2. Administration and expenditure

Administration

2.1In undertaking its review of the administration and expenditure of six of the National Intelligence Community (NIC) agencies for the 2021-22 financial year, the Committee requested that submissions include information on the following topics:

• strategic direction and priorities;
• changes (if any) to the structure of the organisation;
• corporate governance, including information about compliance performance, risk assessment and risk management;
• legislative changes that have impacted on administration of the agency, including, as appropriate, the frequency and nature of use of any new powers, staffing implications, training, the role of legal officers and need for specialist staff, and the relationship with outside agencies such as police or the judiciary;
• involvement (if any) in litigation matters, including any administrative reviews in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;
• human resource management, including:

• staffing numbers and demographic information;
• recruitment and retention strategies;
• recruitment outcomes;
• staff departures and separation rates;
• workplace diversity statistics and initiatives;
• training and development;
• language skills;
• individual performance management;
• staff feedback, complaints and investigations (including public interest disclosures and any code of conduct, fraud, or bullying/harassment-related investigations, as well as review for cause processes); and
• accommodation and facilities, including all locations within Australia where staff are present and any current or planned changes to accommodation arrangements;
• changes in the distribution of staff across different areas of the organisation, including the ratio of field and operational staff to administrative staff, the ration of executive to middle and lower level staff, and the ratio of central office to outlying staff;

• security issues, including policies, training, security breaches and e-security;
• initiatives implemented or underway to ensure compliance with the Protective Security Policy Framework as well as any outcomes from the Richardson review;
• initiatives or programs being developed or implemented to enable information sharing and collaboration with out NIC agencies;
• security clearances, including clearance rates, number of revocations, current procedures, policy changes, average timeframes, delays and any associated outsourcing arrangements;
• information and communications technology initiatives;
• organisational performance evaluation and accountability, including any outcomes relevant to administration and expenditure for the financial year; and
• public relations and/or public reporting, including requests for public access to records.
  2. The Committee also requested each agency to report on certain administration matters, initiatives, or performance outcomes specific to that agency.
  3. The majority of evidence received in relation to these topics was classified, and has not been authorised for publication. However, the Committee scrutinised the evidence provided and followed up on certain matters with detailed questioning at classified hearings and in subsequent questions on notice.
  4. This section outlines evidence on the major themes emerging from the Committee’s inquiry in relation to agencies’ administration, and does not attempt to describe all the evidence received. Additionally, some discussion is necessarily general due to the security classification of the evidence received.

Organisational changes

2.5Each of the intelligence agencies provided an overview of its organisational structure, and provided information regarding senior staffing changes during the reporting period.

2.6Key changes to ASIO’s organisational structure during the reporting period included the appointment of the Deputy Director-General Vetting Service Delivery to lead the development and implementation of reforms to ASIO’s vetting capability, and the establishment of the Office of the Future Technology Advisor.[1]

Workforce

2.7Each of the six intelligence agencies provided an overview of their workforce metrics for 2021-2022. Much of that evidence was classified and is not replicated here.

2.8ASIO advised that an ANAO audit of its workforce planning practices was finalised during the reporting period, and contained three recommendations which ASIO agreed to address.[2] The audit considered whether:

• ASIO was developing workforce plans to support key activities
• the workforce plans were being effectively implemented
• ASIO had successfully implemented Recommendation 12 of the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review.[3]
  9. Each of the agencies provided detailed information about diversity and inclusion in their reports including matters of gender, cultural background, and language proficiency. Much of the information was classified so cannot be discussed further here. The Committee was satisfied with the information provided by each of the agencies in this regard, and welcomed the opportunity to discuss progress and challenges with agencies during the classified hearings.

Recruitment and retention

2.10Recruitment and retention of staff remained a priority for each of the NIC agencies in the 2021-22 reporting period. Each agency provided information on the processes and initiatives undertaken to increase the number of qualified applicants interested in roles in the NIC.

