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Appendix 2
Answers to questions on notice
Question on Notice 1
Credit regulation takeover funding
(Senator Boyce, Hansard p. 15)
Senator BOYCE—And how much is that?
Mr D’Aloisio—I think the government has announced it but I
will need to check it for you, Senator. I think it is of the order of $70 million,
but we might check that.
Response:
The Government has provided $66 million to nationally
regulate consumer credit. (Taken from the Hon Nick Sherry's Media Release, New
Commissioners Appointed to the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission)
Question on Notice 2
Referrals from the ASX (Senator Boyce,
Hansard p. 22)
Senator BOYCE—But has the number of companies that you are
being alerted about changed?
Ms Gibson—We have received a lot more referrals from ASX
this year than in prior years. I do not have the exact figures with me, but
certainly—
Senator BOYCE—Can you give some sort of sense of the number?
Ms Gibson—I would be inclined to say double but I think that
is overstating it. But it is—
Senator BOYCE—So we are talking about a hundred companies or
a thousand companies?
Ms Gibson—We have had 86 referrals from the ASX this year on
continuous disclosure, market manipulation and insider trading. My sense of it
is that market manipulation has been significantly more, but, Senator, I would
need to come back to you with the exact figures on past referrals on those.
Senator BOYCE—I would be interested in any more information
you can give me on that.
Response:
ASIC becomes aware of potential breaches of market rules
through ASX referrals, complaints made directly to ASIC and initiating its own
surveillances. ASX referrals to ASIC during recent years are as follows:
|
ASX REFERRALS |
Misconduct |
2005/2006 (financial year) |
2006/2007 (financial year) |
2008 (from 1 January to 24 November) |
Continuous Disclosure |
7 |
22 |
20 |
Insider Trading |
17 |
20 |
28 |
Market Manipulation |
5 |
9 |
19 |
Question on Notice 3
Dodrill matter (Mr Ripoll MP,
Hansard p. 30)
CHAIRMAN—I also put on the record that at our last meeting I
raised the issue of the Dodrill matter out of Queensland, so could we again
pursue not only that situation but also the related issue of where we draw the
line in the sand in dealing with specific issues that are raised with ASIC?
Response:
As previously advised (QON 11, August 2008 ASIC Oversight
Report), Mr Dodrill has raised a number of complaints against JMD Queensland (ACN
097 200 381), The Irish Restaurant and Bar Pty Ltd (ACN 073 727 205) and
American Pie Restaurant Pty Ltd (ACN 098 180 011). On each occasion ASIC has
assessed the matter and determined not to take any action. There is no ongoing
action in relation to this complainant.
Question on Notice 4
Freeze on redemptions (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How many written, phone and email complaints has ASIC
received from investors related to the freezing of redemptions? Please outline
the types and grounds for the complaints made? Are the hardship provisions
adequate to meet the needs of investors?
Response:
Since our announcement on 31 October 2008 to 12 December 2008, we have received 137 calls and 28 complaints specifically relating to the
hardship relief and/or frozen funds.
For the period 1 January 2008 to 12 December 2008, we have received 142 calls and 58 complaints specifically relating to the hardship
relief and/or frozen funds.
The relief which ASIC has stated it is prepared to provide
allows members of frozen funds suffering hardship to access the lesser of:
- the specific amount the subject of a member's
hardship withdrawal request; and
- $20,000 plus 50% of the balance of the member's
interest in the scheme.
ASIC is not aware of the needs of each member within a
frozen fund, however the funds available under the cap would provide a
significant injection of money to members suffering hardship. ASIC decided to
cap the amount of hardship withdrawals to minimise the disadvantage experienced
by other members of the fund who are not permitted to withdraw their
investments.
Question on Notice 5
Freeze on redemptions (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What process is used to decide if an applicant meets the
hardship criteria? Could ASIC outline the process for an individual seeking
redemption?
Response:
The relief to facilitate hardship withdrawals does not
mandate a process by which the operator of a frozen scheme administers requests
for hardship withdrawals. Individual operators, who have a better understanding
of the needs of their members, are responsible for determining the hardship
withdrawal process. However, the relief does require operators to only permit
hardship withdrawals under three specific criteria:
- where the member is unable to meet reasonable and
immediate family living expenses;
- on compassionate grounds (e.g. medical costs for serious
illness, funeral expenses, to prevent foreclosure); and
- in the case of permanent incapacity.
The operator of the frozen fund has the responsibility of
deciding whether an application for a hardship withdrawal meets, or does not
meet, the hardship criteria. The operator must exercise its discretion in
considering hardship applications in a reasonable manner and must maintain
appropriate documentation of the decisions it makes.
