2. Survivor Experience

2.1
Since the First Interim Report was finalised in May 2020, the Committee continued to receive evidence from survivors that the National Redress Scheme (NRS) was not meeting their expectations. Noting the need for improvement, the Department of Social Services (DSS) continues to make efforts to improve survivor experience. The DSS has committed to decrease processing times and improve communication and engagement between survivors and the NRS.
2.2
This chapter examines changes introduced by DSS, the engagement with First Nations survivors, and the effectiveness of redress support services as they relate to overall survivor experience.

Strategic Success Measures

2.3
One way the NRS has sought to improve survivor experience is through the introduction of strategic success measures (the measures). The measures collect data and identify where more research is needed in relation to improving survivor experience, health of the NRS and equity of access.1 Specific elements include data on application timelines, application progress, and participation for both survivors and institutions. The measures were agreed in April 2020 by the Ministers’ Redress Scheme Governance Board (Ministers’ Board) and are available to view on the NRS website.2 Since that time, two sets of data have been released. The first in October 2020, and the second in July 2021. NRS operational data is also included in DSS Annual Reports.
2.4
A clear trend has not yet emerged in relation to the number of applications received by the NRS. In the first year, 4,180 applications were received, with numbers falling to 3,125 in the second year, and increasing to 3,773 in the third year of operation, bringing the total number of applications to 11,078.3 The lower number of applications received in the second year of operations may reflect the challenges survivors faced with submitting applications during COVID-19.
2.5
The NRS engaged an actuarial firm that used the first two years of operating data to provide advice on the expected total number of expected applications to be received. The advice estimates that 32,000 applications may be expected during the life of the NRS.4 This represents a notable difference from the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse’s finding that 60,000 survivors would be eligible to access a redress scheme.
2.6
Application determination timelines are improving, although not currently meeting the DSS identified metric for success which is that ‘at least 80 per cent of applications that name institutions that participate in the NRS have a decision communicated within six months’.5 In the first year of operation only 11 per cent of applications were determined within six months, 19 per cent of applications were determined within nine months and 23 per cent were finalised within a year of being received.6
2.7
In the second year of operation, the rate of applications determined within six months fell slightly to 10 per cent, but the rate of determinations for nine and 12 months both increased to 27 and 46 per cent respectively.7 While this represents improvement, total NRS average waiting periods remain at 12.5 months for a standard application and 13.4 months for a priority application.8
2.8
In the third year of operation a total of 3,240 determinations were made.9 This is consistent with the 3,195 determinations made within the second year of operation.10 Despite an increase in determinations, the number of applications deemed ineligible did not increase, and dropped from 136 in the second year to 66 ineligible applications in the third year.11
2.9
As at 10 September 2021, a total of 1,909 applications had been received by the NRS, 5,210 are being processed, and 6,307 have been finalised, with 3,283 applications finalised during the third year of NRS operation.12
2.10
The NRS commissioned research so that the strategic success measures could report on the survivor journey. In October 2020, the measures stated that a survey developed by DSS and WhereTo Research would collect the data needed for the NRS to measure key elements of the survivor journey.13 The update in July 2021 notes that the survey failed to be statistically valid due to a low response rate:
The redress survivors survey, part of the measure for the survivor journey, was conducted in March 2021. The survey has seen low uptake among survivors, and as a result there are not enough responses to the survey to be statistically valid.
To address the low participation in the survey, the Scheme has amended the acceptance documents inviting survivors to opt-in to the survivor survey. The survey will be more accessible, better communicated and promoted. The Scheme believes this will increase uptake for the new survey.14
2.11
The DSS confirmed that as of September 2021, WhereTo Research has been paid $146,833.50 to work on the survey.15

