Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1
On 20 March 2002 the Senate referred to its
Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee (the Committee) the Workplace Relations Amendment (Fair Dismissal)
Bill 2002. The provisions of the Workplace
Relations Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002, the
Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002,
the Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002 and the
Workplace Relations Amendment (Fair Termination) Bill 2002 were also referred
to the Committee. All bills propose amendments to the Workplace Relations
Act 1996 (the Act).
1.2
The Workplace
Relations Amendment (Fair Dismissal) Bill 2002 was introduced into the Senate
on 11 March 2002 after being agreed to in the House of Representatives. The
remaining bills were introduced into the House of Representatives on 20 March
2002 with debate adjourned on the same day.
1.3
The Committee received 30 submissions in
relation to the bills and held public hearings on 2 and 3 May 2002 in
Melbourne. A list of submissions and hearing witnesses are to be found in
appendices to the report.
Background to the Bills
1.4
The Act provides the framework for
Australia’s current workplace relations system and retains and builds on
features of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993. A major change
that was introduced in the 1993 Act was a shift from a compulsory arbitration
system that disallowed strikes, to an enterprise bargaining system that made
strikes lawful provided they were taken to win an enterprise agreement.
1.5
The Act retains and reinforces the primacy of
the workplace and the individual enterprise in negotiating conditions of
employment. The principal object of this Act is to provide a framework for
cooperative workplace relations which promotes the economic prosperity and
welfare of the people of Australia by:
- encouraging the pursuit of high employment, improved living
standards, low inflation and international competitiveness through higher
productivity and a flexible and fair labour market; and
- protecting the competitive position of young people in the
labour market, promoting youth employment, youth skills and community standards
and assisting in reducing youth unemployment; and
- ensuring that the primary responsibility for determining
matters affecting the relationship between employers and employees rests with
the employer and employees at the workplace or enterprise level; and
- enabling employers and employees to choose the most
appropriate form of agreement for their particular circumstances, whether or
not that form is provided for by this Act; and
- providing the means:
- for wages and conditions of
employment to be determined as far as possible by the agreement of employers
and employees at the workplace or enterprise level, upon a foundation of
minimum standards; and
- to ensure the maintenance of an
effective award safety net of fair and enforceable minimum wages and conditions
of employment; and
- providing a framework of rights and responsibilities for employers
and employees, and their organisations, which supports fair and effective
agreement-making and ensures that they abide by awards and agreements
applying to them; and
- ensuring freedom of association, including the rights of employees and
employers to join an organisation or association of their choice, or not to
join an organisation or association; and
- ensuring that employee and employer organisations registered under this
Act are representative of and accountable to their members, and are able to
operate effectively; and
- enabling the Commission to prevent and settle industrial
disputes as far as possible by conciliation and, where appropriate and within
specified limits, by arbitration; and
- assisting employees to balance their work and family
responsibilities effectively through the development of mutually beneficial
work practices with employers; and
- respecting and valuing the diversity of the work force by
helping to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex,
sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family
responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction
or social origin; and
- assisting in giving effect to Australia’s international
obligations in relation to labour standards.”[1]
1.6
The second Howard Government identified the need
for further evolutionary changes to the workplaces relations system to build on
the reforms of 1996. On 30 June 1999 it introduced the Workplace Relations
Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999 (the MOJO Bill) to
achieve that objective. Measures contained in the MOJO Bill included a
prohibition on pattern bargaining, the introduction of secret ballots for
protected action and an exemption for small business from the provisions of
unfair dismissal law. The MOJO Bill did not pass the Senate.
1.7
A series of bills designed to implement some of
the specific proposals contained in the MOJO Bill were introduced during 2000
and 2001. These included bills to require secret ballots for protected action,
prevent protected industrial action in the case of pattern bargaining and to
exempt small business from the operation of the unfair dismissal provisions.
Those proposals also failed to pass the Senate, although a small number of
other amendments to the Act were passed.
1.8
In its election 2001 policy statement “Putting
Australia’s Interest First; More Jobs, Better Future,” the Coalition identified
a flexible and productive workplace relations system as one of the six pillars
of its employment action plan. Each of the five bills referred to the Committee
are designed to give effect to this commitment and to promote more employment
opportunities through a workplace system based on enterprise bargaining and
freedom of choice.
Background to the Bills and
Summary of Provisions
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Fair Dismissal) Bill 2002
1.9
This is not the first proposal to remove small
business from the federal unfair dismissal jurisdiction. Since March 1994 there
have been many attempts to wind back the scope of the federal unfair dismissal
laws, with most proposals defeated and all attempts to enact a specific small
business exemption rejected. This Committee has considered the proposal to
exempt small businesses from the unfair jurisdiction on four occasions and this
issue has been dealt with in great detail in previous Committee reports. This report will therefore not revisit all of the issues
relating to unfair dismissal.
