Australian Democrats Additional Comments
Inquiry into the provisions of the Australian Participants in British
Nuclear Tests (Treatment) Bill 2006 and a related Bill
Introduction
This legislation will provide for the testing and treatment
for cancers for Australian participants in British nuclear tests in Australian
in the 1950s and 60s. The Committee's main report has outlined some of the
concerns raised in the inquiry. However, it has downplayed the concern raised
in relation to the legislation in its current form.
As has been pointed out in many of the submissions to the
Inquiry, the Bills
- are predicated on the basis of disputed research,
- ignore the many non-cancer related health effects of exposure to
radiation and the concomitant health care and treatment needs,
- fail to adequately recognise key categories of people exposed to
fallout from the tests,
- neglect the intergenerational genetic and heritable consequences
of participation in the tests and
- do not offer compensation for pain and suffering for surviving
veterans and exposed civilians and their families and for the partners and
families of those test participants who have tragically already died.
The Democrats support efforts, however overdue, to provide
fair and just treatment to those Australians who were involved either as
service personnel or civilians in the tests and consequently exposed to
radiation. As such we welcome the measures in these Bills which essentially
provide the equivalent of a White Card for cancer testing and treatment for
surviving participants of the British nuclear tests, although we would argue
that these measures should be significantly extended.
We are also concerned that these Bills will represent the
entirety of the Government's recognition of its responsibility to the tens of
thousands of veterans and civilians and their families for the diseases and
deaths likely to have been caused by exposure to atmospheric nuclear weapon
test explosions. The Bills explicitly dismiss the Government's liability in
exposing participants to high levels of ionising radiation.
Inadequacies of Research
Many submissions to the inquiry challenged the findings of
the 2006 mortality and cancer incidence study of the Australian participants of
the British nuclear tests. Submissions highlighted controversy over the
studies including specific methodological concerns and broader process issues.
Inadequate dosimetry estimates
Most significantly the claim that increases in cancer were
unrelated to radiation exposure were considered implausible by many witnesses
and submissions, with the more likely explanation considered to be inadequate
dosimetry estimates that substantially underestimated radiation exposure.
Volume 1 of the findings from
the Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Dosimetry
2006 indicates that for the purposes of examining the consequences of radiation
exposure each participant was assigned an estimated accumulated dose for each
test series. Participants were grouped into one of five exposure categories, A
to E, with F applied to those individuals for which there was insufficient
information on which to base an estimate of the dose.
Exposure category
|
Radiation
exposure range
|
|
(mSv)
|
A
|
<1
|
B
|
1–<5
|
C
|
5–<20
|
D
|
20–50
|
E
|
50
or more
|
F
|
Unknown
|
Dr Lonergan commented that
"The proper conclusion emerging from the studies is that, with high
probability, ionising radiation was responsible for a great many of the excess
cancers and that the lack of connection between cancers and dosages was due to
underestimating the dosages experienced by the participants and/or
underestimating the effect of those dosages."
Major Batchelor noted that "The first and only release
of the Cancer and Mortality study for comment by the Consultative Forum
resulted in a conflict between adequate time for assessment of an obviously
unsound document and a desire by DVA to publish as soon as possible, no matter
the consequence. The current situation stems from this unseemly haste, where it
still remains to be established that estimated exposures to ionising radiation
do not agree with recorded measurements by extremely large factors."
Major Batchelor provides several examples of demonstrated mistakes between
recorded and estimated dosage rates. In testimony to the Committee referring
to tables before the Committee he notes that "an extract from AWRE report
T5/54 Fission product sampling, co-authored by an Australian Army
officer who was also the principal scientific officer at the Long Range Weapons
Establishment. Highlighted is documented evidence of even higher dose rates
than those stated in my original submission: a land-rover was driven toward the
photographic tower ‘C’ at a distance of approximately one mile from ground zero
(where) the activity was the order of 50 to 60 roentgens per hour (ie 500 to
600 mSv/hr). On the next page, 4B: The sample was flown immediately from Emu
to Salisbury where the fused black spheres were found to be extremely active
and to contain very large quantities of plutonium. It would take 60,000 hours
of continuous exposure at the study’s estimated dose rate of 0.01 millisieverts
to achieve this dose.
Associate Professor Ruff argued that "the availability
of any film badge external photon exposure for only 4% of test participants is
an inadequate basis for sound dosimetry estimations." Associate Professor
Ruff went on to note that "there is clear evidence that some test
personnel were exposed to very much higher doses than the 100msv used in the
study for all doses estimated to be greater than 50 mSv. The Royal Commission
documented individual exposures up to 300 mSv."