2.11ASIO advised that during the 2021-22 financial year it implemented a ‘recruitment surge’ to address ‘increasing separation rates and a slowing of recruitment and vetting in 2020-21’. ASIO commenced 116 external recruitment rounds during the 2021-22 financial year compared to 42 in the previous year.[4]

2.12ASIO said that it remains focused on its recruitment and retention activities and conducts exit interviews and staff pulse surveys to assess and address staff needs. ASIO said that the results of the surveys showed a positive shift in the areas of change and communication, psychological safety, recognition and career management.[5]

2.13ASD had 464 new starters in the reporting period, including 99 people joining through the ASD Graduate Program. ASD also operates the ASD Internship Program and ASD Work Experience Program, as well as being a member of the Australian Government Digital Cadetships Program and the Australian Government Digital Apprenticeships Program which are managed by the APSC.[6]

2.14ONI noted that it had initiated significant reform in its human resources and vetting functions to ‘increase efficiency and enhance candidate care throughout the recruitment process’. ONI noted some challenges of recruitment:

ONI faces the challenge of a small talent pool as it seeks applicants who are based in Canberra, with the requisite skills and capabilities and the ability to hold and maintain a security clearance. The long lead time to recruit employees in roles which require Positive Vetted (PV) security clearance presents a challenge for ONI.[7]

2.15The average time of service at ONI during the reporting period was four years, and the separation rate for ONI during the reporting period was 16%.[8]

Training and capability development

2.16Most agencies noted that they used a combination of internally developed and externally sourced learning and development programs, including participation in NIC development programs provided by the enterprise management function of ONI.

2.17ASIO said it uses a combination of externally sourced and in-house training programs to meet its learning and development needs. In 2021-22 ASIO reviewed its induction program, continued with its seven mandatory e-Learning modules, and continued its Intelligence Officer Development Program and Intelligence Analyst Development Program which train and assess employees for operational and analytical intelligence roles in ASIO.[9]

2.18ASIO conducts a range of other training, including several entry level programs, to meet the capability development needs of its staff.[10]

2.19ASD provided information on the range of internal and external training provided to maintain its learning and development capability. ASD said that its officers are required to participate in four Defence-provided training courses on work health and safety, workplace behaviour, fraud and integrity awareness and security awareness.[12]

2.20ASD said that it categorised users as ‘high, medium or low compliance risk depending on their access to intelligence data, collections systems, involvement in activities under a Testing Authorisation and other sensitive activities’ which was used to prioritise resourcing for alternatives to in-person training, which continued to be affected by COVID-19 during the reporting period.[13]

2.21Similar to other NIC agencies, ONI indicated that it had pivoted to online training during COVID-19, but continued to offer a range of seminars, training resources and briefing materials. ONI provided support for the following types of training during the reporting period:

• Corporate and administrative skills training
• Language training (including paying an allowance to eligible staff)
• Subject matter-specific and tradecraft related courses
• Leadership training
• Tertiary studies.
  22. AGO noted that the technical nature of GEOINT[14] required tailored and in-house training directed to its areas of expertise including GEOINT and Geospatial analyst tradecraft-related skills.[15]

Security vetting

2.23Each of the agencies provided details regarding internal security clearance processes and associated timelines. In particular, ASIO, ASD, and ONI provided a classified summary of their security vetting progress during the reporting period.

2.24ASIO said that during the reporting period, ASIO and ONI had made significant progress towards establishing the Top Secret-Privileged Access Capability to ‘modernise and strengthen whole-of-government vetting at the TS level’. ASIO also said the change was necessary ‘to harden Australia’s highest-level clearance process, in the context of a complex, challenging and changing security outlook’.[16]

2.25The National TS-PA Capability was established on 1 December 2021, and during the reporting period, ASIO said that it worked to ensure the functions of the associated National TS-PA Authority and the Quality Assurance Office – led by ONI – aligned with the requirements of the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF).[17]

2.26ONI provided additional classified information on the establishment of the Quality Assurance Office and discussed the practices designed to facilitate cooperation between ASIO and ONI.

