Chapter 3
The Government's Management of the Termination
of DIFF
3.1 In this chapter the Committee focuses on:
- the Government's preparations for the termination of the DIFF scheme;
- the Government's notification of the termination of the DIFF scheme
to recipient countries and Australian companies involved with the
scheme;
- the responses of the recipient governments and Australian companies;
and
- the handling of the responses by the Government.
[Contents]
3.2 The Committee refers in Chapter 2 to the Government's pre-election
statements which foreshadowed its intention to terminate the DIFF scheme.
Once in office, the Government was provided with advice about terminating
the scheme.
3.3 In preparing advice for the Government, AusAID consulted the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Industry, Science
and Tourism (DIST), the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC)
and Austrade. AusAID/DFAT submitted that:
AusAID, in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, provided advice to the Government on how to implement its
intended decision to terminate DIFF. This advice contained an analysis
of the key issues, including the legal situation, the status of various
categories of DIFF offers, the level of these commitments, and the amount
of aid flows involved. It also covered the situation with respect to
recipient governments and Australian companies. [1]
3.4 The Attorney-General's Department provided legal advice to AusAID
that Letters of Advice were not binding on the Commonwealth because they
did not contain an offer of funds. It also advised that it was debatable
whether Letters of Formal Offer were binding on the Commonwealth. [2]
The Committee requested a copy of the legal advice from AusAID/DFAT but
this request was denied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In a letter
to the Committee dated 20 August 1996, the Minister said:
I am unable to make this advice public or provide it in
camera. As stated at the hearing by the Director
General of AusAID, Mr Trevor Kanaley, providing a copy of this advice
could be prejudicial to defending the Commonwealth's position in the
event of any legal action against the Commonwealth. Mr Kanaley's statement
reflected the advice he had received from the Attorney General's Department
(AGs). I do not therefore consider that the release of AGs advice
would be in the public interest. I should also add that the main features
of the legal advice received from AGs were summarised in the joint
submission from AusAID and DFAT (page 23) and also in the evidence
provided by officials in the hearings (Hansard page 150). There is
a well recognised public interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of legal advice.
3.5 AusAID acknowledged that it had not sought advice from relevant
Australian diplomatic posts overseas in preparing advice for the Government.
DFAT said, however, that it provided advice on the foreign policy aspects
of the termination of the DIFF scheme, which was formulated by relevant
divisions within DFAT, after taking into account advice from posts within
their areas of geographical responsibility.
3.6 A draft of AusAID's first submission to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs was discussed informally with Australian Embassies in Indonesia
and China. DFAT defended sending the draft submission to only two posts
on the grounds that these two countries had been the main recipients of
DIFF funding. [3] DFAT Deputy Secretary,
Ms Joanna Hewitt, told the Committee that:
But, just to put it in context, we need to understand too that
this was a matter of policy which was very clear when the Government
came to office. What we were being asked for, broadly speaking, was
how to manage the implementation of a decided government policy in a
sensitive way and we provided advice along those lines. [4]
3.7 Mr Kanaley told the Committee that the submission, which was signed
off on 13 March 1996, [5] discussed
some options but that he was not at liberty, as a public servant, to discuss
the nature of the options put to the Minister. [6]
[Contents]
3.8 Following Mr Downer's formal decision to terminate the DIFF scheme
on 8 May 1996, AusAID prepared for simultaneous notification of the
terms of the decision to recipient governments and Australian companies.
3.9 On Thursday, 16 May 1996, all DFAT/AusAID posts were notified of
the decision by cable and heads of mission and senior AusAID staff 'in
countries where the DIFF was in operation were instructed to inform as
soon as possible appropriate Ministers and senior officials in the host
government of the Australian Government's decision'. [7]
Each relevant mission was also faxed a list of individual projects that
were going to be affected by the decision. [8]
On the same day, AusAID told a number of embassies in Canberra of the
decision and gave them an aide memoire. [9]
It would be normal diplomatic practice for those missions in Canberra
to notify their governments quickly of such a decision by the Australian
Government. On 17 May 1996, AusAID held a meeting with representatives
of overseas missions in Canberra to explain the Government's decision
in more detail.
3.10 DFAT told the Committee that it was the responsibility of Australian
heads of mission in DIFF recipient countries to decide how to handle the
notification of host governments. The Committee was told that the Australian
Ambassador in Manila wrote to four Philippine Cabinet Ministers, the Governor
of the Philippine Central Bank and some other senior officials on 17 May
1996 [10] and the Australian Ambassador
in Beijing called on Chinese authorities on Monday, 20 May to notify them
of the termination of the DIFF scheme.
3.11 A Deputy Director General of AusAID, Dr Peter McCawley, visited
'three existing major DIFF recipient countries - Indonesia, China and
the Philippines - from 9 to 16 June 1996' to explain in more detail the
reasons for the termination of DIFF. [11]
3.12 Australian companies which had received a Letter of Advice or a
Letter of Formal Offer were informed of the Government's decision by letter
from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr Andrew Thomson, MP, faxed on 16 May 1996. [12]
[Contents]
3.13 At the time of the Government's decision to terminate DIFF, there
were 50 projects in the pipeline for which Letters of Advice had been
sent to relevant companies and seven projects for which Letters of Formal
Offer had been sent to companies. These projects were designated for
four countries - China, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. The responses
of those countries are set out below. At least some of these countries
had expressed their concern to the Australian Government before the
decision was made on 8 May 1996, even though they would not have known
the details of termination or the fact that it would have excluded all
projects other than the seven for which a Letter of Formal Offer had
been issued.
