing the
safety and security of UN personnel in the field.[2]
20.3
As of 31 May 2008, there had been 2,474 fatalities in UN peacekeeping
operations since 1948. Thirteen Australian peacekeepers have died on
peacekeeping missions while many others have experienced long-term adverse
effects attributable to their service (see Appendix 6 for the names of Australians
who have died on peacekeeping operations). Hostile actions, however, are not
the main cause of death or injury to peacekeepers. Accidents, trauma and
disease account for a significant number of the serious health problems of
peacekeepers.[3]
Statistics provided by the Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) indicate some
of the causes of the longer-term health problems that have resulted from
service in peacekeeping operations. They include injury and poisoning, mental
disorders, infectious and parasitic diseases and diseases of the
musculoskeletal system.[4]
20.4
In Chapters 9 and 10, the committee noted the pre-deployment health and
safety training of ADF and AFP personnel preparing to participate in a peacekeeping
operation. Overall, the committee formed the view that such preparation is
adequate though it did raise concerns particularly with regard to compliance
with safety rules and regulations.[5]
The committee now turns to the measures taken to minimise the risks to the
physical and mental wellbeing of Australian peacekeepers on deployment.
Command of Australian forces
20.5
The control and command structure of a peacekeeping operation has
implications for the safety and wellbeing of peacekeepers. Mr Michael Potts,
DFAT, noted that many countries place a high priority on maintaining
sovereignty over their forces. He said 'most but not all countries do not want
their troops deployed without some ability to say, "Not to this country or
to that country"'.[6]
Lt General Gillespie also noted that the current norm for Western nations is 'never
to give away their sovereignty'.[7]
Consistent with this view, Defence made clear that the ADF always retains
national control over their personnel:
It is Australian practice to deploy a national command element
to effect national command responsibilities over ADF personnel assigned to a UN
operation or multinational force thereby allowing ADF personnel to remain under
Australian command.[8]
20.6
Lt Gen Gillespie argued that Australia cannot divest itself of sovereignty
interest for a number of valid reasons. He explained that if the ADF
surrendered full command of its military forces, it could not control where and
under what conditions they were employed, the length of the engagement, or
whether, for example, they were fed properly. He explained that the ADF retains
sovereignty over Australian troops and allocates them under various instruments
such as the rules of engagement or the memoranda of understanding.[9]
Further:
There are some guidelines which state that I can say no or we
would take the issue to our government and say, 'A unique set of circumstances
have come up. They want us to do this. What do you think?' Unless you are
prepared to do that or you hive off a part of the coalition area, specifically
call it ‘Australia land’ and do it from Australia, you have to be prepared to
release your troops. What we do not ever do is give full command to those
people.[10]
20.7
Retaining control means that Australia can set and insist on its own
safety standards with regard to matters such as personal safety. For example, Lt
Gen Gillespie noted:
The ADF has a very strict rule, which our soldiers, sailors and
airmen and airwomen really do not mind—that is, when you deploy with weapons
and ammunition, there is no alcohol.[11]
20.8
Squadron Leader Ruth Elsley, who had national command of a contingent of
Australian troops engaged in the UN mission in the Sudan under a force
commander, informed the committee of a particular incident. In this case, because
of health and safety reasons, she intervened to ensure that the welfare of a
member under her command was not jeopardised:
...at one time I stopped the deployment of a member to a
particular area in Sudan because the medical support was not there. The force
commander accepted that and, when that medical support was there, they went in.
Other than that, the force commander—as long as it went along with our rules of
engagement et cetera and what we were sent in there to do—had full command over
where they went and what they did. They still reported to me throughout the
mission, but they came under a force commander.[12]
20.9
The only significant evidence received by the committee suggesting that
the chain of command arrangements were not satisfactory related to the
Australian Training Support Team East Timor (ATST-EM). Captain Wayne McInnes
informed the committee that his team 'had no idea of who was the ultimate
commander of ATSTEM' and further that there were no clear reporting lines.[13]
20.10
Another submitter, also posted to ATST-EM, similarly described the
baffling command arrangements. He stated that the chain of command was
'convoluted', with members of his team unaware of who was their overall
commander. He stated that 'to say the chain of command was confusing at times [was]
an understatement'.[14]
20.11
Defence explained that, although the practice was to have ADF personnel assigned
to a UN deployment under Australian command, the arrangements for the training
support team were separate to that of a peacekeeping operation.[15]
It stated that the lack of a designated commanding officer for ATST-EM was 'identified
early in the deployment, which may have caused some initial confusion, but was
rectified'. According to Defence, 'A comprehensive command structure was put in
place for the team, reinforced in a directive from the CDF and the Secretary to
the team's commanding officer'.[16]
20.12
The difficulties experienced by ATST-EM members appear to have been at
the heart of their concerns about the inadequacy of force protection. As noted
in Chapter 7, two members of this team suggested that they had no force protection
which, in their view, placed them at extremely high risk. More generally, Mr Paul
Copeland, Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans' Association (APPVA),
drew attention to smaller contingents not directly under the command of Australian
commanders:
Force protection has been there; however, the force protection
goes around protecting itself, and sometimes when specialist troops are
deployed in the field they are left to defend themselves. So there is a bit of
a communication gap in working hand in hand with foreign forces within the
United Nations.[17]
20.13
Clearly, the ADF needs to maintain command over its personnel to ensure
that it can intervene if it believes that its members are being asked to
perform or operate under circumstances that are incompatible with the mission's
mandate, the rules of engagement or the principles of international law.
