Impacts of CDP on
providers
Introduction
5.1
The previous
chapter focused on the impact of the Community Development Program (CDP) on
individuals and communities. This chapter examines whether the CDP provides the
incentives and structures necessary for employment providers to be able to
deliver for program participants. Evidence taken by the committee points to a
number of barriers faced by providers in doing so, including:
-
Misaligned incentives
for providers;
-
Limited local
decision-making;
-
Difficulty in
assessing employment outcomes;
-
Impediments
to employment; and
-
Uncertainty
about the future.
Misaligned incentives
for providers
5.2
The two key
mechanisms for managing provider activity within the CDP are the Programme
Management Framework, against which providers are assessed every six months,
and a new fee structure that attaches the bulk of potential revenue to
attendance at Work for the Dole.[1]
5.3
Submitters
gave evidence that this administrative framework meant that incentives for
providers were misaligned with the needs of CDP participants and their
communities.
Increase
in administrative burden
5.4
Providers gave
evidence that CDP's administrative systems prioritised monitoring participants'
mutual obligation activities, rather than delivering job outcomes for them. In
their experience this manifested in an increased administrative burden of CDP
when compared to its predecessor programs. At the committee's public hearing on
Palm Island, Ms Kylie Van Der Neut, Senior Manager, Contract Assurance at
Campbell Page noted that 'there was always a requirement for attendance, but
the administration side of that has definitely increased with the CDP contract'.[2]
Ms Van Der Neut described the increased burden in more detail:
With the
change to CDP, to participate five days a week, five hours a day, for 48 weeks
a year. There are the administration requirements, along with the performance
framework. As a provider, you need to make sure that job plans are correct and
that you have your system up-to-date and always up-to-date. Then you also have
the side where a participant doesn't attend for an invalid reason. You're
required to submit the no show, no pay for every day that occurs. I've spoken
with the staff here and they're saying that each no show, no pay can take
between five and 15 minutes, depending on the competency of the staff
member—whether they're new or have been with us for a while. There is the
increased administration and also attending the activity diary every day, as
well as our contact appointments, and making sure that they're booked on a
regular basis as well.[3]
5.5
Submitters
such as the National Employment Services Association described the recording of
daily attendance as 'cumbersome and time-consuming'.[4]
The Ngurratjuta/Pmara Ntjarra Aboriginal Corporation explained that some of
these difficulties stemmed from the CDP Information Technology (IT) system:
The CDP IT system is not user-friendly and a lot of time has been devoted to developing
governmentsanctioned 'work-arounds' to make the system fit the policy. CDP
staff become swamped with the demands of the IT system, which prevents them
from engaging with clients and other community members and stakeholders. We
also must remember we are talking about clients with English as a second or
third language, who have difficulty with the language and terminology of the
system.[5]
5.6
The most
significant implication of a provider's resources being diverted into
administrative tasks is that this distracts providers from working on improving
the job-readiness of participants:
The employment consultants who currently spend hours on data entry
each day could be utilising that time to provide a better service to clients,
including facilitating job placement, providing more post placement support,
etc.[6]
5.7
The primary
reason why so much of the provider's energies are devoted to administrative
processes around attendance is that a CDP provider is funded based on
attendance rather than a set value amount based on the number of participants
in a particular location.[7]
Limited local
decision-making
5.8
Submitters
also gave evidence that the CDP was structured and operated in a manner which
undermined local decision-making capability and opportunities.
5.9
In a recent
paper, Dr Kirrily Jordan stated that the CDP has impeded the capacity of
providers to make decisions at a community level:
For some
[providers], the implementation of CDP has corroded their organisational
standing, compromising their ability to act in accordance with community
interests...the ability to make decisions about how to best maximise participation...in
their communities has been taken out of their hands.[8]
5.10
As a
consequence of the funding incentives, some witnesses argued that providers are
not incentivised to facilitate people moving from the CDP into permanent work.