China
3.14 China expressed its concern about the termination of DIFF before
the formal announcement of the ending of the scheme. The Vice-Minister
of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Mr
Sun Zhenyu, wrote to Mr Downer on 24 April 1996 to express his concerns
and those of his Minister, Madame Wu Yi, to the Australian Government
about the proposed termination of DIFF:
For a long time AusAID has established a relationship of cooperation
with my Ministry and that assured soft loan projects would be completed
smoothly. But recently AusAID has been waiting for the new Government's
policy that (sic) withhold the normal operations of soft loan projects
and for this we express our strong concern. Because both sides on
the agreed projects have invested a lot of man hours and capital if
those projects cannot be started by the 30th of June this year it
will cause the project companies on both sides a substantial financial
loss. I believe you can understand this from the China side that the
companies taking on these projects cannot wait any longer for uncertainties.
Some of these projects might have to be forced to seek the technology
and equipment from other countries, particularly at the moment as
Australian soft loan future is unclear. For the above stated reasons
I hope your Government will give continuous support with the agreed
listed projects so these projects can be executed on time.
3.15 The Committee was told that, at first, DFAT believed Mr Sun was
writing on his own behalf but later, in July 1996, it was clarified at
a meeting in Beijing in a conversation with Australian Embassy officials,
that he was also writing on behalf of the Chinese Government. [13]
Considerable discussion took place in the House of Representatives and
the Committee's hearings about the comparable level in the Australian
system of a Chinese vice minister. Although there is no equivalent position
in Australia, DFAT considered that the closest comparable position was
that of a departmental deputy secretary. It should be noted that it was
Mr Sun and then Australian Minister, Mr Michael Duffy, MP, who signed
the Memorandum of Understanding in relation to DIFF funding on behalf
of their respective governments.
3.16 In an article in The Australian Financial Review of 7 August 1996,
Michael Dwyer wrote:
Further Chinese concerns are contained in a confidential cable
from the Australian Embassy in Beijing, which was leaked from the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade yesterday.
The confidential cable was sent to Canberra after a meeting
in May between embassy officials and Mr Sun Zhenyu, a vice-minister
in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation.
It contains strong comments on the DIFF issue from the Ambassador
in Beijing, Mr Ric Smith, over China's view of the cancellation
of the loan scheme.
It is in our view very important for Australia's image and
standing here [in Beijing] that careful attention be given to how
these decisions are conveyed to the Chinese, and in particular to
avoid breaking, or being seen to break, any commitments,' the cable
said.
3.17 When questioned about the above cable, Ms Hewitt told the Committee
that it was departmental policy not to comment on reported material that
had been leaked. [14]
3.18 Later in the hearing, DFAT was asked whether Mr Sun made 'representations
concerning DIFF to the Australian embassy in Beijing saying that, while
China knew the Australian government faced certain difficulties, it hoped
the projects in the DIFF pipeline could be implemented'. Acting DFAT Deputy
Secretary, Ms Penny Wensley, replied: 'There have certainly been exchanges
with him in Beijing and it is my recollection that that is right'. [15]
3.19 DFAT also acknowledged that, in relation to the termination of DIFF,
there had been 'a considerable number of exchanges right across the levels
that I have described to you - middle levels and senior levels - in the
system'. [16] The Committee sought details
of all representations made by China and other countries but Mr Downer
refused to provide such details to the Committee. Later in the same hearing,
Ms Wensley told the Committee that:
I indicated that we have had input from our embassy in Beijing
to our deliberations here and that we have factored advice from Beijing
into the ongoing communications and discussions we have had about
the management of this issue. These are views that are well known.
It was recognised from the outset that there would be an impact on
the aid program in China.
It was recognised at the outset that we would need to manage
the implementation of the Government's decision with care in response
to what would clearly be registered with us by China as concerns about
the decision. That is what we have been doing since we advised them
of that. The views that the Chinese government have conveyed to us through
a variety of channels are well understood, have been taken into account
and were taken into account in particular in the letter that Mr Downer
wrote to the government of China and to other governments inviting them
to consider possibilities of funding particular priority projects. [17]
3.20 Earlier, Ms Wensley had told the Committee:
As I say, we have always acknowledged that there would be concerns.
It does, after all, represent 54.2 per cent of our total aid program
to China.
We all understand that there would be concern and disappointment
and that there would need to be a process of managing this. That was
what led to the decision for Dr McCawley to travel to Beijing. That
was what led to the decision to invite missions in Canberra to come
in, as I understand it, to AusAID for a briefing. There has been a steady,
measured process of briefing the governments concerned and of engaging
in a dialogue with those governments in recognition that this is an
issue of concern to them. [18]
3.21 During a visit to China, the Minister for the Environment, Senator
Robert Hill, told a press conference on 15 July 1996 that 'Well, actually
this might surprise you, but no-one raised it [the termination of DIFF]
and I suspect it's because of the good work of the Embassy here which
has been explaining to the Chinese it is a policy response based on the
need for fiscal restraint'. [19] On
16 July 1996, a news item in The Australian was headed 'Beijing accepts
aid cut: Hill', which was based on comments by Senator Hill at the press
conference.