1.10
The unfair dismissal
provisions in the Act essentially make provisions for employees who are subject
to the provisions to seek redress through the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (the Commission) if their dismissal is unfair (that is harsh, unjust
or unreasonable). The ‘fairness’ of a dismissal relates not only to the grounds
or merits of the decision to dismiss, but also the process followed. Some
employees who would otherwise come under the Commonwealth jurisdiction are
exempt from the unfair dismissal provisions, either because they are not, for
example, employed by an incorporated company or because they are in a class of
employees specifically exempted, such as employees on fixed term contracts.
1.11
The Act also provides for
redress against unlawful dismissal (that is, on prohibited grounds such as
discrimination on the basis of race, religion and so on). Claims in relation to
unlawful dismissal are relatively few in comparison with claims in relation to
unfair dismissal.
1.12
The aim of this bill is to protect small
businesses from unfair dismissal claims by excluding small business employees,
other than apprentices and trainees, from access to remedies for harsh, unjust
or unreasonable termination of employment. A small business employee would
still be entitled to apply to the Commission for redress where the termination
has been unlawful. The bill applies only to employees who commence employment
in a small business after the bill becomes law. Employees working in small
businesses before the bill is passed would retain access to unfair dismissal
remedies.
1.13
This bill largely reflects measures that were
contained in the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment (Small
Business and Other Measures) Bill 2001. That bill was introduced but not
considered before parliament was prorogued for the election. The bill differs
in some significant respects from the Workplace Relations (Unfair Dismissals)
Bill 1998, which was considered by this Committee in late 1998 and early 1999.
The main differences between the 1998 bill and the current bill are, firstly,
that the definition of small business has been changed to refer to businesses
with fewer than 20 employees. The 1998 bill would have excluded from the
operation of the unfair dismissals provisions those employees working in a
business with 15 or fewer employees.
1.14
The second major difference is that the current
bill establishes a process to allow the Commission to deal with the
jurisdictional issue of whether the employer is a small business as defined by
the Act; the Commission would have the discretion to determine this issue
without a hearing.
1.15
This bill is intended to ensure that unfair
dismissal laws do not unreasonably burden employers when making decisions to
employ or dismiss staff.
The
Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002
1.16
The Act promotes the principles of
freedom of association and freedom of choice. It ensures that employers,
employees and independent contractors are free to join, or not to join, an
industrial association of their choice and are also protected from victimisation
and discrimination regardless of that choice.
1.17
The Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition
of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002 arises out of a need to address attempts by
some unions to require non union members to pay for union activities through
the imposition of bargaining service fees. The Committee previously considered
a similar issue in the Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory
Union Fees) Bill 2001. Although this Committee recommended that bill to the
Senate last year, the bill was not agreed to, with debate being adjourned on 6
August 2001. A more detailed analysis of the circumstances leading up to the
bill’s introduction into the parliament last year can be found in the
Committee’s report on that bill.
1.18
The use of bargaining fees in certified
agreements has been the subject of recent legal challenge. In 2000 the
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Congress endorsed a policy allowing
for the imposition of bargaining fees on non-union members for union services
in the negotiation of certified agreements. Seeing the use of bargaining fees
as a de-facto compulsory union fee, the Employment Advocate (EA) intervened in
the certification process of a number of agreements negotiated by the
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing
and Allied Services Union. The EA’s objection in this mater was eventually
brought before the Commission and heard by Vice President McIntyre. His honour
found that bargaining fee clauses did not contradict the strict letter of the
freedom of association provisions in the Act. This was despite their
acknowledged coercive intent.
In my opinion, it (the bargaining fee) is there to
persuade new employees to join, or to coerce new employees into joining, the
ETU. The minimum fee of $500 is substantially more than the ETU membership
fee. Further there is little doubt, I think, that the ETU would waive the fee
in respect of persons who are or become members. The obligation to pay the fee
is therefore unlikely to be required by the ETU of anyone who is a member of
the ETU.[2]
1.19
A subsequent judgement of the Federal Court in
November 2001 held that a bargaining service fee clause was not a matter
pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees.[3] This decision reiterates the
view that bargaining fee clauses in certified agreements do not provide a basis
on which unions can legally compel non members to pay such fees. Despite this
judgement, the Government considers that the continued presence of bargaining
fee clauses in certified agreements, including those negotiated before the
Federal court decision, lends them unwarranted legitimacy.