The Mayor of Palm Island Aboriginal Shire Council, Councillor Alf Lacey,
repeated anecdotal evidence from his constituents to the committee:
We hear
consistent concern, raised along the lines of: 'The provider's all about
numbers and would prefer to keep people on their books rather than see them get
work, as it means more money for them.' True or not, this is the perception.[9]
5.11
CDP providers
are encouraged, through contractual arrangements, to report non-attendance and
trigger penalties even if they do not believe it is in the participants' best
interests.[10]
The provider is only paid CDP service fees if they report non-attendance to
DHS.[11]
The committee were told
that 'if something goes wrong, if someone has a car accident—if their car
breaks down—then they're in breach if they don't turn up'.[12]
This lack of
flexibility has been discussed in earlier chapters.
5.12
Jordan and
Fowkes noted that the implementation of CDP brought about greater
centralisation of control, with providers serving as the 'delivery arm of
government'. [13]
5.13
In his
submission to the inquiry, Mr Peter Strachan argued that current CDP provider
processes are micromanaged and inflexible and that the emphasis on compliance
and contract management means there is minimal scope to 'genuinely engage with
participants and their community'.[14]
5.14
Jobs
Australia also noted that the decision to roll the Community Development Fund
(CDF) into the Indigenous Advancement Strategy (IAS) has reduced the focus on
employment, participation and community development opportunities identified locally,
and shifted decision making about funding priorities to the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). Locally-identified employment and
community development opportunities were previously negotiated by Remote Jobs
and Communities Program (RJCP) providers with their communities and set out in
Community Action Plans.[15]
Lack
of community involvement
5.15
Earlier in
the chapter, the committee discussed the increase in administrative burden. In
a joint submission, former Federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs Mr Fred
Chaney and former Indigenous Affairs public servant Mr Bill Gray noted 'that
providers are swamped with the demands of the IT system which prevents them
from engaging productively with participants at a local level in any meaningful
way'.[16]
5.16
One witness
highlighted excessive "red tape" as the key impediment to local
decision-making:
Anecdotal
evidence suggests that because so much emphasis is placed on compliance and
contract management/administration, there is minimal scope to genuinely engage
with participants and their community to determine priorities, despite the
Minister's claim in 2016 the programme is "flexible and focussed on local
decision making and local solutions". Daily input of attendance and other
activity is essential for financial viability and non-compliance sanctions are
just as severe for the providers as they are for CDP participants.
Accountability for the use of public funding is fully understood and accepted
but the current CDP processes are micromanaged, inflexible and
counterproductive to the aspirations and needs of Indigenous people.[17]
5.17
Many
communities and individuals feel disempowered by the CDP process, stemming from
the lack of consultation during development and changes to policy as described
in Chapter 2. As Dr Kirrily Jordan noted, this disempowerment leads to an
increase in social problems within communities:
Some
people in communities said to me that there are social problems in their
communities, but people, who, for example, may not be turning up for their
work-for-the-dole requirements or drinking et cetera, have a lot of skills and
abilities to offer, but they've come to the point where they've given up or
they're fed up, disempowered and alienated by the process. If you engaged in
consultation with them in a proper way—you went and sat down with people over
the course of a few days and got to know them and got a bit of trust and
engaged them in the policy process that way—then people could engage and could
have a lot to offer. Whereas at the moment the approach is based on
punishment—punishing people to change their behaviour—and it just doesn't work.[18]
5.18
The Mayor of
Palm Island Aboriginal Shire Council, Councillor Alf Lacey relayed widespread
concerns around interactions between providers and the broader community:
The
provider does not know the community, so the efforts are so often misdirected.
