Chapter 6
The Place of DIFF in Australia's Aid Program
6.1 As well as its direct impact on development, DIFF, like other mixed
credit schemes, also had the following features:
- it required commitment of financial resources from the recipient
country and therefore provided a strong incentive to choose projects
of the highest priority in the country's development program;
- it enabled worthwhile development programs to be funded which were
unlikely to have been funded in the context of a traditional grant
aid program;
- it was a catalyst for involving the private sector in the Australian
aid program, particularly in the capital goods sector; and
- it stretched the aid dollar because aid funds provided only 35 per
cent of total project cost. [1]
6.2 AusAID's 1996 review of DIFF argued that while the scheme might have
addressed different types of development problems from other elements
of the aid program, it played a complementary role to those elements in
contributing to social and economic advancement in developing countries.
[2] Mr Leigh Purnell, Director of the
MTIA, told the Committee that:
The DIFF scheme is a critically important vehicle for the delivery
of eight per cent of our total aid budget. DIFF is the only element
of the aid program directed to the provision of capital goods and equipment
... We must realise that many of the so called softer, humanitarian
type aid projects are not viable without the hard-edged, capital equipment
projects. [3]
6.3 It has been argued that greater development benefits might be generated
by reallocating DIFF funds to programs targeted more directly at such
areas as poverty alleviation and health. [4]
The approach of previous governments has been based on the view that poverty
alleviation requires a range of development interventions, including:
- promotion of sustainable economic growth;
- investment in human resources through education, health, capacity
building and social sector development; and
- safety nets and poverty targeting, which includes emergency relief.
[5]
6.4 Investment in public infrastructure has been viewed as a fundamental
element of any poverty alleviation strategy based on balanced growth.
Mr Michael Lamb, Managing Director of ERG Telecommunications, said that
'The sorts of projects I am talking about now - remote rural infrastructure
- are very definitely poverty alleviation'. [6]
6.5 While often not commercially viable (from 1992 projects had to be
non-commercial to be eligible for DIFF funding) the projects targeted
by DIFF played critical roles in the economic and social development of
the recipient countries. DIFF provided an appropriate mechanism for larger
public sector projects which could not attract private investment funds.
[7] Mr Alexander Gosman, Executive Director
of the Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Association,
said that:
We believe aid is most effective when applied to removing major
constraints to development, that there is a need for capital intensive
inputs to develop the basic economic infrastructure. [8]
6.6 Increasingly, since the inception of the Helsinki rules, recipient
countries have nominated development priorities and Australian companies
have had to compete with firms from other donor countries to win contracts
for DIFF assisted projects. Mr Purnell of the MTIA said that:
Critics talk about DIFF as though this is a grant to Australian
companies. This is simply not the case. DIFF funds go to the recipient
country where the project is being carried out, in the form of concessional
loans. The host country sets its own priorities for projects based on
their own developmental needs and the DIFF funding element represents
one-third of the project value to make a highly concessional loan package
which still must be repaid. [9]
6.7 Mr Kevin Pontifex, Executive Director of Energy Equipment Pty Ltd,
told the Committee that:
Priorities for these projects have clearly been set by the target
countries. We have not been instrumental in selecting the projects.
They have been selected by the regional authorities in the target countries.
They have been vetted by central government agencies. In particular,
we have been subject to great price scrutiny in China. [10]
6.8 One of the major reasons for the introduction of DIFF was to match
the concessional financing of other OECD countries in order to give Australian
companies the opportunity to compete for infrastructure projects in developing
countries. It was a recurring theme of submissions and evidence to the
Committee that without DIFF, companies simply could not compete: 'there
is no chance of a small company competing in a market like China without
some form of government support'. [11]
6.9 Mr John Dougall, Managing Director of AWA Ltd, said of one project
that:
Had we not got DIFF financing, we clearly would not have beaten
the Japanese. They underbid us on the price but our solution was better.
Let me assure you that our product is world class. We are not an inefficient
manufacturer relying on DIFF funding to do business in Asia. The opposite
is the case. [12]
6.10 Mr Robert Kerr, Acting Head of the Productivity Commission, told
the Committee that:
From the viewpoint of the Australian economy as a whole, it
would be better if Australian companies pursued contracts in markets
where subsidies from Australian taxpayers are not required to enable
them to compete.
