Overview
2.1
The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) stated that, in terms of the electoral process, the 2019 election was a success:
…it's absolutely critical to note that, as is the case with most Australian elections, the 2019 election was well-delivered, with an outcome that would be declared on any international standard as a very sound election with a safe result.
2.2
The large scale of the election means that the AEC delivers ‘what is essentially one of Australia's largest peacetime logistic events’.
2.3
The need to deliver an accurate, trusted and speedy election result at the close of the polls on polling day was highlighted by the AEC:
Electoral integrity and security have never been more topical and indeed more critical than at any point in our history. Building confidence and trust in elections is as complex as it's ever been. Further, the electoral landscape continues to change rapidly, and we continue to monitor, assess and adapt our approach in partnership with other government agencies, cybersecurity experts and our domestic and international counterparts.
2.4
This was the first election to follow the ‘citizenship crisis’ of the 45th Parliament, in which 15 senators and members of the House of Representatives were disqualified or resigned from Parliament due to their citizenship status. A further two senators were disqualified from the 45th Parliament due to other disqualifying factors under Section 44 of the Australian Constitution.
2.5
For this election, candidates were required to complete a checklist regarding their qualification when they nominated which set out their family history and citizenship. Completed checklists were made available on the AEC website. There were no successful citizenship challenges following the election.
2.6
Although the Candidate checklist worked well in the 2019 election, with significantly fewer issues arising about the possible credentials of candidates. No MP or Senator has lost a seat in the current Parliament due to citizenship issues. However, the wording on the 2019 election Checklist did not ensure that date and country of birth were required as mandatory data. Accordingly, some candidates left the fields blank or provided obscuring information, where it could have been possible to provide those key facts, for publication and public scrutiny. This information is highly relevant to ascertaining a candidate’s citizenship status. To the extent that there are potential privacy law interactions, the law should be amended to override privacy law because of the strong public interest in knowing that a candidate is qualified to sit in Parliament.
2.7
The Committee recommends that the Candidate Qualification Checklist be revised before the next election to make mandatory the provision of information about the date and country of birth for candidate, their parents and grandparents. Where any of this is not known, a candidate should be required to make a categorical statement that the information is not known. Where exact date is not known for the birth of the candidate, their parent, or a grandparent, an option should be allowed to state the year instead. The AEC should also be required to identify the day on which checklists will be published, when publishing the timeline for an election.
2.8
The 2019 federal election saw 10 candidates resign or lose their party endorsement after the close of nominations and prior to the election – an ‘unprecedented number’. The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (the Electoral Act) does not provide for the removal of disendorsed candidates to be removed from the ballot paper. None of the disendorsed candidates were elected.
2.9
The original party listed against a disendorsed candidate’s name will continue to be on the ballot paper, and the party will receive per-vote public funding for any votes received by that candidate, provided they reach the four per cent threshold needed to qualify for public funding.
2.10
The rate of informality (votes incorrectly cast or incomplete) was slightly lower in the 2019 federal election than the previous election, at 3.81 per cent. The rate of informality for the House of Representatives was 5.54 per cent, a 0.48 per cent increase from 2016. The AEC stated that the 2016 election was ‘the first time that we assessed that the level of deliberate informality overtook inadvertent informality’. No analysis of deliberate versus unintentional informality was undertaken for the 2019 election. Informality is discussed further later in this report, in the context of Optional Preferential Voting.
2.11
The AEC is working to ensure that Australians understand how to correctly cast a vote, and address the factors which go into the informal vote number, such as: English as a second language, high numbers of candidates in one electorate and proximity to a state election leading to confusion over rules.
Metropolitan and regional trends
2.12
The AEC classifies each electoral division based on the following criteria:
Inner Metropolitan – situated in capital cities and consisting of well-established built-up suburbs.
Outer Metropolitan – situated in capital cities and containing large areas of recent suburban expansion.
Provincial – outside capital cities, but with a majority of enrolment in major provincial cities.
Rural – outside capital cities and without majority of enrolment in major provincial cities.
2.13
At the 2019 Federal election there were 45 Inner and Outer metropolitan divisions each, 23 Provincial and 38 Rural divisions. A full list of divisions and their classification is at Appendix C.
Pre-poll voting
2.14
Pre-poll voting consists of both ‘ordinary’ pre-poll votes, where the ballots are placed directly into a ballot box in the same manner as an ordinary vote on the day of the election; and ‘declaration’ pre-poll, where a voter’s name either cannot be found on the certified list, or the name has already been marked as having voted. The voter is required to sign a declaration that they are entitled to vote.