In deciding hardship applications, the operator must comply
with its general statutory duties including the duty to act in the best
interests of the members of the scheme, to act honestly and to exercise the
degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise.
Question on Notice 6
Freeze on redemptions (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Does ASIC investigate the validity of hardship claims or
simply accept the information provided?
Response:
The responsibility of deciding whether to permit a hardship
withdrawal lies with the operator of the frozen scheme. The operator must be satisfied
the hardship claim is valid before permitting a withdrawal. The relief ASIC
provides to operators is conditional on operators only permitting hardship
withdrawals where one (or more) of the criteria is met.
Question on Notice 7
Lifting of bank guarantee
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What consideration has ASIC given to the consequences of the
eventual lifting of the bank-based guarantee is lifted?
Response:
The bank-based deposit guarantee is a policy matter for the
Government. ASIC's role, as part of the Council of Financial Regulators, is to
administer the arrangements that are in place.
Question on Notice 8
Credit rating agencies (CRAs)
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What will be contained in the annual compliance report?
Response:
The annual compliance statement will report on CRAs'
compliance with the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs (May
2008) (IOSCO Code). The annual compliance statement will emphasise the quality
and integrity of ratings processes and arrangements to adequately manage
conflicts of interest. For example, CRAs would report on whether they have
adopted measures so information underlying ratings is of sufficient quality and
from reliable sources and that there are systems and adequate resources to
update ratings periodically and in light of new market intelligence.
Question on Notice 9
Credit rating agencies (CRAs)
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What is the process that ASIC will take to determine whether
the reports are satisfactory? Will ASIC take action if a report is deemed to be
unsatisfactory and if so, how
Response:
ASIC will review the annual compliance reports against the
IOSCO Code. If necessary following review of the report, ASIC may undertake
monitoring and surveillance work (for example compliance visits) to verify that
CRAs are displaying the behaviours needed to restore confidence in their
activities and are complying with their Australian Financial Service licence
obligations, conditions of their licence and the IOSCO Code.
Question on Notice 10
Credit rating agencies (CRAs)
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What is the procedure for holding CRA’s accountable for
corporate misinformation and disinformation or for unanticipated movements in a
volatile market?
Response:
Following the sub-prime crisis, concerns were raised about
the failure of CRAs to identify particular market risks associated with
structured financial products. The IOSCO Code was revised to address these concerns.
CRAs will be required to report on their compliance with the revised IOSCO Code
in their annual compliance statement. CRAs will also be required to obtain a
licence with specific licence conditions dealing with disclosure of CRAs'
procedures, methodologies and assumptions and processes for keeping ratings
current.
Question on Notice 11
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Will investors be less likely to short sell under the new
disclosure requirements? Would ASIC like to see the amount of short sales lowed,
and if so, why?
Response:
The policy embodied in the Corporations Act (as newly
amended by the short selling legislation) is that naked short selling is banned
but covered short selling is permitted subject to disclosure. ASIC is
responsible for administering that policy.
Question on Notice 12
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Did the ban on short selling have an adverse effect on
market liquidity? How would the market have benefited from the liquidity
created by short selling whilst investment funds were being frozen?
Response:
ASX's monthly activity report released for the November
period revealed a decrease (9%) in trades during the period of the short
selling ban when compared to the period from 1 July to the commencement of the
ban on 22 September. Given the volatility in market activity internationally,
we are unable to assess whether that decrease is directly related to the short
selling ban.
An examination of price levels, volatility and liquidity
does not provide a clear view about the effect of the ban in Australia.
However, none of these indicators suggest that ASIC should not have placed the
bans. ASIC's action to ban covered short selling of all quoted stock was
necessary when considering the aims it set out to achieve, that is, to act as a
circuit breaker to assist in maintaining confidence in Australia's financial
markets; as a response to bans imposed overseas; and to deal with high levels
of rumourtrage.
Question on Notice 13
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What type of measure will be used to disclose information
about short sales to the market? Who would be responsible for reporting short
sales?
Response:
The Corporations Amendment (Short Selling) Act 2008 sets out
the framework for disclosure and reporting of covered short sales. It requires
a seller to inform the broker if a sale is a covered short sales, and for the
broker to inform the market operator. The market operator must publicly disclose
the reported short sale information.
Further details of the disclosure regime (including timing
and manner) are yet to be determined by government. It may be the government
decides to continue with the disclosure and reporting regime imposed under ASIC
class orders or otherwise.
ASIC's current disclosure regime for short selling requires
reporting by brokers to the ASX of each day's short sales for a security (ie
gross short sales). The ASX releases to the market aggregate daily short sales
by security the next trading day.
