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Chapter 3
Regulatory frameworks
Prudential requirements
3.1
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) demonstrated that a stable, prudent
banking sector is an essential part of a stable, productive economy. Lenders, or
'authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs)', do not have absolute
discretion in setting their lending policies but must comply with the
prudential regulatory framework overseen by the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority (APRA). The framework applies to all ADIs, including
banks, building societies and credit unions, which cannot provide banking
services in Australia without APRA's authorisation.[1]
Making a sporting analogy, APRA's Chairman has explained the application of the
prudential framework to ADIs as follows:
We licence financial sector participants — we decide whether
each team has the fitness, skills and experience to compete — and then we
monitor teams continuously to ensure they are meeting prudential requirements
and managing their affairs with appropriate prudence. In other words, we ensure
that regulated institutions play within the letter and spirit of the rules and
remain match fit.[2]
3.2
Abacus – Australian Mutuals (Abacus) advised that the application of one
framework to all ADIs is a feature unique to the Australian prudential system:
What is unusual about the Australian banking regulatory
system is that mutuals, credit unions and building societies are entirely
integrated into the same regulatory system. You will find in other markets that
mutuals, credit unions, will have their own regulatory system. The banks will
be off separately. Our members meet all the requirements that banks meet. We
are, I think, the only credit union system anywhere in the world which is fully
compliant with the Basel international banking regulatory frameworks.[3]
3.3
The prudential framework promotes financial stability through directing
ADIs to appropriately engage with risk. As APRA has previously stated, the
framework, which is comprised of legislative requirements, prudential standards
and prudential guidance, 'aims to ensure that risk-taking is conducted within
reasonable bounds and that risks are clearly identified and well managed.'[4]
Treasury supported this view, advising that '[t]he purpose of prudential
regulation is to protect bank depositors and maintain financial stability.'[5]
Westpac Group submitted that the prudential framework promoted financial
stability in Australia throughout the GFC:
We would just like to reinforce that we think the prudential
regulation that existed through the crisis stood up well in the great scheme of
things, and we are quite supportive of it.[6]
3.4
The regulatory framework adheres to the global capital adequacy regime endorsed
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel II framework), which
Australia adopted in 2008.[7]
Treasury stated that the Basel II framework 'is based on risk-weighted capital
requirements', and further noted that:
Minimum capital requirements are a core component of
prudential regulation [....] The amount of capital required for different types
of loans varies in line with differences in the amount of risk they involve. The
amount of risk involved in a loan is a function of the probability of default
by the borrower and the expected recovery value of any collateral
provided to the lender.[8]
3.5
The prudential framework influences conditions attached to the provision
of finance, including business lending. Treasury advised that the Basel II
framework directs ADIs to 'hold capital requirements proportionate to a loan's
riskiness'.[9]
APRA advised that the prudential regulations also require the interest rates to
reflect the risk-weight, with higher risk-weights attracting higher interest
rates:
APRA [...] expects ADIs to reflect the credit risks to which
they are exposed in setting their lending rates, with a higher risk margin on
higher risk loans to reflect the greater probability of default and/or the
potential for loss if the loans were to default.[10]
3.6
APRA and Treasury stated that the Basel II framework provides two
methods for calculating the risk-weight; the standardised approach and the
advanced approach.[11]
APRA stated that the standardised approach 'is more about [ADIs] putting things
into buckets that we have decided.'[12]
In contrast, APRA advised that the advanced approach allows the ADI to 'use its
own internal modelling, drawing on its actual historical loss experience in the
various lending categories, to assist in quantifying, aggregating and managing
its credit risks.'[13]
At present, the major banks and Macquarie Bank are authorised to use the
advanced approach.[14]
3.7
APRA further advised that for SME loans secured by residential property,
'the credit risk-weight under the standardised approach is the same as that
applying to an owner-occupied mortgage'. Using the advanced approach the
risk-weight is generally higher than the risk-weight for an owner-occupied
mortgage. This reflects historical experience that the probability of default
for small business loans is higher than the probability of default for residential loans.[15]
3.8
APRA stated that while the prudential regulations distinguish between
broad categories of credit, for example personal, residential mortgage and