Sometimes they do not even have an office open in the community, so what is the
point? That has been reported on a number of occasions...it's a common perception
from the 17 Indigenous shire[s] in Queensland.[19]
5.19
In some
cases, local community organisations are not being engaged or contacted by
providers until after the provider has won the contract when 'they need a
building' and want some land 'to roll out a program'.[20]
There is a view that current providers are not part of the local community and
have replaced other organisations that may have a more in-depth knowledge and
affinity with the local community. As Mayor Lacey explained:
There
have been cases where providers with good records were replaced by providers
who we can only assume are very adept at writing tenders. It would seem that a
paper-based assessment by a person based down south who has little
understanding of community is the preferred methodology for awarding these very
important contracts. And it seems that regardless of performance the community
has no resources but to put up with that provider until such time as the
contract expires. There must be a better way, where prior and local knowledge around
suppliers and services play some part in the awarding of contracts. Moreover,
contracts must have an opt-out clause where performance does not meet
expectation.[21]
5.20
Ms Rachel
Atkinson, Chief Executive Officer of the Palm Island Community Company raised
another issue which can impede relations between a provider and a community by
noting the 'massive turnover of staff—we'd think we were getting somewhere and
new staff would come on'.[22]
5.21
Witnesses
submitted that when CDP was implemented, funding for regional or community
scale planning processes that was present in RJCP was removed.[23]
Removal of this funding has further entrenched the lack of community
involvement and ownership within the CDP creating significant barriers between
providers and local communities. In
evidence to the committee, Dr Lisa Fowkes, Research Scholar at the Australian
National University noted that the 'funding bucket' for community development
available under the RJCP was amalgamated into the IAS:
When the
RJCP was established, it had a funding bucket that was to deliver the main
program and it had a $234 million community development program. That was
essentially the job creation, economic development side of the package. That
budget allocation was rolled into the Indigenous Advancement Strategy, and I
understand that that occurred for the 2014-15 financial year. So that no longer
exists...That $234 million bucket was there for development, and that's what was
rolled into the IAS.[24]
5.22
Councillor
Lyn McLaughlin, Mayor of Burdekin Shire Council pointed out this breakdown in
communication does not make sense from a strategic standpoint:
In my
previous job, I was chair of the Queensland Local Government Grants Commission
and I visited a lot of the Indigenous councils. What Mayor Lacey talks about is
true; that if you have the CDP separated from the council, sometimes the
projects that this group are delivering aren't in that strategic plan for this
group. We visited most of them, and we didn't go to a couple because they had
sorry business at the time, and when we asked about some infrastructure, they
would say that would be the CDP—which has that disconnect.[25]
Co-ordination
and classification issues
5.23
The lack of
integration between the Department of Human Services (Centrelink) and PM&C
creates confusion on the ground, as well as a lack of coordination of approach
between the identification of job opportunities and training required.[26]
In its submission, Uniting Communities described this issue:
It would
appear that there is not a joint or integrated approach to identifying what
jobs are needed across a community and the requisite training or skills-set
available to execute these jobs. There are, in some cases, a number of training
courses provided in the absence of the development of a practical continuum of
employment demand. Training for training sake is frequently undertaken, without
necessarily giving attention to the jobs that trainees can then feed into. All
too often service providers, training organisations and training facilities do
not sufficiently link-up or co-ordinate their efforts.[27]
5.24
Concerns
around classification of regions as remote or non-remote were also raised.
Broome is classified as a non-remote town (and therefore not eligible for CDP),
while larger WA centres like Geraldton, Kalgoorlie, Port Hedland and Karratha
are classified as remote for CDP purposes. This seems to be an anomaly, given
that Broome is a small town with a seasonal tourism industry and a significant
Aboriginal population.[28]
Difficulty in assessing
employment outcomes
5.25
The committee
has received evidence from submitters and witnesses highlighting a number of
issues with the assessment of employment outcomes under the CDP.