Committee view
20.14
The committee agrees with the ADF's insistence on retaining ultimate
command over its members as a means of affording them greater protection. It
notes, however, the problems experienced by members of ATST-EM where the
absence of a clear and effective chain of command placed them in a difficult
situation. This experience underlines the importance of ensuring that
Australian peacekeepers operating outside a recognised Australian chain of
command have an Australian commanding officer who is directly responsible for
them and to whom they should report. It should be noted that, according to
Defence, the problem with ATST-EM was identified and rectified.
Information gathering
20.15
A critical factor underpinning the safety of peacekeeping personnel is
good, sound and reliable local intelligence. Here the committee turns to
explore some of the evidence received suggesting deficiencies in Australia's
intelligence-gathering capacity.
20.16
The AusAID submission implied that Australia needed to improve local information
gathering. It indicated that recent tensions in Fiji, East Timor, Tonga and Vanuatu
'point to the need for more effective analysis of the triggers of conflict in
the region, and the grievances that underpin them'.[18]
When asked directly by the committee about the adequacy of local information
gathering, Mr David Ritchie, disagreed with AusAID's observations. Rather than
answer the question, he described what he believed was 'a pretty strong
diplomatic network in the Pacific':
...we look to our diplomats on the ground to understand what is
happening in the countries where they are accredited and to give us constant
reporting on what the security situation is going to be, for this sort of
purpose but also for consular purposes...we maintain the expertise that we have
here in Canberra both in DFAT and in the intelligence agencies, which are able
to analyse situations on the ground in the Pacific and make the calls that we
need to make almost daily in terms of the issues that we face with a huge
operation like RAMSI. I think in large part it boils down to maintaining the
expertise on the ground and at home, to be able to analyse the situations on
the ground.[19]
20.17
The committee agrees that the quality of intelligence available to
peacekeepers depends on the expertise on the ground and at home to assess local
developments. The committee, however, was seeking to establish whether that
expertise was there. Indeed, a number of other witnesses supported AusAID's
concerns. Associate Professor Wainwright suggested that Australia needs to
become better at recognising the warning signs when flare-ups occur.[20]
Professor Andrew Goldsmith, Australian Research Council Linkage Project with the
AFP, was of the view that Australia probably suffers 'from deficiencies in
local area knowledge which undermine our efforts'.[21]
He noted that the political deterioration leading up to the violence in Honiara
in April 2006 seemed to take everyone by surprise:
No-one, from our perspective, seemed to have any prior warning.
And as we have had a lot of people on the ground there since 2003, you have to
ask if we have good enough intelligence and what can be done to improve the
situation.[22]
20.18
With regard to this incident, the AFP explained that 'Information
processes were in place, and were robust. However, no credible intelligence
emerged either before or after the event that there was any identifiable threat
to public safety on 18 April 2006'.[23]
20.19
The AFP informed the committee that intelligence support to the mission
was reviewed following the April 2006 riots. The review 'identified the need to
establish a centralised analytical capability within the mission to improve
both coordination and RAMSI's force protection needs'. According to the AFP, it
is funding the Coordinator’s position within the new organisation structure to
better manage the information process and to enhance the analytical capability.
Furthermore, it indicated that recruitment of identified staffing expertise
required by the organisation is being addressed along with other agencies.
Additionally, there is 'an enhanced focus towards improving the Solomon Islands
Police Force's intelligence capability'.[24]
Committee view
20.20
The committee notes the suggestions raised by a number of witnesses
about the need to improve the gathering and analysis of local information. It therefore
urges agencies engaged in missions to examine closely the ways that local
knowledge and information can be gathered during the conduct of missions. It
considers the possession of this knowledge to be of vital concern to the
success of any peacekeeping operation. The committee also notes the measures
taken by the AFP, following the Honiara riots, to improve local intelligence
gathering in Solomon Islands and its analysis. This response indicates the AFP's
readiness to learn lessons from particular incidents. Even so, the outbreak of
violence in both Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands in mid-2006 caught Australian
forces unaware. Lapses of this kind are of great concern to the committee since
they may threaten both the safety of Australian personnel and perhaps,
ultimately, the success of the operations.
20.21
In the following section, the committee considers the medical care and
assistance available to ADF and AFP personnel on deployment.