Application and Determination Process

2.12
Evidence to the inquiry noted that the introduction of a specialist care leaver team and a case management model were positive changes in the survivor experience of the NRS.16 Redress support services Micah Projects and the Child Migrants Trust agreed that the NRS is maturing and has improved in its second year of operation.17
2.13
The increasing number of applications being resolved is one aspect that can contribute to positive outcomes for survivors. Micah Projects explained:
I can tell you about an individual who recently received the maximum payment and has commenced plans to start his own small business. He says this is something he would never have had the opportunity to pursue if it hadn't been for an offer of redress. So I would suggest that, for him, that has the potential to be life-changing.18
2.14
Despite improvements, many survivors continue to experience trauma as a result of engaging with the NRS. Evidence noted that survivors can experience harm at every stage of the application process, and the subsequent long determination timelines. Survivor advocates such as Care Leavers Australasia Network (CLAN) suggest that a majority of survivors struggle with poorer mental health while engaging with the NRS:
There's a lot of depression. There's a lot of feeling that they're powerless, that they're worthless.19
2.15
Relationships Australia National Office (Relationships Australia) noted that the NRS practice of asking for specific abuse details and the significant amount of detailed documentation sought from survivors in applications contribute to survivors feeling that Independent Decision Makers (IDMs) do not believe survivor accounts.20
2.16
A survivor who was excluded from the NRS due to her foster care arrangement not being formally recognised by a state government, described the pain of being repeatedly asked personal questions by NRS staff:
I have had to relive traumatic childhood experiences and recall painful memories to explain my fostering and family situation time and time again to the people processing my claim at the redress scheme. It’s like I’m not being believed all over again. I am telling the truth. I had several unbelievable childhood experiences, some of which I’d rather not have to continue to recall, but it is what I experienced and endured as a child. I provided the relevant information in my application.21
2.17
The Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency (VACCA) outlined that there is a sense that claims are being tested to a beyond reasonable doubt standard, similar to that of a criminal matter.22 This is contrary to section 29 (2)(a) of the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (the Act) which provides that IDMs should approve an application if there is a ‘reasonable likelihood that the person is eligible for redress’.23
2.18
Relationships Australia suggested that the fear of an increased burden of proof starts to develop when survivors begin completing the application form:
The application form is premised on applicants discharging an onus of proof that echoes the widespread disbelief with which their earlier disclosures of abuse were too often met; the degree of particularisation urged on applicants seems excessive having regard to the threshold of ‘reasonable likelihood’ legislated by Parliament.24
2.19
The Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme (Second Year Review) heard similar feedback and considered the guidelines and policy documents used by IDMs. This is discussed in Chapter 6.
2.20
The In Good Faith Foundation (IGFF) observed that a person's experience of the NRS can be determined by their first point of contact. IGFF suggested that this finding highlights the importance of NRS staff being appropriately trained and resourced.25
2.21
Contract based staff previously formed the majority of employees in the NRS. As at 31 October 2020, 214 of the 349 staff in the Redress Group of DSS were employed through labour hire arrangements. Only 130 were ongoing Australian Public Service (APS) employees.26 By August 2021, the number of permanent APS employees increased to 229. Additionally, 17 APS staff were engaged in a non-ongoing capacity. The number of non-APS contract staff had fallen to 77.27
2.22
Evidence suggested that survivor mental health can significantly deteriorate when an application is not approved. CLAN highlighted that a negative determination can make an applicant feel like they were not believed about the abuse or are at fault for what happened. CLAN explained the effect that this has on survivor mental health:
One of our members was going to kill herself the day she got a letter that was telling her she was not eligible for a redress payment and she'd waited two years for that.28
2.23
A large number of redress applicants spoke about the ongoing harm that arises from poor NRS communication practice. One survivor spoke about the difficulties he had when trying to understand who in the NRS was writing to him, and highlighted the challenges he faced when he tried to seek further information on the redress offer he received. The survivor also told the Committee that many of the letters he sent asking for clarification were never answered by the NRS.29
2.24
Survivors have repeatedly raised concerns that when they call the NRS they never get to speak to the same person and that they need to recount their information numerous times. DSS confirmed that although the case management model was suspended temporarily during the early phase of COVID-19, it has resumed. DSS state that ‘applicants are able to request to speak to their allocated case coordinator if they call the Scheme. All inbound calls are taken by the call handling team who are able to transfer the call to the relevant case coordinator.’30 This evidence does not reflect the experiences shared by survivors to the Committee.
2.25
The effect of re-traumatisation is not limited to applicants. CLAN highlighted that survivor’s families can also be impacted:
Redress is very traumatising for care leavers and their families who are the silent victims. We don't hear enough about the families who have to pick up the pieces or the care leavers who are not eligible for redress, who get rejected by redress, and those people need to be heard as well.31
2.26
IGFF explained that as there is no detailed threshold information publicly available on what behaviours meet the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, most survivors understandably believe that their experience of sexual abuse justifies the maximum payment amount. This can create trauma when an offer is received and it is less than expected:
Survivors who were made offers that fall far short of this highest level of redress are often deeply disturbed by this. Almost universally, those survivors are profoundly damaged by their abuse and many struggle with what they see as a failure to truly acknowledge the damage that's been done. IGFF works actively with the survivors to manage their expectations, and this would be much easier if the eligibility for the payout levels was communicated more clearly, published and made available to survivors.32
2.27
The Queensland Law Society suggested that the ‘absence of guidance for survivors explaining how determinations are made fuels concerns about a lack of transparency in the decision making process’.33
2.28
Divergent decisions and apparent inconsistency of decision-making contribute to fears of a lack of transparency within the NRS. VACCA explained:
[W]e're seeing a very strange kind of inconsistency. Some clients will receive $100,000. Some clients will receive $150,000. When we compare applications, we think: 'What was the extreme circumstance? How did they define that?'34
2.29
CLAN provided another example of institutional child sexual abuse that would appear to meet the threshold of extreme circumstances that was not determined as such:
We put in the revocation ... It stayed the same. He was seven years of age when he was sodomized 12 times. How can that not be seen as extreme circumstances? I don't understand it.35
2.30
knowmore confirmed that they are also concerned about consistency with practitioners noting that ‘there are some survivors from similar institutions that experienced similar abuse but not the consistency in the payments that you would expect.’36
2.31
Between the start of the NRS and 31 December 2020, approximately 230 reviews were sought.37 This equates to almost 10 per cent of total applications. Of the finalised reviews, there were 13 decisions amended on the basis of eligibility and 26 reviews resulted in an increased award payment. One review has resulted in a decrease due to an error in calculating the indexation on a prior payment in the original decision.38
2.32
A revocation allows a survivor to make a new application with additional information. DSS confirmed that at 16 September 2021, there have been 93 revocations accepted by the NRS. Of these, 65 have led to an increase in the redress payment, six have led to a decrease in the redress payment, 10 have led to no change in the redress payment and 12 are currently being determined.39
2.33
DSS confirmed that of the six revocations that have led to a decrease in the offer of redress payment, one was due to the applicant providing further information as they believed the offer of redress reflected a level of abuse that was higher than that which they experienced. The remaining five were due to the applicant receiving a larger financial redress payment in a settlement with the relevant institution after their initial offer of redress from the NRS.40
2.34
The appropriateness of current review processes is considered in Chapter 3. Review processes were also considered by the Second Year Review, which is discussed in Chapter 6.
2.35
In the second year of NRS operation, 10 survivors declined an offer of redress, while in the third year of operation, from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 that figure rose slightly to 13.41 Further, 320 applications have been withdrawn by survivors to December 2020.42 No reasons have been provided to explain the high number of withdrawals.
2.36
The Second Year Review found that 424 applications are on hold due to reasons other than institutions not participating, 135 are on hold at the request of the applicant, and 114 applicants are not contactable to the NRS.43 This raises equity concerns for survivors that might live in areas without a phone or internet access.
2.37
As of 30 June 2021, 1,054 of applications received within the first two years of the NRS have yet to progress to an outcome.44 This is largely due to institutions that have not yet, or only recently joined the NRS, as well as survivors placing their applications on hold, or difficulty contacting survivors.

Privacy Concerns

2.38
The Committee heard that survivors held fears related to applicant privacy. Concerns related to standard processes which, in some cases, may allow an institution’s insurance company to view part three of the application form. Part three often contains intimate details that are highly sensitive. Additionally, media reports of administrative privacy breaches may also be impacting survivor perceptions.
2.39
CLAN highlighted that not knowing who may see your story has a negative impact on survivors:
They don't like the fact their part 3 goes to the insurance companies and the institutions, because they don't know how many pairs of eyes see their most personal and private information.45
2.40
The Second Year Review confirmed that there are ‘no guarantees’.46 DSS noted that while institutions are not prohibited from sharing information with their insurance companies, DSS are not aware of any occasions where this has occurred.47
2.41
In October 2020, DSS provided detail around the 10 notifiable privacy breaches that had occurred. In these cases, there were instances of personal information being sent to the incorrect applicant, personal information being sent to the incorrect institution, and information not being appropriately redacted prior to being sent to the intended recipient.48 By March 2021, the number of notifiable breaches had increased to 13.49 All breaches were identified as unauthorised disclosures of both personal and protected information in accordance with the Privacy Act 1988.
2.42
In the first two years of operation there were 98 occasions where some information was provided to the wrong institution.50 Mrs Silvia Skinner from Bravehearts detailed some concerning experiences:
We've seen some really concerning things happening, with our clients receiving letters from other survivors or our own clients. There have been serious breaches of privacy because of some mistakes that we believe might be due to the ICT system.51
2.43
In response to the breaches, DSS wrote letters of apology to applicants and introduced the following measures to prevent further breaches occurring:
Refresher training for staff on application processing processes and privacy.
Directives to staff, reiterating the importance of appropriate handling of information, and obligations relating to privacy.
Enhanced quality assurance processes at various application processing stages.
Changes to the application forms to clarify applicant intent.52
2.44
In September 2021, the Committee sought updated information regarding privacy breaches. DSS did not provide a response to the Committee prior to the publication of this report.