3.22 This article provoked a letter to the editor from the Minister
Counsellor (Economic & Commercial), Mr Zhu Zhen Yuan, at the
Chinese Embassy in Canberra, which was published in The Australian on
17 July 1996. In his letter he said:
The Chinese Government has, both prior and after the decision
of the Australian government, expressed many times and through various
channels its grave concern over the termination of DIFF. Deputy Minister
Mr Sun Zhen Yu of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
has purposely, and on behalf of the Chinese Government, sent a letter
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Alexander Downer to make clear
the grave concern and position of our Government.
The Chinese Government still hope that the Australian Government
can abide by the Agreement reached by our two Sides, work out an appropriate
solution to the problems we both sides are confronting in the DIFF
projects and TC program, so as to ensure a more healthy development
of economic cooperation and trade between our two countries.
3.23 It is clear from information provided by DFAT officers and by
the Chinese Embassy that the Chinese Government has conveyed its 'grave
concern', to use the words of Mr Zhu, to the Australian Government on
many occasions concerning the termination of the DIFF scheme.
Indonesia
3.24 The Indonesian Government also raised the cancellation of DIFF with
Mr Downer before the formal termination of the scheme. During Mr Downer's
visit to Indonesia in mid April 1996, the Indonesian Minister for National
Development and Planning, Professor Ginandjar, expressed concern about
the proposed termination of the DIFF scheme. The next day, the Minister
of State for Research and Technology, Dr Habibie, spoke to Mr Downer about
a proposed DIFF project, which he was keen to see succeed. On the same
day, the Minister for Industry and Trade, Tungky Ariwibowo, referred to
the heavy marine engineering training centre project, which Mr Downer
did not know was a DIFF project until 26 June 1996. [20]
3.25 Correspondence available to the Committee also shows that the
cancellation of DIFF projects was raised by at least one Indonesian
Minister with the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta. On 4 April 1996,
the Minister for Education and Culture wrote to Ambassador Taylor seeking
continued Australian support for the 'Quality Improvement of Vocational
Senior Schools Project'. On 14 May 1996, the Secretary General of the
Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture, Professor Hasan Walinono,
also wrote directly to Mr Downer concerning a special education project
for handicapped children which was to be funded by DIFF.
3.26 Dr Habibie sent Mr Downer a letter dated 13 June 1996 to express
his concern about the termination of DIFF which was received in Mr Downer's
office on 19 June 1996.
Philippines
3.27 On 22 April 1996, the proposed termination of DIFF was raised indirectly
with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Tim Fischer, MP, by the Philippines
Foreign Secretary, Mr Domingo Siazon, and directly by the Philippine
President Ramos. [21] Mr Fischer told
the House of Representatives that a summary of his discussions with both
men were cabled to Canberra in the normal way. [22]
Mr Downer acknowledged that, 'I saw through the cable summaries records
of the Deputy Prime Minister's meetings. There is no question of that.
My remarks referred to my own experience, not the experience of the Deputy
Prime Minister.' [23]
3.28 Two days later, the Philippines Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Mr
Ernesto D. Garilao, wrote to Mr Downer about DIFF. This letter was received
in the Minister's office on 9 May 1996 but was passed to AusAID without
Mr Downer seeing it. [24] A proposed
reply, accompanied by the original letter, was submitted to Mr Downer's
office on 11 June 1996. The delay in the preparation of the reply was
due to a breakdown in AusAID systems. [25]
The draft reply was not signed by Mr Downer until two weeks later, on
the morning of 25 June 1996. [26] Mr
Downer claims that he did not see Secretary Garilao's letter until he
signed the reply. A further letter from Mr Garilao, dated 13 May 1996,
was only drawn to Mr Downer's attention by AusAID on 28 June 1996, after
its existence had been discovered by the media. Mr Downer drew this letter
to the attention of the Parliament by writing to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives on 19 July 1996.
3.29 On 6 May 1996, the Philippine Ambassador raised on behalf of President
Ramos a particular DIFF-funded project. [27]
3.30 On 13 May 1996, Senator Michael Baume wrote to Mr Downer enclosing
copies of two letters, one from the Secretary of Socio-Economic Planning,
Mr Habito, addressed to the Australian Ambassador to the Philippines,
and the other from the Chief of Staff, Office of the Philippines Vice
President, Mr Rolando Ramirez, addressed to Mr Downer, about two DIFF
projects. Mr Downer said in his letter of 19 July 1996 to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives that he had not received the original
of that letter, and neither had his Department nor AusAID. The Committee
does not know when Senator Baume's letter (and attached correspondence)
was drawn to Mr Downer's attention or when any reply to either Senator
Baume or Mr Ramirez was signed. The Committee also noted that Mr Downer
had not indicated what inquiries had been made to determine how the
letter from Mr Ramirez had been conveyed to him and how and where it
had gone missing.
3.31 Foreign Minister Siazon raised the issue of DIFF with Mr Downer
during the ASEAN post-ministerial conference in Jakarta on 22 July 1996,
the day on which Mr Downer's DIFF policy reversal was announced publicly.
Vietnam
3.32 During Mr Downer's visit to Vietnam on 4 and 5 July 1996, the Minister
for Planning and Investment, Mr Do Quoc Sam, and the Foreign Minister,
Mr Nguyen Manh Cam, expressed their disappointment to him about the termination
of DIFF. [28]
General Comments
3.33 DFAT on a number of occasions during the public hearings referred
to the decision to terminate DIFF as not causing substantial damage
to the overall bilateral relationship with any of the DIFF recipient
countries. However, Ms Hewitt, who, at one point, was concerned with
the Committee's characterisation of the Department's evidence, said:
We did not refer simply to disappointment. We did recognise
that there was concern in the region, that these concerns had been
expressed and it was not a question but there would be a large number
of projects which would not proceed.