Legislative change

2.27The six intelligence agencies provided evidence relating to the impact of legislative change during the reporting period. The enactment of the following pieces of legislation were considered by intelligence agencies to have had an impact during the reporting period:

• Foreign Intelligence Legislation Amendment Act 2021 (FILA Act)
• Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Act 2021
• Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Act 2021 (SLACI Act) as well as the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act 2022 (SLACIP Act)
• National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 1) Act 2021 (NSLA 1 Act)
  28. ASIO submitted that the amendments made by the FILA Act had broadened the foreign intelligence warrant powers, and that these amendments had been applied to ‘long-standing investigations through warrant requests being made to the Attorney-General’.[18] ASD also indicated that the Act had impacted its administration during the reporting period.[19]
  29. ASIO said that the introduction of the legislation governing International Production Orders (IPOs) had resulted in additional powers for the organisation, and work to implement the provisions of the Act was undertaken throughout the reporting period. However, ASIO noted that the international agreement between Australia and the United States of America that would give effect to the powers of the Act had not yet entered into force at the conclusion of the reporting period.[20]
  30. ASD said that the introduction of amendments to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 made by the SLACI Act and the SLACIP Act impacted its legislative environment during the reporting period. The Acts introduced ‘new requirements for critical infrastructure entities to report cyber security incidents and provide certain operational and ownership information’.[21]

Impact of the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 1) Act 2021

2.31Each of the six intelligence agencies subject to review of administration and expenditure by the Committee indicated that the passage of the NSLA 1 Act impacted on their administration during the reporting period. The agencies noted that the Act implemented measures from the 2020 Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community (Richardson Review) and the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review.[22]

2.32ASD advised that the reforms with the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 1) Act 2021 contained important amendments. ASD indicated that some of the important amendments related to participation in the Assumed Identities scheme, class authorisation provisions, and changes to ministerial authorisations.[23]

2.33ASIO said that there were three amendments that related directly to the organisation, including provisions to facilitate cooperation between ASIO and ASIS, extension of the period of time in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs can suspend passports on security grounds, and class authorisation provisions.[24]

2.34AGO submitted that key amendments made by the NSLA 1 Act related to the ministerial authorisation framework, including class authorisation provisions. Other amendments highlighted by AGO included the introduction of new cooperation provisions, extension of immunities for computer related acts in the Criminal Code Act 1995, and a requirement to publish its rules regarding the use of intelligence information concerning Australian persons.[25]

2.35DIO said that the NSLA 1 Act required the organisation to make written rules regarding the use of intelligence information concerning Australian persons (Privacy Rules), which DIO worked to develop and implement during the reporting period.[26]

2.36ONI said that the amendments that impacted its administration related to the amendment of ‘cooperation with international entities’ provisions, and amendments made to required inclusions in ONI’s Privacy Rules, which were addressed by the organisation during the reporting period, prior to the commencement of the amendments in October 2022.[27]

2.37ASIS provided a classified description of the impact of the changes made by the NSLA1 Act.[28]

Public engagement

2.38Each of the agencies provided information on their public engagement during the reporting period.

2.39ASIO noted that its public engagement was ‘governed by a strategic framework that seeks to build trust, communicate security advice and advance targeted recruitment’.[29]

2.40ASIO’s public engagement activities included the Annual Threat Assessment, and associated activities which were designed to explain and contextualise the messages presented by the Director-General. ASIO said:

Quantitative and qualitative analysis showed that the Threat Assessment and subsequent media activity created a significant positive sentiment shift toward ASIO and the organisation’s mission.[30]

2.41ASD said that it had formally responded to 184 media enquiries in 2021-22, and undertaken a range of media engagement with journalists, closed roundtable meetings and background briefings during the reporting period. The Director-General of ASD and the Head of the ACSC also delivered 35 speeches and 9 opening remarks or panel discussions at a range of public events during the reporting period.[31]

2.42ASD added that it had provided routine assistance to other Commonwealth agencies in their responses to media queries, as well as referring queries to other Commonwealth agencies where appropriate.[32]

2.43During the reporting period, ONI continued to respond to media requests, as well as requests for the Director-General of National Intelligence (DGNI) and senior ONI officials to speak at key events. ONI said that it continued to consult with business, academia, and think tanks to support its analytical work.[33]

