1. Introduction

Background to the inquiry

1.1Under section 8(1) of the legislation establishing the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (the Committee), the Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act 1951, one of the duties of the Committee is to ‘examine all reports of the Auditor-General (including reports of the results of performance audits) that are tabled in each House of the Parliament’. The Committee is empowered to ‘report to both Houses of the Parliament, with any comment it thinks fit, on any items or matters in those reports, or any circumstances connected with them, that the Committee thinks should be drawn to the attention of the Parliament’.

1.2On 27 June 2023, the Committee adopted an inquiry into probity and ethics in the Australian Public Sector, with a view to examining whether there are systemic factors contributing to poor ethical behaviour in government agencies, and identifying opportunities to strengthen government integrity and accountability.

1.3The inquiry was to have particular regard to any matters contained in or connected to the following Auditor-General Reports:

• Probity Management in Financial Regulators — Australian Prudential Regulation Authority[1]
• Probity Management in Financial Regulators — Australian Securities and Investments Commission[2]
• Probity Management in Financial Regulators — Australian Competition and Consumer Commission[3]
• Acquisition, Management and Leasing of Artworks by Artbank[4]
• Administration of the Community Health and Hospitals Program.[5]

Conduct of the inquiry

1.4The inquiry received 12 submissions (including one confidential submission), and 22 supplementary submissions containing responses to questions provided in writing by the Committee or taken on notice at public hearings. The Committee held four public hearings in Canberra and by videoconference on Friday, 8 September 2023, Monday, 20 November 2023, Thursday, 1 February 2024, and Tuesday, 12 March 2024.

1.5The list of submissions and supplementary submissions is at Appendix A. The public hearings are listed at Appendix B.

Approach to the report

1.6The five audit reports that formed the basis for this inquiry highlighted different aspects of probity and ethics in the Australian public sector:

• the Artbank report dealt with procurement practices in the broader context of program administration
• the report on the Community Health and Hospitals Program (CHHP) studied grant management
• the financial regulator reports examined probity management.
  7. This report deals in separate chapters (chapters 2 and 3) with procurement and grants, which involve an examination of aspects of the audit reports relating to Artbank and CHHP respectively. Chapter 4 examines integrity frameworks and the probity assurance practices of the five entities and discusses whether an integrity framework approach can provide the accountable authority with confidence that officers are acting with probity and ethically. Chapter 5 discusses culture and accountability. In the final chapter the Committee draws its conclusions and makes 10 recommendations.
  8. Ultimately, as will be discussed in chapter six, the Committee finds that the key to ensuring the public sector acts with probity and integrity is through the interrelationship of frameworks, culture and accountability, drawn together with the ‘golden thread’ of ethical leadership.

Public sector probity and ethics obligations

1.9This section discusses the broad probity obligations that apply to public sector officials. The obligation to act with probity and ethically is contained in the legislation that governs the functioning of the Australian public sector.

Definition

1.10Probity and ethics are closely linked ideas with definitions often explaining one in terms of the other such that probity is generally considered evidence of ethical behaviour. The entities during the inquiry also often referred to ‘integrity’ when speaking about probity (the issues that arise from this are taken up in chapters four and five). The terms have multiple definitions, including those provided by the Department of Finance and the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC).

1.11Establishing and maintaining probity, according to the Department of Finance, ‘involves applying and complying with public sector values and duties such as honesty, integrity, impartiality and accountability’.[6] Probity is also ‘evidence of ethical behaviour, and can be defined as complete and confirmed integrity, uprightness and honesty in a particular process’.[7]

1.12‘Ethical’ is defined by the Department of Finance in relation to the proper use of public resources and ‘the extent to which the proposed use is consistent with the core beliefs and values of society’.[8]

Where a person behaves in an ethical manner it could be expected that a person in a similar situation would undertake a similar course of action. For the approval of proposed commitments of relevant money, an ethical use of resources involves managing conflicts of interests, and approving the commitment based on the facts without being influenced by personal bias. Ethical considerations must be balanced with whether the use will also be efficient, effective and economical.[9]

1.13The ANAO stated ‘it is clearly unethical to comply with the letter of a rule, but in a way which undermines its intent’.[10]