5.26
Jobs
Australia argued that comparative employment outcomes under CDP are difficult
to assess because, prior to the implementation of CDP, providers were not
required to record attendance in the IT system, so there is no publicly
available comparative data on the 26-week outcomes under RJCP and CDP. Jobs
Australia claimed that:
In remote
areas, long-term full time work is scarce while short term seasonal and
contract work often provides the best opportunities for employment. The change
to CDP made it harder for providers to achieve employment outcomes.[29]
5.27
In 2013, the Department
of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) released a draft Performance Management Framework (PMF) and invited written
submissions. The framework sought to assess RJCP provider performance on a
nationally consistent basis while providing flexibility for different labour markets,
levels of disadvantage, geographic size of regions and community priorities in
remote regions.[30]
5.28
Also, in
2013, a change in administrative arrangements led to a shift in policy
responsibility for this work to PM&C and the replacement of the PMF with a
draft Remote Employment Programme Delivery Framework (REPDF) which was formally
released as Programme Management Framework. The key differences were that:
-
Regional Employment
Targets would not be individually negotiated with providers;
-
Job placement
measures and seven- and 13-week outcomes were abolished; and
-
A strong
focus on measuring new full-time Work for the Dole attendance was introduced.[31]
5.29
The REPDF was
formally adopted with these principles and when released as a final framework
was called the Programme Management Framework.[32]
5.30
According to
Jobs Australia, the new REPDF moved the focus away from building relationships
with participants, communities and employers and towards transactions that can
be measured and quantified.[33]
Jobs Australia explained:
The
Regional Employment Targets (RETS) have a major impact on the measurement of
provider performance under the PMF, but many providers report that they are
often unrealistic and unachievable. The processes for determining the targets
are centralised in Canberra and are not transparent. The RETS do not reflect
historical performance and local labour market issues and opportunities. They
have not been set and made available to providers prior to each related
performance period, undermining their capacity to achieve them. Most providers
are judged to be underperforming. Almost every provider is on a Performance
Improvement Plan (PIP) because they haven't achieved a satisfactory overall
rating, supporting the contention that the RETs are set too high.[34]
5.31
Many
providers have also reported confusion over how Work for the Dole activity
payments are calculated and linked to performance.[35]
This is compounded by an IT system that is not coping with the upsurge in
recording attendance and reporting participation, and loss of trust in the data
used as a the basis for payments because of discrepancies between reports used
by providers and those used by PM&C to calculate payments.[36]
Evaluation
of the effectiveness of CDP
5.32
In addition
to providers indicating that the performance framework is unclear, the
committee has heard that the absence of transparent data-sets across the
program makes it difficult for local communities to draw any real conclusions
on the success or otherwise of the CDP.
5.33
Councillor Lacey
put forward his view that it is nearly impossible to assess performance at a
local level as the providers 'are not forthcoming with meaningful information
about their progress, and the [PM&C] rarely will provide us with
information and data'. Councillor Lacey added:
The
challenge with all of these programs is whether the practice matches the
rhetoric. Does the investment in these programs deliver an appropriate return?
How much of the money actually is spent on the ground in communities, directly
benefiting Indigenous people, and how much money goes into overheads of
companies and profits where the money is spent in other economies? How do we
measure the return? Is it the number of people registered with CDP providers?
Or is it the number of people who are successful in proceeding through the
program and have meaningful and sustainable employment afterwards? These are
the questions that we always ask when we examine these programs, and rarely;
actually, never, do we get the answer in a manner that allows us to offer genuine,
evidence-based comments and feedback to government.[37]
5.34
The committee
has received very limited information that would assist in drawing conclusions
on the effectiveness of the CDP. The committee also understands that there is
no publicly available information detailing the funding arrangements and
activities of individual providers.
5.35
In a response
to a question on notice, Campbell Page (the local CDP provider on Palm Island)
informed the committee that 30 outcomes for sustained employment beyond 26 week
outcomes were achieved for the six-month period from April to September 2017.
Of these, five people gained formal qualifications including two concreting
traineeships, one sewerage and water treatment traineeship, and two paramedic
cadets.[38]
The 30 employment outcomes were drawn from a pool of 490 CDP participants—a
placement rate of about six per cent.[39]
Campbell Page also noted that it has placed 239 people in sustained employment
beyond 26 weeks since the inception of the CDP on 1 July 2015.[40]
In comparison, Mr Hobday noted that RISE Ventures (a provider for multiple
regions in northern Queensland) delivered 12.5 per cent of CDP job placements
(1 937 job placements) despite only holding 7.5 per cent of the CDP caseload
since the commencement of the CDP.[41]
My Pathway noted that it placed 19.4 per cent of all 26 week placements from
12.6 percent of participants since the CDP began.[42]
5.36
Dr Cassandra
Goldie, CEO of the Australian Council of Social Services outlined the
deficiency in the government's approach to describe the effectiveness of the
CDP:
The
government emphasises the number of people involved in 'activities'. There is
much less emphasis on the communities' or the local provider's experience of
this program, of any sense of how meaningful these activities are either to the
person participating in the program or to the community, and how much time and
energy is devoted to propping up to administering this damaging system.
Employment outcomes have been listed—12,000 have found jobs since July 2015.