2.15
Pre-poll votes were able to be cast from dedicated pre-poll voting centres and divisional offices from Monday 29 April 2019.
Table 2.1: Pre-poll voting breakdown, 2019 election
|
|
|
|
|
|
Inner Metropolitan
|
1,014,842
|
203,565
|
4,374,970
|
|
Outer Metropolitan
|
1,189,870
|
184,522
|
4,504,902
|
|
Provincial
|
771,039
|
79,312
|
2,375,657
|
|
Rural
|
1,312,700
|
152,981
|
3,833,087
|
|
Total
|
4,288,451
|
620,380
|
15,088,616
|
Sources: Australian Electoral Commission, ‘Vote type by division’, viewed 7 October 2020, <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseVotesCountedByDivision-24310-NAT.htm >;
Australian Electoral Commission, ‘First preferences by candidate polling place’, viewed 9 October 2020, <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseDownloadsMenu-24310-Csv.htm >;
Australian Electoral Commission, ‘Demographic classification as at 1 January 2019’, viewed 9 October, <https://www.aec.gov.au/Electorates/files/demographic-classification-as-at-1-january-2019.xlsx >
2.16
Rural and Provincial divisions recorded noticeably higher levels of pre-poll voting compared with metropolitan divisions, with more 38.2% of voters in rural electorates opting for some form of pre-poll voting compared with 27.9% of Inner Metropolitan voters.
2.17
The AEC noted in their submission that pre-poll voting has consistently increased over recent elections, rising from 11.3% of the total vote in 2010 to 32.5% (across all demographic classifications) in 2019.
Informal voting
Table 2.2: Informal lower house voting, 2019 election
|
|
|
|
|
|
Inner metropolitan
|
203,693
|
4.66
|
-0.01
|
|
Outer metropolitan
|
263,745
|
5.85
|
+0.63
|
|
Provincial
|
137,246
|
5.78
|
+0.65
|
|
Rural
|
230,539
|
6.01
|
+0.69
|
Sources: Australian Electoral Commission, ‘Informal votes by division’, viewed on 7 October 2020 <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseInformalByDivision-24310-NAT.htm>;
Australian Electoral Commission, ‘Demographic classification as at 1 January 2019’, viewed on 7 October 2020, <https://www.aec.gov.au/Electorates/files/demographic-classification-as-at-1-january-2019.xlsx>
2.18
Across Australia, informal voting was lowest in inner metropolitan divisions (4.66%), with a negligible average swing (-0.01%). The remaining demographic classifications experienced informal voting rates closer to 6% and notably, all saw average informal swings of between +0.6% and +0.7%.
Other voting types
Table 2.3: Vote type breakdown, 2019 election
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Inner metropolitan
|
391,504
|
213,910
|
16,705
|
4,374,970
|
|
Outer metropolitan
|
406,710
|
204,482
|
17,952
|
4,504,902
|
|
Provincial
|
176,346
|
79,797
|
6250
|
2,375,657
|
|
Rural
|
272,610
|
118,493
|
9111
|
3,833,087
|
|
Total
|
1,247,170
|
616,682
|
50,018
|
15,088,616
|
Sources: Australian Electoral Commission, ‘Vote type by division’, viewed on 7 October, <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseVotesCountedByDivision-24310-NAT.htm>;
Australian Electoral Commission, ‘Demographic classification as at 1 January 2019’, viewed on 7 October, <https://www.aec.gov.au/Electorates/files/demographic-classification-as-at-1-january-2019.xlsx>
2.19
There were less notable variances amongst the demographic classifications in other voting types. Postal voting was higher amongst metropolitan divisions, at around 9%.
State and Territory breakdowns
2.20
The electoral roll for the 2019 election was the most complete in history. A breakdown of enrolment by state and territory shows enrolment broadly in line with the population for each state and territory, as expected for a total enrolment of nearly 97 per cent.
Table 2.4: Enrolment by state, 2019 election
|
|
|
|
New South Wales
|
5,298,606
|
|
Victoria
|
4,184,955
|
|
Queensland
|
3,262,848
|
|
Western Australia
|
1,645,637
|
|
South Australia
|
1,210,867
|
|
Tasmania
|
386,076
|
|
Australian Capital Territory
|
295,933
|
|
Northern Territory
|
139,326
|
|
National
|
16,424,248
|
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, Enrolment by State, viewed on 16 September 2020, <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseEnrolmentByState-24310.htm>
2.21
Divergence between federal and state electoral rolls can occur where information provided by the elector is insufficient for enrolment at both levels due to differing legislative requirements. The AEC provided a recent update on electoral divergence to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM):
As at 30 September 2020, there were 85,069 enrolments for persons aged 18 and over that were divergent due to procedural reasons. This is a reduction of approximately 700,000 enrolments or 89 per cent since December 2015.