Group Captain Geschke commented that the dosimeter readings
estimated from aircraft readings and inferred for aircrew could be misleadingly
low. Ms Rabbitt Roff points out that the dosimetry study relied on
"internal radiation exposures...calculated from estimates of radionuclide
intakes. An assessment of internal doses requires information on the time spent
performing specific tasks and the probable intakes of radioactivity during the
time. Ms Rabbitt Roff goes on to highlight that the study report itself
acknowledges that "some of the biggest uncertainties...are in the lack of
detailed knowledge of what various participants in the UK atomic testing
program were actually doing, where and for how long."
Major Batchelor, in his testimony before the Committee,
commented that "because the dosimetry committee was not properly equipped
to prepare work histories at the individual or workgroup level, employment
designations were described in such sweeping categories as: general engineering
support, all ships prior to the D + 4, transport in contaminated vehicles,
logistical support for G1 and so on, with no proper description of who did
what, where and when. There was some identification of specific tasks but the
lack of involvement information remained a problem. It follows that dosage
categorisations for individuals were based on obscure and uncertain employment
groupings."
The Australian Veterans and Defence Services Council
commented that "The outcome of the Dosimetry Report is that there was no
hazard from radiation. This position is not acceptable in the face of the clear
evidence of radiation hazard. On Tremouille Island in the Monte Bellos, to this
very day, there are signs which say, “Radiation Risk Hazard, do not stay for
more than one hour, do not raise dust, do not consume food, do not remove
anything from the island." The submission continues "if there was no
radiation hazard why did the Australian Government spend $104 million on a
decontamination of the Taranaki area of Maralinga in the late 1990s? In this
context if there was a hazard that necessitated a clean-up, how much more would
the hazard have been for the men who were there in the 1950s and 1960s, most of
them without proper safety clothing. The manner in which the Dosimetry Report
was produced, give little confidence in the integrity of its content and the
conclusions, which are so fundamental to the determination of the government
commitment."
Healthy Soldier Effect
Many submissions commented on the failure of the study to
incorporate what is commonly referred to as the healthy worker effect – or in
this case the healthy soldier effect. This refers to the phenomenon whereby
mortality and morbidity within the workforce is generally lower than the
general population as individuals must be generally healthy to be employable.
Associate Professor Ruff identified the lower non-cancer mortality rate in
serviceman and civilian contractors participating in the nuclear tests in comparison
to the Australian population as evidence of the healthy worker effect.
Witnesses to the inquiry commented that the failure to
adjust for this effect in the analysis of the data contributed to an
underestimation of the effects of exposure to radiation. Group Captain Geschke
argued that "I have little doubt that the average serviceman is healthier
than the average member of the population at large....in addition to serviceman
being healthier on intake most serviceman have a regimen which require them to
stay fit not only through activities but also adequacy of their diet and the
regular medical examinations and treatment. On this basis I believe the
percentages of 18 and 23 understate the degree of higher incidence of cancers
amongst participants."
Major Batchelor commented "For some reason this study
only looked at the healthy soldier effect for the first two years, whereas the
soldier’s life is healthy for all of his life in the service. To disregard that
is to mask the results of the study. It should have been stated, and there
should have been an effective percentage allowance made for the healthy soldier
effect." Dr Lonergan remarked "there is no doubt at all that the
results that are presented in the reports would be worse if you took away the
healthy worker effect. There is no question about that; the results would be
worse.
Groups included and omitted from study sample
Many of the witness and submissions to the inquiry raised
concern exclusion of individuals and groups from the study and the consequent
effect on the findings. Associate Professor Ruff commented that "the
study excludes... about 6000 – more than one third – of the estimated 17,000
individuals directly exposed to the nuclear tests, including groups likely to
include highly exposed individuals, such as Aboriginal people and some
pastoralists living in the vicinity of tests sites and subjected to local
fallout."
In testimony before the Committee Prof Armstrong, a member
of the Consultative Forum involved in the studies, commented "it is true
that pastoralists and Aboriginal people were not included, and that is
principally because we had absolutely no way of getting anything like a census
of who they were, where they were and what they were doing."
Ms Madigan, in reference to the exclusion of Indigenous
Australians, suggests that it is "astounding that the very people whose
lifestyle and lack of knowledge of what was going on at the time ensured that
they be potentially the most vulnerable as a group of all those affected by the
tests ....this serious error...of course undermines the validity of the entire
study."