We do not want to minimise the degree of concern; we want to
be very clear and correct about that and express it objectively. So
I would like to make sure that in your own thinking about that point
you do not perceive our reaction as being one of understatement. [29]
3.34 The Committee sought details of all representations made to the
Australian Government about the termination of DIFF, although it did
not ask for the content of those representations. This information would
have provided the Committee with an overview of responses from recipient
countries. Mr Downer refused to provide this information. In a letter
to the Committee dated 20 August 1996, Mr Downer said:
I am unable to provide this information as it could be harmful
to Australia's foreign relations and would therefore not be in the
public interest. It is the Government's view that the well established
convention of confidentiality in high level government-to-government
exchanges should be preserved.
3.35 The Committee is at a loss to understand Mr Downer's reasoning
for withholding this information from the Committee. The Committee merely
requested a list of the representations, not the contents of them. The
Committee understands that the contents might contain sensitive information,
the disclosure of which might not be in the public interest, and, accordingly,
did not request to see the text of the representations. Moreover, all
the ministerial representations, which would normally be regarded as
the most sensitive of the representations received by the Government,
have been identified by Mr Downer in the Parliament. It should be noted
that the Committee has the power to receive information or take evidence
in camera should any of the information be diplomatically sensitive.
3.36 The Committee also asked for a list of all cables received concerning
representations made on the termination of DIFF, including those which
reported discussions which Dr McCawley had with several governments
in June 1996. The Committee also asked for details of their distribution
to the Prime Minister and other Ministers and whether those Ministers
responded to those cabled representations. In his letter to the Committee
of 20 August 1996, Mr Downer said:
I regret that I am unable to make a list available as this
has the potential to harm Australia's foreign relations and therefore
its release would not be in the public interest. In relation to the
request for details of the cable distribution, I am unable to make
this information available as it concerns the deliberative processes
of government and release of this would not be in the public interest.
For this reason also, I am unable to indicate whether there were responses
to cables from Ministers' offices.
3.37 Again, the Committee cannot understand Mr Downer's reasoning.
As Mr Downer has already identified all the ministerial representations
made directly to him, or at least claims to have done so, it appears
odd that a list of the remaining representations has the potential to
harm Australia's foreign relations with the four recipient countries
over and above the harm which the decision to terminate DIFF has already
caused. Should public identification of any particular representation
pose a foreign relations problem, the Committee could receive details
of that representation in camera. The Committee believes that, otherwise,
it would be in the public interest to identify the range of representations
made to the Australian Government on its decision to terminate DIFF.
3.38 The Committee understands that it is normal practice for cables,
which are of any substance, received through the diplomatic cable network
to be distributed to the Prime Minister and other Ministers who have
an interest in the subject of the cable. The cables are also distributed
to their departments and relevant agencies. The distribution of some
highly sensitive cables might be restricted to fewer recipients. As
most, if not all, of the cables conveying representations of foreign
governments on the subject of the termination of DIFF would probably
have been distributed in accordance with the normal distribution of
substantive cables, the Committee can reasonably conclude that the Prime
Minister and other Ministers with an interest in DIFF, and their departments
and relevant agencies, would have received copies of those cables. The
Committee would be astonished if this were not the case.
3.39 Mr Downer argued against disclosure of the distribution of cables
on the grounds that it concerns the deliberative processes of government
and that disclosure would therefore not be in the public interest. The
Committee does not agree with Mr Downer's reasoning. The processes of
government are not secret and should not be kept secret in a parliamentary
democracy. Within those processes, it is accepted that it would not
be within the public interest for deliberations of government, the advice
generated by public servants and certain information protected by statute
not be disclosed publicly. The Committee does not believe that the fact
that a Minister received a particular cable is a matter which should,
as a matter of principle, not be disclosed in the public interest. Similarly,
it is hard to see why it would be contrary to the public interest for
the simple fact that a particular Minister responded to foreign representations,
without disclosing the nature of the response, to be provided to the
Committee.
3.40 The refusal of Mr Downer to provide such basic factual information
can only encourage speculation as to the real reasons for withholding
it from the Committee.
3.41 At least three of the four main DIFF recipient countries had drawn
their concern about the foreshadowed termination of DIFF to the attention
of the Government prior to the formal decision on 8 May 1996. Some Ministers
and at least one Head of State of those countries pointed out the importance
they placed on particular high-priority projects. Despite being made
aware of that concern, the Government decided to disregard those expressions
of concern about the proposed termination of the scheme generally and
the consequential cessation of high-priority projects of recipient countries,
and still proceed to the termination of DIFF without any transitional
arrangements, except for companies that had already been given Letters
of Formal Offer.
[Contents]
3.42 Mr Downer was first asked a question in the House of Representatives
on Tuesday, 18 June 1996 about foreign government responses to
the termination of DIFF. The Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr
Laurie Brereton, MP, asked:
Can the minister confirm that China, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Vietnam have all made official protests against the government's
decision to axe development projects to be funded by the Development
Import Finance Facility? Has the Chinese Ambassador stated that your
decision will 'do no good to the Australian side in terms of our credibility
and business interests? In addition, has the Chinese government now
made at least four representations at vice-ministerial level seeking
a reversal of the decision to scrap DIFF? How do you reconcile your
stated commitment to extend and develop Australia's engagement with
Asia with the serious regional backlash you are provoking, to the
detriment of our international reputation?