Medical care of Australian peacekeeping
personnel
ADF
20.22
As noted earlier, the ADF has a deployment culture and has long been
accustomed to providing the full range of medical services to its forces on
overseas service. Access to mental health support is provided during deployment
through 'embedded assets, fly-in capabilities or coalition forces'.[25]
Medical and psychological personnel, chaplaincy and command provide immediate
and ongoing support in garrison together with the Defence Community
Organisation and the Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service.[26]
20.23
The only significant criticism of the provision of medical services to
ADF peacekeepers came from the APPVA. Mr Paul Copeland was of the view that
medical evacuation procedures for Australian troops have at times been very
poor. Although noting that medical evacuation plans (MEDEVAC) must be firmly in
place prior to deployment, the APPVA maintained:
Past experiences has seen seriously injured ADF members been
repatriated by civilian aircraft, without the company of a medic or nurse. This
places serious risk to the ADF member. Another experience was the ADF arguing
over the repatriation of a soldier in a serious condition, risking the loss of
his right leg, as to who was going to pay for the C-130 Hercules MEDEVAC
mission—the UN or the ADF. The result was that the MEDEVAC Crew arrived five
days after the request. The latency of the MEDEVAC response could have jeopardised
the soldier’s life.[27]
20.24
Apart from APPVA's suggestion that the ADF's medical evacuation
procedures have on occasion fallen short of acceptable standards, the committee
received no evidence to suggest that there were any systemic problems with the
provision of medical services on peacekeeping deployments. ATST-EM, however,
once again raised concerns about the conditions under which its members were
deployed.
20.25
Captain Wayne McInnes argued that the health of ADF personnel serving
with ATST-EM was put at risk because of inadequate medical services. Referring
to his experiences while serving with the mission, he stated:
We should have had guaranteed medical support. We are all
trained in basic first aid and we did some triage training before we left
Metinaro, to the degree where we practised how to cannulate and so on. But you
need a trained medic in that particular incident, because we were four hours
from Dili in an isolated location in the mountains, in atrocious
conditions...once we arrived at Los Palos we found that something like 150 of the
soldiers had fairly severe symptoms of malaria. We had a huge outbreak of
diarrhoea.[28]
20.26
The committee has already noted the circumstances of ATST-EM and has
suggested that the ADF use the experiences of this small unit as a case study
for future reference.
AFP
20.27
The AFP has in some instances relied on the ADF to supply medical
services. For example, in Timor-Leste in 2006, where the environment was at
times dangerous, the ADF provided the medical capability in case of severe or
serious injury to AFP officers.[29]
20.28
Assistant Commissioner Walters explained that the AFP prefers to engage contractors,
such as Patrick Defence Logistics (PDL), to provide that support so that the AFP
does not have to build that level of capability within the IDG.[30]
He said:
The medical services in the Solomon Islands are provided through
a contractor, so probably the best medical facilities there are provided within
GBR [the RAMSI headquarters]. If there is any doubt about a member's health, we
repatriate them back to Australia for further tests and medical services,
depending on what the situation is. We think that we provide a fairly robust
support network for our members offshore and for their families back here as
well.[31]
20.29
It was similar in Timor-Leste, where PDL was contracted to 'find
sufficient accommodation for 200 police officers and provide the food,
security, transport and medical support that was necessary'.[32]
The committee received no evidence indicating shortcomings in the medical and
health care arrangements for AFP officers deployed on peacekeeping operations.
Rest and recreation
Leave and redeployment
20.30
The Regular Defence Force Welfare Association noted that 'both the ADF
and the AFP have policies that specify a minimum of twelve months in Australia
before being deployed again but in both organizations these policies can be
reviewed for exceptional circumstances'.[33]
It stated:
Due to shortages of ADF personnel, entitled leave may not be
able to be taken on return from peacekeeping deployments, which impacts on the
health and wellbeing of service personnel and their families.[34]
20.31
The committee did not receive evidence suggesting that the rest and
recreation period between deployments has caused problems for ADF or AFP
personnel. It is nonetheless an important consideration for the health and wellbeing
of Australians serving on peacekeeping operations. The policies in place to
ensure that personnel have adequate breaks in overseas deployments should be observed.
This comment is made in light of the difficulties facing the ADF and the AFP in
recruiting and retaining skilled personnel and the recent increase in demand
for peacekeeping operations in the region.
Conclusion
20.32
The committee briefly looked at the measures taken to minimise the risks
to the health and safety of Australian ADF and AFP personnel while on
deployment. The evidence did not indicate any systematic problems with the
health services and medical practices provided to Australian peacekeepers on
deployment. ATST-EM, however, shows that there are always exceptions that
underline the importance of learning and capturing lessons from any lapses or
failings in the system. The committee has made a recommendation with regard to
a review of ATST-EM (see Recommendation 4).
20.33
The following chapter continues the committee's consideration of these
measures by looking at post-deployment health practices and procedures.
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