... Other countries' aid policies affect the competitiveness
of Australian firms in developing-country markets but in our view, Australia
should not embrace subsidies solely on the basis that other countries
do. [13]
6.11 However, in response to questions from the Committee Mr Kerr said
that in examining DIFF from the point of view of micro-economic policy
issues the Commission had looked at the program solely from the point
of view of domestic industry efficiency and had not considered its role
in the aid program or the impact of its termination on foreign relations:
I daresay that is certainly a relevant issue for the Committee's
consideration but we made no comment on that and nor do we have any
basis for any expertise to make any comment on that. [14]
6.12 The Committee believes that views of Australia's aid program that
are premised on a theoretical economic model which does not take into
account the realities of the nature of developing countries' needs and
international approaches to meeting those needs, are not only not helpful
but can, in fact, distort discussion of the aid program by giving spurious
legitimacy to arguments against the value of schemes such as DIFF.
6.13 DIFF was not just a financing mechanism, economically efficient
or otherwise. As a part of the Government's aid program it was an important
embodiment of a continuity of relationship between Australia and the
recipient government which was not simply commercially based. It demonstrated
Australia's practical commitment, through the provision of grant and
export credits, to the projects and to the enhancement of the social
and economic conditions of the communities affected.
6.14 Mr Robert Trenberth, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Industry,
Science and Tourism, stated that:
If you believe that an important element or a legitimate element
of aid relates to the provision of substantial infrastructure projects
into markets where one is competing with countries that provide these
kinds of facilities to their own companies, my view would be that,
to the extent that it is possible, we ought to do the same.
... it seems to me important that companies who do want to compete
in these markets, who do have the skills and who are in a sense the
vehicles of Australian aid into the region be given the opportunity
to do so. [15]
6.15 Mr Brent Davis, Director of Trade and Policy Research for the Australian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that his organisation believed that
'capital infrastructure programs are an essential element of any comprehensive
aid program'. However, he also said that spoiled markets, where there
is a high level of concessional finance from other donor countries, should
be eradicated so that Australian firms could compete for contracts without
the need for the DIFF program. [16]
6.16 The Committee believes that while a 'level playing field' may
be a desirable end in general, as long as other countries offer mixed
credits, the DIFF scheme has a place in Australia's aid program. Moreover,
the Committee believes that the enormous need for major infrastructure
projects in developing countries, and the limited ability of those countries
to finance such projects, makes mixed credit schemes a useful, if not
necessary, mechanism for the delivery of aid.
6.17 Dr Katherine Woodthorpe, Chief Executive Officer of the Technology
Industries Exporters Group, referring to two projects undertaken by
companies in her organisation, spoke of the need for concessional finance
for certain projects:
The projects that DIFF financed in these cases are ones that,
although the country believes very strongly in them, they could not
have afforded to have put together. [17]
6.18 Many witnesses spoke of the importance of the fact that concessional
loans have to be repaid, and therefore ensure that close attention is
paid by the recipient government, which has to provide funds and resources.
[18] However, DIFF has sometimes been
the subject of criticism precisely because it diverts scarce aid resources
to better off countries with access to commercial funding.
6.19 Restrictions introduced in 1992 under the Helsinki rules, including
a per capita income ceiling on countries eligible for mixed credits,
specifically address this question by encouraging donor countries to
direct mixed credits towards projects and countries with little or no
access to market financing. The restrictions do not apply to countries
recognised as 'least developed' by the United Nations, so that mixed
credits are more freely available to such recipients.
6.20 In addition, the largest DIFF recipients were Indonesia and China,
which were also the largest recipients of bilateral aid in general, so
that it cannot be argued that DIFF distorted the geographical focus of
Australia's aid program. [19]
6.21 One of the roles of mixed credit schemes under the Helsinki rules
is to help finance projects that are not commercially viable. Rural
electrification programs for remote villages have an undeniable value
for the communities concerned but it is unlikely that any company, operating
on a purely commercial basis, would consider investing in such schemes.
A similar argument would apply to remote area telecommunications:
The two projects I talked about in China with the cable industry
are right out near Mongolia. It is going to be a long time before anyone
makes a commercial return. When they sat down to look at the extension
to the existing projects, it had to be on the basis of concessional
finance. [20]
[Contents]
6.22 The DIFF scheme has been terminated. On 8 May 1996 the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alexander Downer, decided that, with the exception
of those seven projects holding Letters of Formal Offer, it would terminate
from the beginning of 1996-97.