Question on Notice 14
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What type of reporting exemption would be taken to take
small trades into account?
Response:
A small trade exemption would allow small traders to avoid
compliance costs, however, such an exemption would also compromise the accuracy
of reported figures and may be inconsistent with the desire to capture data
reflecting actual levels of short sales executed in a stock. The current
interim disclosure regime imposed by ASIC's Class Order does not provide such
an exemption.
It is open to the government providing a small trade
exemption in the regulations to the Corporations Amendment (Short Selling) Act
2008.
We are aware of reporting exemptions provided in overseas
reporting regimes to take small trades into account. For example, in the
jurisdictions of the other regulators contributing to the IOSCO Task Force for
short selling, the disclosure regime is only triggered for short positions
above certain thresholds. These disclosure regimes differ on thresholds as
well as other aspects. The government will be informed by the outcomes of the
IOSCO Task Force on short selling.
Question on Notice 15
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What is world best practice for the release on short sales
to the market?
Response:
There is currently no consensus on this point. Given the
integrated and international nature of financial markets, it is important for
international regulators to co-ordinate ways to deal with short selling. An
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) Technical Committee
Task Force has been formed to develop common international principles for the
regulation of short selling to eliminate gaps in various regulatory approaches
to naked short selling, and to examine how to minimise adverse impacts on
certain transactions that are critical to capital formation and reducing market
volatility.
Question on Notice 16
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What other developed countries use the short selling regime
being adopted for Australia? If no other country has used this system, why is Australia
adopting the system?
Response:
We assume this question relates to reporting. Under ASIC's
class order, clients must advise their brokers at the time of placing a sell
order whether it is for a short sale. Brokers are required to advise the ASX of
the gross short sales executed on the previous day. ASX consolidates and publishes
this data for the public.
Measures implemented by both ASIC and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States now require real time recording
of short sales. Some jurisdictions, such as the UK and Japan, require daily
reporting by clients of gross short positions exceeding 0.25% of total issued
stock, while other jurisdictions do not provide a threshold for reporting.
ASIC believes it is important that covered short sales only
occur with appropriate disclosure in place. It was an important factor contributing
to ASIC's decision to lift its ban on covered short selling without being
confident that market participants were able to disclose levels of short sales
occurring.
It is a matter for government to determine whether the
disclosure regime currently imposed under ASIC's class order continues under
the regulations to the Corporations Amendment (Short Selling) Act 2008. To this
end, the common international principles that will be developed as a result of
the IOSCO Technical Committee Task Force on short selling will inform this
process.
Question on Notice 17
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What will be the lead times for brokers to make changes to
their systems?
Response:
All brokers are currently reporting in accordance with the
reporting regime required by ASIC. We have been and continue to work closely
with industry and technology providers on systems issues associated with the
disclosure regime.
We understand Treasury has been and will continue to consult
industry with a view to inform the technical aspects of the regulations and
consequent adjustments to reporting systems.
Question on Notice 18
Market manipulation (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How will ASIC ensure that it and the ASX’s role in detecting
market manipulation will not overlap?
Response:
ASIC and ASX will continue to work closely in detecting
issues. Under existing arrangements, where ASX detects unlawful market conduct,
such as, market manipulation, ASX refers the matter to ASIC for further
investigation. Both ASX and ASIC may initiate investigations.
Question on Notice 19
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How will the new reporting regime be a long-term solution to
what ASIC sees as the problems caused by short-selling?
Response:
The new reporting regime meets a few aims. It assists
market transparency of pricing pressures, for example, by providing an early
signal that individual securities may be overvalued or that high levels of
short selling may cause high stock lending utilisation. Reporting will also
help to provide additional market confidence that regulators have access to
data allowing it to detect market manipulation or other market abuse, and
identify persons engaged in such activity. Reporting will also enable the
regulator to identify transactions (and relevant parties) carrying potential
settlement risks arising from short selling and stock lending positions.
Question on Notice 20
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How will the proposed rules enhance or prejudice the
competitiveness of the Australian financial markets in comparison to other
major foreign markets?
Response:
As mentioned, the technical aspects of the regime are yet to
be decided by government. However, we note that other jurisdictions similarly
require or have taken steps to require reporting and disclosure of short sales.
The principles to be established by the IOSCO Technical Committee task force on
short selling may inform the content of the proposed regulations.
An important factor to ensuring that Australian financial
markets remain competitive is stability and confidence in the market. The
proposed disclosure rules will provide a comprehensive set of short selling
data to investors and regulators, thereby promoting confident and informed
participation in a transparent market.
Question on Notice 21
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How do the proposed arrangements for the regulation of short
selling ensure that investors are protected and not misled?