3.43 In his answer, Mr Downer said that:
As I have travelled around South-East Asia and North-East Asia
and met foreign ministers and other ministers from those countries
there and here, not one minister - be he a foreign minister or an
economic development minister - has expressed any concern to me about
the abolition of the DIFF program. Not one!
They would be writing me letters. They would be expressing their concerns
to me. There has been not one raised.
The fact is that of course some officials who are involved in
the details of these programs have raised issues with my department,
and you would not expect otherwise. But if this was a serious issue
in our relationships they would raise it at the ministerial level. [30]
3.44 On Monday 24 June 1996, Mr Downer acknowledged in the Parliament
that Chinese Vice Minister Sun Zhenyu in the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation wrote to him on 24 April 1996 expressing the
concern of the Chinese Government about the then proposed termination
of DIFF. Mr Downer defended his answer of 18 June 1996 that he had not
received any ministerial representations on DIFF by saying that Mr Sun
was not a minister; he was equivalent to a departmental secretary. He
said he would check his records about any ministerial representations
on DIFF but he had no recollections of any.
3.45 The Committee considers the fact that Mr Downer attempted to defend
his answer of 18 June 1996 by resorting to a reflection upon the status
of Mr Sun only served to emphasise how tenuous and unconvincing was
his answer. The Committee noted that Mr Sun had signed the Memorandum
of Understanding in respect of DIFF on behalf of the Chinese Government
while an Australian Minister, Mr Michael Duffy, MP, signed for the Australian
Government.
3.46 That evening, Mr Downer made a brief statement to the House of
Representatives in which he confirmed that he had not received any ministerial
representations on DIFF since the Government announced the termination
of the scheme. He said, however, that:
So that the record is complete, I have had records checked back
to 11 March, when the government came into office, to establish whether
this issue was discussed at all by me with any minister prior to the
abolition of the DIFF program. On 16 April, a month before the abolition
of the DIFF program, the program was briefly referred to in a discussion
with me in Jakarta by Professor Ginandjar, the Indonesian Minister for
national Development Planning; and Dr Habibie, the Minister of State
for Research and Technology. I tell the House this so that the record
is complete. [31]
3.47 On the morning of 25 June 1996, Mr Downer signed a reply to the
letter from the Philippines Secretary of Agrarian Reform which had been
submitted to his office two weeks earlier. [32]
In question time on the afternoon of 25 June 1996, however, Mr Downer
made no mention of Mr Garilao's letter - in spite of the fact that it
was a further ministerial representation in addition to those disclosed
on the previous evening. In reply to a question on 25 June 1996 he said:
'I gave an undertaking to the House during my answer to questions yesterday
and during the censure debate that I would check the records in my department
on this matter and was quite happy to come back to the House and add anything,
and indeed I did that. Frankly, Mr Speaker, I have nothing else to add.'
3.48 Later in the afternoon of 25 June 1996, Mr Downer's office was
obliged to acknowledge that Dr Habibie had written to Mr Downer concerning
DIFF. Mr Downer did not disclose the existence of Mr Garilao's letter
until his statement on the following day, 26 June 1996.
3.49 On 26 June 1996, Mr Downer made a statement to the House of Representatives
admitting that he had inadvertently misled the House. He confirmed that
Professor Ginandjar had expressed concern about the proposed abolition
of DIFF and that Dr Habibie had raised the matter of a specific DIFF project.
He said that he knew before 18 June 1996 that Dr Habibie was writing
to him about DIFF but this letter was not received in his office until
19 June 1996 and not read by him until the afternoon of 24 June 1996.
He added that the Indonesian Minister for Industry and Trade, Tungky Ariwibowo,
made no reference to DIFF but referred to a heavy marine engineering training
centre in a conversation with him in April 1996. Mr Downer said that he
was told only that morning that the centre was a DIFF project. Mr Downer
also said that he had been shown that morning a record of a conversation
on 6 May 1996 with the Ambassador of the Philippines in which she
had raised with him on behalf of the President of the Philippines a particular
DIFF-funded project. [33]
3.50 The Committee examined during the public hearings why information,
which was held in AusAID or DFAT, was not used by Mr Downer before 26
June 1996.
3.51 In DFAT/AusAID, as in other departments, there is a system of 'possible
parliamentary questions' (PPQs) which 'provide our portfolio Ministers
with accurate, succinct and timely information on significant issues of
current portfolio concern for use in Parliamentary question time'. [34]
The Committee sought to establish whether the PPQs prepared by AusAID
during the second half of June 1996 provided Mr Downer and other portfolio
ministers with accurate advice on the termination of DIFF, especially
in relation to the representations made by recipient countries.
3.52 AusAID told the Committee that:
There were five PPQs on DIFF issues as at 17 June 1996 ... These
were not updated throughout the period in question. Four additional
PPQs were added on 27 June. Any further advice from AusAID and DFAT
was provided direct to the minister not in PPQ format. [35]
Mr Downer subsequently advised the Committee that one of the
PPQs referred to representations from Dr Habibie, but curiously he
did not indicate whether this was one of the five PPQs on DIFF issues
in his brief on 18 June or whether it was one of the four additional
PPQs added on 27 June 1996.
3.53 Earlier, Mr Kanaley told the Committee, 'there is a PPQ brief, and
it is updated as sensitive topics arise that might be raised in parliament.