Committee Comment

2.45
The Committee appreciates that are NRS officials are committed to improving the operation of the NRS and actively working towards ensuring that engagement does no harm to survivors or their families. Despite ongoing efforts, many survivors continue to report that engaging with the NRS is harmful to their mental wellbeing. The Committee strongly agrees that reform is needed to improve survivor experience.
2.46
The Committee also acknowledges the efforts undertaken to improve data collection and transparency through the production of strategic success measures. It is disappointing to note that despite a significant financial investment, the survivor experience journey failed to capture useful information that could have provided helpful insight on how to improve the NRS.
2.47
Additionally, the Committee considers that NRS performance measures need to be broadened to include basic operational matters such as how long it is taking staff to return survivor phone calls, and monitoring how many different staff are speaking to a survivor throughout the application lifecycle. These smaller elements come together to collectively have a significant impact on overall survivor experience of the NRS. The Committee believes that DSS should use the commissioned survivor journey research to guide the collection of additional data and performance indicators.
2.48
The Committee agrees that inconsistency of decisions is a concern that can have significant impacts upon survivor mental health and public perceptions of the NRS. DSS should actively consider current guidelines, procedures and community education materials to ensure that survivors understand what is being considered and how decisions are made.
2.49
The Committee also agrees that further investigation is needed to understand why survivors are withdrawing from the NRS, requesting that their application be put on hold or ceasing communication with the NRS. It should be in the interest of the NRS to determine whether applicants are making these decisions for self-identified positive reasons, rather than a need to disengage with the NRS for the sake of their mental health.
2.50
Whilst there is a detailed discussion of the Second Year Review findings in Chapter 6, the Committee notes the review received evidence that aligns with the evidence presented to the Committee during the inquiry period. The Committee agrees with the Second Year Review conclusion that the need for improvement is urgent. Areas that require priority consideration include addressing the ongoing concerns associated with the application form, clarifying the standard of proof and level of evidence required by IDMs in determining an application and improving the collection of data.
2.51
The Committee acknowledges that many changes require agreement from state and territory jurisdictions and that this can take time. However, not all changes need to be implemented at once. The Committee strongly encourages DSS to identify the simple reforms that would improve survivor engagement most and expedite implementation of these measures. Reforms such as making the application form more accessible for people with disabilities and more culturally appropriate for First Nations survivors should be implemented immediately.

First Nations Survivor Experience

Aboriginal people are not applying because they are not being supported to apply.53
2.52
Many redress support services including both First Nations specific organisations and general support services raised concerns in relation to the operation of the NRS for First Nations survivors.
2.53
A low level of cultural awareness within the NRS was identified as an underlying problem. Relationships Australia Northern Territory suggested that the panel of IDMs may understand trauma in a general sense, but lack an ‘understanding of the lived experience of First Nations people, particularly in remote communities’.54 Relationships Australia Northern Territory explained that this creates concerns ‘given the historical context and connection between independent decision-makers, their lived experience, their family links and historical links to colonists’.55 The Healing Foundation also raised concerns, stating:
Unfortunately, our experience is that not all aspects of the redress process are survivor focused, accessible, culturally safe and meet the needs of particularly vulnerable survivors.56
2.54
knowmore agreed with this sentiment, suggesting that IDMs need cultural awareness training to ensure they possess the requisite skills to assess applications through a cultural lens.57 VACCA noted that any training should be provided by Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations.58
2.55
Relationships Australia suggested that current arrangements are not adequate due to a lack of appropriate cultural consideration when the NRS was established:
A national Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Engagement Strategy should have been developed at the outset. Instead, Redress Support Services are now being asked by the Scheme to develop regional engagement strategies within the existing service delivery funding.59
2.56
This was also expressed by the Healing Foundation who highlighted that the situation has changed, and the NRS is now in a position to make positive change:
We're fortunate now it's all there. We've got the lived experience viewpoints, we've got the data analysis from experts in the health and wellbeing space, and we've got views on what needs to happen. But we're all working with a scheme that didn't have this information in its design phase, so the opportunity to redesign is important.60
2.57
It was also suggested that the NRS does not fully understand the practical challenges facing survivors who live in remote communities who may not have reliable access to support services, internet, or government shopfronts:
A lot of our survivors are actually homeless, so it may take us a day just to find where they are actually living at any one time. Plus, they can move from house to house or shift between communities as well. So it can often take hours or days to locate them. During COVID-19 and also during the wet season, this can become even more difficult.61
2.58
The need for survivors to produce identification documentation was provided as an example of how the administration practices underpinning the NRS can disproportionally disincentive First Nations survivors from applying. It was suggested that up to 25 potential First Nations applicants in the Northern Territory were impacted at the beginning of the application process.62 Kimberley Stolen Generation Aboriginal Corporation (KSGAC) illustrated:
For us, providing ID would be a simple thing to do, but, for a lot of Aboriginal people, it isn't. They don't have birth certificates. Some weren't even born in hospitals. Getting a birth certificate, especially in remote areas like the Kimberley, is a journey that we have to work through with them. They can't do it on their own. It's too difficult for them. Remote communities have no support whatsoever. … Living in a remote community, there's no way that you could get that information unless somebody was there helping you through that process, and that's not always the case. This is the reason why Aboriginal people are finding it difficult to apply and why the number of applications is so low.63
2.59
Relationships Australia Northern Territory shared two additional concerning examples where the NRS did not fully account for cultural sensitivities. The first involved a woman who was told to receive her direct personal representation from a state-based government department which had a poor historical connection to First Nations culture. The NRS did not take into account that the historical link may be a trigger for the survivor.64
2.60
The second example was a serious privacy breach. In this case, it was suggested that the NRS failed to recognise the very significant impact that this breach had, firstly, on the client and, secondly, on her support network and those people that she was institutionalised with.65 It was suggested that the effect of the privacy breach in the community resulted in widespread distrust of the NRS within the region.
2.61
KSGAC suggested that First Nations survivors are not being provided enough time and support to understand what details the NRS requires and why certain information is important. This is leading to misunderstanding and poor outcomes that could easily be avoided:
Contact from the NRS is often more traumatising for Aboriginal survivors because they don't always understand what is being said and often misinterpret or just agree and say that they do understand, for fear of being thought of as stupid. What I mean there is that the NRS will call the survivor directly and ask them questions that they don't understand, when we've put in the application that they have to go through with our redress officer because the survivors don't understand the questions.66
2.62
Relationships Australia Northern Territory identified that improvements are needed in relation to communication tools and resources, suggesting that existing communication resources are text dense and are not accessible to people with limited numeracy and literacy. The creation of ‘audio visual or visual aids and resources such as story cards and the development of videos would be useful in communicating the message of the scheme’.67
2.63
The NRS is attempting to address this shortcoming. On 17 May 2021, a new set of resources was added to the NRS website. It includes posters with information about the NRS and a video called ‘Martin’s Story’ which discusses a First Nations survivor navigating the NRS.68
2.64
In December 2020, DSS confirmed that a specialised team had been formed to address the issues identified. The team commenced in June 2020:
The National Redress Scheme (Scheme) has established an Indigenous Service Delivery Stream (ISDS). This positions the Scheme to be culturally understanding when working with Indigenous applicants, and builds trust and understanding with the Scheme, responding to the cultural needs of applicants. The ISDS team comprises staff who identify as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander who provide specialist case handling for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The ISDS also engages with the Scheme’s Redress Support Services to provide coordinated support for Indigenous applicants.69
2.65
VACCA agreed that the creation of the specialist team has helped engagement stating:
Ngarra Jarra Noun was assigned two case managers who are committed and available. The scheme has taken on board our specific requests on how to engage with our clients. An example of this is starting off the phone calls with an acknowledgement of country.70
2.66
Mr Jahmayne Coolwell, Team Leader for the culturally specific service, Danila Dilba based in Darwin, also noted that engagement on a personal level with NRS staff is effective and responsive:
I found that my engagement with regard to DSS and the team there—they've been really open to hearing feedback and adjusting as we've gone along.71
2.67
The Healing Foundation also noted that some positive feedback had been received in relation to redress support services developing their own new networks:
Feedback from survivors and support services suggests that the implementation of the scheme has been most effective in creating referral pathways, generally promoting the scheme, acknowledging trauma and making support and counselling more available to survivors.72