Response:
Although the Corporations Act required a level of disclosure
for short selling, over time, the market developed a view that those
obligations were only directed at naked short sales.
The arrangements under the Corporations Amendment (Short
Selling) Act 2008 clarifies that these obligations also apply to covered short
sales. These measures give investors access to information about levels of
short selling activity occurring in the Australian markets (that is, transparency).
Accurate information about levels of short selling will also enable ASIC to
identify and address market manipulation and settlement risks, in that way,
protect investors by enhancing the integrity of the market.
Question on Notice 22
Short selling (additional Question
on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What is the procedure for protecting the confidentiality of
hedged positions?
Response:
There is some concern that advising brokers in real time of
short sales executed may comprise asset managers' proprietary research and
could lead to front running by those brokers.
We note that these are risks already borne by traders in the
market and some traders use techniques, such as using multiple brokers and
splitting transactions, to mask their intentions if they have concerns.
Brokers have a fiduciary duty to their clients not to misuse
confidential information.
Question on Notice 23
Stock lending for vote renting
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How is ASIC regulating stock lending for vote renting
purposes? Can ASIC outline how widespread the practice of vote renting is in
the market?
Response:
Under stock lending arrangements, vote renting can occur
where an investor 'borrows' shares in order to secure voting rights to
influence the outcome of a company vote. ASIC regulates the following
provisions that may apply in particular cases of vote renting:
- Section 671B of the Corporations Act requires a
person to publicly disclose if they have voting rights over at least 5% of a
listed company’s shares. Therefore, significant acquisitions of voting rights
must be disclosed to the market.
- Section 606 of the Corporations Act prohibits a
person from obtaining voting rights over more than 20% of a company’s shares
unless an exception applies (such as approval by the company’s shareholders).
We do not have precise data on how widespread the practice
of vote renting is. But ASIC’s regulatory experience over recent years does not
suggest that there is widespread abuse of vote renting. Vote renting was also
recently discussed in the PJC Report Better Shareholders – Better Company.
Question on Notice 24
Insider trading and market
manipulation (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What were the findings from Project Mint? Is the
investigation ongoing? Can ASIC provide the precise terms of reference to
Project Mint?
Response:
Findings
The project has yet to be completed. We are not in a
position to comment on ongoing matters of investigation. However, general
findings to date have included:
- The burden of proof for market misconduct cases
and the 'transient' nature of market rumours makes prosecution challenging.
There are evidentiary issues in establishing the rumour – source and flow.
There is then an issue of materiality.
- The most useful leads to ASIC on rumours and
market misconduct have come so far from direct complaints made to ASIC.
- The practices of brokers in terms of the
prevention of the circulation of rumours differ significantly and can be
improved.
Terms of reference
The project's objectives are broadly:
- Review allegations of market misconduct to
assess whether enforcement action is required in particular cases
- Increase market compliance with section 1041A
and 1041E of the Corporations Act.
- Improve brokers' and other market participants'
practices in the handling of rumours.
- Increase ASIC's role in being a credible
deterrent for market misconduct.
- Be responsive to complaints/whistleblowers.
Question on Notice 25
Insider trading and market
manipulation (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What information has Project Mint provided concerning the
extent of the spreading of false and misleading information? Do you have the
numbers of any prosecutions or investigations that have resulted from the
project?
Response:
Project Mint has resulted in a number of parties expressing
concerns about false and misleading information and has also resulted in ASIC
obtaining documents that in some cases suggest information has been circulated
in the market that may not be completely accurate. Our investigations into
these matters are ongoing.
Question on Notice 26
Insider trading and market
manipulation (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What is the process that ASIC follows to prove the origin of
false rumours?
Response:
Typically ASIC would seek to prove the origin of false
rumours by:
- Gathering evidence. For example, we would gather
information by communicating with parties who may have reported a rumour;
reviewing trading data of certain stocks during specific trading periods;
preparing and serving ASIC notices on market participants to gather documentary
information or voice recordings they hold about particular stocks; interviewing
market participants and entities the subject of rumours; and working with ASX
and other regulators in reviewing data they have obtained.
- Undertaking Surveillance. For example, this can
include on-site surveillance and interviews about trading activities with
particular market participants (e.g. hedge funds and major brokers).
Question on Notice 27
Insider trading and market
manipulation (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What were the main findings of the review ASIC conducted
last year on the regulations governing day traders on internet forums? How is
ASIC cracking down on people using multiple online identities to manipulate
share prices?
Response:
ASIC's review of internet forums, or internet discussion
sites (IDS), is ongoing.