1.20
The bill is consistent with the Federal Court
decision in 2001 (which is now subject to appeal in the Full Court). It differs
from the previous bill in a number of significant respects. Unlike the previous
bill it focuses on conduct that is aimed at forcing people to pay bargaining
services fees rather than on regulating the circumstances in which fees could
be paid. It operates more directly to make it clear that bargaining services
fee clauses in certified agreements are void and provides a mechanism for their
removal. It also includes a power to expressly prevent the Commission from
certifying an agreement, or amending an existing agreement, that contains a
bargaining fee clause.[4]
Workplace
Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002
1.21
This bill requires a secret ballot to be held
prior to the taking or organising of protected industrial action. The Commission
must oversee the ballot process.
1.22
The introduction of secret ballots as a
precondition for protected industrial action is designed to ensure that
employees who will be affected by protected industrial action are fully
consulted in the decision and that the decision is based on a democratic
process. The explanatory memorandum sets out the intent of the ballot
provisions:
The new provisions are intended to ensure that protected action
is not used as a substitute for genuine discussion during a bargaining period,
and to ensure that the final decision to take industrial action is made by the
employees concerned.[5]
1.23
The secret ballot provisions should be
considered in the context of the significant protection that attaches to
industrial action undertaken as a means of advancing claims when negotiating
enterprise agreements. Provided unions and employees comply with certain
procedural requirements (such as giving notice to the employer of proposed
industrial action) and are genuinely attempting to reach agreement on an
enterprise agreement, they gain immunity from most forms of civil liability
that may arise from industrial action. They are also protected from dismissal
or other penalties by the employer as a result of taking part in protected
action.[6]
1.24
The requirement for a secret ballot features in
several contexts in the workplace relations system. For example, before the
Commission can certify an agreement, it must be agreed to by a majority of
employees voting in a secret ballot. The Act requires that union officials be
elected through a secret ballot. It also provides the Commission with the power
to order a secret ballot as a means of assisting the settlement of an ongoing
industrial dispute.
1.25
The Department of Employment and Workplace
Relations (the Department), explains the policy rationale for the provisions in
this bill:
Current approval mechanisms for authorisation of industrial
action are left to the organisation’s rules, and so authorisation may occur at
the higher levels of the organisation without reference to the members who will
be directly affected. Such a process undermines the intention of the WR Act to
ensure that decisions in relation to agreement-making are made at the workplace
level. It does not guarantee that employees have the opportunity to
participate in the decision making process or, to the extent that they do
participate, that they do so freely.
Even in circumstances where members have the opportunity to vote
on proposed industrial action, there is no requirement for the ballot to be conducted
secretly, leaving open the possibility that members could be pressured into
voting in favour of industrial action.[7]
1.26
In outlining the value of the secret ballot
process, the Department quotes Professor Niland:
Concerns are frequently expressed regarding the need for secret
ballots, before industrial action is taken to ensure that members can exercise
a democratic right. The view is often expressed that the silent and timid
majority are outvoted by the industrially militant where open or no votes are
taken before industrial action.[8]
1.27
This bill requires that a secret ballot of union
members or employees be held as a precondition for protected industrial action.
The process requires a union representative or employee to apply to the
Commission for an order that a secret ballot be held. Before ordering a secret
ballot, the Commission would need to be satisfied that a bargaining period is
in place and the applicant is genuinely negotiating to reach an agreement.
1.28
The bill also sets out the procedural requirements
for secret ballots for protected action. These include that at least 40 per
cent of eligible voters participate in the ballot (the ‘quorum’) and that more
than 50 per cent of the votes cast are in favour of the proposed industrial
action.
1.29
This model differs from the previous models that
the Government has proposed in relation to secret ballots in the Workplace
Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999 and the
Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2000.
This Committee endorsed both those models. However minority reports raised a
number of objections, including that the process proposed was an unreasonable
impediment to lawful industrial action, contrary to International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and had would encourage unions to take more far-reaching
industrial action.
1.30
The Government has stated that this bill takes
account of reasonable concerns raised during previous inquiries and following
consultations with the International Labour Office . The ballot process
proposed in this bill is more streamlined and flexible than its predecessors.
In this bill, applicants are able to conduct their own ballots, attendance
ballots are allowed in place of postal ballots in specified circumstances and the
ballot question has been simplified so that only the nature of the proposed
industrial action need be specified and not the precise form and duration of
the action and the specific days on which it will occur.
1.31
The bill also contains protection against legal
challenges to the validity of a ballot. Further, whereas previous models
required that certified agreements had expired before a ballot could be
conducted, in this bill the ballot process can commence up to 30 days prior to
the expiry date of a certified agreement. This is intended to address concerns
about the delays that would occur in negotiating new agreements under previous
models.