business, the framework 'does not generally distinguish by size of business
borrower.'[16]
Mr Wayne Byres, Executive General Manager, Diversified Institutions
Divisions, APRA, further advised that '[t]he regulatory system is really
designed, to the extent possible, to reflect differences in risk rather than
differences in type of borrower or the purpose of borrowing.'[17]
3.9
While the prudential framework is intended to apply equally to all
categories of lending, it was evident that the prudential requirements have
particular consequences for SME finance. It was apparent that the prudential
requirements influence the range of ADIs that provide finance to small
businesses. Abacus explained that ADIs are required to meet certain standards
before entering the SME finance market:
APRA strongly advises mutual ADI boards not to allow their
institution to move into commercial lending without ensuring they have the
personnel, expertise and systems to do so prudently. APRA's position is that
assessing, pricing and securing commercial exposures requires a set of skills
distinct from those required for assessing standard mortgages and personal
lending. APRA requires ADIs to have robust product development processes to
analyse new lines of business before products are formally endorsed and
launched.[18]
3.10
Abacus advised that the prudential framework can constrain second-tier
lenders from providing finance to SMEs. Mr Lawler stated that '[i]f our members
want to enter into new forms of businesses, they can. They just have to make
sure that they have the right level of expertise and capacity and risk
management systems to do it.'[19]
However, Mr Lawler further stated that these requirements can deter smaller
ADIs:
[I]t is challenging to meet all the prudential regulatory
requirements and to meet all the other regulatory compliance issues. We see
ongoing consolidation in our sector. The sector itself continues to grow, and
our assets are growing, but the number of participants is shrinking because the
smaller mutuals either find the regulatory compliance burden too heavy or they
see, for good strategic reasons, a case to merge with another institution to
become larger and get access to economies of scale. Economies of scale help in
the context of entering new lines of business, such as business lending.[20]
3.11
Additionally, Treasury advised that ADIs 'are likely to need to hold
more capital against SME loans, relative to residential mortgages.'[21]
Similarly, ANZ reported that:
[t]he higher probability of default and loss given default
for small business customers when compared to mortgage customers requires banks
to hold a higher level of capital and reserve more for bad debt expenses for
small business lending. A requirement to hold three times as much capital for
small business customers than residential mortgage customers is typical and is required
by APRA.[22]
3.12
NAB also reported greater capital requirements for SME loans, stating
that 'the amount of capital required to be held by banks is generally three
times higher than for residential loans, and in some instances can be up to seven
times higher for certain products.'[23]
Codes of conduct and additional legislative requirements
3.13
In addition to complying with APRA requirements, ADIs may choose to
adhere to voluntary, industry-based policies and guidelines. The two key
industry codes are the Code of Banking Practice and the Mutual Banking Code of
Practice.
3.14
The Code of Banking Practice, developed by the Australian Bankers
Association (ABA), directs the banks' interactions with customers.[24]
Matters that the code covers include disclosure of application fees and
notification of changes to terms and conditions such as fees, charges and interest
rates.[25]
3.15
The ABA advised that the code applies to small business finance.[26]
However, the code is voluntary and therefore may not apply to all bank lenders.[27]
A list of banks that have adopted the code is at Appendix 3. For banks that
have adopted the code, compliance with the code is monitored by the Code
Compliance Monitoring Committee.[28]
3.16
The Mutual Banking Code of Practice (MBCOP) outlines requirements regarding
the provision of finance from a second-tier lender. Matters that the MBCOP
covers include notification requirements for setting terms and conditions for
products and facilities, reviewing fees and charges, and providing notification
of increased interest rates.[29]
Abacus stated that the MBCOP is designed to build on the prudential framework:
The MBCOP sets high standards in a range of areas beyond
those required by law, as an expression of the value mutual ADIs place on
improving the financial wellbeing of their members and communities. The number
one promise in the MBCOP is: "We will always act honestly and with
integrity, and will treat you fairly and reasonably in all our dealings with
you.[30]
3.17
In addition to regulating the provision of finance to individuals for
non-commercial purposes, the MBCOP applies to small business members or
customers and covers the provision of small business loans and other financial
products.[31]
However, the MBCOP does not cover the field for mutual lending. Similar to the
Code of Banking Practice, the MBCOP only applies to the credit unions or mutual
building societies that choose to subscribe.[32]
A list of ADIs that have subscribed to the MBCOP is at Appendix 4.