IDSs have been a source of concern in relation to their
possible use for the purposes of market manipulation. Our current policy, set
out in Regulatory Guide 162 Internet discussion sites (RG 162), was developed
prior to the implementation of the financial services reforms in the Financial
Services Reform Act 2001. It allows a limited kind of IDS operator to operate
without a licence, provided that they comply with certain conditions set out in
RG 162. These conditions require the giving of certain warnings and disclosures
to IDS users.
ASIC will shortly be releasing a consultation paper, which will
revisit our current policy on IDS, including through dealing with some recently
raised concerns (e.g. ensuring warnings are given to users of these sites,
looking at the potential for misconduct via discussion sites and the need for
appropriate identification of users of these sites).
We intend to release the consultation paper in early
January, with a 6--8 week consultation period. We will likely re-release RG 162
in updated form as soon as possible after consultation is completed.
Question on Notice 28
Market supervision
responsibilities (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How does the ASX’s conflict of interest jeopardise the market?
Can ASIC give examples?
Response:
As the holder of an Australian market license ASX is
required to manage conflicts between its commercial interests and the need to
ensure that the ASX market operates in a fair, orderly and transparent manner
(section 792A(c)(i) of the Corporations Act 2001).
In ASIC's most recent Market Assessment Report about the ASX
group dated 31 July 2008 which ASIC prepared pursuant to section 794C(3) of the
Corporations Act, ASIC concluded that ASX adequately managed its commercial
conflicts of interest over the period covered by the assessment.
Details of ASIC's most recent assessment of ASX's conflicts
handling arrangements are set out in the Market Assessment Report, which is
available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/REP_135.pdf/$file/REP_135.pdf.
Question on Notice 29
Market supervision
responsibilities (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How does ASIC see the ASX’s conflict of interest best
managed?
Response:
As an Australian financial market licensee ASX is required
to ensure that it satisfies its obligations under section 792A(c)(i) of the Corporations
Act to adequately manage conflicts between its commercial interests and its
obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure that the ASX market operates
in a fair, orderly and transparent manner.
ASIC does not consider that there is any particular method
that ASX should adopt to ensure it complies with its obligations under section
792A(c)(i) of the Corporations Act.
ASX has made a number of changes to the way it manages its
conflicts of interest over the years, some of which were made in response to
past ASIC's recommendations. ASIC anticipates that ASX's approach to managing
its commercial conflicts of interest will continue to evolve in response to internal
and external changes.
Details of ASIC's most recent assessment of ASX's conflicts handling
arrangements are set out in the Market Assessment Report, which is available at
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/REP_135.pdf/$file/REP_135.pdf.
Question on Notice 30
Market supervision
responsibilities (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Would competing listing agencies have helped prevent the
recent turmoil in the share market caused by the financial crisis? If so, how?
Response:
ASIC understands this question to be asking whether the
existence of competing markets upon which securities quoted on ASX can be
traded would have helped prevent the significant market volatility and price
declines in ASX listed securities.
In light of the experience in various overseas jurisdictions
where securities can be traded on more than one platform or market, including
in the USA and Europe, it is not obvious that the existence of competing
markets upon which ASX quoted securities can be traded would have had any
impact in reducing recent market volatility and price declines due to the
global financial crisis.
Question on Notice 31
Market supervision
responsibilities (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
31 In what circumstances would it be appropriate for
the ASX to maintain any regulatory activities if market competition is
implemented?
Response:
ASIC provided confidential advice to the Government in March
2008 on the issues it considers important in constructing a supervisory
framework if competition for market services is implemented.
ASIC's primary concern is that market supervision
arrangements work effectively across the whole market, as well as at each
market individually, if market competition is implemented.
It is a question for the Government as to the circumstances
in which ASX continues with its supervisory activities in the event that
competition for market services is implemented.
Question on Notice 32
Market supervision
responsibilities (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How will ASIC undertake more detailed market surveillance in
the absence of the ASX performing the role?
Response:
ASIC is not aware of any existing Government decision that
would result in a change to the supervisory framework for ASX listed
securities.
Question on Notice 33
Blackout trading (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
To what extent is blackout trading occurring in the market?
How many investigations or prosecutions has ASIC initiated over the past six
and twelve months with relation to blackout trading? Have the amount of
investigations and prosecutions risen or fallen over the past five years?
Response:
In 2008 ASX conducted two reviews of directors trading
during 'blackout' periods. A 'blackout' period is period set under a company's
trading policy during which trading in the company's securities by its
directors and employees is restricted. The periods from year or half-year end
leading up to the announcement of the company's results are usually declared
'blackout' periods. Under the ASX Corporate Governance Council's Corporate
Governance Principles and Recommendations, companies should establish and
publish its policy in relation to trading in its securities.