Participation

2.68
Submissions suggest that low levels of cultural awareness within the NRS have contributed to poor First Nations participation rates. KSGAC explained how applying for redress sits within the broader context of previous government compensation programs, and how this effects current participation rates:
Even though they're still given the opportunity to apply, they don't want to do that. A lot of them, especially the stolen generation mob, have given their stories to the Bringing them home report and they've given their stories to other things that have come about. They're just tired of telling their stories with very little outcome. … So, when you ask them to tell their story again and say, yes, they're going to be compensated, they're very wary about those statements, and rightly so.73
2.69
Relationships Australia noted that the rate of survivor participation from the Northern Territory does not correlate with the rate of previous institutional involvement suggesting that this raises questions about the adequateness of the NRS engagement with First Nations communities.74 For example, there are cultural prohibitions which prevent some First Nations applicants from disclosing sexual abuse to people who are not First Nations people, of the same or other genders, from certain family groups or a person who is younger than the applicant.75 At present, it is unclear how the NRS takes these considerations into account.
2.70
Mr Coolwell highlighted that service provider choice is essential to increasing participation due to cultural norms relating to the disclosure of abuse. Mr Coolwell stated:
Talking with members of the community, they've appreciated the fact that in Darwin there is that option. We acknowledge that there might be community members that don't feel comfortable coming and talking to us directly, whether it's because they have family that work here et cetera, but then that option of going to Relationships Australia is a valuable one because they're still able to get that assistance. Likewise, the other way around, there may be conflicts within Relationships Australia and so they can come to us.76
2.71
There was a suggestion that more First Nations survivors would apply if increased communication and support was extended to regional and remote areas.77 It was noted that this would result in redress support services needing to spend more time in communities to build relationships.78 As with all survivors, support would need to continue for the whole application cycle, including the direct personal representation. These considerations are further discussed in relation to redress support service funding arrangements.
2.72
Relationships Australia also raised that healthy participation in the NRS requires a baseline level of needs, such as housing, first being met:
If we have a client who has unstable housing or there is domestic and family violence present, we will often try and address this with the client through collaborative case management with other services before we start unpacking their childhood trauma, to ensure that people are in the best place they could be to talk about a really difficult subject.79
2.73
The NRS has expanded upon initial Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander survivor engagement efforts. Actions taken have included:
Establishing a specialist engagement team for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander applicants.
Launching more accessible communication materials on the Scheme website.
Implementing a communication and engagement plan for Indigenous Australians living in Northern Australia.
Hosting a Survivor Roundtable in Darwin on 15 June 2021 focused on Indigenous engagement.
Engaging the Healing Foundation to provide advice, assistance and culturally appropriate community-based support and materials to other support services, including access to interpreting and cultural translation services.
Developing a national toolkit for redress support services.80
2.74
As part of this work, DSS engaged an Indigenous public relations consultant to undertake media and community engagement activities. DSS state that the outcomes of this work included:
English-language community service announcements on over 112 Indigenous radio stations throughout northern Australia.
Translated community service announcements on over 63 Indigenous radio stations in the NT and Kimberley.
Live reads on over 96 Indigenous radio stations throughout northern Australia
Redress Support Service interviews with four key national or regional radio programs, reaching over 102 Indigenous radio stations nationally.81

Direct Personal Response

2.75
KSGAC explained that asking First Nations survivors about receiving a direct personal response can affect them significantly given the complex history with institutions and government agencies.82 Due to this, it was suggested that separate DPR processes and guidelines need to be considered for First Nations survivors.
2.76
Whilst there have not been a lot of DPRs undertaken with First Nations survivors due to the low number of finalised applications, the Committee heard that lessons have been learnt in relation to delivery. Relationships Australia Northern Territory provided an example which highlighted the need for flexibility and understanding:
Whilst most institutions are flexible in their delivery of a direct personal response, we have certainly had experiences where institutions have been poorly trained in the delivery and in engaging with clients. So in an attempt to provide greater emotional safety, we make that first contact so that clients are not offended or not spoken to harshly. Certainly we had one applicant who had requested a slightly out-of-the-normal direct personal response. When we contacted that institution to discuss this and see whether it might be possible, the response was: what more do these people want?83

Specialised Redress Support Services

2.77
There are urgent calls for the increased provision of specialist redress support services for First Nations survivors. KSGAC stated:
Support and training for staff and support services has been ad hoc. This, in turn, has impacted our ability to provide the best possible support, advice and advocacy in their application process.84
2.78
DSS provided detail on the support offered to First Nations applicants through First Nations specific providers. In the first two years of operation, First Nations redress support services assisted 814 clients, which comprised 6,296 support sessions.85 In a positive trend, this increased in the third year of operation with the eight First Nations redress support services assisting 1,131 clients, through 12,238 support sessions, including healing camps.86
2.79
DSS notes that many First Nations survivors receive support from mainstream services. In the first two years of operation almost 1,000 First Nations applicants accessed mainstream services.87

Counselling and psychological care

2.80
In relation to the provision of counselling and psychological support services for First Nations survivors two primary concerns emerged. The first is the lack of culturally appropriate services available, and the second is the limited scope of services provided. VACCA explained:
To provide the full benefit to survivors on their healing journey, counselling and psychological care must be available from the beginning of their rigorous journey, it must be available across the lifetime of the survivor, and it must be available to survivors' family.88
2.81
Noting that redress support services can seek permission and funding from the NRS to provide culturally sensitive models,89 the widespread introduction of culturally specific counselling and psychological care services was identified as an urgent need:
Aboriginal people don't see counselling the same way non-Indigenous people do. They're not going to go to a counsellor and sit down and talk about their issues. That's not what works for them and it's not culturally appropriate for them either.90
2.82
VACCA submitted research conducted by La Trobe University which concluded that ‘cultural healing has positive impacts on the social and emotional wellbeing of Aboriginal survivors.’91
2.83
The shortage of specialist psychological service providers in regional and remote areas was also identified as a need, with details of current shortages across Australia. Yokai provided an example from Western Australia:
There are issues around the remote areas and regional areas of Western Australia. We understand that there aren't any service providers capable of dealing with the counselling and psychological needs of some...92
2.84
The flow on effect of a shortage of specialist services is an increase of pressure on existing health services. This was illustrated by People with Disability Australia (PWDA) in relation to NSW:
We've managed to make really good connections with the Aboriginal health services in Broken Hill and Tamworth, and they're very excited to be working with us. The big issue in these areas is the lack of victim services counsellors to provide psychological support for people going through the process. Both these medical services have offered to provide counselling. They've promoted the work that we're doing and have got the word out to all of their clients. They realise that these people need psychological support. So while they're not funded through the scheme to provide that support, they have taken it on, off their own bat, because they think this is something that's really important. They will provide the psychological support and counselling and we as an advocacy service can assist people with the nitty-gritty of filling out the applications.93
2.85
There is also significant need for the provision of specialised financial counselling services, as explained by VACCA:
Culturally informed and culturally safe financial counselling provided by Aboriginal organisations is desperately needed, and timing is critical. Having access to counselling prior to a determination is what is needed.94
2.86
The Healing Foundation noted that First Nations redress support services would benefit from extra knowledge around financial options in order to provide survivors with general advice.95 KSGAC highlighted that the consequences of not providing financial counselling can include elder abuse and bullying so services need to be able to work with survivors before payments are made to prevent issues arising.96