1.14The APSC definition of integrity is taken from Stephen Sedgwick’s report dealing with institutional integrity in the Australian Public Service (APS):

… the pursuit of high standards of APS professionalism, which in turn means doing the right thing at the right time to deliver the best outcomes for Australia sought by the professionally advised government of the day.[11]

Legislation

Finance law

1.15Probity and ethics in the APS are legislated in part through finance law. Finance law is defined in the PGPA Act as: the PGPA Act, the rules, any instrument made under the PGPA Act (including the procurement rules and grants rules), or an Appropriation Act.[12] The PGPA Act states ‘to avoid doubt, the finance law is an Australian law …’ for the purposes of the APS Code of Conduct (CoC).[13]

1.16The APS CoC (see below) is contained in the Public Service Act1999 (PSAct), and specifies an APS employee, when acting in connection with APS employment, must comply with all applicable Australian laws, in addition to behaving honestly and with integrity.[14] If an official contravenes finance law, sanctions may be imposed under the PS Act (for breaches to the CoC), up to and including termination of employment.[15]

1.17Additional probity requirements may also apply, depending on the type of entity, enabling legislation, government policies and frameworks (including activity-specific frameworks like those applying to grants and procurement), internal policies and accountable authority instructions, and professional codes and standards, amongst other things.[16]

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act

1.18The PGPA Act contains the governance, accountability and performance framework for Commonwealth entities, and, amongst other things, establishes the general duties of public sector officials.[17] These general duties constitute the overarching framework for probity and ethical behaviour applying to officials of PGPA Act entities.[18] Under the PGPA Act, officials have duties of: care and diligence; to act honestly, in good faith and for a proper purpose; in relation to the use of position and use of information; and to disclose interests.[19]

1.19Section 15 of the PGPA Act deals with the duty to govern a Commonwealth entity and applies to the accountable authority (typically the secretary—or equivalent—of an entity). It requires the accountable authority, amongst other things, to govern the entity in a way that promotes the proper (efficient, effective, economical and ethical) use and management of public resources.[20]

1.20Various instruments have been made under the PGPA Act, including the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs),[21] and the Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines (CGRGs),[22] which as discussed above are part of finance law and legally binding.

Public Service Act

1.21The PS Act mandates that departmental secretaries are responsible ‘to manage the affairs of the Department efficiently, effectively, economically and ethically’ and to ‘implement measures directed at ensuring that the Department complies with the law’.[23]

1.22The PS Act also contains the APS Values, which relate to officers being committed to service; ethical; respectful; accountable; and impartial.[24] Ethical is defined in the values as demonstrating ‘leadership’, being ‘trustworthy’ and acting with ‘integrity’ in all it does.[25]

1.23The Australian Public Service Commissioner is able to issue directives with regard to the APS Values and has specified what exactly constitutes ethical behaviour:

… subsection 10(2) of the [PS] Act requires the following:

(a) acting in a way that models and promotes the highest standard of ethical behaviour;

(b) following through on commitments made;

(c) having the courage to address difficult issues;

(d) complying with all relevant laws, appropriate professional standards and the APS Code of Conduct;

(e) acting in a way that is right and proper, as well as technically and legally correct or preferable;

(f) reporting and addressing misconduct and other unacceptable behaviour by public servants in a fair, timely and effective way;

(g) providing leadership in policy development, implementation, program management and regulation;

(h) supporting systems that give APS employees appropriate opportunities to develop and demonstrate leadership qualities.[26]

1.24Agency heads must uphold and promote the APS Values, and officers must at all times behave in a way that upholds the values.[27] In particular, senior executive service (SES) officers are required, by personal example and other appropriate means, to promote the APS Values and CoC.[28]

Codes of conduct

1.25The APS CoC, which is contained in the PS Act, contains 13 requirements, including that: officials behave honestly and with integrity; act with care and diligence; comply with all applicable Australian laws; comply with any lawful and reasonable direction given by someone who has authority to give the direction; and use Commonwealth resources in a proper manner and for a proper purpose.[29]

1.26The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) engage employees under their respective enabling legislation and the accountable authority of each institution is required to produce a code of conduct and values.