ASX's most recent review of 'blackout' trading (Review of
directors' trading during the "blackout period" – Q3 2008, released 11 December 2008) found that during the period from 1 July to 30 September 2008 there were:
- 718 active trades by directors during a
'blackout' period; and
- Of these, 95 trades potentially contravened the
trading policies of the relevant company concerned; and
- After inquiry, 15 did contravene the relevant
company's trading policy. 2 of those were in securities of companies in the
All Ordinaries Index, including one in the ASX/ASX 200 Index.
This compares with 795 trades during a 'blackout' period and
57 trades that potentially contravened the company's trading policy for the
earlier period of 1 January to 31 March 2008.
ASIC has not conducted any investigations specifically into
'blackout' trading during the past 6 or 12 months. This is primarily because
trading during 'blackout' periods does not, in itself, contravene the
Corporations Act. This is explained further under the next question.
ASIC does review referrals (from ASX and otherwise) alleging
directors traded with insider information, some of which do occur in the
blackout period.
Question on Notice 34
Blackout trading (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Is there any ambiguity in the Corporations Act with respect
to blackout trading, and if so, what is it? Under what circumstances could
directors trading shares in their company not be considered a breach of the
Act?
Response:
The Corporations Act does not directly regulate trading
during 'blackout' periods. Directors and others who trade whilst in the
possession of information that is not generally available are subject to the
insider trading prohibitions under Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act. Directors
are also subject to the obligations not to misuse company information for
personal gain (ss183 & 184(3) Corporations Act), and to notify the market
when they trade in the company's securities (s205G Corporations Act).
We note that on 19 November 2008 the Minister for
Superannuation and Corporate Law requested that the Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee (CAMAC) consider whether any changes are required to the
Australian regulatory framework in relation to trading by directors during
'blackout' periods.
Question on Notice 35
Market disclosure (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What improvements have been made over the past 12 months to
disclosure and shareholder communication? How is ASIC continuing to address and
improve this issue?
Response:
Since June 2007, companies and shareholders have been able
to take advantage of amendments to s314 of the Corporations Act, which allow
shareholders to choose whether they wish to receive a hard copy of an annual
report, an electronic copy of the report or to download the report from a
website.
In addition, ASIC has recently published the following
Regulatory Guides that aim to improve disclosure in particular industry sectors:
- Regulatory Guide 69 Debentures – improving
disclosure for retail investors (published in October 2007, updated in August
2008);
- Regulatory Guide 45 Mortgage schemes – improving
disclosure for retail investors (published in September 2008); and
- Regulatory Guide 46 Unlisted property schemes –
improving disclosure for retail investors (published in September 2008).
ASIC continues to be mindful of the need to improve
disclosure and shareholder communication in light of relevant market
conditions. ASIC and ASX presented a joint seminar focussed on disclosure for
listed entities in Perth, Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne in 2008. That series
will be continued in 2009, and extended to Adelaide. Commissioner Belinda
Gibson has made a number of presentations in 2008 (including most recently a
speech on 27 November 2008) addressing various disclosure related issues,
including the need for good disclosure in a volatile market, together with some
suggestions for how companies might deal with market rumours.
Question on Notice 36
Market disclosure (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What are the observance rates of margin loan disclosure of
directors? Has ASIC examined instances where materially significant margin loan
exposure has not been disclosed?
Response:
On 29 February 2008 ASIC and ASX jointly published a
reminder of obligations of a listed entity to disclose market sensitive
information about margin loans. Following that publication a number of
entities announced directors margin loan exposure (eg Asciano, Fairfax, United
Group) or that no such exposure existed (eg CSL). Other entities announced that
they would be undertaking a review of their margin loan policy (eg Brambles).
Question on Notice 37
Market disclosure (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What kind of feedback has ASIC had concerning whether
directors understand whether or not their margin loan exposure needs to be
disclosed?
Response:
The ASX/ASIC Update on margin loans mentioned above advised:
- Where a director has entered into margin loan or
similar funding arrangements for a material number of securities, the
continuous disclosure obligations, in appropriate circumstances, may operate to
require the entity to disclose the key terms of the arrangements.
- Whether a margin loan arrangement is material is
a matter which the company must decide having regard to the nature of its
operations and the particular circumstances of the company.