But unless it's compared with the number of participants over two years or,
better still, the number who have found jobs without the program, it doesn't
mean much. These questions are fundamental to employment program evaluation.[43]
5.37
Dr Goldie
also offered her view that the effectiveness of the CDP in improving employment
outcomes is negligible:
We know
that evaluations of programs like Work for the Dole that make work schemes such
as this are well removed from regular paid employment and from employers, and
that, with these features, they have little or no impact on people's employment
prospects. With the Work for the Dole program, the evaluation shows that it
barely touches the employment outcomes that [lead] to a two per cent increase
in the probability of employment in a more regular labour market environment.
Where such a scheme is rolled out on a large scale in remote communities and
participation is ongoing, it is all the more likely to lock people out of
regular paid employment opportunities that may be available, because it's
almost impossible to design and sustain meaningful activities on that scale
that are connected to the real paid employment opportunities that may be
available. [44]
5.38
Councillor
Lacey recommended that local communities should have a greater say in how Australian
Government funds provided through the CDP are spent in the community, with
local councils providing oversight of the providers activities:
I would
encourage the committee to demand the program...includ[e] a reporting regime
determined by government, with the prior approval of communities—which these companies
are funded to service. Council would be an ideal organisation to sign off on
such a reporting regime, which would include providing regular prescribed
reports to government as well as to the community.[45]
5.39
Councillor
Lacey also offered his view that more transparency was required about how Australian
Government funds are expended in local communities:
Too
often, the public are informed of the millions of dollars invested in our
people. They should also be told just how much of this money actually reaches
our people, and what the results of that investment are.[46]
Impediments to
employment
Government
procurement policies
5.40
The poor
implementation of government procurement policies in remote communities and its
role in perpetuating joblessness in these communities has already been
discussed in Chapter 2. It is also important to acknowledge the role that these
policies play in impeding providers from placing remote jobseekers in
employment.
5.41
According to
the Tangentyere Council Aboriginal Corporation, the Northern Territory's
Department of Housing and Community Development procurement processes have resulted
in a proliferation of for-profit companies being responsible for service
delivery in remote communities, employing a 'drive in and drive out' approach
that does not provide any meaningful employment outcomes or support for
vulnerable communities.[47]
In their submission, Mr Fred Chaney and Mr Bill Gray provided an example of the
'drive in and drive out' procurement culture:
Present
government approaches, involving contracting out to external agencies and
reduced funding to Aboriginal corporations, result in the essential and
meaningful tasks in communities being done by non-Aboriginal visitors. The
recent example of the ten-year housing maintenance contract for remote
communities in Western Australia being let to a company in Queensland inflating
costs and leading to massive travel costs as against actual maintenance while
at the same time depriving locals of work, is an extreme but not atypical way
in which employment possibilities in remote communities are destroyed by
government approaches in the name of mythical efficiencies.[48]
Lack
of training and start-up funding allocated under CDP
5.42
The committee
were told that there is very limited funding made available as part of the CDP
to provide for certified training or start-up capital to encourage the creation
of businesses.[49]
In a response to a question taken on notice, Campbell Page stated that the
delivery of 'formal accredited training for our job seekers' is 'funded by
either Campbell Page or state government (or a blend of both)' rather than
through the CDP.[50]
5.43
At the
committee's Townsville hearing, Mr Hobday noted that there is also no funding
available for projects to put people into work or to start their own businesses:
There are
opportunities, but there is a complete lack of funding to do so. There is a
complete lack of business mentorship and knowledge and understanding. I will
give you an example: if someone wanted to start a lawn-mowing business in any
of our communities, we would probably go out and buy the lawnmowers for them.
But we would also provide them with the assistance to get their ABN or to run
their business or to market it.[51]
5.44
The committee
were also told that there are many other unfunded job-seeker costs which are
impediments to individuals and job providers placing CDP participants in work:
...the lack
of access to funds for critical tools to assist people get jobs, like wage
subsidies and training; the lack of transport reallocation or relocation
assistance to assist participants to seek employment away from their community. [52]
5.45
Notwithstanding
this, the committee did hear some positive stories from providers in relation
to small-business initiatives that were being implemented outside the CDP,
often self-funded and initiated by providers such as the 'small business hub'.[53]
Mr Sotir Kondov, Interim CEO of Campbell Page (the provider for Palm Island)
explained:
We have a
very community led approach in that we look at, assess and understand, talking
to elders and others, what is needed on the island. We identified that the
small-business hub was an opportunity for locals who would like to create a
business but just don't have the means, the knowledge or the capacity to do so.