Legal advice

2.87
The need for culturally specific legal providers was raised. The Healing Foundation reported that First Nations survivors experience harm when dealing with legal firms that are not culturally aware:
We hear from the service providers and survivors after the fact about the additional trauma that legal firms have added to them or provided them. While they have offered to hold their hand, these legal firms know very little about trauma and its origins for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and are ill equipped to provide healing centred approaches.97
2.88
The Northern Territory (NT) government noted that ‘many survivors want to sit down, face-to-face, and discuss their eligibility, especially with legal services, but there are no legal services or redress support services available to people in rural and remote areas’.98
2.89
There was also evidence that private law firms may be targeting First Nations survivors in the absence of culturally appropriate local options being known within communities. While discussed in depth in Chapter 4, the Healing Foundation noted that exploitative practice is widespread and a result of poor community education:
Stolen Generation survivors have reported that private law firms have been proactively contacting them to promote their services in a predatory manner. Unfortunately, many survivors are unaware there are other alternatives available to them.99
2.90
VACCA suggested that a specialist First Nations legal service would be able to ensure that First Nations survivors are supported in a culturally appropriate manner, and that applications are written in a way that is understood by IDMs who may not appreciate some cultural nuances within applications from First Nations survivors.100 Yokai highlighted that accessibility of current and future services must be a consideration:
… generally speaking knowmore is an online service provider. This is very tricky for some of our members who don't have the ability to interface online or struggle to access the information online.101

Cultural awareness

2.91
There are tangible negative consequences for both survivors and their communities when redress support services are not provided in a culturally aware manner. The multitude of effects were explained by Micah Projects:
For a mainstream organisation to enter into a community and advertise their remit, a potential applicant in a smaller community knows that, if someone sees them engaging with a redress support service, they do so detailing a history of sexual abuse. We've encountered issues on a number of occasions where the perpetrator is still a member of that community and could easily identify their victim's level of engagement in the process. That's why I think it's essential to work in partnership with members and organisations of those relevant communities and Indigenous services to navigate through these difficulties.102
2.92
There were concerns about how redress service providers have been chosen, particularly in regional and remote areas, noting that mainstream services may not be able to provide the service needed. KSGAC stated:
DSS have funded organisations with little to no experience working with Aboriginal people, especially those who may speak English as a second, third or even fourth language. The dissemination of information was done with no interaction with Aboriginal people around the wording of the brochures or media campaigns to ensure that they were relevant.103
2.93
Concerns about how providers were chosen to work with First Nations survivors were echoed by VACCA who noted that funding to culturally specific redress support services is less than 25 per cent of all funding provided to redress support services despite First Nations survivors making up 25 per cent of all applicants.104
2.94
The Healing Foundation suggested that future improvements should include both building workforce capacity and the provision of additional resources to ensure culturally safe responses to address complex needs:
Organisations supporting Stolen Generation survivors are resilient and resourceful, but they are struggling to meet demand.105
2.95
There were also concerns raised that while mainstream redress support services try to work in a culturally appropriate way, there are ongoing challenges in relation to both accessibility and cultural awareness for First Nations survivors. KSGAC highlighted what this means for survivors in practice with the following example:
Organisations such as Relationships Australia, expect survivors to apply for the National Redress Scheme either online or over the phone. Internet or phone access in some communities is problematic. Kalumburu, for example, has one public phone box. An application through RAWA [Relationships Australia Western Australia] would be via a computer at the business centre or public phone. There is no privacy.106

Funding

2.96
The need for specialised funding streams to meet the needs of First Nations survivors was consistently raised by First Nations service providers.
2.97
Link Up Queensland gave an example of their counselling service working across the breadth of Queensland with only one staff member.107 Link-Up NSW also only has one counsellor working across most of the state.108
2.98
The need for funding to recognise that applying for redress is a long, circular, and traumatic process was strongly supported by all First Nations redress support services who gave evidence.109
2.99
Further, it was suggested that current funding does not recognise that First Nations survivors have additional needs which require additional support in the redress application process given the history of forced removal.110
2.100
KSCAG also spoke of the confusion that surrounds funding and the poor outcomes that have arisen as a result. They gave the following example when the NRS asked them to expand their service area:
We were asked to put in a budget for the additional funds. We did that, but we didn't include the funds that we had already been in receipt of, because we didn't know that we had to. So they have given us the money for the additional scope of work but have taken away the existing funding that we had previously. To me, that's nonsensical. Now they've given us a job to do, but they've tied our hands behind our back.111
2.101
KSCAG highlighted that the funding limitations affect both survivors and the staff who support them:
We have one team leader and two redress support officers who are funded, and one counsellor that we're funding at the moment through rollover funding that we have. The counsellor position isn't funded through the scheme, and that's not good enough. Everybody knows that when you're going through this type of thing there needs to be a counsellor on hand to assist not just the survivor but also the staff who are hearing these stories. Most of the survivors we work with are either illiterate or semi-illiterate, so our staff have to actually transcribe their stories. They are hearing these stories. So we have to provide a lot of counselling not just to the survivors but also to our staff.112
2.102
KSGAC explained the effect limited funding has on the ground for people who wish to apply with the support of a First Nations specific provider:
We have one community, based in east Kimberley, where there are between 12 and 15 survivors who are waiting for us to receive the funding so that they can put an application in with us because they don't want to use the current two service providers. That's just one community.113
2.103
Additionally, when acknowledging the need for additional specific community education materials, it was suggested that First Nations redress support services need to be given primary consideration for any project and design grants:
[T]here is a tendency to fund mainstream organisations to do this on behalf of us as ACCHOs [Aboriginal Controlled Community Health Organisations]. Then they reach out to us and say: 'Oh, by the way, we've got all this funding. We're not going to give you any of it, but can you run some groups, co-design messaging and test it for us?' If you don't give us the money, we end up doing all this volunteer work for mainstream… they have written an amazing tender and then we do all the legwork for them. … I would highly recommend that we cut out the middleman, ask our own communities what they want and need, and test the messaging ourselves.114

