Chapter 7 - The way ahead
Introduction
7.1
The ADF is now facing some of its greatest
challenges since the end of the Second World War. These challenges are both
strategic and operational. At the strategic level the ADF is adapting itself to
meet those objectives outlined in Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force. At
the operational level, the ADF is responding to the many demands of
multinational coalition operations, regional peacekeeping and domestic
security. All of these challenges are being negotiated amidst a growing deficit
of qualified and experienced personnel.
7.2
The purpose of this inquiry was to assess
whether the current recruitment and retention strategies of the ADF are meeting
the organisation’s requirements. In this final chapter, the Committee will make
its final assessment and indicate the way ahead. In making its assessment, the
Committee returned to the original terms of reference and tested them using the
fundamental themes outlined in Chapter 1. In essence the Committee has judged
the ability of the Department of Defence to recognise the reasons people
enlist, the uniqueness of military service and the sanctity of the
‘psychological contract’ in recruitment and retention strategies.
Whether the current recruiting
system is meeting and will continue to meet the needs of the ADF
7.3
Although general enlistments are increasing,
according to pure statistical data, the current recruiting system is not
meeting ADF recruiting targets. It has been assessed that the ADF will not be
able to meet a target force of 53,555 by 2010. The first step to restoring the
recruiting system must be the implementation of improvements to the recruiting
organisation and process already identified by the Defence Force Recruiting
Organisation. This step must be supported by the development of a strategic
marketing and advertising plan that appeals to the real reasons for enlistment
and is focussed particularly on critical trades and wider demographic groups.
The impact of the Defence
Reform Program on retention levels and recruiting
7.4
The heart of the recruitment and retention
problem lies in the fact that, during the 1990s, Defence initiated a number of
efficiency and rationalisation measures in order to enhance the ADF’s
operational capability. These measures were neither well communicated nor well
implemented. They reduced the ADF’s strength by 27 per cent and established a
workplace environment that undermined the principal values of service in the
ADF. The Department of Defence must now reassess those reform measures that reduced
the number of personnel in recruiting, removed respite postings for ADF combat
personnel and reduced the quality of base support. In the interests of
recruiting and retaining ADF personnel, a new balance must be restored between
efficiency and effectiveness.
The impact of changes to ADF
conditions of service, pay and allowances on retention and recruitment of
personnel
7.5
The Department of Defence has failed to
recognise the unique nature of military service and preserve its ‘psychological
contract’ with ADF personnel. Broad adjustments to pay and allowances and bold
adjustments to fringe benefits and superannuation benefits are necessary to
attract and retain ADF personnel. Such adjustments must be combined with an
improved strategic communication plan to convey policy measures and provide
support to Defence families. The Government is invited to support these
adjustments, particularly in the area of nationalising education standards.
These measures are necessary to restore the belief that soldiers, sailors,
airmen and airwomen are valued employees of their Government and nation.
The impact of current career
management practices on retention of personnel
7.6
Poorly implemented reform measures and
increasing shortages of personnel have compounded to create reactive rather
than pro-active career management practices in the ADF. Again, these practices
have undermined the ‘psychological contract’ the Department of Defence
maintains with its personnel. The ADF’s Defence People Plan goes some way to
addressing this issue. However, a strategic framework must be established to
manage personnel issues. This framework would include placing DPE in the
strategic decision making process and establishing a career stream for human
resource managers. This framework would also include the development of a new
ADF personnel model characterised by fixed terms of engagement, incremental
incentives and recognition of service, and formal discharge packages for all
ranks and trades. Measures such as these will restore the pro-active nature of
career management.
Other issues which arose in the
course of the Inquiry –The Reserves
7.7
It appears the ADF is on the verge of addressing
one of its most elusive structural issues. By confirming roles and tasks, the
outcomes of Project Army 2003 will set the agenda for the most suitable
structure, manning, equipment and training for the Army Reserve. This is a key
opportunity for the ADF to examine the issues of direct-to-unit recruiting, CIT
and ‘hollowness’ that have shattered Army Reserve recruitment and retention. At
the same time, the introduction of a system of incentive-based Army Reserve
service following full-time service will go some way to the retention of
experienced personnel in the ADF.
Retention is the key
7.8
Chapter 1 determined that an inquiry of this
nature must understand the fundamental linkages between recruitment and
retention. It may be argued that retention of current personnel is more
important than recruiting new personnel. The pillar of this argument is that
‘the better the retention, the fewer the requirements there are for
recruiting’.[1]
But the more important argument is that initiatives to improve retention have a
wider impact than initiatives to improve recruiting. Improving career
management and conditions of service will not only retain current personnel,
but also attract people to enlist in the ADF. Therefore, the broad thrust of
all ADF personnel planning and management strategy must be retention minded.
7.9
The evidence gathered by the Committee during
this inquiry was wide ranging. The picture of recruitment and retention gleaned
from this evidence depressed the Committee. Unfortunately, the cold fact
is that many of the conclusions from previous reports (as early as the Hamilton
Report) remain valid.
It is an excuse for doing nothing; it is paralysis by analysis.
All of the inquiries come up with essentially the same thrust. The most recent
recommendations of the Defence Action Plan for People were little different to
the Cross inquiry’s recommendations.[2]
7.10
Everything the Committee discovered during the
inquiry was already known to Defence. The evidence had been in front of them
for quite some time. The conclusions and recommendations of previous reports
have either been ignored or poorly implemented. Given recent national and international
events, there is no longer time for procrastination. The Rubicon must be
crossed now and not put off again as have decisions on crucial recruitment and
retention issues for some 15 years, at great cost in personnel terms and
expense to the ADF. The Department of Defence must develop and maintain
strategies to recruit and retain qualified and experienced people to ensure our
national security today and tomorrow.
7.11
The time for action is now!
John Hogg
Chair
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