Issues raised in evidence
Introduction
2.1
This chapter summarises the main issues raised in public evidence,
including the structure of Resistance to Interrogation (RTI) training, the
process around the consent provided by Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel
who participate in the training, the potential for physical and psychological harm,
the benefits of training and whether the training complies with Australia's domestic
and international legal obligations.
Resistance to interrogation training framework
2.2
All military operations conducted overseas carry some risk that ADF personnel
may be captured, detained, interrogated and exploited by an adversary, threat
group, foreign military or foreign government.[1]
2.3
To mitigate this risk, the ADF incorporates an element into its
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape program that teaches participants how
to behave in the event that they are captured. Previously known as RTI
training, the activity simulates the realistic captivity of participants by
using trainers to role-play as threat forces in a variety of scenarios.[2]
2.4
Defence conducted a review of RTI training in 2004, which incorporated
improvements to safety and accountability. According to Defence:
The review aimed to ensure that the sensitive and demanding
training was robustly controlled and monitored, while continuing to prepare ADF
members to cope with incarceration, detention and exploitation. The review
initiated a re-write of the overarching Defence policy with the intent of
aligning Defence practices with our principal allies...[3]
2.5
Following the internal review, changes to RTI training were planned in
2005, and carried out in 2006, after which the training was renamed Conduct
after Capture (CAC) training.
2.6
Conduct after Capture training includes three levels:
- Level A: An introductory computer based package that provides a basic
awareness of the ADF Conduct after Capture policy;
-
Level B: A one-day theory workshop covering Introduction to Conduct
after Capture, Hostage Survival, Foreign Government Detention, Military
Exploitation, Common Survival Strategies and a Level C activity brief; and
-
Level C: Practical immersion training for identified 'prone-to-capture'
personnel such as special forces personnel. The activity includes the three
Conduct after Capture scenarios of Foreign Government Detention, Hostage
Survival and Military Exploitation.[4]
2.7
According to Defence, CAC training is conducted in a humane and lawful
manner and 'mentally prepares ADF "prone-to-capture" personnel for
the rigours of captivity whilst teaching them how to survive a capture
situation and return to Australia with dignity'.[5]
Defence argued that CAC training is consistent with coalition and NATO partner
best practices.[6]
2.8
The committee received evidence from former participants of both RTI and
CAC training. As upgrades to the training were incorporated following the 2004
review, it is important to distinguish whether evidence received refers to pre-2004
or post-2004 activities. Throughout this report, evidence is either attributed
to 'RTI' or 'CAC' participants in order to indicate which model the criticisms
are related to.
2.9
Not all submitters were critical of the objectives of the training. A
former RTI participant argued that exposure to interrogation scenarios is
essential for identified personnel. The individual argued that teaching
techniques for dealing with captivity and exploitation in a safe and controlled
environment mentally prepares personnel and provides guidance on how to survive
with dignity.
2.10
It was also argued that RTI training ensures that Defence is able to
exercise duty of care. One submitter argued that the training allows Defence to
mitigate risk of harm to individuals as well as reduce potential harm to
operations.[7]
Training methods
2.11
The Defence submission advised that the detailed content, training
methods and survival strategies of Level C practical immersion activities are
sensitive from an operational security perspective and should not be on the
public record:
An understanding of ADF Conduct after Capture techniques and
procedures by an enemy or threat force would enable them to alter their
tactics, techniques and procedures to improve their chances of successfully
exploiting detained or captured ADF personnel. In a worst case scenario, this
could pose a risk to the lives of ADF personnel captured or detained in the
future.[8]
2.12
Level C activities require Resistance Trainers to role-play as threat
forces and use interrogation techniques, such as mental and physical stressors,
on participants to replicate realistic captivity situations. Participants are
trained to behave, resist exploitation, and survive with dignity in the
following scenarios:
- Foreign Government Detention: This module is conducted over a 12–24 hour
period and provides ADF personnel with survival strategies, coping mechanisms
and experience in how to behave during detention by officials from a foreign
government. The scenario for this module is that Australia may or may not be
involved in an armed conflict with the second country;
-
Hostage Survival: This module is conducted over a 12–24 hour period and
provides ADF personnel with survival strategies, coping mechanisms and
experience in how to behave during detention by a terrorist or criminal
organisation; and
-
Military Exploitation: This module is conducted over 48–72 hours and
provides ADF personnel with survival strategies, coping mechanisms and
experience in how to behave during detention by a military service of a hostile
government. The training includes situations where ADF personnel are detained
as prisoners of war and the detaining authority acts in a manner compliant with
applicable international humanitarian law, but also includes situations where
ADF personnel are detained by an authority that does not comply with the Geneva
Conventions.[9]
2.13
According to Defence, there are a number of control measures in place to
protect the safety and wellbeing of participants who undergo Conduct after
Capture training. These include:
-
providing participants with an activity overview during Level B
briefings;
-
obtaining the consent of participants before Level C activities
are conducted via signed volunteer declaration forms;
-
reaffirming the volunteer status of participants prior to commencement
of Level C training;
-
informing participants of their right to withdraw at any stage