1.27Employees of APRA are engaged under section 45 of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (APRA Act). The APRA Chair is the accountable authority of APRA and responsible for determining the APRA Values and APRA CoC.[30] Amongst other things, under the APRA CoC, APRA staff ‘should demonstrate the highest standards of professional conduct and integrity at all times by living the APRA Values’ and ‘should act to the highest ethical standards at all times and in all of their dealings’. Breaching the standards of conduct established in the CoC may result in disciplinary action up to, and including, termination of employment.[31]

1.28Under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act), the ASIC Chairperson is the accountable authority of ASIC, and responsible for determining the ASIC CoC and ASIC Values.[32] Under the ASIC CoC, staff ‘must act in accordance with ASIC’s values’, and ‘behave honestly in connection with their employment’. Breaches of the CoC may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.[33]

1.29Finance law applies to both ASIC and APRA.[34]

Probity themes highlighted by the Auditor-General

1.30In its submission to the inquiry, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) stated its ‘audits provide evidence that the Australian public sector regularly falls short of complying with both the intent and requirements of its regulatory frameworks and lacks effective accountability for performance’.[35]

1.31Ethical behaviour and integrity are not, according to the Auditor-General, ‘just doing narrow compliance’.[36] The ANAO emphasised the principles-based legislation and frameworks under which the public sector operates establish ‘high expectations’ and ‘meeting mandatory requirements is not sufficient’ to meet this standard.[37]

1.32In general, the ANAO has identified in recent audits a focus on outcomes over compliance with finance law:

… the risk tolerance for non-compliance is high, particularly where consequences are low or benefits are high. That is, an “achievement orientation” and “getting things done” —including by “cutting corners” if necessary — has a significantly higher value than compliance.[38]

1.33The situation, stated the ANAO, is exacerbated by the absence of any effective accountability or assurance for entity performance. Further, ‘policy owners are reluctant to take accountability for providing robust advice to entities, defaulting to advising that decisions are for accountable authorities’.[39]

1.34The Auditor-General told the Committee the ANAO did not undertake sufficient audits to make a statistically based conclusion on whether there existed a systemic problem.[40] The ANAO submission identified selected areas—procurement, grants administration, record keeping, performance measurement and reporting, and accountability for performance—where its audit work provides evidence of persistent non-compliance across the sector and levels of resistance to accountability for performance.[41]

1.35The Auditor-General also stated there is evidence of entities failing to prioritise the resolution of identified issues and failing to take accountability for performance:

Some responses to audit reports try to diminish their value, by suggesting that: a conclusion refers to a minor issue, when under auditing standards a negative conclusion can only relate to a material finding; the entity was already aware of the issue and was dealing with it, when evidence does not support this; or an audit has not appropriately taken account of context, when the entity is really seeking to hide the conclusions in a narrative of excuses.[42]

Procurement

1.36The ANAO stated its audit findings indicated ‘there was strong evidence … the public sector’s approach to procurement regularly fell short of expectations set out in the regulatory frameworks’, which constitute finance law.[43] It stated in some cases, procurement arrangements ‘appear[ed] to be primarily an exercise in form over substance’.[44]

1.37By way of example, the ANAO highlighted entities complying with the letter of procurement rules but not their intent. For instance:

• where the provision for ‘extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseen’ is used to exempt a procurement from open tendering because the procurement process was left too late[45]
• where a procurement is exempted from open competition based on it being a less costly and easier process, rather than focussing on the overall value of the use of taxpayer funds.[46]
  38. In the four years between 2018–19 and 2022–23, the ANAO identified 19 audits that contained findings with regard to procurement. Some of the concerns in these reports were that entities:
• were unable to demonstrate that value for money had been achieved or that value for money requirements had been met[47]
• managed contracts where contract variations changed the planned cost, scope, and/or delivery timeframes[48]
• had probity frameworks in place, but either did not follow or implement them, or could not demonstrate that they had followed them due to poor record keeping[49]
• did not effectively manage conflicts of interest[50]
• engaged in activities did not support the intent of the CPRs, or the intent of the instructions received from the minister.[51]
  39. Specific examples of some of these concerns include:
• only approaching one supplier, despite internal guidance instructing the entity to approach more than one supplier,[52] and the CPRs stating that officials should ‘encourage competition and be non-discriminatory’ so officials can be satisfied that the procurement will achieve a value for money outcome[53]
• frequent direct sourcing of suppliers using panel arrangements, undermining the intent of the CPRs[54]
• gaming procurement processes in the Digital Marketplace so the preferred tenderer could be located and then selected[55]
• failing to conduct systematic monitoring to assess whether a panel arrangement was meeting its objectives.[56]
  40. Entity responses to ANAO findings have included:
• suggesting niche products are something of an exception to the requirements in the CPRs, and that providing better documentation and an auditable trail of decision making would not have materially impacted the decision-making process[57]
• the market being too narrow for robust value for money processes[58]
• management processes were highly complex due to international dynamics impacting timeframes[59]
• suggesting that shortcomings that occurred throughout the tender process were of limited consequence as the department’s intended outcome was achieved[60]
• contesting the ANAO’s findings that the procurement process undertaken by the entity fell short of the CPRs.[61]