1.32
The quorum requirement has also been reduced
from 50 per cent to 40 per cent of eligible members or employees.[9]
1.33
The Department’s submission summarises the
contrast between this bill and its predecessors:
It takes into account key concerns raised before this Committee
when considering the SBPA 2000 Bill. It also follows consultation with the
International Labour Office, with a view to ensuring that the underlying
elements of the model for secret ballots meet Australia’s international
obligations. A key element was to ensure that the model would not interfere
with the capacity of employees to access industrial action when there was
genuine support amongst employees for such action.
This approach has resulted in a more streamlined process for
applying for and conducting ballots and a more flexible approach to the framing
of the ballot question. The procedures enhance the opportunity for
participation by employees in the decision to take industrial action while
ensuring that the process is simple and quick and does not diminish the
capacity for employees to take legitimate industrial action.[10]
Workplace
Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002
1.34
This bill is designed to reinforce the emphasis
on enterprise bargaining in the Act.
1.35
Since the early 1990s there has been general
support for a move towards decentralised, enterprise – level bargaining. This
shift has been at both state and federal levels and endorsed by all political
parties. In its submission the Department writes:
Whilst differing approaches were advocated, the need to make
enterprise agreement-making part of the system was endorsed by both major
political parties, all major employer associations, the ACTU and the majority
of individual unions. The widespread acceptance of this need for change
reflected the fact that in the more competitive and open international economy
that emerged in the 1980s, the capacity for Australia to maximise its economic
growth, employment opportunities and living standards required a more flexible
labour market.[11]
1.36
The 1996 workplace relations reforms broadened
the range of agreement types available including agreements for both union and
non-union collective agreement making at the enterprise level as well as
individual Australian Workplace Agreements. The agreement-making framework put
in place by the Act was also underpinned by a compliance framework which
included protection for industrial action taken in support of claims in respect
of proposed (single business) agreements. The Act extended such protection to
action in relation to agreements reached directly with employees (in contrast
to the previous Enterprise Flexibility Agreements arrangements) and to
Australian Workplace Agreements. [12]
1.37
There are now more than 41,000 collective
agreements formalised in the federal system and over 1.3 million employees
covered by federal wage agreements. [13]
1.38
The second reading speech states:
In reforming the workplace relations system, the government has
ensured that Australia has workplace relations arrangements that sustain and
enhance our living standards, our jobs, our productivity and our international
competitiveness. The government has also promoted a more inclusive and
cooperative workplace system where employers and employees are able to make
agreements on wages, conditions and work and family responsibilities subject to
a safety net of minimum standards.
Australia's system of genuine workplace or enterprise level
bargaining has underpinned these achievements. The overwhelming majority of
Australian employees in the federal workplace relations system are now employed
under enterprise or workplace agreements—whether collective or individual.
Enterprise bargaining has produced benefits for both employees
and employers. Employees have gained better wages, more relevant conditions,
more jobs and greater workplace participation. At the same time, employers have
gained higher productivity, increased competitiveness and lower industrial
dispute levels.[14]
1.39
The Government has expressed concern that the
gains associated with enterprise bargaining are being placed at risk as a
result of attempts by some elements within the union movement to return to industry
level bargaining through a process known as pattern bargaining. Pattern
bargaining is a process whereby a negotiating party attempts to negotiate
across a range of workplaces but does not genuinely bargain at the enterprise
level.
1.40
This bill is the third attempt to reinforce the
principles of enterprise bargaining and ensure that access to protected
industrial action is limited to circumstances where there is genuine bargaining
at the enterprise level. The MOJO Bill and the Workplace Relations Amendment
Bill 2000 both attempted to restrict access to protected industrial action in
cases of pattern bargaining. This Committee’s reports on those bills provide
detailed discussion of the context and background of the bills. The Committee
majority argued in those reports for support for the bills in order to protect
and preserve the benefits of enterprise bargaining, including higher
productivity and improved wages and conditions.