2.22
In the Northern Territory its two electorates, Solomon and Lingiari, had enrolment rates of 95 to less than 98 per cent, and 75 to less than 80 per cent respectively. Lingiari is classed as a rural demographic, while Solomon is Inner Metropolitan. Both seats changed from a previous seat status of ‘Fairly Safe’ to ‘Marginal’.
Table 2.5: Vote type breakdown, 2019 election
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
New South Wales
|
86.22
|
3.98
|
0.3
|
3.8
|
5.71
|
|
Victoria
|
80.92
|
4.18
|
0.29
|
4.75
|
9.87
|
|
Queensland
|
81.74
|
3.65
|
0.3
|
3.94
|
10.37
|
|
Western Australia
|
80.67
|
5.46
|
0.5
|
4.92
|
8.45
|
|
South Australia
|
82.45
|
4.57
|
0.48
|
3.02
|
9.48
|
|
Tasmania
|
86.09
|
3.35
|
0.33
|
2.51
|
7.72
|
|
Australian Capital Territory
|
88.51
|
1.96
|
0.35
|
4.21
|
4.96
|
|
Northern Territory
|
88.62
|
2.04
|
0.42
|
5.55
|
3.37
|
|
National
|
83.2
|
4.09
|
0.33
|
4.11
|
8.27
|
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, Enrolment by State, viewed 16 September 2020, <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseVoteTypeBreakdownByState-24310.htm>
2.23
The 2019 federal election saw a significant increase in pre-poll and postal voting. In 2010 pre-poll and postal voting comprised 17.44 per cent of votes, while in 2019 they accounted for 40.80 per cent of the total votes. This change has produced administrative challenges for the AEC, as the Electoral Commissioner noted, ‘that the more votes there are in envelopes … the longer it takes to count them.’
2.24
The Australian Electoral Commissioner noted that ‘there are always, as you know, a number of seats where a result is not clear until after all postal votes are in, 13 days after the event.’ Given this, the AEC noted its focus on following procedure to deliver safe, accurate elections.
Informal voting
Table 2.6: Informal lower house voting, 2019 election
|
|
|
|
|
|
New South Wales
|
342,051
|
7.01
|
+0.84
|
|
Victoria
|
180,426
|
4.66
|
-0.11
|
|
Queensland
|
147,290
|
4.95
|
+0.25
|
|
Western Australia
|
80,575
|
5.44
|
+1.45
|
|
South Australia
|
54,202
|
4.81
|
+0.63
|
|
Tasmania
|
15,970
|
4.39
|
+0.41
|
|
Australian Capital Territory
|
9,616
|
3.49
|
+0.73
|
|
Northern Territory
|
5,093
|
4.69
|
-2.66
|
|
National
|
835,223
|
5.54
|
+0.49
|
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, Informal votes by state, viewed 7 October 2020 <https://results.aec.gov.au/24310/Website/HouseInformalByState-24310.htm>
2.25
The number of informal votes rose by less than one per cent in five states and one territory, and grew by 1.45 per cent in Western Australia. The informal vote fell by 2.66 per cent in the Northern Territory and by 0.11 per cent in Victoria. The national informal swing was 0.49 per cent.
2.26
A number of factors were noted by the AEC as influencing the informality of votes, including; English as a second language; number of candidates on ballot paper; and proximity to a state or territory election which has a different voting system.
2.27
Amongst the states and territories, New South Wales saw the highest level of informal voting at 7%. 13 of the 15 divisions with the highest informal voting rate (all between 8% and 14%) were from NSW, and 8 of the top 10 were from metropolitan (inner or outer) divisions with NSW.
2.28
The NSW state election occurred on Saturday 23 March 2020, just 7 weeks prior to the Federal election. NSW utilises an optional preferential voting system, meaning that only one preference needs to be recorded for a vote to be considered valid. Federal elections utilise a full preferential voting system, in which voters must enter a preference for each and every lower house candidate for a vote to be valid.
2.29
It is likely that a number of voters in NSW mistakenly thought that providing only one preference (or anything less than numbering all candidate boxes on the lower house ballot) was also a valid method of voting for the 2019 Federal Election.