Grants

1.41In the administration of grants, the ANAO has found ‘evidence of “gaming”, or actions designed to achieve pre-determined results by technically meeting mandatory requirements, but in a way that is inconsistent with framework principles’.[62]

1.42The ANAO has also found evidence of deliberate non-compliance with legal requirements. Its audits indicate ‘a view appears to have emerged that likely non-compliance with legal requirements is a risk that can be taken on by entities’.[63]

1.43In the years between 2017–18 and 2022–23, the ANAO highlighted 14 reports where grant findings were made.[64] Some of the concerns in these reports were that entities:

• had processes for the selection of grants that did not conform with the underlying intent of the CGRGs or in some cases the CGRGs themselves, either through shortcomings in grant opportunity/program guidelines, or assessment criteria and practices[65]
• failed to provide key information to Ministers regarding the extent to which applications had been assessed as having met the selection and/or appraisal criteria[66]
• facilitated ineffective processes[67]
• lacked adequate probity frameworks and/or probity plans[68]
• were unable to demonstrate that value for money had been achieved[69]
• had poor record keeping practices (see further discussion below).[70]
  44. Examples of some of these concerns include:

• published program guidelines stated that the decision-making panel may use at its discretion the consideration of a non-exhaustive list of ‘other factors’ to override the results of the merit assessment process, with applicants not asked to specifically address those other factors in their applications for grant funding[71]
• the approach taken to identifying and selecting projects for funding was limited in coverage and not demonstrably merit-based, and the assessment work underlying the department’s advice to award funding to the selected projects was not to an appropriate standard[72]
• grants that were awarded high scores against the selection criteria not being recommended for funding, while low scoring applications were recommended.[73]
  45. Entity responses to ANAO findings have included:

• contesting findings made by the ANAO that the entity’s processes did not comply with the CGRGs[74]
• suggesting projects that were election commitments might be treated differently, and disputing the ANAO’s findings[75]
• proposing that once timeframes and various circumstances were considered, the entities’ conduct was understandable and/or unavoidable[76]
• placing the emphasis on the outcomes achieved despite the entity not complying with the CGRGs in order to achieve the outcome.[77]

Record keeping

1.46Of the 211 performance audits tabled in the Parliament in the last five years, the ANAO stated 91.5 per cent included findings with respect to record keeping. The ANAO has found ‘a lack of adequate documentation and records to support the rationale for decisions made and the actions undertaken. This often makes it difficult for entities to demonstrate compliance with framework and integrity requirements.[78]

Previous reports on grants and procurement

1.47During the current Parliament, the Committee has concluded reports dealing separately with grants and procurement.

Inquiry into Commonwealth grants administration

1.48The Committee’s Report 495: Inquiry into Commonwealth grants administration, examined, amongst other things, the administration of a number of grants programs, including Commuter Car Park Projects within the Urban Congestion Fund, the Safer Communities Program, the Building Better Regions Fund, the Regional Growth Fund, and the Modern Manufacturing Initiative. The Committee received evidence of serial non-compliance with the spirit and at times, the requirements, of the CGRGs by officials and decision-makers. This had occurred to such an extent that key grant-making principles of transparency and accountability could not be satisfied in some instances. The Committee came to the view some of the discretion currently in the CGRGs should be removed.[79]

1.49The report examined in detail a number of issues including: the use of non-competitive processes; the funding of election commitments through grants programs; whether officials and decision-makers were fulfilling legal requirements; and the use of unspecified ‘other factors’ in grants assessments.