Dr Williams, a member of the research team, commented that
"without having done a proper scientific assessment, my guesstimate is
that any Aborigines who passed through that area at that time could have
potentially received similar doses to the Commonwealth Police on the basis that
through any dust-raising activities, such as filling in rabbit holes, hunting
for bush tucker or whatever, and by simply living in the area—a very dusty
area—you were going to be exposed to the risks of inhaling plutonium. So, while
Aborigines were never part of the DVA study and therefore we never had a cohort
of Aboriginals to assess doses for....any who were in the area were potentially
at risk."
In testimony to the committee Major Batchelor identified as
critical the omission of records of some high-exposure groups from any analysis
of the effects of participation in the nuclear tests, "probably the most
critical evidence provided to, and ignored by, the minister was the documented
level of exposure experienced in their working environment by 40 military
engineers involved in the desealing of instrument bunkers one hour after the
detonation of the weapon codenamed Taranaki. The dosage records for this
group, the other members of the Antler Engineer Troop, members of the Buffalo
Engineer Troop and the crew of HMAS Koala have not been published in the
official records. These groups were all employed on very early re-entry and in
high exposure situations."
The omission of individuals whose cancer fell outside the
study data collection window of 1982-2001 was also identified as a substantial
limitation to the results outlined in the study report. Associate Professor
Ruff commented that "the cancer study window of 1982-2001 would have
missed cancers occurring up to 30 years after the first nuclear test in Australia
(1952). This is particularly relevant for leukaemia, which has a much shorter
latency (approximately 5-15 years) compared with solid tumours ..... excess
leukaemia rates could have been missed by the observation period
selected." Associate Professor Ruff also noted that "the absence of
data since 2001 excludes cancers and deaths occurring in the last 5 years,
during which elevated rates of these outcomes would be expected to continue to
rise.
Concerns were also raised within evidence presented to the
Committee over the omission of deaths attributed to cancer from cancer
incidence figures. Major Batchelor argued that "If a person dies of cancer
then his contraction of cancer should also be included in the cancer incidence
numbers." In his testimony to the Committee Major Batchelor noted that
"The first paragraph of the Adelaide university main findings identifies a
mortality study starting from the time of the nuclear tests, and a cancer study
for cases of cancer, whether fatal or not, commencing in 1982. It is important
to note that the main findings state that the study of both cases of cancer and
cancer deaths commenced in 1982 and provides the basis for much that
follows." Dr Crouch's testimony to the Committee confirmed that
"incidence was only counted after 1982 .... I would presume that there were
cases of fatal cancer prior to 1982."
Group Captain Geschke makes the point that 17.7% of the
cohort were excluded from the study analysis and findings because their date of
birth was not known, commenting that "the exclusion could have slanted the
results of the study". No justification is provided as to why lack of a
date of birth was sufficient grounds for the exclusion of all data from these
individuals.
Dr Lonergan noted that "I have seen evidence that the
nominal roll of participants is deficient to the extent that some participants
have been left out and others have not been correctly credited with the
circumstances of their actual involvement." The nominal roll is the list
of individuals who were considered participants of the nuclear tests for the
basis of the studies.
The National Servicemen's Association of Australia commented
that while the Department of Veterans Affairs has identified 137 Navy National
Serviceman as participants of the nuclear tests, their organisation believes
that the correct figure should be 400 plus.
The omission of Commonwealth Police Officers from inclusion
in the epidemiological study was also identified in oral and written
submissions. Dr Crouch and his colleagues argued that "they were clearly
one of the most heavily exposed groups involved in the tests and their
aftermath... the period used to identify the participants for the purposes of the
epidemiological study was 1952-1965. Those who did not serve in the area
during that period are excluded....even though many of them may have had multiple
tours of duty at Maralinga and accumulated significant radiation
exposures."
The Australian Nuclear Veterans' Association raised concerns
about the inclusion on the nominal roll of individuals who would have had
little or no exposure to radiation. Their submission states "Most of the
civilians whose names appear on the nominal roll had left the test site before
any tests were carried out and were put on the nominal roll purely to water
down any tests or studies that would follow." Mr Johnstone, the National
President of the Australian Nuclear Veterans' Association, further stated
"including people who obviously had no exposure at all at any time in the
studies would dilute the findings."
Dr Crouch, a member of the Study Group involved in the 2006
mortality and cancer incidence study of the Australian participants of the
British nuclear test, acknowledged that "80% of that group we believe got
virtually no radiation exposure at all." Paragraph 2.12 of the
Committee's main report references the study's estimation that approximately
79% of the participants were assessed as receiving less than 1 mSv that is,
approximately half the annual dose received from natural background radiation.