and the process for withdrawing prior to commencement of activity;
-
monitoring of activities by psychology and medical officers who
may withdraw participants at any stage;
-
recording Level C activities on closed circuit television (CCTV);
-
monitoring of CCTV footage by the Conducting Officer and Shift
Senior Trainer who may veto activities at any time; and
-
individually debriefing all participants (completed and
withdrawn) after training with both a Resistance Trainer and psychology
officer.[10]
2.14
Prior to the commencement of the training, all activity staff also receive
a safety brief which covers the key safety issues relevant to the activity and
provides guidance on how to respond to an issue if the need arises.[11]
2.15
The evidence received by the committee from ADF personnel mostly related
to RTI training conducted during the 1990s and up to RTI training transitioning
to CAC training in 2006. The concerns raised by submitters address a number of
issues with the equivalent of today's Level C training activities including the
risk of physical and psychological harm, informed consent and the role of
activity staff. The benefits of the training from Defence's perspective and the
ability of the training to adequately prepare personnel for the reality of
being captured were also questioned by a number of submitters.
Risk of harm
2.16
Submitters to the inquiry raised concerns that participants and trainers
involved in Level C activities are at risk of physical and psychological harm. Submitters
argued that participants are at risk of sustaining physical or psychological
injury due to their exposure to realistic interrogation scenarios. Trainers are
also at risk of psychological harm due to their involvement as role-players.
2.17
In evidence to the committee, a former RTI participant described how they
had suffered immediate physical injury from the training and continued to
experience pain from that injury for years afterwards.[12]
Another former RTI participant explained that they also continued to be
significantly physically affected:
I am not able to control it. I am still impacted on a weekly
or daily basis when my physiology is triggered by the levels of physical
distress that they put on us.[13]
2.18
As well as the risk of physical injury, submitters argued that trainees have
experienced significant psychological harm as a direct result of the training.
A former CAC participant described a range of mental health issues following
their participation in the training:
I went to see this psychologist to deal with this imprinting
and, with her help, we managed to stop that. But what happened then was other
symptoms started to manifest themselves: sleeplessness and restlessness, mild
shaking in the hands, problems with short-term memory.[14]
2.19
Significant psychological issues also had lasting effects on yet another
RTI participant:
It can take me three to five days to come back down from
where I am not quite incapacitated but pretty well impaired in my thinking and
my capacity for self-care. I can go from being a normal, highly-functioning
person with a well-paid job to being someone who really is in dire straits for
a few days.[15]
2.20
One submitter highlighted that the UK no longer conducts its equivalent
RTI training longer than 48 hours because studies had showed it could induce
psychosis.[16]
2.21
Although the Australian Psychological Society (APS) acknowledged that
participants who voluntarily enter into RTI training are less likely to suffer
from psychological harm than non-voluntary participants, it highlighted a lack of
research into the prevalence of mental health issues due to participation in
RTI activities.[17]
The committee heard evidence that volunteerism may not mitigate the risk of
psychological harm:
I know that the common human way of coping is to dissociate
in those situations, and the stress involved can have permanent effects upon
the brain in a similar way to what PTSD does, so there can be long-term damage
that can occur from a process that has no proven benefit. Even if it were
voluntary, it still will not offset those risks.[18]
2.22
Submitters expressed concern that CAC activities are conducted directly
following SAS selection courses, at a time when participants are mentally and
physically exhausted and therefore in a vulnerable condition:
...the activities I experienced during the R2I process would be
stressful to the point of being psychologically dangerous and damaging for
anyone under any circumstances. Add to that, the state of physical and
emotional fragility that we were in after 18 days of food and sleep deprivation
and mental exhaustion, and I consider that the R2I process I experienced was an
act of gross negligence, possibly criminal negligence.[19]
2.23
The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists warned
that ADF personnel are at increased risk of developing mental health issues due
to the unique demands of their military service and suggested that Defence
implement systematic screening of individuals exposed to CAC training to
identify mental health trends.[20]
At the hearing, the APS argued:
Clearly, if someone withdrew from the training, that should
be setting off warning bells for people.[21]
2.24
The APS advised that following any traumatic event the symptoms for most
individuals will decline after the first month, however around 10 per cent or
less may continue to be impacted; therefore screening of participants should be
conducted as soon as possible following activities so early treatment can be
provided. The APS argued that all organisations should obtain independent
advice on the potential effects of any contentious course, and that independent
oversight of CAC training is essential:
This is such a serious thing, that can leave such a mark on a
person psychologically, that I do not think it can be left to the people who
are undertaking or providing the training to assess whether it is having an
impact on people. I think there has to be an arm's length, third-party kind of
review process.[22]
Informed consent
2.25
From a legal perspective, informed consent generally refers to an
individual agreeing to a course of action (such as undergoing a medical
procedure) only after all the relevant factors and risks associated with that
activity have been disclosed. In this context, there is a conundrum with RTI
training and the consent of individuals who participate in and complete the
training.