- There are some differing views on the circumstances in which
margin loan exposure needs to be disclosed to the company, and in turn to the
market and whether the existing regulatory regime is sufficiently certain in
this regard. Industry guidance has also been produced. For example,
- The Australian Institute of Company Directors
published a position paper in June 2008 setting out its views on directors and
margin loans. The paper states that to give effect to the ASX/ASIC Update,
boards must possess all relevant information about the funding arrangements so
that an assessment of materiality can be made. It recommends boards adopt a
policy requiring disclosure of this information. The paper also states that
materiality and whether market disclosure is required are best judged by boards
and companies with reference to the company’s particular circumstances at a
particular time.
- Chartered Secretaries Australia has recommended
mandatory disclosure to the company and the market if a director holds more
than five per cent of the company’s issued securities subject to security
interests or other third party rights.
We note that on 19 November 2008 Minister Sherry referred
this issue to CAMAC.
Question on Notice 38
Market disclosure (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What have been the difficulties of seeking disclosure of
margin loans? What is the process for managing disclosure without flagging
trigger prices to the market?
Response:
ASIC considers that, to the extent that companies permit
their directors to enter into margin loan arrangements, the manner of
disclosure is a matter for the companies and their directors to manage. If the
trigger price is material price sensitive information (as it often will be for
significant holdings) ASIC would expect companies to restrict their directors
from taking margin loans, as it places the directors in a position of potential
conflict.
Question on Notice 39
Market disclosure (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How does ASIC intend to improve disclosure of other types of
director’s debt?
Response:
ASIC does not seek to require all director's debt to be
disclosed to the market. It does require material price sensitive information
to be disclosed by a company. Margin loans over significant shareholdings can
be in this category. Simple unsecured debt is less likely to be in this
category.
Question on Notice 40
ASIC strategic review (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
The new structure became operational on 1 September. What
have been the movements in staffing levels since this date?
Response:
The turnover experienced in the 3-month period 1 Sep - 30 Nov 2008 was a slight increase on the turnover for the same period last year (1.3
percentage points). However, this is a decline on turnover we have experienced
in other quarters. We have not experienced any significant increase in exits
from the organisation.
Question on Notice 41
Managed investment scheme
prosecutions (additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Have the levels of illegal managed investment scheme
prosecutions continued to fall during the last 6 months? What are the numbers?
What is the reason for the rise or fall?
Response:
In the period 1 July 2008 – 23 December 2008, ASIC has resourced for enforcement activity matters in relation to 20 illegal managed
investment schemes involving 449 investors and funds totalling $177 million.
Set out below is a table of action taken in relation to
illegal investment schemes over the last four financial years. The table covers
civil actions taken by ASIC and does not include other actions, such as
criminal proceedings.
Financial Year |
No. of Schemes |
Investors |
Funds involved |
04/05 |
76 |
2150 |
$220M |
05/06 |
102 |
5000* |
$788M* |
06/07 |
105 |
2550 |
$202M |
07/08 |
80 |
2069 |
$174M |
*Westpoint has impacted on these figures, involving 4300
investors and about $360M in funds.
Question on Notice 42
ASIC strategic review (additional
Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
How is ASIC managing the danger that an increase in
‘stakeholder teams’ and increased supervision will result in extra bureaucracy
and less efficiency?
Response:
Following its recent strategic review ASIC replaced its
previous structure of four functionally-based directorates with smaller,
externally focused financial economy and real economy teams, including 20
financial economy stakeholder and deterrence teams.
The previous directorate structure had unclear and
overlapping roles and accountabilities, which inhibited effective decision
making and gave rise to a 'silo' mentality, and an inflexible resourcing model
which limited ASIC's responsiveness to external issues.
ASIC has now moved to an externally oriented structure
focused on achieving stakeholder outcomes, with a leadership group employed for
its market knowledge, judgment and decision making ability, and inbuilt
resource flexibility to identify and respond to new issues.
Stakeholder team leaders understand the market sectors for
which each leader is responsible, are alive to emerging trends and risks, and
can apply their knowledge practically and commercially and act without unnecessary
escalation. The new team structure also enables resources to be moved to suit
changing needs, with project teams formed as needed and disbanded when work is
completed.
Finally, in the new structure a member of the Commission
takes overall responsibility for the work done by teams across specific sectors
of the market, and is closely involved in and externally accountable for the
work carried out by each team. The recently announced increase in the size of
the Commission will further broaden its skill base, improve responsiveness and
enable ASIC to cover in greater depth all the market and industry sectors that
the new structure contemplates.
Question on Notice 43
Financial Services Compensation
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
43 What is the distinction between monetary limits
and compensation caps? What advice is provided to investors from ASIC before
they waive their right to claim for the excess amount elsewhere?
Response:
Where monetary limits operate, a complaint will not fall within
the EDR scheme's jurisdiction if the claim exceeds the monetary limit. This
existing model can require EDR schemes to spend significant time and resources
determining whether a complaint falls within the EDR scheme's monetary limits
before they consider the actual merits of the complaint.