1.50Although it is not mandatory under the CGRGs for open and competitive grants processes to be adopted, it is the Australian Government’s stated preferred approach. The Committee received evidence that: across all grants, competitive selection processes were chosen in the minority of cases; there were instances where programs announced as being competitive and merits-based actually employed closed, non-competitive processes; and that even when programs were reported as using open and competitive selection processes, the most meritorious applications may not be the applications funded.[80]

1.51Notwithstanding the fact election commitments delivered through grant programs remain subject to the PGPA Act and the CGRGs, the Committee heard there were a number of risks to fair and transparent administration that could arise from a grant being classified as an election commitment, particularly where there was no solid definition of what constitutes an election commitment in the context of grant programs. These risks included the potential failure of a department to undertake robust value for money (CGRGs) and proper use of money (PGPA Act) assessments; and administering election commitments through existing programs where the criteria were not necessarily fit for purpose.[81]

1.52The Committee received evidence of poor record-keeping practices, including where the basis for funding decisions was not recorded or did not clearly address published eligibility requirements and merit criteria; where the documentation of decisions by a minister to overturn advice from a department that a grant not be funded was insufficient; and where applications had been ‘pooled’ and blanket advice and recommendations to the minister had then been attributed to all the applications. This final practice, the Committee was told, allowed ministers wide discretion without having to declare they had overturned merit recommendations.[82]

1.53The inclusion of ‘other factors’ in grant guidelines, the Committee heard, in some instances had the potential to undermine the awarding of grants on the basis of merit, and was not consistent with the key principles of grants administration in the CGRGs.[83]

1.54While the Committee accepted that ministers rightly retain discretion and authority in relation to accepting or rejecting departmental recommendations when making grant funding decisions, they remained subject to the law. Further, agencies retained a legal obligation to support ministers by undertaking merit-based assessments of applications in competitive programs based on factors outlined in program guidelines, making clear recommendations and providing helpful paperwork to ministers, and educating and reminding ministers of their responsibilities.[84]

1.55The Committee made eight recommendations, including that the CGRGs be amended to provide that: competitive and merit-based processes be adopted by default; there be clear recommendations for each individual grant; decision-maker approvals of funding against the recommendations be clearly recorded and reported online; and the use of ‘other factors’ be transparent and formally included as part of an assessment. It also recommended that the Department of Finance provide good-practice examples of recording-keeping templates and checklists to give effect to the rules and principles of the CGRGs, and clarify the definition of an election commitment for the purpose of delivering grants programs.[85]

Inquiry into Commonwealth procurement

1.56The Committee’s Report 498: ‘Commitment issues’ – An inquiry into Commonwealth procurement, examined five Commonwealth procurements in detail where audit reports had identified significant shortcomings in procurement policies and practices,[86] including with procurement planning and approaches to market; the use of competition in procurement to deliver value for money outcomes; contract management; ethical procurement and the management of probity; and record keeping.[87]

1.57In addition to findings on the individual audits, the Committee examined common problems in institutional procurement capability and proficiency, noting the ANAO’s audit reports indicated a considerable capability deficit in this area. Further, it heard that though the CPRs aim to ensure procurement is conducted in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and delivers value for money, entities were using certain provisions in the CPRs to exempt procurements from the CPRs, to justify sole-sourcing arrangements, and to use a limited tender approach where it may not be supported.[88]

1.58The report noted that while Finance was a policy owner, it focussed primarily on building the capability of procuring entities rather than on monitoring or compliance, arguing adopting a more compliance-focussed regulatory approach would negatively affect its relationship with entities and result in worse outcomes—which the ANAO suggested was a ‘strange view to take’.[89]

1.59The Committee also considered: whether the role of entity audit committees was appropriate, specifically because most do not directly manage risks to an entity but instead provide advice on entity systems and frameworks, and generally have no specific requirement to advise on procurement; the functionality of AusTender; and the difficulty entities have in demonstrating the legal requirement to obtain value for money, particularly through the use of competitive procurement approaches such as open tenders, which are frequently avoided because it is less costly and easier to do so.[90]