2.44ASIS, AGO and DIO all provided information on media and public engagement undertaken during the reporting period. ASIS said it had undertaken a number of media engagements in 2022,[34] whereas DIO said it had not undertaken any public engagements or media liaison during the reporting period.[35] AGO advised that it had participated in a small amount of public relations and industry engagement, and had responded to three media requests related to hydrographic operations in the reporting period.[36]

Public access to records

2.45All agencies examined as part of this review are exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act), but certain records are subject to ‘open access’ provisions under the Archives Act 1983. These provisions allow any member of the public to request access to documents during an open period,[37] although certain restrictions apply to national security information.

2.46ASIO advised that it had received 256 requests for access to information during the reporting period. ASIO noted that although the number of requests completed during the timeframe, 239, was lower than the previous reporting period, the quantum of pages reviewed was comparable to previous years.[38]

2.47ASIO said that the consideration of requests had become significantly more complicated over time, and that a single request could require consideration of thousands of pages:

As an example, ASIO is currently assessing a request for the file of Nikolay Fomin who was the Russian Embassy Press and Information officer in 1984. This request runs to 40 volumes which contains over 16,000 pages, which must be assessed, and to date ASIO has assessed and dispatched 20 volumes to the [National Archives of Australia].[39]

2.48ASD said that it had received 45 requests for access to information during the reporting period, which represented a significant increase when compared to previous years.[40]

2.49ONI received 88 requests for access to information during the reporting period, many of which required additional consultation.[41]

2.50DIO received 107 requests for access to information during the reporting period, and processed and completed 48 cases.[42]

2.51ASIS provided classified information on the requests for access to information received during the reporting period.

2.52AGO indicated that it had not received any requests for access to information during the reporting period, but noted that:

During the Parliamentary debates on the legislation that integrated the hydrographic functions from the Royal Australian Navy to AGO, the then Minister for Defence undertook to Parliament that AGO would apply the principles of the FOI Act to requests for [Australian Hydrographic Office] information as a matter of policy.[43]

2.53AGO said that this policy had been formalised by a Ministerial Direction issued by the (then) Minister for Defence in December 2020.[44]

Accommodation and facilities

2.54ONI provided an update on the Department of Finance-led development of the National Security Office Precinct. During the reporting period the project was in the design phase of its multi-year development and ONI indicated that a Managing Contractor for the development of the precinct was expected to be announced in early to mid-2023.[45]

2.55Several of the intelligence agencies provided information on their accommodation and facilities, much of which is classified and cannot be discussed further in this report. AGO noted that its primary offices are located in Canberra, Bendigo and Wollongong. AGO said that ‘operating at a range of [different] classifications, these facilities enable the accommodation of a growing workforce and also support flexibility in recruitment’.[46]

Expenditure

2.56In addition to the review of administration, the IS Act requires the Committee to consider the expenditure, including annual financial statements, of the six agencies.

2.57Budget statements for ASIO, ASIS, ASD and ONI are available publicly as part of the relevant Portfolio Budget Statements published each year.[47]

2.58Each of the six agencies provided a copy of their 2021-22 financial statements to the Committee, either directly in classified submissions or by reference to the publicly available statements in annual reports. Agencies were requested to provide the following information to the Committee to inform its review:

• the overall financial position of the agency;
• the impact of any funding increases and budget measures;
• any budget constraints;
• the ongoing implications of the efficiency dividend (where applied) and other savings measures;
• efficiencies and savings measures implemented within the organisation;
• financial controls;
• the status and key deliverables of significant capital expenditure projects, including any changes to the budget, scope or timeframe for each project; and
• any significant changes in recurrent expenditure compared to previous years (both in total and in individual expenditure items), including the nature of and reasons for those changes.
  59. The Committee reviewed the financial statements and related evidence and took additional evidence from agencies in relation to specific points in classified hearings. The Committee also received a submission from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) outlining its audit findings for each agency over the reporting period.
  60. Much of the evidence received by the Committee is classified and not authorised for publication. The following paragraphs outline evidence on the major themes emerging from the Committee’s inquiry in relation to agencies’ financial management and expenditure. Some discussion is necessarily general due to the security classification of the evidence received.
  61. ASIO, ASD and ONI provided detailed information regarding their financial performance in line with the information requested by the Committee.
  62. ASIO reported an operating result of $11.9 million surplus in 2021-22. Some of the key drivers of the surplus were depreciation and amortisation expenses being lower than predicted due to a delay in asset purchases, and employee benefits being lower due to the impact of movements in the 10 year bond rate and lower than anticipated staffing levels. On the other hand, supplier expenses were higher than predicted due to the level of operational activity.[48]
  63. ASIO noted that in the 2021-22 Federal Budget the Australian Government announced significant new investment in the organisation over the next decade. ASIO said this funding was critical to ‘support ASIO’s technological capabilities and the maintenance of its core capabilities and infrastructure’.[49]
  64. ASIO said that the cost inflator over the life of the measures was set at the time of consideration and had not been updated in light of inflation and supply chain changes and managing the capital element of the funding over time. ASIO also noted that the measures did not include operational supplementation which, over time, would require the organisation to rigorously prioritise according to risk.[50]
  65. ONI reported an operating result of $11.863 million surplus in 2021-22. The key driver of the surplus was the engagement of personnel, employees and contractors during the reporting period. ONI also indicated that COVID-19 continued to have an impact on staff travel, ONI-hosted conferences and other face-to-face engagements which contributed to reduced expenditure.[51]
  66. During the reporting period ONI noted that it had 18 active grant arrangements in place which had been entered into under the provisions of the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018.[52]
  67. Further information on financial management and efficiency, which was identified as a focus area for the 2021-22 review, is contained in Chapter3.

Committee comment

2.68The Committee has reviewed the administration of the six intelligence agencies under its oversight for the 2021-22 reporting period and is satisfied that they are conducting their administrative functions and administering outcomes and outputs effectively.

2.69In reviewing the expenditure of the six intelligence agencies, the Committee is satisfied with the conduct of agencies, their efforts to achieve value-for-money outcomes for Australian taxpayers, and their appropriate management of budget and expenditure over the reporting period.

2.70The Committee extends its appreciation to the intelligence agencies for their engagement in this important oversight function, and their candour in the classified hearings of the Committee. The Committee invites the intelligence agencies to consider the classification of elements of their submissions, ensuring all content is only classified to the level necessary, and to consider providing an unclassified summary of their administration and expenditure that can be made publicly available.

2.71The Committee also extends its appreciation to the IGIS and the ANAO for their ongoing contribution to the Committee’s understanding of the administration and expenditure of the six intelligence agencies that fall within the Committee’s oversight.

2.72The Committee acknowledges that some time has passed since the conclusion of the 2021-22 reporting period, receipt of the submissions, and the comments in this report.

2.73However, the Committee notes that the 2021-22 reporting period began a period of growth for ASIO and ASD, as well as the announcement and commencement of the significant National Security Office Precinct project. The Committee remains interested in the administration and expenditure aspects of these initiatives and looks forward to continued engagement with the relevant agencies on these matters in its future reviews. The Committee has also discussed the National Security Office Precinct with the Department of Finance, and intends to continue that engagement during the life of the project.

2.74Significantly, the Committee acknowledges the evidence of ASD in relation to the launch of the REDSPICE program at the conclusion of the reporting period. While the Committee acknowledges that much of the program is directed at operational and capability development, the Committee also notes that a significant proportion of the activities to be undertaken under the REDSPICE program comprises elements that fall within the remit of the Committee’s oversight of administration and expenditure.

2.75The Committee considers that, though the progress of the REDSPICE program will continue to form part of ASD’s evidence to the review of administration and expenditure, given the rapid pace and ambition of elements of the program the Committee may benefit from more frequent updates on matters relating to the program within the Committee’s remit. Therefore, the Committee recommends that ASD provide the Committee with an additional update six months after each ASD submission to the review of administration and expenditure, for the duration of the program.