6.23 Many witnesses who appeared before the Committee or made submissions
to the inquiry emphasised the effect of the suddenness of the of termination
of DIFF, which seriously affected their companies commercially and which
had severe repercussions on relations with the recipient governments.
Mr Julian Dinsdale, Chairman of Austenergy, said that his organisation's
main concern was that the termination of DIFF was so dramatic: 'Things
have just been shut off instantaneously instead of being phased down.'
[21]
6.24 The effect of the abruptness of the termination of DIFF, rather
than a phasing out of the program with projects holding Letters of Advice
allowed to go through the rest of the DIFF process, has been considered
earlier in this report.
6.25 The Government has said that it will consider the introduction of
a reformed, more tightly focused mixed credit arrangement as early as
1997-98. [22] On 17 July, however, the
Minister decided that while the DIFF scheme is abolished, it might be
possible to support some high priority projects using mixed credits with
funding from AusAID's bilateral program allocation for 1996-97. Accordingly,
he wrote to the four governments most affected by the cessation of DIFF,
raising the possibility of funding some of those governments' highest
priority projects. [23]
6.26 The Minister's decision reflects the strength of the adverse reaction
by recipient governments and in the Australian business community to
the original decision to terminate DIFF, and suggests a lack of understanding
of what that reaction would be. Given the impact of the original decision
to terminate DIFF, on Australian companies and on bilateral relations
with countries in the region, and given the Minister's later decision
to restore some DIFF projects, the original decision strikes the Committee
as precipitate, ill considered and unwise.
6.27 According to Dr Woodthorpe of TIEG, the decision to restore some
DIFF projects only:
compounds the idiocy of the whole thing. We will look foolish
and naive. If we say, 'It's finished. Well maybe it's not quite finished.
Well maybe some of you can get it and we might do it again in a year's
time,' what do we look like? [24]
6.28 Mr Andrew Johnson, Chief Executive of Transfield Defence Systems,
told the Committee that the Philippines authorities believed that all
of the DIFF projects with Letters of Advice had:
passed the test of being worthy of aid and now suddenly they
have been asked to rank the approved projects in some sort of order
... I suppose they believe that is not the way two friendly governments
should deal with each other. That is the point they have made to us.
[25]
6.29 On 20 August, in conjunction with the Federal Budget, the Minister
announced funding for Australia's aid program in 1996-97. This included
funds 'which may be used for high priority DIFF projects with Letters
of Advice', the priority projects restored following the original termination
of DIFF. [26] The funds allocated are
shown below with the yearly average of DIFF funding over the last three
years of the scheme and the value of the DIFF component of outstanding
Letters of Advice shown alongside:
|
Projects offered
1996 - 97 $m
|
Yearly average
1993 - 96 $m
|
Letters of Advice DIFF value $m
|
China |
14
|
44.1
|
121.8
|
Indonesia |
10
|
52.0
|
156.1
|
Philipines |
6.7
|
17.8
|
85.7
|
Vietnam |
1.3
|
na
|
20.8
|
6.30 During the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee's
estimates hearings held in September 1996 the Minister representing the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Senate, Senator Robert Hill, stated
that 'It is expected that similar amounts would be applied in 1997-98'.
[27] In addition, AusAID Director General,
Mr Trevor Kanaley, and Deputy Director General, Dr Peter McCawley,
made it clear during the estimates hearings that the additional funds
are not necessarily to be used for DIFF projects affected by the cancellation
of the scheme. Recipient governments might bring forward projects formerly
holding DIFF Letters of Advice or might choose to bring forward other,
full grant aid projects. Conversely, governments might choose to use funds
nominally allocated as grant funds to add to the additional funds for
former DIFF projects. [28]
6.31 However, the Committee reiterates the point made throughout this
report, that the nature of the DIFF scheme, and of the understandings
reached between Australia and recipient governments, makes anything less
than allowing all applicants who hold Letters of Advice to go through
the rest of the DIFF process a breach of faith on the part of the Australian
Government. In February 1996 the Coalition had estimated total DIFF funding
of $382.9 million for 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99. [29]
Alongside that figure, and the $384.4 million of outstanding Letters of
Advice, the $32 million allocated to the possible funding of former DIFF
projects in 1996-97 and the similar amount expected in 1997-98 hardly
answer the criticisms made of the original decision to terminate DIFF
and in fact may only serve to complicate matters by causing further difficulties
when some projects are funded and others are not.