1.60While the use of panel arrangements for procurements was designed to improve efficiency and reduce risk, the Committee heard in practice their use often had the effect of reducing fair and transparent competition and increasingly a small number of suppliers on a panel were capturing a large proportion of the contracts awarded through the panel.[91]

1.61The inquiry frequently heard evidence relating to the management of probity during procurement processes. Most of the audited entities were found to have conducted procurements without properly managing probity appropriately, including a failure to adhere to policy requirements such as mandatory fraud training, flawed processes for appointing probity advisers, and failing to address identified probity risks even where proposed treatments were put forward. In addition, the report noted requirements with regard to record-keeping under the CPRs were often not met; and contract management was found to be problematic in several audits.[92]

1.62The Committee acknowledged that while procurement could be a complex endeavour, given the sums of public money involved, improvements in procurement practices and processes had to be made to ensure value for taxpayer money. It called for improvements systemically, across the APS.[93]

1.63The Committee made 19 recommendations dealing, amongst other things, with: professionalisation of public sector procurement capability; amending the CPRs to emphasise achieving value for money and conducting procurements in a fair, transparent and accountable manner continue to apply when certain exemptions to the CPRs are used; more comprehensive reporting on compliance with the CPRs; increasing the scrutiny provided by entity audit committees in certain circumstances; guidance on the use of probity advisers; amending guidance on the use of panels to make explicit the requirement for separate value for money assessments and multiple competing tenders; refreshing panels at regular intervals and providing for new entrants to be listed; and amending the reporting requirements on AusTender. In many respects, the Committee called for Finance to take a more active role as the policy owner for the CPRs.[94]

Footnotes

[1]Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), Probity Management in Financial Regulators — Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, No.30 2022–23, hereafter, APRA report.

[2]ANAO, Probity Management in Financial Regulators — Australian Securities and Investments Commission, No. 36 2022–23, hereafter ASIC report.

[3]ANAO, Probity Management in Financial Regulators — Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, No. 38 2022–23, hereafter ACCC report.

[4]ANAO, Management and Leasing of Artworks by Artbank: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, No. 18 2022–23, hereafter Artbank report.

[5]ANAO, Administration of the Community Health and Hospitals Program: Department of Health and Aged Care, No. 31 2022–23, hereafter CHHP report.

[6]Department of Finance, Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines, Canberra, 2017, paragraph 13.1.

[7]Department of Finance, ‘Ethics and probity in Procurement’, www.finance.gov.au/government/procurement/buying-australian-government/ethics-and-probity-procurement, viewed 3 July 2023.

[8]Department of Finance, ‘Glossary’, www.finance.gov.au/about-us/glossary, viewed 5 February 2024.

[9]Department of Finance, ‘Glossary’, www.finance.gov.au/about-us/glossary, viewed 5 February 2024.

[10]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 11.

[11]Australian Public Service Commission (APSC), ‘Integrity in the APS’, www.apsc.gov.au/working-aps/integrity, viewed 22 May 2024; S Sedgwick, Report into consultations regarding APS approaches to ensure institutional integrity, October 2020, p. 18.

[12]Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act2013 (PGPA Act), section 8.

[13]PGPA Act, section 32.

[14]Public Service Act1999 (PS Act), section 13(2), 13(4).

[15]PS Act, section 15.

[16]ANAO, APRA report, p. 18; ANAO, Submission 5, pages 3–4.

[17]PGPA Act, sections, 6, 25–29.

[18]ANAO, ASIC report, p. 18.

[19]PGPA Act, sections 25–29.

[20]PGPA Act, sections 8, 15.

[21]PGPA Act, section 105B.

[22]PGPA Act, section 105C.

[23]PS Act, sections 57(2)(a), 57(2)(c).

[24]PS Act, section 10.

[25]PS Act, section 10(2).

[26]Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2022, section 14. Directions are made under the PS Act and prescribe standards that Agency Heads and APS employees must comply with in order to meet their obligations under the Act. See: Australian Public Service Commission, ‘Commissioner’s directions’, www.apsc.gov.au/working-aps/commissioners-directions, viewed 18 March 2024.