2.30
The Committee recommends that the Electoral Act be amended to:
replace compulsory preferential voting with optional preferential voting; and
introduce the Robson Rotation of ordering candidates on ballot papers for the House of Representatives.
Indigenous voter engagement
2.31
The AEC outlined its approach to increase Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander enrolment, which since 2012 has ‘given voice to something like 1.4 million Australians’, while:
The national rate of Indigenous enrolment, over the last period, has actually exceeded the general increase in enrolment, and, in the same way, the estimated increase in Indigenous enrolment in the Northern Territory has exceeded the general rate of increase around Australia.
2.32
Work to increase Indigenous enrolment by the AEC is ongoing, and includes a focus on engagement and communication through a range of channels:
The new process that we have in place, where we're partnering with a range of other agencies, including the Department of Human Services, and working with local communities in a big outreach and ensuring that we're providing in-language material, including in-language material spoken by local elders, at the very least is demonstrating an increase in enrolment.
2.33
One such effort was the Electoral Awareness Officer pilot program, which engaged 12 Indigenous people to undertake electoral participation activities in the communities of Galiwin’ku, Milingimbi and Ramingining. This pilot program resulted in 280 enrolments.
2.34
During the 2018-19 year the AEC further engaged with Indigenous voters through a range of other modes which notably included Indigenous Language videos, community outreach and partnerships with the AFL and other sporting teams to deliver and distribute educational material.
2.35
Indigenous Australian enrolment estimates as at 30 June 2019 were estimated at 76.6 per cent, with the highest enrolment rate found in New South Wales with 86.2 per cent enrolment, and the lowest rate of enrolment found in Western Australia at 65 per cent. From 30 June 2018 to 30 June 2019 there was an overall increase in Indigenous enrolment of 0.2 per cent, while the period of 30 June 2019 to 30 June 2020 saw an increase in the Indigenous enrolment rate of 1.4 per cent, up to 78 per cent.
Political donations
Past inquiries
2.36
The governing framework for disclosure of political donations at a federal level is set out in Part XX of the Electoral Act.
2.37
The JSCEM has undertaken several inquiries into the issue of political donations in recent years.
2.38
The Report on the conduct of the 2016 federal election and matters related thereto (the 2016 Report) contained a comprehensive overview of these past inquiries and of issues relating to political donations. It also contained a comprehensive overview of the political donation regimes in Australia’s state and territory jurisdictions and how these compare with the federal regime.
2.39
The 2016 Report recommended that the issue of tax deductibility thresholds and tax concessions for political parties be referred to the Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue for consideration.
2.40
Siphoning of donations is a practice that can help a political actor avoid various obligations in the Electoral Act, such as disclosure, registration, or limitations on conduct (such as the foreign donation ban).
2.41
Evidence was adduced by Senator Abetz during Senate Estimates regarding funnelling of funding through front groups, before large donations were made by climate-related groups in key electoral battlegrounds.
2.42
The final entity in the chain disclosed the total that they provided, shielding the true source of the funds that passed through the funnelling entity. The key entity that siphoned money was formed in close proximity to the last election, suggesting it could have been established principally or partly for an avoidance purpose.
2.43
This behaviour is not however sanctioned under the two very narrow anti-avoidance rules in the Electoral Act (section 287S deals just with avoiding certain registration obligations and section 302H deals just with foreign donations).
2.44
Siphoning itself ought to be an offence in its own right, otherwise it is not possible to investigate and establish what other Electoral Law breaches arose from it. A number of law-abiding entities are established as associated entities, and report donations that they receive to the AEC. Entities that are engaging in siphoning should likewise be registered as associated entities and subject to the same laws as others. Siphoning conduct should be liable to punishment with either criminal or civil penalties, so that the AEC has a graduated range of sanctions at its disposal to address conduct at different levels of seriousness.
2.45
The Committee recommends that the Electoral Act be amended to include new offences for siphoning money through intermediaries. The offences should be drafted to deal with avoidance behaviour by donors who channel money through intermediaries, to avoid transparency. The offences should likewise cover any funnelling entities, including persons or organisations who play a part in a chain of entities that siphon money. The offences should also cover receiving entities that had knowledge of siphoning arrangements and who did nothing to stop, or repay siphoned amounts. Persons who coordinate siphoning arrangements should also be liable to appropriate sanctions.
