- Introduction
- Under section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act), the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s (PJCIS) first function is to review the administration and expenditure of six intelligence agencies in Australia that comprise the majority of the National Intelligence Community (NIC):
- Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO)
- Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)
- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
- Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)
- Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
- Office of National Intelligence (ONI).
- AGO and DIO sit within the Defence Intelligence Group (DIG) in the Department of Defence, with the Director of DIO also leading the DIG as the Chief of Defence Intelligence.
- There are four additional members of the NIC over which the PJCIS does not presently have responsibility for review of administration and expenditure:
- Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC)
- Australian Federal Police (AFP)
- Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)
- Department of Home Affairs.
- The NIC, and within it the agencies for which the PJCIS has oversight, operates within a strict oversight and accountability framework. This framework serves to balance the need for public accountability and publication of information against the need for agencies’ operations, and sensitive information held within agencies, to remain classified to protect Australia’s national security interests.
- As a result, intelligence agencies have limited public reporting responsibilities. During the reporting period ASD and ASIO were the only intelligence agencies that presented unclassified annual reports to the Australian Parliament, while reporting by AGO and DIO was included within broader Department of Defence annual reporting.
- In addition to annual reporting requirements, there are several levels of oversight to ensure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the Australian Government, Parliament and public. These include:
- oversight by the responsible Minister for each agency
- oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), an independent statutory officer who provides assurance that each agency acts legally and with propriety, complies with ministerial guidelines and directives, and acts consistently with human rights
- parliamentary oversight, including oversight of administration and expenditure by the PJCIS.
How the Committee undertakes its review of administration and expenditure
1.7The Committee is established pursuant to section 28 of the IS Act. As noted above, the functions of the Committee include an obligation to review the administration and expenditure of each of the six intelligence agencies listed in the Act, including their annual financial statements. While other work of the Committee contributes to that function, it is fulfilled most directly through the Committee’s annual Administration and Expenditure Review of the agencies.
1.8For the review the Committee receives detailed classified, as well as some unclassified, information about the administration and expenditure of the agencies. Each agency under review provides classified written submissions, and gives evidence to the Committee in private (classified) hearings. Much of the evidence received by the Committee must remain confidential, due to its classified nature.
1.9In addition, the Committee is able to seek evidence from any other people or organisations that it considers can assist its review, and may also receive submissions from the public.
1.10While the Committee’s administration and expenditure reviews are broad in scope, the IS Act limits the Committee’s ability to review what Australia’s national security priorities should be, and the allocation of resources to those priorities. Further, the Committee has no role in reviewing particular operations conducted by agencies, sources of information available to agencies, aspects of the activities of agencies that do not affect Australian persons, or individual complaints about the activities of the agencies.
1.11Rather, the Committee has responsibility to analyse the evidence put before it and report to the Parliament (and through it, to the Australian public) on the administrative arrangements and expenditure of each agency, and any changes to these that may affect an agency’s ability to continue to meet its objectives. Within these parameters, the Committee is able to set its own terms of reference for the review.
Conduct of the inquiry
1.12The Committee commenced Review No. 21 in November 2022. Submissions were sought and received from the six intelligence agencies listed in paragraph 1.1, as well as the IGIS and the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO).
1.13A list of submissions received for the review is at Appendix A.
1.14Private (classified) hearings were held in June 2023. Appendix B lists the witnesses who appeared before the Committee. Transcripts of these hearings are classified and not publicly available. However, unclassified portions of these transcripts are referred to in relevant sections of the report.
1.15In addition to the standard administration and expenditure information provided by agencies, the Committee requested that agencies provide specific additional commentary on the following areas of focus:
- Cyber resilience and cyber assurance processes, including how internal systems are assessed against common standards, details of that assessment, common trends in this area, and future challenges in this space.
- Financial management and efficiency, including opportunities for efficiencies, cost savings, how value for money is considered and opportunities for collaboration across the NIC.
- Strategic workforce planning activities and initiatives, including long-term recruitment planning, attracting and retaining specialised skill sets, and initiatives directed at diversity and inclusion.
- Governance and compliance systems, including an overview of the systems and processes in place to ensure compliance with legislative provisions, how agencies engage with relevant oversight bodies, and any current and future challenges in this space.
- Most of the submissions received for the review were classified, and are therefore not publicly available. However, unclassified excerpts or summaries from these submissions are used in the report.
- As part of its submission ASIO provided the Committee with information concerning authorisations for telecommunications data pursuant to paragraphs 94(2A)(c)-(j) of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). It is a function of the Committee to review matters related to the retained data activities of ASIO that are included in this part of ASIO’s annual report, for the sole purpose of assessing and making recommendations on the overall operation and effectiveness of the mandatory data retention regime. Unlike its other functions, the Committee is authorised to review particular ASIO operations for the purpose of performing this function.
- This report is divided into three chapters:
- The remainder of Chapter 1 provides an overview of the security environment for the 2021-22 review period.
- Chapter 2 discusses the administration expenditure and financial position of the intelligence agencies, and any related issues that were identified during the course of the inquiry.
- Chapter 3 discusses the areas of focus identified by the Committee for this review period, as well as any other observations noted in the course of the review.
The security environment during 2021-2022
1.19ASIO indicated that Australia’s security environment remained ‘complex, challenging and changing’ during the reporting period.
1.20ASIO said that espionage and foreign interference ‘overtook terrorism as Australia’s principal security concern’ during the reporting period and that more Australians were being targeted by foreign intelligence services than at ‘any time in this country’s history’.
1.21Multiple countries were ‘aggressively’ seeking information about Australia’s strategic capabilities, economic and policy priorities, research and development, and defence technologies, primarily through cyber vectors, during the reporting period. However, ASIO considered that as international borders reopened after the decline of the COVID-19 pandemic, foreign intelligence services would resume intelligence gathering ‘in person, on location in Australia’.
1.22ASIO also reported that foreign governments were attempting to interfere in Australia by harassing diaspora communities, and making efforts to shape political and business decision-making to their advantage. ASIO said
These attempts are occurring in all states and territories, at all levels of government, on all sides of politics and in the private sector.
1.23The national terrorism threat level remained at PROBABLE during the reporting period, meaning:
… credible intelligence, assessed to represent a plausible scenario, indicated an intention and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia.
1.24ASIO reported that the threats posed by religiously motivated violent extremists and ideologically motivated violent extremists remained real. Specific-issue motivated violent extremism grew during COVID-19, however ASIO noted that the majority of the grievances were expressed peacefully – with a small number of exceptions that triggered ASIO’s interest.
1.25ASIO indicated that:
The most likely terrorist attack scenario continues to be a lone actor attack without warning and using a rudimentary and readily available weapon such as a knife or vehicle.
1.26ASIO discussed Australia’s security environment during the period in the ASIO Annual Report 2021-22 and also in the Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment, both of which are publicly available.