Through those mechanisms, we look at ways to go beyond just the program.[54]
Indigenous
Advancement Strategy
5.46
At its
Canberra hearing, Mr Andrew Tongue, Associate Secretary for Indigenous Affairs
at PM&C told the committee that applications can be made to the IAS to fund
a variety of needs within remote communities including infrastructure.[55]
5.47
Further to
this, PM&C informed the committee that the Minister was seeking to expand
the role of the IAS by funding CDP providers in the future through the IAS.[56]
Mr Hans Bokelund, CEO of the Goldfields Land and Sea Council was supportive of
this approach which would recognise, for some remote communities, that the IAS
would be the most appropriate source of funding for 'a social Aboriginal
assistance program' in areas where there are serious challenges to job creation.[57]
5.48
Despite this
evidence, some providers expressed their frustration at the application process
to access funds from the IAS. Mr Hobday explained that providers are encouraged
to apply for funding through the IAS for projects that may assist a community;
however, the fate of the applications lodged is unclear:
We are
encouraged to make grant applications to the Indigenous Advancement Strategy
for projects locally. For some of those projects we've put in submissions for,
we have never received a reply at all. These can be projects such as power,
solar power and renewable energy projects in Kowanyama and Pormpuraaw. We've
put in two applications for the same one and still not received a reply. The
length of time it takes when it gets lodged and it gets stuck is at various
levels, but I would have to say there is an issue there.[58]
Work
experience
5.49
Some
witnesses pointed out that one of the problems with the CDP is that it is not
flexible enough to allow people to trial employment through work experience. If
a person finds that a particular job does not suit their interests or
experiences, there is no flexibility for them to voluntarily leave that job
placement and seek a more appropriate placement without incurring a fine. Mr
Graeme Hastie, CDP Case Manager and Co-ordinator at Kullari Regional
Communities Indigenous Corporation explained:
There is
a reason that we do the work experience—and this goes to one of the problems
with the CDP when it comes to employment. When a young person says, 'Graeme, I
don't really know what I want to do,' I say, 'Well, have a crack at something
and, if you don't like it, cross it off.' But, if they have a go at something
and they don't like it and they leave, they get penalised for two months,
because they've voluntarily left their employment. How does that encourage
people to try different employment opportunities?[59]
Uncertainty about the
future
5.50
The committee
understands that the current CDP funding arrangements between the Commonwealth
and the providers 'expire in June 2018'.[60]
Mr Hobday, told the committee that many providers are unsure of arrangements
beyond that date, even though it is less than seven months away:
None of
us in this provider group know what is going to happen from 1 July, so we
are all living in limbo. We can't invest. We can't look at long-term projects.
We cannot do anything at this point in time. No-one has heard from the minister
for a number of months. Substantial change is proposed. We are now into
October. We have major reviews by this committee, by the ANAO and by the
department itself. We are under constant and consistent review status. In terms
of what we are going to do in the future, can I say a lot of us are just
getting on with the day-to-day job. When it comes to planning for longer term
solutions and longer term contracts, we have to wait for the government.[61]
5.51
Furthermore,
providers have not heard from the Minister and PM&C since July 2017 about possible
reforms to the program or when tendering for contract renewal might commence.
Mr Hobday explained:
We were
invited to a meeting in July [2017] in Canberra for the purpose of being asked
what we think about the changes that were announced by the minister at a
conference in Cairns. That's the only consultation we've had. We do believe
that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has been trying to keep
us as up to date as possible and we certainly don't have a problem with our
relationship with the department, but it has gone into a period of 'no comment'
type of stuff.[62]
5.52
Mr Hobday
advocated about the need for certainty for providers, and for individuals and
communities. Under current funding arrangements, there is an 'inability of CDP
providers to invest in long-term solutions and programs due to [a] lack of
funding being available'.[63]
5.53
Some
witnesses argued that in order for providers to invest in long-term solutions,
there is a requirement for government to 'provide a stable platform for
providers to operate' including 'a five-year contract period and minimal
changes throughout that period'.[64]
Councillor Lacey spoke about the necessity for even longer funding cycles of up
to 10 years:
Let's
take the government at its face value and say, 'We want you to invest in an
employment program in our community, but don't invest on a three or four yearly
cycle. Invest in a 10-year cycle so that we can see if we can get some really
better results and put our mob in a better position than what they are
currently in at the moment.' With the short-term investment, one provider had
it four years ago; another provider then gets awarded it for the following four
years. The community has to re-educate the new providers every time there is a
new provider.[65]
5.54
Councillor
Lacey added his view that local councils would be well-placed to deliver CDP
services as one way of overcoming the detrimental effects of provider and staff
turnover in remote communities. The issue of limited community involvement was also
discussed earlier in this chapter.