As days go on, if the topic changes for some reason or there is need for
modification, the brief is then updated.' [36]
Mr Kanaley's statement is in accord with the DFAT Administrative Circular
dealing with PPQs, which states, 'It is essential that PPQs prepared for
our Ministers contain the most up-to-date information. PPQs therefore
can require regular, even daily, revision when Parliament is sitting.'
[37]
3.54 On 18 June 1996, Mr Downer answered a question about recipient
country representations on the termination of DIFF. The Committee does
not know whether any of the five DIFF PPQs then in Mr Downer's brief
covered this particular topic. As discussed above, Mr Downer has not
advised the Committee whether or not one of these five PPQs referred
to representations by Dr Habibie. Nor has he indicated whether any PPQs
referred to ministerial representations from any country other than
Indonesia. Given the fact that one week earlier, on 11 June 1996, AusAID
had submitted to Mr Downer's office a draft reply to the first letter
of the Philippines Secretary of Agrarian Reform, it would be a serious
omission if no reference was made to that ministerial representation
in the PPQ briefing available to Mr Downer on 18 June 1996. In
any event, Mr Downer, in his answer to the question, misled the Parliament.
3.55 On 18 June 1996, Mr Downer's office was in possession of the first
letter to Mr Downer from the Philippines Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, Mr Garilao, and the draft reply had been submitted to Mr Downer's
office by AusAID on 11 June 1996. The presence of this letter in
Mr Downer's office proves that his answer to the question on 18 June
misled the Parliament.
3.56 On 20 June 1996, Dr Habibie's letter, which had been received
the previous day, was referred to by AusAID officials in briefing Mr
Downer. With the receipt of this letter, Mr Downer would have to
change the answer he gave to the Parliament on 18 June 1996 should he
be asked a similar question. However, the PPQs were not changed to reflect
this significant new development.
3.57 On 21 June 1996, AusAID passed to Mr Downer's Canberra office
a record of conversation he had had with Indonesian Minister for National
Development and Planning, Professor Ginandjar. This record proved that
Mr Downer had misled the Parliament.
3.58 In the morning of Monday, 24 June 1996, AusAID faxed to Mr Downer's
office the record of conversation which Mr Downer had had with the Indonesian
Minister of State for Research and Technology, Dr Habibie. Leaving aside
the question of whether or not the PPQs available to Mr Downer on 18
June 1996 contained any reference to any representation by Dr Habibie,
this record of conversation also showed that Mr Downer had misled the
Parliament.
3.59 Yet, inexplicably, PPQs were not updated to reflect Dr Habibie's
letter or the records of conversation with Professor Ginandjar and Dr
Habibie. Other documents might have been provided to Mr Downer but these,
by his own admission, were not read until after question time on Monday,
24 June 1996. The PPQs, which are the documents referred to by Ministers
in answering parliamentary questions, did not reflect these developments.
That afternoon, Mr Downer was asked two further questions about
foreign representations on DIFF and was subject to a censure motion.
3.60 Later that day, Mr Downer read AusAID's material on this subject.
He made a statement to the House of Representatives that evening in
which he admitted that two Indonesian Ministers had spoken to him about
the termination of DIFF contrary to his answer in the Parliament on
18 June 1996. Despite these very significant developments, the DIFF
PPQs were not altered in any way. Mr Downer's failure to require the
preparation of up to date and accurate briefing for question time is
extraordinary. Such an omission can only lead to speculation that the
Minister for Foreign Affairs was not anxious to learn of further material
which contradicted his statement to the House of Representatives on
18 June 1996.
3.61 On 25 June 1996, Mr Downer was subjected to a barrage of nine
questions without notice during question time and a second censure motion.
The PPQs were still not changed.
3.62 On 26 June 1996, Mr Downer made a statement to the House of Representatives
admitting that he had inadvertently misled the Parliament in his answer
to a question on 18 June 1996. A further eight questions without
notice were directed to him on DIFF and he was again subjected to a
censure motion.
3.63 Four new PPQs on DIFF were added to Mr Downer's brief for question
time on 27 June 1996.
3.64 There was discussion during the public hearings about the Administrative
Circular's requirement for the preparation of fewer PPQs than before.
The Circular stated:
Ministers require fewer PPQs. As both Ministers are in the
House of Representatives it is expected that fewer questions will
be directed towards them.
Last year the Department, Austrade and AusAID produced over
2,000 new and updated PPQs. The Ministers are keen to reduce this
figure by 75% to about 500 or fewer.
The Ministers would also like to see a reduction in the number
of briefing updates required. The greater use of generic briefing should
avoid the need for overlapping PPQs and constant updating. [38]
3.65 The question of Ministers wanting less information and whether
this had any bearing on the fact that the DIFF PPQs were not updated
between 17 and 27 June 1996 was discussed at some length during the
Committee's hearings. Ms Hewitt told the Committee, in relation to the
requirement for fewer PPQs generally, that:
I think that that is a matter for professional judgement and
I would not put it in terms of information either being provided or
not being provided. If there is an unrestricted idea about the volume
of paper that can flow, you have desk officers at a very junior level
wanting to change a document perhaps on a daily basis to make some
minor adjustment in a background factual point that may or may not
be pertinent to the sort of response the minister might be interested
in providing.
What we were seeking to do was to have officers exercise more
professional judgment. What was important was what needed to be adjusted
and to make sure that information was correct and focused but not necessarily
hugely voluminous. Ministers, in my experience, do have different appetites
for paper and it was really a question of making sure we put some further
effort into focusing that material to make it as useful as possible.