2.76The Committee recommends that the Australian Signals Directorate provide an update on the progress of the REDSPICE program to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security twice per year until the program concludes.

Follow up from previous administration and expenditure review

2.77The Committee notes the Government’s response, presented in October 2023, to its Review of Administration and Expenditure – Australian Intelligence Agencies 2020-2021, and wishes to comment further specifically in relation to the Committee’s Recommendation 2: that legislation be amended to enable intelligence agencies’ classified annual reports to be provided to the Committee. In its response the Government ‘noted’ the recommendation while simply restating the current legislative functions of the PJCIS:

There is no Intelligence Services Act 2001 legislated requirement for agencies to produce classified annual reports. Were an agency to produce a classified report, section 29(1)(b) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 stipulates that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security can review any matter in relation to intelligence agencies referred to the Committee by the responsible Minister or the Attorney-General or a resolution of either House of the Parliament.[53]

2.78The Committee reiterates the view put forward in its report that allowing intelligence agencies that produce a classified annual report to provide it to the Committee would result in considerably greater efficiency for both the Committee and the agencies, and reduce the agencies’ current administrative burden and duplication of effort in preparing material for the Committee’s annual review of administration and expenditure.

2.79In this regard the Committee emphasises that it is not seeking to be able to inquire directly into the contents of annual reports, nor compel their disclosure to the Committee. Rather, the Committee recommended the amendment of provisions preventing the annual reports from being provided to the Committee, in order to allow them to be shared where it is the preference of the agency head to do so. The Committee further notes that this recommendation was consistent with views expressed by agencies during that review.

2.80On this basis, the Committee invites the Government to reconsider and clarify its response to that recommendation.

Footnotes

[1]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 5.

[2]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 20.

[3]ANAO, Workforce Planning in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Auditor-General Report No. 2 of 2021-22, p. 17.

[4]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 28.

[5]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 21.

[6]ASD, Submission 3, p. 31.

[7]ONI, Submission 5, p. 12.

[8]ONI, Submission 5, p. 14.

[9]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 28.

[10]ASIO, Submission 4, pp. 36-37.

[11]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 34.

[12]ASD, Submission 3, p. 36.

[13]ASD, Submission 3, p. 37.

[14]GEOINT means the collection, analysis and dissemination if imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visibly depict physical features and geographically referenced activities. See Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 5.

[15]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 32.

[16]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 72.

[17]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 72.

[18]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 64.

[19]ASD, Submission 3, p. 17.

[20]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 63.

[21]ASD, Submission 3, p. 17.

[22]ASD, Submission 3, p. 17; ASIO, Submission 4, p. 65; Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 12; Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.2 (DIO), p. 10; ONI, Submission 5, p. 11.

[23]ASD, Submission 3, p. 17.

[24]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 65.

[25]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 12.

[26]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.2 (DIO), p. 10.

[27]ONI, Submission 5, p. 11.

[28]ASIS, Submission 6, p. 20.

[29]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 75.

[30]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 75.

[31]ASD, Submission 3, pp. 62-63.

[32]ASD, Submission 3, p. 63.

[33]ONI, Submission 5, pp. 27-28

[34]ASIS, Submission 6, p. 18.

[35]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.2 (DIO), pp. 24-25.

[36]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.2 (DIO), pp. 42-43.

[37]Archives Act 1983, s. 40.

[38]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 78.

[39]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 76.

[40]ASD, Submission 3, p. 61.

[41]ONI, Submission 5, p. 27.

[42]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.2 (DIO), p. 24.

[43]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 43.

[44]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 43.

[45]ONI, Submission 5, p. 17.

[46]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 2.1 (AGO), p. 36.

[47]Interested parties can access relevant Annual Reports and Portfolio Budget Statements at www.transparency.gov.au.

[48]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 15.

[49]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 18.

[50]ASIO, Submission 4, p. 18.

[51]ONI, Submission 5, p. 32.

[52]ONI, Submission 5, p. 33.

[53]Australian Government Response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Report: Review of Administration and Expenditure: No. 20 (2020-21) – Australian Intelligence Agencies, 30 October 2023, p. [3].