6.32 Had the 50 projects holding Letters of Advice gone through the usual
DIFF process, only 35 could have been expected to reach Formal Offer.
[30] The cost of funding those projects
would have been significantly outweighed by the damage caused to Australian
business and to relations with recipient governments as a result of not
allowing them to proceed.
6.33 In the light of the Minister's announcement that the Government
would consider introducing a revised mixed credit scheme as early as
1997-98, and given that a number of DIFF projects will now proceed after
all, the Committee is at a loss to understand why the existing mixed
credit scheme could not have been allowed to continue to operate for
those projects already at a stage which involved a degree of commitment
on the part of the Australian Government, the recipient governments
and the companies concerned.
6.34 On 28 May 1996 the Minister announced that Australia's overseas
aid program would be the subject of a major independent review by a
three person committee, chaired by Mr Paul Simons AM, former Executive
Chairman of Woolworths. The review will report to the Minister on the
overall priorities, objectives and focus of the aid program. Its principal
objective will be to examine how the aid program can best contribute
to lasting poverty reduction while also serving Australia's interests.
6.35 The Simons review will consider, among other things, what form any
'new, reformed and more focussed mixed credit arrangements' might take
and how they might differ from the scheme that was abolished by the Minister.
[31]
6.36 The Government has acknowledged the continuing need for concessional
finance, citing World Bank estimates that developing countries of South
East and East Asia will require $US 1.5 trillion of infrastructure investment
during the next decade. According to AusAID and the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 'there will continue to be important activities that
are critical to development, that will not be funded except through concessional
finance'. [32]
6.37 AusAID and the Department go on to say that among those sectors
which might fail to attract sufficient public or private investment are
environmental improvement and water sanitation: 'Both sectors have an
immediate impact on growth and equity in developing countries, and both
sectors have huge investment needs.' By the year 2000 developing countries
in the region will require $US 8.5 billion investment each year for pollution
and emission controls, and $US 7 billion a year for water and sanitation.
[33]
6.38 Among those projects holding Letters of Advice at the time of the
decision to terminate DIFF were water supply projects in China, Vietnam
and Indonesia and environmental projects, including the emission control
project of Smartgas cited in this report, in China, Vietnam, the Philippines
and Indonesia. [34] AusAID suggested
to the Committee that 'the Minister himself has said that he has been
attracted to water, sewerage and sanitation type projects. That has a
clear humanitarian focus. He has said that he thinks they are good.' [35]
6.39 The Committee finds it difficult to understand that the Government
can acknowledge the need for concessional finance for such projects
and cite figures such as those quoted above and yet can terminate a
program involving the very projects which are contributing to the acknowledged
need for such activities in developing countries in the region.
6.40 Witnesses who appeared before the Committee were willing to concede
that despite the very significant improvements to DIFF brought about
as a result of the Helsinki rules there might still be further improvements
to be made. Dr Woodthorpe of TIEG conceded the questionable value of
some earlier DIFF projects, as did many witnesses, but spoke of the
need not to 'throw the baby out with the bathwater'. She said that it
was preferable to:
look at the DIFF scheme, tighten it up, maybe add a few more
guidelines about what sort of aid is appropriate under the DIFF scheme,
than cancel it completely. That seems to me to be too cavalier and foolish.
There is much that is good within it, even if there is much that is
rightly and genuinely criticised. [36]
She added that:
It is a clean scheme that has a lot of decent things associated
with it. If it needs to be tightened down, if you need to change some
of the projects allowed under it, that is great. Do some work on it,
modify it, but do not just chuck it out. [37]
6.41 The submission from AusAID and the Department suggests that any
new concessional finance mechanism might include the following:
- Objective: A clear statement of the primacy of the development objective
of the mechanism;
- Focus: A greater emphasis on projects which focus on humanitarian,
poverty alleviation and environmentally targeted activities;
- Selection and appraisal of projects: A greater role for recipient
governments and AusAID in nominating and appraising projects;
- Integration into AusAID's bilateral programs for individual countries;
and
- Greater competition among Australian companies. [38]
6.42 It is the Committee's view that in the light of the evidence presented
during the course of its inquiry, such an outline very largely describes
DIFF, either as it was or as it was in the process of becoming under
the Helsinki rules. The major difference in the outline suggested is
the incorporation of concessional financing into bilateral programs.