Committee Comment

2.104
The Committee agrees that the lack of cultural awareness within the NRS contributes to lower participation numbers and poorer engagement outcomes for First Nations survivors. It is important that DSS has recognised this shortcoming and has taken action to address deficiencies in culturally appropriate community education materials and activities.
2.105
At the core of trauma informed practice is choice. While some First Nations survivors seek culturally specific services, the Committee acknowledges that cultural practices, such as not disclosing abuse to family members, may also be a reason for applicants feeling more comfortable with mainstream support options. The Committee agrees that there is currently limited choice available for First Nations survivors.
2.106
The Committee does not agree that it is a reasonable expectation for any survivor to choose between the local service that may be connected to family, or having to complete the process on the one public phone within the community. The Committee strongly agrees that greater consideration of locally accessible services is needed in regional and rural areas to ensure that survivors are able to make a considered choice of service support provider.
2.107
Equally, the Committee is highly concerned by administrative barriers preventing First Nations access to the NRS. Consideration of what identification documents are required by the NRS must be examined. If a person is known to other government services, the NRS should be able to use that existing information to move forward. The Committee believes that there is merit in examining the application form and the potential of creating a form specifically designed to reflect cultural needs.
2.108
Funding arrangements for all redress support services must be reconsidered in this context. All services need to be funded in a way that adequately supports fulsome on the ground support of both survivors and staff.

Recommendation 1

2.109
The Committee recommends the establishment of a First Nations panel to provide specific advice to the National Redress Scheme on:
the design and implementation of cultural safety principles and practice; and
the development and implementation of an intensive education campaign across regional, rural, and remote communities to drive awareness and improve access to the National Redress Scheme for First Nations people.

Effectiveness of Redress Support Services

2.110
It is essential that redress support services are able to meet the varied and often complex needs of survivors. Evidence presented suggests that current services are not adequately supported to be accessible to all survivors or provide holistic assistance from the time of first inquiry to the provision of a DPR. For example, PWDA raised that:
… we have found that disability tends to be treated in certain contexts as an ‘add-on’ or ‘special’ category by the Scheme and mainstream support services rather than being rightly acknowledged as central to the Scheme. There is a sense that the needs of people with disability can be largely met through specialist Redress support services such as PWDA. Limited funding and resources make this impossible’.115

Availability and Accessibility

2.111
The strategic success measures include a redress support service accessibility heatmap, that overlays applicant locations to the service reach of redress support services. The map shows where larger numbers of applicants live and where services are concentrated.116 The heatmap shows large parts of Australia do not have access to services which are predominantly based in capital cities.
2.112
The suggestion of discrimination was raised by PWDA in light of the limited services available in regional and rural areas.117
2.113
Further, consecutive strategic success measures highlight a concerning trend. While there were very low levels of survivors engaging with support services in 2020, the percentages of applicants accessing services fell in 2021.118
Table 2.1:  Percentage of applicants engaging redress support services
Applicants
October 2020
July 2021
Aged 70 or older
8%
8%
First Nations
15%
12%
People with a disability
28%
22%
People living in a rural or remote location
18%
14%
Source: DSS, Strategic Success Measures October 2020 and July 2021.
2.114
The DSS 2020-21 Annual Report state that over half of applicants were supported to apply for the NRS. Approximately 30 per cent were supported by a redress support service, and approximately 25 per cent were supported by knowmore.119 Two thirds of survivors supported self-identified as being a care leaver, having a disability or being a First Nations survivor.
2.115
Community education continues to be identified as requiring an urgent focus and greater resource allocation. PWDA highlighted that between July 2020 and July 2021, it conducted a range of education and awareness activities to 895 people from 286 different organisations, and of those only 21 people had ever heard of the NRS.120 Relationships Australia Northern Territory echoed this:
[T]here has been an improvement in engagement, but I believe that is more closely linked to the work of the support services around Australia rather than the Commonwealth government. We have worked very hard to raise awareness outside of the scope of our funding in terms of outreach, and awareness-raising has been a priority because if we don't do it, we don't have clients.121
2.116
KSGAC suggested that greater alignment with existing programs of work could have significant efficiency benefits, especially in regional and remote areas. KSGAC provided an example based on its current operations:
KSGAC already provide two regional programs, both of which include a service to many potential survivors outside our current scope. There was no thought process in rolling out the scheme. We've had lots and lots of conversations about being provided with the funding to roll out the scheme regionally, like our other two programs, and have been knocked back on every occasion.122
2.117
A psychologist noted concerns with current counselling and psychological services available for survivors. Ms Christabel Chamarette noted that she has ‘grave concerns about the quality of counselling’ available.123
Ms Chamarette suggested that there should be a pool of practitioners available for survivors and their families to access. The pool should include therapists who engage in a wide range of approaches so that survivors can self-determine what type of support they access.124

Financial Counselling

2.118
The lack of specialised financial counselling services for survivors was identified as an area requiring urgent consideration.
2.119
knowmore explained the role that financial counsellors play in a survivor journey:
It helps people to manage debt issues and to safeguard their payments and ultimately to get the maximum benefit out of any redress payment that they receive, which we think is the policy outcome that of course everyone wants to see.125
2.120
The National Debt Helpline (NDH) was listed as a redress support service in the first two years of the NRS operating without receiving any funding from DSS in order to provide a specialised service to survivors. The NDH was included on the list of support services solely as an acknowledgement that the existing service scope may assist survivors.
2.121
Representatives from Financial Counselling Australia (FCA), who operate the NDH, explained that the advertised 1800 phone line is managed by a number of mostly state-based organisations under the national banner of the NDH. Data on how many survivors have accessed the resource is unclear as it is held by the organisation that takes the initial call, but is likely to be around 60 a year.126
2.122
FCA noted that survivors represent complex engagements and that the level of service required to meet their needs is not able to be supported by the NDH without specific funding provided.127
2.123
When DSS confirmed that additional funding would not be provided, FCA supported the creation of a charity to fund a financial counselling service for survivors. knowmore was selected as the beneficiary. It provided client services directly to survivors, and offered professional development to other redress support services to strengthen their capacity to provide financial counselling services.128 knowmore also undertook systemic advocacy and stakeholder engagement with key bodies including the Australian Banking Association, major banks, and other peak bodies including hardship entities and hardship units in various financial and utility entities through the charitable grant.129
2.124
On 1 June 2021, a grant to knowmore for the provision of a financial counselling service was published on GrantConnect.130 DSS state:
The department has funded knowmore Legal Services $4.5 million over four years to 30 June 2024 to deliver free and independent financial counselling services to specifically support participants in the Scheme.131
2.125
Financial counselling was identified by knowmore as one tool to prevent bullying, abuse and manipulation following the receipt of a redress payment.
We've been hugely concerned around elder abuse as well and other kinds of stand-over tactics where we're seeing the pressure that's applied to people—emotional, physical or otherwise—about accessing their money.132
2.126
knowmore noted that even with its current service provision, gaps remain for survivors and in some of the redress support services that are dealing either with large numbers of redress applications or supporting specialist client groups including Aboriginal community controlled organisations.133
2.127
Mr Frank Golding suggested that the application or redress acceptance form could be amended to include a tick box, where survivors could indicate that they would like to receive financial counselling.134