1.41
The purpose of the Workplace Relations Amendment
(Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002 is to reinforce the statutory intent and
emphasis of the Act in relation to workplace bargaining and access to protected
action. The explanatory memorandum outlines the aim of the bill as being to:
- provide guidance to
the Commission when it is considering whether a party is not genuinely trying
to reach agreement with other negotiating parties, particularly in cases of
so-called ‘pattern-bargaining’;
- empower the
Commission to make orders preventing the initiation of a new bargaining period,
or attaching conditions to any such bargaining period, where a bargaining
period has been withdrawn; and
- empower the
Commission to order ‘cooling–off’ periods in respect of protected industrial
action where it believes this will facilitate resolution of the issues in
dispute.[15]
1.42
A major difference between this bill and its
predecessors is that in this bill the emphasis is on the conduct of the
negotiating parties at the workplace, rather on the pursuit of common claims
and common outcomes across an industry. Whereas the 2000 bill sought to
introduce new procedures specifically targeting pattern bargaining, this bill
seeks to build on the existing provisions in the Act requiring that negotiating
parties seeking the benefit of a bargaining period and access to protected
action are genuinely attempting to reach agreement. The bill would provide
guidance to the Commission when considering whether a negotiating party is not
genuinely trying to reach agreement with other negotiating parties. The
Commission will retain its discretion to suspend or terminate the bargaining
period where it concludes that the negotiating party is engaging in non-genuine
bargaining. Under the 2000 bill, in contrast, the termination of a bargaining
period was mandatory once the Commission was satisfied that a union was
engaging in pattern bargaining. [16]
1.43
The bill draws on a Commission ruling in October
2000 whereby Justice Munro[17]
set down some clear and practical rules for differentiating between legitimate
common claims that unions are entitled to pursue and unlawful industrial action
in pursuit of industry outcomes. It preserves the right of unions to make
common claims across an industry but requires those claims to be genuinely
negotiated at the enterprise level.
1.44
The bill would also provide the Commission with
a power to order a cooling off period in the case of a protracted dispute. The
second reading speech sets out the policy rationale for this proposal:
The government believes that cooling-off periods should be given
statutory recognition because of their potential to refocus negotiations.
Accordingly, this bill would give the Commission discretion to suspend a
bargaining period for a specified period, on application by a negotiating
party. [18]
1.45
Unlike in the 2000 bill, the Commission would
have a discretion to order a cooling- off period.
1.46
Finally, the bill would also prevent unions from
withdrawing from a bargaining period and then commencing a new bargaining
period in pursuit of the same claims, as a tactic to escape the jurisdiction of
the Commission. It is intended to address the misuse of bargaining periods that
occurred during Campaign 2000, an industry wide campaign by elements of the
manufacturing unions.
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Fair Termination) Bill 2002
1.47
This bill is the only one in the package that
contains matters not addressed in legislation previously considered by this
Committee. It is designed to deal with a matter that arose after the conclusion
of the last Parliament.
1.48
In November 2001, the Federal Court in the Hamzy
decision, ruled that regulations that excluded short-term casual from unfair
termination remedies were invalid, because they went further than the
regulation making power in the Act.[19]
The regulations found to be invalid had excluded casuals from accessing termination
of employment remedies unless they had been working for their employer on a
regular and systematic basis for at least twelve months and had a reasonable
expectation of continuing employment with the same employer.
1.49
A consequence of this decision is that casual
employees are able to bring an unfair dismissal claim against an employer
(unless they are subject to some other exclusion from the provisions, for
example during the 3-month probationary period). The Government expressed
concern that this decision would suddenly expose employers of many casual
employees to the risk of an unfair dismissal claim, contrary to their
understanding on engaging those employees, and create great uncertainty. On 6
December 2001, as an interim arrangement, the Government made new regulations
that would exclude certain short term casual employees from the unfair
dismissal provisions, to the extent allowable under the Act in light of the Hamzy
decision.
1.50
The regulations introduced on 6 December 2001
excluded those casual employees that were engaged by a particular employer for
a period of less than twelve months from the termination remedies under the
Act. This is narrower than the previous regulation because there is no
requirement that the casual employees must also have been employed on a regular
and systematic basis. It would not necessarily exclude those casual employees
who are on ‘lists’ of casuals held by employees and are engaged only
intermittently, perhaps for only several days or weeks, but who may have been
first engaged more than 12 months previously. It is also subject to a
disallowance motion.
1.51
In introducing this bill the Government has
stated that its purpose is to restore the casual exclusion that was in place
prior to the Hamzy decision. In light of Hamzy, the bill is also
designed to validate the invalid regulations so as to ensure that the rights
and liabilities of employers and employees are the same as they would have been
if the invalid regulations had been validly made.
1.52
The bill would also insert a new provision into
the Act requiring applicants seeking relief under federal termination laws to
lodge a $50 filing fee. The fee, which is currently provided for under
regulations, will be indexed annually in line with movements in the Consumer
Price Index. The Government considers that the filing fee is an important
mechanism to deter frivolous or vexatious unfair dismissal claims, and that
indexation of the fee is essential to ensure that it retains the deterrence
effect over time.
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