Missing and unavailable records
Difficulties accessing hospital and other records and
documents were identified as problematic both for the study and wider
compensation claims.
Ms Munslow-Davies commented that "History will show a
history of available documents and not those that for whatever reason are
destroyed, altered or mislaid..... Recently I discovered a hidden archive of
documents about the British Nuclear Tests, their conduct in Australia, safety
and health implications and policy of that era. Altogether there were over 3000
documents. As of today nine of these documents have been released .... We still
do not have access to the remaining 2991 documents or many of the documents
that they refer too. This is despite numerous court cases, a Royal Commission,
a health study, the current health study and the passage of almost 50
years." In testimony to the Committee Ms Munslow-Davies expanded on her
submission and reported that "The knowledge that the documents were
missing was widespread. The Adelaide hospitals had lost their documents,
hospitals at Watson had lost their documents, the hospital at Woomera had lost
its records and the records at Maralinga hospital and at all the first-aid
posts were gone as well." Major Batchelor also noted that the Amberley
hospital records are missing as well.
Alternative Explanations
A number of submissions highlighted that none of the
proffered explanations for excess cancers among nuclear test participants,
offered as alternatives to ionising radiation, are satisfactory as they are not
substantiated with evidence that links the participants with the hypothesised
causes.
Dr Lonergan commented that "The epidemiologists tried
to blame a swag of [cancers] on excess smoking. But their argument which runs
like this is circular - smoking is a common cause of this set of cancers,
therefore these military people must have smoked excessively, therefore they developed
these cancers. Such an argument is only valid if independent evidence of
excessive smoking is produced. No such evidence was produced." Dr
Lonergan continues "the speculation that increased smoking prevalence in
the cohort could account for excess incidences of cancers of the oral cavity,
oesophagus and lung is discussed but substantially negated 'because the
mortality study of nuclear test participants has shown no excess mortality from
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), a finding that would be
unexpected in a population with a high smoking prevalence.'"
This inconsistency is also highlighted by Ms Munslow-Davies
who states "there is no evidence to support the statement that these
servicemen smoked more than the general population...There is no corresponding
increase in airways disease (which you would expect if this were the
case."
Similarly, in an attempt to link civilian participants to
asbestos-related diseases. Dr Lonergan points out that study report makes the
statement that "many of the civilian subjects in the cohort were in the
construction industry, where asbestos was commonly used, at a time when less
caution was exercised than in recent years. Whether any of these subjects were
exposed to asbestos during the nuclear tests is not known". Dr
Lonergan goes on to comment that no "evidence produced to show whether
they were exposed to asbestos in the work they did before the nuclear tests, or
after them, or whether they differed in this or any other way from their parent
population."
Ms Rabbitt Roff points out that researchers responsible for
the Australian study have proffered different age structures between Vietnam
Veterans samples and Australian participants in the nuclear tests as a possible
explanation for the higher cancer incidence and mortality in the Australian
test participants. A similar argument has been proposed for differences in
cancer mortality between UK and Australian participants in the nuclear tests.
However no evidence of any age difference between the cohorts is offered.
General Process Issues
The Committee received written and oral evidence that the
final stages of preparation of the study report was very rushed and that
criticism and comment on the report by members of the Consultative Forum and
Scientific Advisory Committee was ignored. In his testimony before the
committee Dr Lonergan made the point " My objections to the published
reports were sent to the Repatriation Commission on 30 July and then passed by Rear
Admiral Harrington to DVA for attention. They have never been answered."
In her testimony Ms Munslow-Davies reported that "We
were under the assumption, going into the final [Scientific Advisory Committee]
meeting, that the main findings would be reviewed, as they were seen as
prejudicial (a) to the study and (b) to the veterans. This did not occur, and
the final meeting of the SAC lasted for less than an hour and a half, at which
time it became extremely obvious that nothing would be changed, the report was
already on its way to the printers and the decisions had already been made.
That was the point where I withdrew full and total support, something that I
did not take lightly."
Dr Crouch, a member of the Study Group involved in the 2006
mortality and cancer incidence study of the Australian participants of the
British nuclear test, confirmed in his testimony before the Committee that
"there did appear to be some rush towards the end to get [the report]
finalised so it could be presented to parliament."
The Democrats acknowledge that we have commented on only
some of the many matters raised by witnesses and submissions to the inquiry.
However, due to the short time allowed by the Government for this inquiry and
the associated reporting deadline, we are limited in the issues we can
address.