[39]
3.66 The Committee appreciated the need for PPQs to be focused and
relevant but noted that, as PPQs were required to be approved by at
least branch or division heads, there was little likelihood that junior
desk officers would deluge the system with unnecessary new or updated
PPQs. In relation to the period in question, AusAID told the Committee
that:
the potential range of information you could provide in PPQs
is almost infinite. You are always making judgements as to which ones
you should provide, particularly in a situation where you are trying
to keep those numbers within reasonable bounds. It that was an error
of judgment on AusAID's part, then that was an error of judgment. [40]
3.67 AusAID confirmed, however, that it 'certainly was not the case that
the circular which spoke of trying to reduce the number of PPQs had any
impact whatsoever on the flow of papers on this subject'. [41]
3.68 The Committee noted that there were other forms of communication
available to AusAID to brief the Minister on DIFF matters and officers
during the hearings referred to some of those other forms. Nevertheless,
it was in question time that the Minister came to grief and it is the
PPQ which is the main reference tool available to the Minister in answering
questions without notice.
3.69 The Committee sought to obtain copies of the AusAID PPQs for the
period from 18 to 27 June 1996. The Minister refused to provide them
to the Committee. In his letter to the Committee of 20 August 1996,
he said:
I am unable to agree to the provision of the PPQs as these
papers represent advice to the Minister on the public presentation
of sensitive policy. I consider that it is in the public interest
that the important relationship of confidence between officials and
Ministers in such matters be protected.
3.70 Ms Hewitt told the Committee that:
while all arms of the portfolio prepare these possible parliamentary
questions and prepare possible responses, these documents are provided
without necessarily carrying the status of having been approved like
government policy lines are. They are suggested lines from departments
to the minister. Their precise status as documents is difficult to pinpoint.
[42]
3.71 The Committee notes, however, that the Administrative Circular
relating to the preparation of PPQs, which was distributed by Ms Hewitt,
states:
PPQs promote and defend Government policy. Following approval
by Ministers, they become fundamental public policy documents, whether
or not they are used in Parliament. Once approved they are used as media
talking points in Ministers' offices and by Departmental spokespersons,
they can be used as briefing in other forums such as Senate Estimates
hearings, and are sometimes sent to posts as policy guidance documents.
[43]
3.72 The circular also states that, 'Once PPQs are approved by Ministers
they are retained in briefing folders ... in Ministerial offices for
as long as necessary'.
3.73 The Committee acknowledges that PPQs would be regarded simply
as departmental advisory documents until they are approved by the Minister.
However, once approved, it is obvious from the Administrative Circular
that approved PPQs have a wide use by officers as well as the Minister.
They are clearly intended to serve as authoritative statements of fact
and government policy.
3.74 It would be a reasonable presumption on the part of the Committee
that the five PPQs as at 17 June 1996 were in the Minister's briefing
folders and were therefore approved by him. Consequently, the Committee
cannot understand why the Minister will not provide copies of the PPQs
prepared by AusAID during the period in question. Such reluctance to
co-operate with the Committee only serves to encourage speculation as
to the real reason for withholding such documents from the Committee.
3.75 The Committee asked AusAID and DFAT: 'Was Mr Downer's statement
in parliament on 18 June that he had received no ministerial representations
whatsoever concerning DIFF consistent with the PPQ brief on the subject
provided to him? [44] Neither AusAID,
DFAT nor Mr Downer have answered this question.
3.76 AusAID told the Committee that Mr Downer's statement of 26 June
1996 and his letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of
19 July 1996 were accurate and complete. [45]
AusAID also said that the Minister's statement of 26 June 1996 was consistent
with what the PPQs contained. The Director General of AusAID said 'There
are no elements of those PPQs which in any way contradict the minister's
statement to the House. There were other elements of those PPQs, certainly,
but none of them were in any way in conflict with the Minister's statement
to the House.' [46] Mr Downer has also
written 'I would emphasise the point made by the Director General of AusAID
during the hearings that the information contained in the PPQs is entirely
consistent with my statement to Parliament' [47]
(on 26 June 1996).
3.77 The Committee would make the point that the statements above do
not answer its question concerning the consistency between the PPQ briefing
available to Mr Downer at question time on 18 June 1996 and his statement
about representations concerning DIFF on that day. AusAID and Mr Downer
have said that the PPQs do not contradict the Minister's statement of
26 June 1996. The same PPQs were available to the Minister when he answered
the question on DIFF on 18 June 1996. As his answer on 18 June 1996
was contradictory to his statement on 26 June 1996, did the Minister
contradict the information contained in the PPQs on 18 June 1996? Without
seeing the PPQs, the Committee is not in a position to answer this question,
but Mr Downer's refusal to make the PPQs available to the Committee
can only encourage speculation that he is attempting to conceal evidence
of deliberate deceit.
The Committee recommends to the Senate that
the Senate order the Minister for Foreign Affairs to provide
the Committee with the following documents or information by
18 October 1996:
- the five possible parliamentary questions (PPQs) concerning
DIFF in Mr Downer's office on 17 June 1996;
- the four additional PPQs concerning DIFF provided to
Mr Downer's office on 27 June 1996;
- a list of all government-to-government representations
on the termination of DIFF made by other governments from
2 March 1996;
- a list of cables received by the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade concerning representations on the termination
of DIFF or reporting the results of Dr McCawley's visit
to Asia in June 1996 (including originating post and date
received in Canberra); the distribution of these cables
to Ministers and the Prime Minister; and the responses or
queries made by Ministers or the Prime Minister to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs about those cables.