Disclosure
2.46
The AEC website outlines the entities required to disclose political donations. Registered political parties and their state and territory branches, associated entities, political campaigners, third parties and donors must lodge an annual return each financial year. Candidates for the 2019 federal election were also required to lodge an election return no later than 15 weeks after polling day.
2.47
Annual returns are available to the public from the first working day in February the following financial year; election returns are available 24 weeks from polling day.
2.48
In the financial year leading up to and including the 2019 election, the disclosure threshold was $13,800.
Committee comment
2.49
The JSCEM notes the concerns raised by inquiry participants regarding political donations, and the overall interest in improving transparency in the system. This interest must be balanced with the practical considerations of implementing a more onerous reporting regime.
2.50
As noted in recent inquiries, it is important that an increasing administrative burden does not deter ordinary Australians from participating in the political process. Changes to the political donation regime must be assessed for disproportionate impact on minor parties and independents, which typically have fewer resources to call upon to meet disclosure obligations.
2.51
The JSCEM will have an opportunity explore these issues further when it undertakes the Statutory Review of the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018, which commenced in November 2020.
2.52
The Committee recommends, as per its recommendation in the 2016 report, that the Government refer the issue of increasing tax deductibility thresholds for donations to political parties and the tax concessions available to political parties to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue for detailed consideration.
Key challenges for the Australian Electoral Commission
2.53
The 2019 election saw a number of highlights, such as a record enrolment and a 94 per cent satisfaction rating in the AEC’s 2019 voter survey. There were also a number of challenges identified by the AEC and other inquiry participants which affected the 2019 election. Some of these challenges, such as security, are expected to feature in future elections and will require extended consideration.
2.54
Legislative amendments during the 45th Parliament led to some changes to the AEC process in the lead up and holding of the 2019 election:
the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Modernisation and Other Measures) Act 2019 made the qualifications checklist mandatory for candidates, among other provisions;
Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018 relating to public funding of election campaigns and the receipt and reporting of donations; and
Commonwealth Electoral (Authorisation of Voter Communication) Determination 2018, which enhanced the transparency of the electoral system.
Increasing complexity of Federal elections
2.55
The AEC noted the record enrolment of nearly 97 per cent in the 2019 election, and highlighted that although this is an indicator of a successful democracy, it adds complexity:
The significant growth in the electorate coupled with dynamic shifts in the electoral environment, especially in the area of electoral security, made the 2019 federal election not only Australia's largest ever but also wickedly complex. In observing the domestic and international electoral environments closely, I'm confident in predicting that the next event will be not only larger in scale again but also even more complex to administer.
2.56
Further, the AEC does not know the date for the election until the writs are issued, and highlighted that elections are organised and held within a short space of time. The AEC prepares for elections by working to improve and protect systems, create efficiencies and enhance services for voters.
2.57
The AEC recognises that the public has high expectations; with ‘little tolerance for any delay at the polling place and, understandably, zero tolerance for any errors in the electoral process’.
2.58
Part of the increasing complexity of elections is found in the distribution of misinformation, the AEC introduced its ‘Stop and Consider’ campaign which aimed to prompt voters to analyse the accuracy and authenticity of information. Further, the AEC monitored social media nearly 24 hours per day, which allowed it to ‘refute potentially damaging claims and stop them from gaining currency’.
Secure elections
2.59
The AEC noted the ‘dynamic shift’ in the area of electoral security in the lead up to the 2019 election.
2.60
A multi-agency taskforce was brought together to address rising concerns over threats to the integrity of the electoral system:
The Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce was also convened during the 2019 federal election, which proved to be a successful model for agencies working together to support the integrity of the election. Advice from the taskforce members was that no foreign interference, malicious cyber-activity or security matters were identified that undermined the integrity of the federal election.
2.61
The Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce is made up of members of the following Commonwealth government agencies:
Australian Electoral Commission;
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet;
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications;
Attorney-General’s Department;
Department of Home Affairs; and the
Australian Federal Police.
2.62
The Taskforce is also supported by the national intelligence community as needed.
2.63
Operational aspects of the electoral process, including the physical security of voters and cyber security, are protected by the AEC in association with security and law enforcement agencies:
… the electoral landscape continues to change rapidly, and we continue to monitor, assess and adapt our approach in partnership with other government agencies, cybersecurity experts and our domestic and international counterparts.
2.64
This broad reaching focus on security was consistently emphasised by the AEC, with particular consideration given to the impact of security of voters’ ‘trust in electoral results’.