[27]PS Act, sections 12, 13(11).

[28]PS Act, section 35(3).

[29]PS Act, section 13.

[30]Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (APRA Act), sections 7, 48AB, 48AC.

[31]Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Code of Conduct, 15 December 2020 (updated 2 February 2022), pages 5, 9.

[32]Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act2001 (ASIC Act), sections 9A, 126B, 126C.

[33]Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Code of Conduct, August 2023, pages 10, 12.

[34]ASIC Act, sections 8, 9A; APRA Act, sections 7, 13.

[35]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 6.

[36]Mr Grant Hehir, Auditor-General, ANAO, Committee Hansard, 8 September 2023, p. 42.

[37]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 4.

[38]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 6.

[39]Policy owners include: Department of Finance (PGPA Act framework); Australian Public Service Commission (PS Act integrity framework); National Archives of Australia (record keeping framework); Attorney-General’s Department (performance of Commonwealth legal work). ANAO, Submission 5, pages 2, 6.

[40]Mr Grant Hehir, ANAO, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2023, p. 9; ANAO, Submission5, p. 6.

[41]ANAO, Submission 5, pages 6, 14–16.

[42]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 16.

[43]ANAO, Submission 5, pages 10, 14–15.

[44]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 14.

[45]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 11.

[46]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 10.

[47]These included: ANAO, Procurement by the National Capital Authority, No. 30 2021–22, hereafter NCA report, pages 6, 8; ANAO, Department of Defence’s Procurement of Hunter Class Frigates, No. 21 2022–23, hereafter Frigates report, pages 9, 27; ANAO, Digital Transformation Agency’s Procurement of ICT Related Services, No. 5 2022–23, hereafter DTA report, pages 9–10; ANAO, Procurement of Strategic Water Entitlements, No. 2 2020–21, hereafter SWE report, pages 9, 47; ANAO, OneSKY: Contractual Arrangements, No. 4 2019–20, hereafter OneSKY report, p. 9; ANAO, Procurement of the Permissions Capability, No. 34 2022–23, hereafter Permissions Capability report, p. 6.

[48]See, for instance: ANAO, Management of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services Contract, No. 6 2021–22, hereafter Maritime Surveillance report, p. 8; ANAO, The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission’s Administration of the Biometric Identification Services Project, No. 24 2018–19, hereafter Biometric Identification Services report, p. 9; ANAO, OneSKY report, pages 43–44; ANAO, DTA report, pages 9–10.

[49]See: ANAO, Defence’s Administration of Enabling Services — Enterprise Resource Planning Program: Tranche 1, No. 1 2021–22, p. 10; ANAO, Permissions Capability report, pages 9–10; ANAO, DTA report, pages 8, 34.

[50]See, for instance: ANAO, NCA report, p. 9; ANAO, Purchase of the ‘Leppington Triangle’ Land for the Future Development of Western Sydney Airport, No. 9 2020–21, hereafter Leppington Triangle report, pages 37–38.

[51]ANAO, DTA report, p. 9; ANAO, SWE report, p. 40; ANAO, Establishment and Use of ICT Related Procurement Panels and Arrangements, No. 4 2020–21, hereafter ICT Related Procurement Panels, p. 83; ANAO, Leppington Triangle report, p. 14; ANAO, DTA report, pages, 9, 80; ANAO, Procurement of Office Furniture, No. 37 2022–23, hereafter Office Furniture report, pages 8, 23–26.

[52]ANAO, Office Furniture report, p. 8.

[53]Department of Finance, Commonwealth Procurement Rules, Department of Finance, Canberra, 2023, section 4.4.

[54]ANAO, DTA report, p. 9.

[55]ANAO, DTA report, pages 50–51.

[56]ANAO, ICT Related Procurement Panels, p. 9.

[57]ANAO, OneSKY report, p. 11.

[58]ANAO, NCA report, p. 11.

[59]ANAO, Procurement of Garrison Support and Welfare Services, No. 37 2019–20, pages 11–12.

[60]ANAO, Procurement of Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (LAND 400 Phase 2), No. 18 2020–21, pages 11–12.

[61]ANAO, Frigates report, pages 13–14; ANAO, SWE report, pages 59–60.