Conclusion
The current legislation is the Government's response to the
2006 mortality and cancer incidence study of the Australian participants of the
British nuclear tests which identified increased cancer rates and cancer deaths
amongst test participants.
It is now 50 years since the nuclear tests took place and
many people were exposed to the radiation that has harmed them. These people
have been poorly treated in the past 50 or so years. About half of the test
participants have died waiting for the recognition and justice they are yet to
receive.
The Democrats acknowledge that this is a difficult area to
research and to find hard evidence. However evidence to the Inquiry throws
doubt on the validity of the conclusions drawn by the studies. It is noteworthy
that all of the criticisms of the study identify ways in which exposure to
radiation and consequent illness would have been underestimated. It is
disappointing that the concerns and questions raised by members of the
consultative forum and others have not been adequately resolved. The Democrats
are disappointed that neither Associate Professor Ruff nor Ms Rabbitt Roff,
both critics of the study methodologies and findings, were invited to appear
before the Committee during the course of the inquiry.
There is general recognition that participants in the tests
were essentially human guinea pigs. Governments have a duty of care to their
citizens, whether military personnel or civilians, and the Government has a
responsibility to provide care and compensate those whose illnesses have a high
probability of being connected to their exposure to hazardous activities.
It is a welcome step in the right direction that we have a
bill which provides for non-liability treatment for cancer for the participants
in the test, but it is disappointing that participants are still being denied
the recognition and respect that they are entitled to. Equally just are
demands for acknowledgement from indigenous groups and others who experiences
have been completely disregarded to date.
This Government should do better. In line with the Clarke
review, participants of the nuclear tests should be classified as veterans and
non-warlike hazardous service status granted. This would permit easier access
to a range of benefits including war widows' pensions. Paragraph 2.22 of the
Committee's main report acknowledges that, according to the Clarke report,
coverage as hazardous service under the VEA would provide greater entitlements
than offered by this legislation. Mr Hodges, the National Veterans' Affairs
Advisor for the Returned and Services League of Australia made the comment in
his testimony to the Committee that "With regard to test participants in
particular, yet again at the RSL national congress in September this year the
motion that the service that the participants undertook during these tests be
regarded as hazardous service under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act was passed
and again formed part of the RSL’s budget submission to government. .....Once
service has been deemed hazardous and a member of the service has been allotted
to that area then that member comes under the VEA for that period of service.
This means simply that compensation is payable for any disease or injury during
that service that can be related to that service. For these participants this
would mean that, as they came under the VEA at the time of the tests, any
cancers, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression or anxiety disorder that
they have been diagnosed with will be treated at departmental expense without
admitting liability for compensation. This is available to all members whose
service falls under the VEA and this is what this bill does in relation to
cancers for the participants. As a follow-on, if a claim for compensation is
made and accepted then a disability pension is payable. Then the big one: if a
veteran then dies of a war or defence caused injury or disease then the widow
is entitled to a war widows pension. ..... [the minister]has missed the point: it
is not only the health care but also the compensation."
This Bill also does not go to the question of compensation.
This remains an outstanding issue and one that should be dealt with
expeditiously. To date only nine cases of compensation related to the effects
of ionising radiation for services related to nuclear tests have been made by
the Australian Government under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act
1988. As highlighted in the Bills Digest for this legislation the current
compensation pathways present many difficulties for participants trying to
obtain compensation. It is time-consuming, expensive and places the burden of
proof on the individual who has difficulty accessing hospital and dosage
records and is ill-matched to meet the resources of the Government. Nevertheless
the Government, through the provision of these compensation payments to a small
number of successful claimants, has acknowledged its liability for the exposure
to radiation during the nuclear tests. Similarly the compensation provided by
the British Government and subsequent efforts to remediate the Maralinga site
is recognition of the contamination resulting from the tests. The Government
has finally recognised that it has an obligation to provide at the very least
cancer treatment for test participants. It should act with integrity towards
those who participated in the tests and their families and stop hiding behind
denials of the consequences of exposure to radiation and address the issue of
compensation.
The Democrats support the Bill as it does go some way to
providing assistance to Australian participants in nuclear testing in the 1950s
and 60s. However this legislation is a limited and inadequate response to the
needs of test participants. It does nothing to address the broader health needs
of participants and their families and ignores the long-standing issue of
compensation. The Government should implement the Clarke review
recommendations, undertake appropriate compensation arrangements, give further
consideration to the concerns about the study conduct and findings, and commit
to continued data collection and epidemiological studies that include data
subsequent to the 2001 cut-off for the 2006 mortality and cancer incidence
study.
Senator Lyn
Allison
Australian Democrats
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