Funding

2.128
As of 30 June 2021, $90 million has been provided for redress support services.135 A competitive grants round is currently open for the next four years of operation.
2.129
Redress support services suggested that current funding arrangements make it difficult to provide the level of service required, both in relation to the scope of support offered to survivors currently engaging with the NRS and promoting the NRS through community education.136
2.130
Micah Projects suggested that funding agreements need to recognise that community education is delicate work that requires long-term investment and dedicated resources. It is not a function that is ancillary to existing services. Noting that some redress support services received short-term funding designed to increase participation, it was questioned if a short term approach is the best way to engage with community education activities:
I think a service agreement that lasts for six months—it would be irresponsible for us or any service to engage with an Indigenous community, for example, or the deaf community or contemporary care leavers and say, 'This is what we're able to do; we can support you,' to then, potentially, find out that in six months time the funding won't continue, is a dangerous game to play, to really engage in that work when there's no security.137
2.131
Once the community is aware of the NRS, and survivors choose to pursue an application, services need the appropriate provision of resources to support applicants. Balancing community education and the provision of support is challenging. Micah Projects explained:
[W]e've been maintaining a waitlist that has been sitting at about the 100- or 110-person mark for the last six to seven months.138
The risk we run is that you go out and establish connections with people and then say, 'We've got a waitlist and it might be three or four months before we get back to you’.139
2.132
Micah Projects also highlighted that funding arrangements need to reflect the level of service required, noting that support does not stop when an offer of redress is made:
Initially, we were funded primarily to support people with their applications. But we've seen, over time, that that work has expanded to include supporting people through DPR processes, CPC [clinical prioritisation criteria] processes, and also supporting people with everything that comes up as a product of opening that Pandora's box and having to confront these histories of childhood sexual abuse.140
2.133
Victims Support Services South Australia highlighted that survivors need certainty and time to build trusting relationships. Current funding arrangements do not provide certainty for either the survivor or the service provider. This can impact the effectiveness of a trauma informed response.141
2.134
Relationships Australia spoke of how limited resourcing has a practical effect on survivors seeking psychological care:
[T]hey often want to continue counselling, post-outcome, with the practitioners with whom they have built trust and rapport during the course of their application. Some of our services are at capacity, but are ethically unable to discharge clients to free up capacity for new claimants. This has a flow on effect for wait times for all clients. Sometimes, clients want to at least continue while they weigh up the option of seeking a direct personal response. Some of our workers are carrying up to 100 clients each, at differing stages of progress through the application process.142
2.135
Relationships Australia noted that small changes, such as the introduction of a phone line for redress support services to access NRS staff would provide significant benefits, including efficiency.143
2.136
The NT government noted the challenges faced by redress support services operating in the NT, but considered the low rate of survivor access to redress support services of concern.144 The NT government also highlighted that currently funding is not linked to the amount of contact time with survivors or the number of applications processed.145

Committee Comment

2.137
The Committee is concerned at the current operation of redress support services. Current funding arrangements are not enabling services to adequately support the mental health and wellbeing of survivors for the application lifecycle. The need to adequately support staff is also paramount to the sustainability of the NRS. The Committee agrees that funding must be adequate for the period starting with consistent community-based education activities that are targeted and sensitive to local needs. Appropriate support must then be available for survivors, and their families, until the successful provision of a direct personal representation.
2.138
Given the low rate of survivor engagement with redress support services, the Committee considers that there would be value in a formal evaluation of redress support services with a view to costing appropriate funding for regional and rural provision, after-hours and weekend support, and ensuring that culturally appropriate support is available.
2.139
The Committee also agrees that there is merit in DSS considering a dedicated contact point for support services within the NRS. Significant efficiencies and greater clarity for survivors may be achieved through direct communication channels.

Recommendation 2

2.140
The Committee recommends that formal evaluation of redress support services be established to ensure that the needs of survivors and their families are being met through professional and timely engagement.

Recommendation 3

2.141
The Committee recommends that the National Redress Scheme engage additional redress support services in regional, rural and remote areas that offer face-to-face support.

Recommendation 4

2.142
The Committee recommends that the National Redress Scheme consider expanding current funding arrangements to provide after hours and weekend specialist services.

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
    Department of Social Services (DSS), Annual Report 2020-21, p. 160.
  • 4
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 46.
  • 5
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 53.
  • 6
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 43.
  • 7
    National Redress Scheme, Strategic Success Measures, October 2020, p. 4.
  • 8
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 43.
  • 9
    DSS, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 160.
  • 10
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 250.
  • 11
    DSS, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 160.
  • 12
    Australian Government, Australian Government response to the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme First Interim Report, First Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme April 2020, September 2021, p. 2.
  • 13
    National Redress Scheme, Strategic Success Measures, October 2020, p. 6.
  • 14
    National Redress Scheme, Strategic Success Measures, July 2021, p. 6.
  • 15
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000096, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 16
    Mrs Leonie Sheedy, Chief Executive Officer, Care Leavers Australasia Network (CLAN), Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 3.
  • 17
    Dr Margaret Humphreys, International Director and Mr Ian Thwaites, Assistance Director (Services), Child Migrant Trust, Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 20 and Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 26.
  • 18
    Mr Darcy Orr, Team Leader, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 26.
  • 19
    Mrs Sheedy, CLAN, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 2.
  • 20
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 5.
  • 21
    Name Withheld, Submission 51, p. 1.
  • 22
    Ms Hanina Rind, Senior Program Manager, Ngarra Jarra Noun, Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency (VACCA), Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 19.
  • 23
    National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth).
  • 24
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 3.
  • 25
    Ms Clare Leaney, Chief Executive Officer, In Good Faith Foundation (IGFF), Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 15.
  • 26
    DSS, answer to question on notice DSSSQ20-000913, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Budget Estimates 2020-2021, 28 October 2021 (received 23 February 2021).
  • 27
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000100, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 28
    Mrs Sheedy, CLAN, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 1.
  • 29
    Mr John Everett, private capacity, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 11.
  • 30
    DSS, answer to question on notice DSSSQ21-000083, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Additional Estimates 2020-2021, 25 March 2021 (received 12 August 2021).
  • 31
    Mrs Sheedy, CLAN, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 1.
  • 32
    Mr Philip Lindenmayer, Head of Governance, IGFF, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 16.
  • 33
    Queensland Law Society, Submission 49, p. 2.
  • 34
    Ms Rind, Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency (VACCA), Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 19.
  • 35
    Mrs Sheedy, CLAN, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 4.
  • 36
    Ms Nicole Peyton-Smith, Aboriginal Engagement Advisor, knowmore Legal Service (knowmore), Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 15.
  • 37
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 155.
  • 38
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 155.
  • 39
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000102, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 40
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000102, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 41
    DSS, Annual Report 2019-20, p. 95; DSS, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 160
  • 42
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 251.
  • 43
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 252.
  • 44
    DSS, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 160.
  • 45
    Mrs Sheedy, CLAN, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 6.
  • 46
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 98.
  • 47
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 98.
  • 48
    Ms Emma Kate McGuirk, Group Manager Redress, DSS, Senate Community Affairs and Legislation Committee Budget Estimates 2020-21, Official Committee Hansard, 28 October 2020, pp. 160-162.
  • 49
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 99.
  • 50
    Ms Kruk AO, Final Report: Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme, March 2021, p. 99.
  • 51
    Mrs Silvia Skinner, National Manager of Advocacy and Supports Services, Beyond Brave, Bravehearts Foundation, Proof Committee Hansard, 16 August 2021, p. 16.
  • 52
    DSS, answer to question on notice DSSSQ20-000870, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Budget Estimates 2020-2021, 28 October 2020 (received 24 March 2021).
  • 53
    Kimberley Stolen Generation Aboriginal Corporation, Submission 53, p. 2.
  • 54
    Miss Mary Wellington, Manager, Relationships Australia Northern Territory (RANT), Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 1.
  • 55
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 1.
  • 56
    Ms Fiona Petersen, Chief Executive Officer, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 28 September 2020, p. 6.
  • 57
    Mr Warren Strange, Executive Officer, knowmore, Official Committee Hansard, 6 April 2020, p. 37.
  • 58
    VACCA, Submission 34, p. 7.
  • 59
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 19.
  • 60
    Ms Fiona Cornforth, Chief Executive Officer, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 9.
  • 61
    Mrs Tania Bin Bakar, Chief Executive Officer, Kimberley Stolen Generations Aboriginal Corporation (KSGAC), Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 25.
  • 62
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 5.
  • 63
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 25.
  • 64
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 2.
  • 65
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 2.
  • 66
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 25.
  • 67
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 3.
  • 68
  • 69
    DSS, answer to question on notice DSSSQ20-000636, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Budget Estimates 2020-2021, 28 October 2020 (received 17 December 2020).
  • 70
    Ms Rind, VACCA, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, pp. 18-19.
  • 71
    Mr Jahmayne Coolwell, Team Leader Social and Emotional Well-Being Team Leader, Danila Dilba Health Service, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 3.
  • 72
    Ms Petersen, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 28 September 2020, p. 6.
  • 73
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 27.
  • 74
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 7.
  • 75
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 7.
  • 76
    Mr Coolwell, Danila Dilba Health Service, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 1
  • 77
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 26.
  • 78
    Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 29.
  • 79
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 6.
  • 80
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000105, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 81
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000105, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 82
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 28.
  • 83
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 3.
  • 84
    Ms Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 5.
  • 85
    DSS, answer to question on notice DSSSQ20-000636, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Budget Estimates 2020-2021, 28 October 2020 (received 17 December 2020).
  • 86
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000105, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 87
    DSS, answer to question on notice DSSSQ20-000636, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Budget Estimates 2020-2021, 28 October 2020 (received 17 December 2020).
  • 88
    Ms Rind, VACCA, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 19.
  • 89
     