2.26
Defence does not use the term 'informed consent' in relation to its RTI
or CAC training activities. As previously noted, Defence refers to participants
in Level C training as 'volunteers' if they have signed a volunteer declaration
form prior to commencing training.
2.27
The committee received evidence from former participants of RTI training
which clearly demonstrates that on a number of occasions during the 1990s, Defence:
-
suddenly initiated RTI training without participants having prior
knowledge this would happen;
-
failed to obtain the consent of participants; and
-
obtained consent when participants were in a depleted mental and
physical state.
2.28
Submitters alleged that, in some cases, Defence failed to provide RTI
participants with briefings prior to or following the training:
We astoundingly have a cohort of formerly serving Australian
soldiers who have been subjected to one of the most hazardous (and possibly
heinous) forms of military training, without any preparation, training,
consent, post-exercise debriefing, or access to any form of support.[23]
2.29
One former RTI participant advised the committee they would not have
elected to participate had they received more information prior to the activity.[24]
Another former RTI participant argued that they would have either opted out earlier
had they known in advance that doing so would not affect their career.[25]
According to the APS:
I think the problem with what we are talking about—the
resistance-to-interrogation training—is that it is described to people, but the
demands that it places on individuals really only become apparent to them as
they are undergoing the training. So under the present set of circumstances
they are not consenting in a way where they fully understand the risks and the
dangers to them. That is not informed consent.[26]
2.30
The evidence from submitters suggested that pressure to participate in
RTI training activities contributed to the decision to consent, even though
activities had not been fully explained beforehand. Being considered eligible
for the SAS or maintaining personal reputation amongst peers are strong
motivating factors. As one former RTI participant explained:
Particularly in the context of SAS selection, you have got a
bunch of people who are trying to prove that they can handle whatever is thrown
at them. Certainly I was just trying to prove I could handle whatever was
thrown at me, and it would have been shameful amongst my peers to put my hand
up and say, 'I can't handle this' or, 'I think this is wrong' or, 'I'm not prepared
to go on'.[27]
2.31
The committee also heard evidence that on at least one occasion in 2006,
volunteer declaration forms were only provided to trainees after they had been
'captured'. In this case, signatures were obtained from individuals who were
confused and exhausted from SAS training over the preceding days.[28]
It remains unclear to the committee whether these individuals were RTI or CAC
model participants as information on the timing of Defence's transition to CAC
was not provided to the committee.
Issues related to activity staff
Resistance Trainers
2.32
Submitters expressed concerns that the active role of trainers may cause
psychological harm. Although Defence argued that activity staff are trained to
protect the safety and wellbeing of CAC participants, information on measures
to protect the wellbeing of Resistance Trainers was not provided to the
committee.
2.33
According to the APS, interrogation and torture can have long-lasting
negative effects on both the subject and the person delivering it. However, it
highlighted the absence of clinical evidence on the occurrence of harm to trainers
and suggested that further research into the subject be conducted.[29]
2.34
The committee received evidence alleging that RTI activities conducted
by Defence doubled as training for army interrogators to enable them to
practice information extraction techniques on personnel undertaking training to
resist interrogation.[30]
2.35
According to the APS, misuse of RTI training is a genuine risk. It
highlighted cases where psychologist-designed SERE training for US Special
Forces had been reversed by members of US military and security services and
misused as techniques for interrogation.[31]
2.36
Defence advised that the Defence Force School of Intelligence is the
only ADF unit authorised to deliver Conduct after Capture training. It
indicated that only qualified ADF Resistance Trainers are authorised to deliver
training and that trainer qualification is awarded following a suitability
assessment, including psychological testing, as well as the successful
completion of a five week Resistance Trainer course which covers all aspects of
Conduct after Capture training.[32]
Independence of psychological and
medical officers
2.37
Submitters also raised concerns over the use of psychologists and
medical officers during CAC activities. It was argued that staff who
participate in training activities are in direct conflict with their ethical
obligations. Their independence to protect the safety and wellbeing of
participants can also be compromised.