[62]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 15.

[63]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 15.

[64]ANAO, Submission 5, pages 15–16.

[65]See, for instance a range of concerns raised in: ANAO, Award of Funding under the Building Better Regions Fund, No. 1 2022–23, hereafter BBRF report, pages 31–33; ANAO, Administration of Commuter Car Park Projects within the Urban Congestion Fund, No. 47 2020–21, hereafter CCPP report, pages 10–11; ANAO, Award of Funding under the Safer Communities Fund, No. 16 2021–22, hereafter SCF report, p. 11; ANAO, Award of Funding under the Supporting Reliable Energy Infrastructure Program,No. 31 2020–21, hereafter SREIP report, p. 10; ANAO, Indigenous Advancement Strategy, No. 35 2016–17, hereafter IAS report, pages 9–10; ANAO, Award of a $443.3 Million Grant to the Great Barrier Reef Foundation, No. 22 2018–19, hereafter GBRF report, pages 8–9; ANAO, Award of Funding under the Community Sport Infrastructure Program, No.23 2019–20, hereafter CSIP report, p. 10.

[66]See, for instance: ANAO, Award of Funding under the Community Development Grants Program, No. 3 2017–18, hereafter CDGP report, p. 28; ANAO, SREIP report, p. 10.

[67]See, for instance: ANAO, SCF report, pages 23–24; ANAO, CCPP report, pages 27–32.

[68]See, for instance: ANAO, SREIP report, p. 9; ANAO, GBRF report, p. 51; ANAO, Administration of the Data Retention Industry Grants Program, No. 2 2017–18, hereafter DRIGP report, p. 10.

[69]See, for instance: ANAO, SREIP report, p. 26; ANAO, SCF Report, pages 30–31, 43–44; ANAO, CCPP Report, pages 12, 50, 77; ANAO, GBRF Report, pages 9–10, 39–43, 46.

[70]See, for instance: ANAO, BBRF report, p. 13; ANAO, SCP report, p. 55; ANAO, CCPP report, p. 8; ANAO, SREIP report, pages 26–27; ANAO, IAS report, pages 10, 42; ANAO, Management of the Try, Test and Learn Fund Transition Projects, No. 41 2022–23, p. 8; ANAO, CSIP report, p. 42; ANAO, Award of Funding Under the Regional Jobs and Investment Packages, No. 12 2019–20, pages 30–31.

[71]ANAO, BBRF report, p. 10.

[72]ANAO, CCPP report, p. 6.

[73]ANAO, IAS report, p. 42.

[74]ANAO, GBRF report, p. 13.

[75]ANAO, CCPP report, pages 94–97.

[76]ANAO, DRIGP report, p. 12; ANAO, GBRF report, p. 13; ANAO, CSIP report, p. 12.

[77]ANAO, GBRF report, pages 8–9, 13.

[78]ANAO, Submission 5, p. 16.

[79]Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA), Report 495: Inquiry into Commonwealth grants administration, June 2023, hereafter Report 495: Grants, pages 1, 20–21.

[80]JCPAA, Report 495: Grants, pages 6–7.

[81]JCPAA, Report 495: Grants, pages 8–10.

[82]JCPAA, Report 495: Grants, pages 13–16.

[83]JCPAA, Report 495: Grants, pages 16–18.

[84]JCPAA, Report 495: Grants, pages 19–20.

[85]JCPAA, Report 495: Grants, pages xvii–xix.

[86]These were Home Affairs’ Management of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Services Contract, the Department of Defence’s Procurement of Six Evolved Cape Class Patrol Boats, Procurement by the National Capital Authority, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources Procurement of Delivery Partners for the Entrepreneurs’ Programme, and the Digital Transformation Agency’s Procurement of ICT Related Services. JCPAA, Report 498: ‘Commitment issues’ – An inquiry into Commonwealth procurement, August 2023, hereafter Report 498: Procurement, p. 1.

[87]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, p. 1.

[88]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages 7–8, 12, 14–16.

[89]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages 18–19.

[90]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages 21–27.

[91]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages 27–30.

[92]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages 30–34.

[93]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages 34–35.

[94]JCPAA, Report 498: Procurement, pages xvii–xxi.