In contrast, if monetary limits were replaced with
compensation caps, a consumer or investor with a complaint involving an amount
that is higher than the compensation cap would be permitted to waive the excess
and still have the complaint heard by the EDR scheme. The scheme would then be
able to make an award up to its compensation cap.
The question of whether or not consumers and investors would
be required to waive their right to claim for the excess amount elsewhere is
still open. In the UK, for instance, complainants must not be bound by an EDR
scheme decision at any stage. The UK system is however different to the
Australian system: it is statutory and has a right of appeal.
If complainants are required to waive their rights to pursue
the balance of the claim elsewhere, the next question becomes when they should
be required to do so. If complainants are only required to waive their rights
at the end of the process (that is if they accept the outcome), then they will
be in a good position to make an informed decision about the outcome, and their
remaining rights.
If they are required to waive their rights at start of the
process, then the issue of ensuring that complainants are properly informed of
the rights they are giving up becomes very significant, because the outcome of
the process is unknown so complainants will not necessarily be aware of what
they are giving up. If this last option is implemented, it is not yet clear
whether ASIC's policy would include requirements about what advice must be
provided to complainants, or whether this issue would be left to EDR schemes to
determine.
Question on Notice 44
Financial Services Compensation
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
To what extent will these charges apply retrospectively,
such as for Westpoint investors?
Response:
It is not intended that changes to ASIC's policy would apply
retrospectively.
Question on Notice 45
Financial Services Compensation
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
What sort of feedback has ASIC received so far? Why are
different limits for different dispute resolution bodies appropriate?
Response:
We have received 24 submissions to Consultation Paper 10,
Dispute resolution – Review of RG 139 and RG 165 (CP102), including submissions
from most retail financial services industry associations and a joint
submission on behalf of nine consumer groups (including CHOICE and Consumers'
Federation Australia).
As a general observation, the submissions were often polarised
as between industry and consumer representatives on key issues including:
- whether or not ASIC-approved EDR schemes should
be required to operate compensation caps rather than hard monetary limits and,
if so, when a complainant should be required to waive their rights to recover
the excess in court;
- whether or not a minimum dollar figure for
compensation caps (or monetary limits) of $280,000 should be stipulated;
- if monetary caps/limits are increased, whether
there should be a transitional period; and
- whether interest should be awarded in addition to
– or as part of – an EDR scheme award for compensation.
In CP102, ASIC proposed to set $280,000 as a minimum for
compensation caps – subject to very limited exceptions.
ASIC considers it important that all EDR schemes operate a
consistent minimum compensation cap to ensure that there is an equal minimum
level of protection for consumers and investors and to prevent forum shopping.
For example, a consumer or investor should have access to the same compensation
cap whether or not they buy an insurance product through a broker or directly
from an insurer.
The approach also provides some flexibility and allows EDR
schemes to tailor the compensation cap for different industry sectors where
appropriate. The Productivity Commission has recognised that tailored limits
for different types of disputes may be appropriate because "[t]he ceilings
set for any particular scheme should reflect the underlying distribution of
risks facing consumers for the relevant financial services".
For instance, there are currently much lower limits ($6,000
and $3,000 respectively) in the Investments, superannuation and life insurance
division of FOS for income stream products and in the General insurance
division for complaints about third party general insurance claims. ASIC will
consider where these limits should be set, but the very significant difference
from the $280,000 limit reflects the facts that income stream risk products
generally provide coverage for 75% of income, and third party general insurance
claims depend on the cost of repairing a vehicle.
Question on Notice 46
Financial Services Compensation
(additional Question on Notice, Senator Boyce)
Would any legislative amendments be required to give effect
to these changes? If so, what?
Response:
Our intention at this stage is to implement any changes
through amendments to our Regulatory Guides 139 Approval of external dispute
resolution schemes and 165 Licensing: Internal and external dispute
resolution. Depending on the likely costs of each change, we may issue a
Regulatory Impact Statement.
Several of our proposals about internal dispute resolution
(including the adoption of the definition of complaint and the Guiding
Principles in AS ISO 10002 as well as other specific elements of the new
standard) reflect the fact that Australian Standard AS 4629-1995 Complaints
Handling has been superseded by AS ISO 10002 Customer satisfaction – Guidelines
for complaints handling in organisations.
We understand that the Government intends to update the
Corporations Regulations to reflect the introduction of AS ISO 10002 and it is
for this reason that RG 165 must also be updated. One option is that amendments
to ASIC's regulatory guides only take effect once the Corporations Regulations
have been updated.
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