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[Contents]
3.78 Although Mr Downer told the House of Representatives on 25 June
1996 that the Government would not be reviewing the decision to terminate
the DIFF scheme, [48] he made a partial
policy reversal on 17 July 1996 by agreeing to consider funding some high
priority individual DIFF projects within AusAID's bilateral program allocation
for 1996-97. [49] This embarrassing
policy reversal reflects both the strength of the responses from recipient
countries, which were obviously more than just 'disappointment' and 'concern',
and the lack of understanding on the part of Mr Downer and the Government
of the implications of the Government's original decision.
3.79 Following Mr Downer's decision on 17 July 1996 to consider some
high-priority projects, he signed letters to relevant Ministers in the
four countries most affected by the termination of DIFF - China, Indonesia,
the Philippines and Vietnam - the next day and these were faxed to Australian
embassies in those countries on 19 July 1996. On the same day, AusAID
staff also notified relevant embassies in Canberra of the dispatch of
the letter to their governments. The decision was released publicly
in Australia on Monday, 22 July 1996.
3.80 Mr Downer has made it clear that only projects with a 'strong humanitarian,
poverty alleviation and environmental focus' would be considered. [50]
AusAID was unable to provide any definition of the types of projects that
might be covered by such terms. [51]
AusAID went on to say:
I think you have to stay away from specific definitions and look
at the actual particular projects concerned. You can fall far too easily
into the trap of saying, 'A water project is humanitarian and another
sort of project is not'. The reality is that you need to look at these
things project by project and see the impact they have on the quality
of people's lives. That is what defines a humanitarian project. [52]
3.81 In the letters dispatched on 19 July 1996 to Ministers of the
four DIFF recipient countries, Mr Downer asked each of those countries
to nominate their very high priority projects for funding consideration
within the relevant bilateral aid programs. Once the nominated priorities
have been received, they would be appraised if this had not already
been done. This would enable an assessment to be made regarding the
humanitarian focus of the project. AusAID ruled out drawing up a check
list for the nominated projects to be assessed against when being considered
by the Australian Government. Only projects for which letters of advice
had been issued would be considered by the Government under this arrangement.
3.82 AusAID told the Committee that the number of projects that might
be approved by the Australian Government in respect of individual countries
would depend on the amount of funds allocated to the respective bilateral
aid programs in the August 1996 Budget and the size of the projects.
It might be only one project approved, or two or even more but for no
country would many projects be approved. Decisions would be made after
discussions with the governments of the respective countries. The Budget
figures are detailed in Chapter 6.
Footnotes
[1] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 22.
[2] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 23.
[3] Committee Hansard, pp 151-52.
[4] Committee Hansard, p. 152.
[5] Committee Hansard, p. 175.
[6] Committee Hansard, p. 174.
[7] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 25.
[8] Committee Hansard, p. 177.
[9] Committee Hansard, p. 461.
[10] Committee Hansard, p. 461.
[11] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 25.
[12] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 25.
[13] Committee Hansard, p. 334.
[14] Committee Hansard, p. 331.
[15] Committee Hansard, p. 342.
[16] Ms Penny Wensley, Acting Deputy Secretary,
DFAT, Committee Hansard, p. 335.
[17] Committee Hansard, pp 342-43.
[18] Committee Hansard, p.157.
[19] Transcript of press conference attached
to letter of 21 August 1996 from AusAID and DFAT to the Committee.
[20] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2782.
[21] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2788.
[22] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2789.
[23] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2791.
[24] Committee Hansard, p. 118.
[25] Committee Hansard, p. 14.
[26] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2782.
[27] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2782.
[28] Committee Hansard, p. 10.
[29] Committee Hansard, p. 27.
[30] House of Representatives Hansard, 18
June 1996, p. 2064, emphasis added.
[31] House of Representatives Hansard, 24
June 1996, p. 2591.
[32] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, p. 2781.
[33] House of Representatives Hansard, 26
June 1996, pp 2781-82.
[34] DFAT, Handbook, Possible Parliamentary
Questions, 1.1, DFAT Administrative Circular No. 58/96 dated 12
April 1996.
[35] Committee Hansard, p. 118.
[36] Committee Hansard, p. 17.
[37] DFAT, Handbook, Possible Parliamentary
Questions, 7.1, DFAT Administrative Circular No. 58/96 dated 12
April 1996.
[38] DFAT Administrative Circular No. 58/96
dated 12 April 1996, p. 1.
[39] Committee Hansard, p. 127.
[40] Committee Hansard, p. 125.
[41] Committee Hansard, p. 133.
[42] Committee Hansard, p. 122.
[43] DFAT, Handbook, Possible Parliamentary
Questions, 1.2, DFAT Administrative Circular No. 58/96 dated 12
April 1996.
[44] Committee Hansard, p. 18.
[45] Committee Hansard, p. 118.
[46] Committee Hansard, p. 119.
[47] Letter to the Committee dated 20 August
1996, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alexander Downer, MP.
[48] House of Representatives Hansard, 25
June 1996, p. 2627.
[49] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 25.
[50] AusAID/DFAT, submission, p. 25.
[51] Committee Hansard, p. 139.
[52] Committee Hansard, p. 139.