2.38
According to the APS, registered psychologists are guided by a Code of
Ethics which provides that psychologists must in no way harm individuals and
ensure that their knowledge and expertise is not misused to harm others.[33]
Following the misuse of SERE training in the US and questions into the
integrity of the American Psychological Association, the APS released a
statement that condemned the involvement of psychologists in situations where
inhuman treatment is being used or threatened. The APS argued that:
It is imperative that the [committee] understand the
importance of the ADF recognising psychologists' obligations under the APS Code
of Ethics and associated guidelines...[34]
2.39
Accepting that CAC training may be a necessary activity, the APS
recommended that Defence support psychologists involved in CAC activities to
remain compliant with professional codes of conduct.[35]
2.40
Concerns regarding the independence of activity staff were also raised.
Dr Steven Scally argued that medical staff are not able to protect the safety
and wellbeing of participants because their power to report or veto activities
is compromised by command. Dr Scally alleged that staff were historically deterred
from exercising their powers during RTI activities for fear of reprisal:
Challenging the wants of command is an audacious, if not
career-ending, prospect. The military has many implicit sanctions for the
non-conforming, and this includes the lowly-ranked psychology or medical officer...Medical
officers being forced to change clinical decisions (not over-ruled, but
enforced) was common place. Concepts of confidentiality were lost on superior
officers insisting on intruding on sacrosanct doctor-patient ground, in
directed attempts to sway the outcome of the clinical interaction, such as
occurred in Resistance to Interrogation training, and other settings. Threats
of insubordination charges, legal action and imprisonment were reserved for the
particularly feisty.[36]
Value of training
2.41
Although Defence argued that CAC training is essential to prepare
prone-to-capture personnel in conduct after capture, submitters speculated
whether it has any proven operational benefit or whether the risk of injury to
participants is too high and outweighs any military operational benefits.[37]
2.42
Several submitters highlighted that the benefits of the training is
poorly researched, and not enough is known about the efficacy of the training
or the effects on those who participate.[38]
The APS doubted if it was even possible to prepare people for the brutality of
captivity.[39]
2.43
During the hearing, a former RTI participant reflected that:
I am not confident that anybody who went through the training
in my era, as undergoing interrogation, got anything out of it. The crux is
that it is actually a misnomer to call it 'training', because no instruction
was given, there was no feedback, there was no evaluation and there was no
coaching...what the objectives of the training are, what they are going to take
you through, what the key techniques are that you need to understand are. None
of that was there.[40]
2.44
According to Defence, an analysis conducted by the Defence Force School
of Intelligence investigated the positive and negative experiences of CAC
trainees over 2015–16. Whilst trainees acknowledged the training was arduous,
they indicated that their experience better prepared them for resisting
interrogation and surviving captivity.[41]
Compliance with the law
2.45
Since 1989, Australia has been a signatory to the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
and it continues to be legally bound by it. The convention is an international
human rights treaty that aims to prevent torture and other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment around the world.[42]
2.46
However, former RTI participants described their personal experience
with being forced into degrading and humiliating activities without prior warning
or consent. One submitter argued that their activity had subjected individuals to
abusive behaviour in direct conflict with their employer's duty of care
obligations:
When we come back to the issue of duty of care, and whether
the duty of care was met in taking care of people like myself who were being
interrogated, it does not really stack up in terms of the duty of care of the
people coordinating all this.[43]
2.47
In April 2016, Defence completed a legal review of its Conduct after
Capture training framework. The review was undertaken by a Senior Counsel from
the NSW Bar as an ADF reserve legal officer. According to Defence:
This legal review determined that the training is compliant
with Australian domestic law and applicable international legal obligations.
The legal advice has been reviewed by the Office of the Australian Government
Solicitor, in order to address previously raised concerns over the independence
of any review. The office of the Australian Government Solicitor concurs with
Defence's legal advice.[44]
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