Committee view
5.55
The committee
is concerned that the CDP establishes incentives for providers that are
misaligned with the needs of individuals and their communities. In particular,
the committee is disturbed by the program's focus incentivising providers to
focus on attendance compliance and contract management instead of helping
participants to become job-ready and assisting communities to develop. The
concomitant increase in administrative burden means that even well intentioned
providers are forced to divert their resources from equipping and placing
jobseekers in employment.
5.56
The committee
considers that any future program must streamline or discard elements that
focus on punishing participants instead of promoting community development and improving
their job-readiness. There is a need for local communities to be involved in
determining their own community development goals.
5.57
A consistent
theme heard throughout the inquiry has been that the CDP does not encourage the
involvement of the local community or consider its views. Part of this stems
from the government's lack of consultation prior to, and throughout the life of
the CDP. It is clear to the committee that the lack of community involvement in
the development of the CDP has led to many of the problems outlined in this,
and the previous chapter. The committee has earlier expressed its view that the
lack of consultation is not an appropriate way to develop government policy or
to amend existing government programs. Future policy development in this area must
have consultation at its heart with this consultation being funded as an
on-going component of any future program.
5.58
The committee
understands that there are no publicly available figures on the performance of
CDP providers and how much CDP providers are paid to progress jobseekers into
employment. The committee is grateful to two job providers who have voluntarily
shared some of their job placement data with the committee. These numbers
provide a starting point for the committee to consider the effectiveness of the
program; however, in the absence of comparative figures from other providers
and average placement numbers across the scheme, it is difficult to ascertain the
effectiveness of the CDP. The committee agrees that there needs to be an
increased level of transparency around the level of funding being paid to
providers, how much of that funding is reaching the local community, and the
number of jobs being created as a result of that spending.
5.59
The committee
has heard about the impediments that providers face when assisting participants
to find employment in remote communities. The haphazard approach to Indigenous
employment targets within government contracts concerns the committee. It is
the committee view that government procurement in remote areas represents a
unique opportunity to stimulate economic activity in remote communities when contractors
are obliged to employ local workers. Evidence in this chapter and earlier
chapters has shown that better co-ordination of government projects will lead
to increased and sustained employment in remote communities.
5.60
The committee
notes that the CDP's lack of funding for training and business development
works against the CDP's objective to place participants into long-term employment.
The committee agrees that funding for training should be made available as part
of any employment program to ensure that participants are equipped to meet the
requirements of employers. Equally, start-up funding will empower participants
to transform activities undertaken as part of an employment program—or indeed,
their own ideas and aspirations—into sustainable businesses providing essential
services and economic activity in remote locations.
5.61
The committee
notes that current CDP funding arrangements expire in mid‑2018, less than
seven months away. Many witnesses noted that there has been little
communication from the Minister or PM&C about the future of the CDP. The
committee finds this very troubling for a number of reasons. First, it appears
the Minister is repeating the poor community and stakeholder consultation that
have characterised the current CDP. Second, the limited period of time before
contracts expire mean that if there are changes to the CDP, there is only
limited time for providers and communities to engage with the Minister and
PM&C in a consultation process. Third, the uncertainty of whether the CDP
will change or remain the same will fuel more distrust between communities,
providers and PM&C. Finally, capability within CDP providers is eroded as
provider's employees seek job security elsewhere. The committee are concerned
to hear about the difficulties that some providers have had in applying to the
IAS. This concern is compounded by the Minister's future intention to fund CDP
provider's from the IAS. It is the committee view that the Minister needs to
urgently indicate his intended proposed reforms to CDP, and to then engage in a
genuine consultation process with stakeholders.
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