Need for further modernisation
2.65
The AEC described the Electoral Act as ‘highly prescriptive’, and consider that the Act requires them to use ‘what is essentially an “analogue” system’ without the AEC having the licence to lawfully alter or streamline the process used.
2.66
The continued commitment to reform and modernisation was expressed by the AEC, and was linked to the increasing complexity and scale of elections:
It's also important to reiterate that the complexity of elections and the urgent need for modernisation continue to be a focal point for the AEC. Every federal election is larger in scale than the previous one, particularly so for the 2019 election, with a record enrolment of 97 per cent and a slight increase in turnout resulting in an additional 800,000 voters.
2.67
Modernisation is restricted in a range of ways, while the AEC is aware of the public expectation that an indicative election result be available as soon as possible after polls close at 6pm on election day, many of the options to improve timeliness would depend upon legislative change. Given this, the AEC has limited capacity to change its processes ‘to deliver services in the most efficient manner possible’. Given the importance of our democratic system and the need for accountability around the conduct of elections, the Parliament has seen fit to enact prescriptive rules about how elections are to be managed.
2.68
The AEC highlighted its ongoing focus to update critical infrastructure and IT systems, which ‘are not able to be quickly (or safely) reconfigured to adapt to short notice legislative or procedural changes’. This could also serve to facilitate the expanded use of Electronic Certified Lists, which were used effectively at the 2019 Federal Election.
2.69
In the most recent Federal Budget, the Australian Government recognised the need for renewal of the AEC’s ageing IT infrastructure, by announcing $96.7 million over three years for the first tranche of investment to replace the core election systems. These new systems will be better suited to implementing future policy change and supporting administrative flexibility. However the corollary is that the new systems will take a number of years to build to achieve the standard for robust and adaptive IT systems.
2.70
The Committee recommends that the Government issue a re-write schedule to replace each part of the Commonwealth Electoral Act with a ‘fit-for-purpose’ Electoral Act, to modernise the administration of Australia’s electoral system.
2.71
The Committee recommends that the Australian Electoral Commission bring forward a costed proposal and timeline for the introduction of an electronic certified roll before the next federal election.
Inquiry participant views of the Australian Electoral Commission
2.72
A number of inquiry participants raised concerns over the clarity of information provided by the AEC, the management of pre-poll early voting centres, consistency of communications across polling places, and other issues.
2.73
One inquiry participant noted the narrow focus on matters the AEC is able to act upon under the Electoral Act regarding potentially misleading and deceptive information.
2.74
An inquiry participant noted the important role of the AEC in facilitating elections, ‘I've often disagreed with their decisions, but I've never questioned their impartiality or professionalism’. They further suggested that the AEC’s oversight role should be expanded to include state, territory and local government elections to operate as an ‘independent and professional arbiter’.
2.75
Inclusion Melbourne noted the AEC’s focus on accessibility:
A lot of the accessibility stuff from the AEC is fantastic in terms of the accessible voting centres and also plain language advertising just before elections, encouraging people to vote.
2.76
By contrast, GetUp suggested that the AEC has adopted a ‘one-size-fits-all approach to electoral management’ which is not inclusive of many Indigenous Australians, particularly for those living in remote communities. GetUp highlighted the issue of voters being contacted by mail by the AEC prior to removal from the electoral roll, with voters being turned away due to their inadvertent removal from the electoral roll.
2.77
The Liberal Party of Australia expressed concern over the AEC’s criteria for selecting locations of pre-polling centres, and divergent interpretation of campaigning rules by individual AEC staff, many of whom are temporary staff. The Liberal Party suggested greater consideration be given to the location of polling places, and the impact they pose for their surrounds, ‘prior to leasing a property for early voting polling places’.
2.78
In response to the AEC’s 2019 Voter Survey, which measured voter satisfaction with the AEC’s conduct of the 2019 federal election, 94 per cent of respondents were satisfied with their overall voting experience, while 89 per cent of respondents were ‘confident in the AEC’s ability to deliver electoral services’.
2.79
Julian Simmonds MP asked for the Committee to consider the inclusion of local government areas and their internal ward / division boundaries and codes as part of the Roll Management System (RMANS) and Elector Enrolment Information (ELIAS) data.
2.80
Mr Simmonds believes such a move would ‘greatly assist’ in his duties, particularly during boundary redistributions, as the electorate of Ryan covers several local government areas.
2.81
The Committee recommends that the AEC include local government areas and their internal ward / division boundaries and codes as part of the Roll Management System (RMANS) and Elector Enrolment Information (ELIAS) data to assist Members of Parliament in servicing their electors.