The Committee accepts the value of this suggestion but believes that
given the very close parallels between DIFF as it was and the outline
proposed by the Government's key agencies in the area, there was no
need at all to terminate DIFF.
6.43 The Committee believes that if such a scheme is to be introduced
as early as 1997-98, in other words if concessional financing is to
be suspended simply for one year as part of the Government's budget
strategy, the enormous disruption caused to business and to bilateral
relations by the one year suspension of such an important and valuable
program simply does not justify the questionable need to save the 1996-97
DIFF allocation. Rather, the Government would have been better advised
to maintain DIFF and work with agencies and recipient governments to
continue to refine the scheme in order to achieve the best possible
means of assisting developing countries with major infrastructure projects.
The Committee recommends that the Australian
Government not wait for the financial year 1997-98 but introduce,
at the earliest possible time, another mixed credits scheme
to replace the Development Import Finance Facility.
The Committee recommends that the replacement mixed credits
scheme be based on the following criteria:
- that it be primarily a development aid scheme;
- that emphasis be given to projects of an humanitarian,
poverty alleviation or environmental nature;
- that all projects be nominated by recipient governments;
- that it be integrated into AusAID's bilateral programs
for individual countries; and
- that all projects be open to competition among Australian
companies.
|
Michael Forshaw
Chairman
Footnotes
[1] AusAID, A Review of the Effectiveness
of the Development Import Finance Facility, p. 41.
[2] AusAID, A Review of the Effectiveness
of the Development Import Finance Facility, p. 42.
[3] Committee Hansard, pp 68-69.
[4] AID/WATCH, Australian Conservation Foundation,
submission, p. 1.
[5] AusAID, A Review of the Effectiveness
of the Development Import Finance Facility, p. 40.
[6] Committee Hansard, p. 109.
[7] AusAID, A Review of the Effectiveness
of the Development Import Finance Facility, p. 40.
[8] Committee Hansard, p. 105.
[9] Committee Hansard, p. 69.
[10] Committee Hansard, p. 76.
[11] Mr Kevin Pontifex, Director, Energy
Equipment Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, p. 74.
[12] Committee Hansard, p. 71.
[13] Committee Hansard, pp 479-80.
[14] Committee Hansard, p. 488.
[15] Committee Hansard, pp 497-98.
[16] Committee Hansard, p. 189.
[17] Committee Hansard, p. 263.
[18] See, for example, Mr Peter Dawson, Director,
LANDMARC, Committee Hansard, p. 416.
[19] Dr Ravi Tomar, A DIFFerence of Opinion:
Cancellation of the Development Import Finance Facility, Parliamentary
Research Service, Current Issues Brief No. 20 1995-96, p. 7.
[20] Mr Alexander Gosman, Executive Director
of the Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Association,
Committee Hansard, p. 109.
[21] Committee Hansard, p. 214.
[22] AusAID/DFAT, submission p. iv. Note,
however, the Minister's 'intention' to introduce such a scheme: AusAID/DFAT,
submission, p. 27.
[23] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. iv. See
also Chapter 3, above.
[24] Committee Hansard, p. 272.
[25] Committee Hansard, p. 407-408.
[26] Australia's Overseas Aid Program
1996-97, pp 32, 33, 35, 37.
[27] Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 23 September 1996, p.
200.
[28] Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 23 September 1996, pp
203, 206.
[29] This is the amount which Mr Costello
announced would be saved in those three years by the termination of
DIFF. Press release, 15 February 1996, AusAID/DFAT, submission, Appendix
3, Attachment A.
[30] 'Seventy per cent of those with a Letter
of Advice proceed to ultimate fruition.' Mr Ian Anderson, Assistant
Director General, AusAID, Committee Hansard, p. 161.
[31] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 27.
[32] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 27.
[33] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 27.
[34] AusAID/DFAT, submission, Appendix 3,
Attachment G.
[35] Committee Hansard, p. 139.
[36] Committee Hansard, p. 267.
[37] Committee Hansard, p. 275.
[38] AusAID/DFAT, submission, pp 27-28.