    VACCA, Submission 34, p. 16.
  • 90
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 26.
  • 91
    VACCA, Submission 34, p. 16.
  • 92
    Mr Brendan Loizou, Legal Consultant, Bringing Them Home Committee Western Australia and the West Australian Stolen Generations Aboriginal Corporation (Yokai), Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 21.
  • 93
    Ms Karen Kobier, Manager and Specialist Advocate, Redress Project, People with Disability Australia (PWDA), Proof Committee Hansard, 16 August 2021, p. 28.
  • 94
    Ms Rind, VACCA, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 19.
  • 95
    Ms Petersen, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 28 September 2020, p. 10.
  • 96
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 25.
  • 97
    Ms Petersen, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 28 September 2020, p. 11.
  • 98
    The Hon. Selena Uibo, Northern Territory (NT) Attorney-General, Correspondence, 18 October 2021, p. 8.
  • 99
    Ms Petersen, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 28 September 2020, p. 7.
  • 100
    VACCA, Submission 34, p. 7.
  • 101
    Mr Loizou, Yokai, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 20.
  • 102
    Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 27.
  • 103
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 24.
  • 104
    VACCA, Submission 34, p. 7.
  • 105
    Ms Petersen, The Healing Foundation, Official Committee Hansard, 28 September 2020, p. 7.
  • 106
    Mrs Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 24.
  • 107
    Ms Patricia Thompson, Chief Executive Officer, Link Up Queensland, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 2.
  • 108
    Ms Lisa Polyblank, Redress Counsellor, Link Up NSW, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 3.
  • 109
    Including Mrs Sarah Gafforini, Director, Office of the Chief Executive Officer, VACCA, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 6 and Ms Polyblank, Link Up NSW, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 7.
  • 110
    Mr Loizou, Yokai, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 6.
  • 111
    Ms Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, pp. 7-8.
  • 112
    Ms Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 5.
  • 113
    Ms Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 8.
  • 114
    Mrs Gafforini, VACCA, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 10.
  • 115
    PWDA, Submission 50, p. 16.
  • 116
    National Redress Scheme, Strategic Success Measures, October 2020, p. 10.
  • 117
    PWDA, Submission 50, p. 20.
  • 118
    National Redress Scheme, Strategic Success Measures, October 2020, p. 10.
  • 119
    DSS, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 162.
  • 120
    Ms Kobier, PWDA, Proof Committee Hansard, 16 August 2021, p. 24.
  • 121
    Miss Wellington, RANT, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 5.
  • 122
    Ms Bin Bakar, KSGAC, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 5.
  • 123
    Ms Christabel Chamarette, Psychologist, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 9.
  • 124
    Ms Christabel Chamarette, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 9.
  • 125
    Mr Strange, knowmore, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 10.
  • 126
    Ms Fiona Guthrie, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Counselling Australia (FCA), Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 23.
  • 127
    Ms Guthrie, FCA, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 23.
  • 128
    Mr Strange, knowmore, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 10.
  • 129
    Mr Strange, knowmore, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 10.
  • 130
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000089, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 131
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000088, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 132
    Ms Amanda Whelan, Director of Client Services, knowmore, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 16.
  • 133
    Mr Strange, knowmore, Official Committee Hansard, 25 September 2020, p. 10.
  • 134
    Mr Frank Golding, private capacity, Official Committee Hansard, 26 November 2020, p. 3.
  • 135
    DSS, answer to question on notice IQ21-000099, 13 September 2021 (received 1 October 2021).
  • 136
    Including Mrs Gafforini, VACCA, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 6 and Ms Polyblank, Link Up NSW, Official Committee Hansard, 18 August 2021, p. 7, Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, pp. 27 – 28, and Ms Helena Van Schalkwyk, Team Leader, Victims Support Service South Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 14.
  • 137
    Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 28.
  • 138
    Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 27
  • 139
    Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 27.
  • 140
    Mr Orr, Micah Projects, Official Committee Hansard, 11 March 2021, p. 27.
  • 141
    Ms Van Schalkwyk, Victims Support Service South Australia, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 14.
  • 142
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 6.
  • 143
    Relationships Australia National Office, Submission 56, p. 13.
  • 144
    The Hon. Selena Uibo, NT Attorney-General, Correspondence, 18 October 2021, p. 10.
  • 145
    The Hon. Selena Uibo, NT Attorney-General, Correspondence, 18 October 2021, p. 10.

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About this inquiry

The Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme was appointed by resolution of the House of Representatives on 10 September 2019 and resolution of the Senate on 11 September 2019.



Past Public Hearings

11 Oct 2021: Canberra
18 Aug 2021: Canberra
16 Aug 2021: Canberra