3.18
As noted in the MBCOP, regulatory requirements that can impact SME finance
are also contained in:
-
the Corporations Act 2001 and requirements set by the
Australian Securities and Investment Commission;
-
Commonwealth, State and Territory privacy legislation; and
-
fair trading laws.[33]
3.19
At present, the National Consumer Credit Code does not regulate the
provision of finance to SMEs. However, the ABA advised that while not
officially applying to SME loans, banks may be choosing to apply the Code to
SME customers:
While they apply to individual customers, for a small
business, whether it is doing individual banking or small business banking is
quite blurred. We will find that certainly for small operations the banks will
err on the side of caution and treat them as small customers.[34]
3.20
In July 2010, Treasury sought public feedback on a proposal to extend
the consumer credit code to apply to small business finance.[35]
Three options were outlined. Option one proposes limited application of the
consumer credit regulations, under which '[m]inimum standards of conduct and
competencies could also be developed for small business lending'. Option two
proposes full application of the National Consumer Credit Code to small
business lending. Option three proposes the development of industry standards,
which could be enacted in legislation, to address current regulatory gaps.[36]
The committee understands that if the proposal is endorsed, it is intended that
legislative measures be in place by mid 2012.[37]
Treasury advised that 'there has not yet been any decision or outcome arising
from the consultations following the release of the Green Paper.'[38]
SME concerns with the regulatory framework
3.21
APRA stated that SMEs have benefitted from the Basel II framework:
The second point I want to make is that, although the capital
adequacy requirements for banks, building societies and credit unions were
changed in 2008 with the introduction of the Basel II framework into Australia,
we would say those changes were, if anything, marginally favourable towards SME
lending and certainly we do not see anything in those which would materially
disadvantage SME lending relative to other sorts of lending that a bank might
choose to do.[39]
3.22
In contrast, evidence presented to the committee highlighted three main
concerns with the regulatory framework's impact on SME access to finance,
namely,
-
Increased lending costs;
-
The introduction of Basel III requirements;
-
Changes to the conditions of existing loans following the GFC.
Increased lending costs
3.23
The RBA informed the committee that interest rates are determined taking
into account the cost of obtaining funds to lend and the 'perceived riskiness
of the borrower.'[40]
As the RBA explained, and as explored elsewhere in this report, the GFC
prompted ADIs to re-evaluate the risk of lending:
One of the things you have seen as to why interest rates have
gone up over the subsequent few years was that the banks repriced that risk, which
saw lending rates rise.[41]
3.24
Similarly, Treasury advised:
Lenders' perception of the risk associated with a loan are
also significant drivers. Just as the risk appetites of the banks' wholesale
funders have decreased since the financial crisis, so too have the risk
appetites of lenders themselves.[42]
3.25
The RBA reported that the variable interest rate for residentially
secured loans increased 220 basis points relative to the cash rate from mid
2007, and further advised that '[o]ver the same period, the spread between the
actual variable rate paid by small businesses and the cash rate also rose by
about 175 basis points.'[43]
Figure
3.1 Variable lending rates, residentially-secured term loans[44]
![Figure 3.1 Variable lending rates, residentially-secured term loans[44]](/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010_13/sme_finance/report/c03_1_gif.ashx)
3.26
Submissions from SME representatives recognised that lenders must assess
the level of risk and offer credit accordingly. However, it was disputed
whether the interest rates accurately reflect the cost of, and the risks
associated with, providing SME loans. For example, the NSW Business Chamber
argued that:
[W]ith the worst of the crisis now behind us, lending
conditions should have improved, and small businesses should now be able to
access the funding they need to expand and support the economic recovery.
Unfortunately, it appears that banks are reluctant to move away from the high
levels of risk aversion adopted during the height of the crisis.[45]
3.27
The Council of Small Business Organizations Australia (COSBOA)
questioned the disparity between the interest rates for SME loans and
residential mortgages, particularly for business loans secured by residential
property: '[i]t still seems wrong. It is the same house, the same person and
the same business earning them money.'[46]
ACCI stated:
Data from the Reserve Bank indicates that small businesses
were paying a margin of 4.17 percentage points above the cash rate on average
for bank finance, compared to a margin of 2.23 percentage points for large
businesses and 2.47 percentage points for mortgage customers as of
2 February 2011, despite most of these small business loans being
residentially secured.[47]
3.28
It appeared there were three causes for the higher interest rates for
SME loans. First, it was submitted that the higher interest rates resulted from
the increased cost to ADIs in obtaining funds to lend. The ABA explained:
[The GFC] had two major impacts on lending to small business.
The first was that the cost of funds to lender increased dramatically. For many
lenders, particularly smaller lenders, even access to funds became a real
issue. In other words, money became less available and much more expensive.
This inevitably affected bank lending.[48]
3.29
The ANZ also noted the impact of rising costs on interest rates,
stating:
In setting interest rates, ANZ considers our funding costs
and the inherent risk profile of the lending portfolio. The GFC impacted on
both these fronts and required us to consider all interest rates, including
those to small businesses, to ensure they adequately reflected the cost and
risk of lending.[49]
3.30
Second, it was argued that the higher costs are an appropriate response
to the higher default rates, and therefore the higher risk, of SME loans. The
RBA submitted:
One common concern of small businesses is that interest rates
on residentially secured small business loans are priced at a premium to
residentially secured housing rates. However this pricing results from higher expected
losses on small business loans...[50]
3.31
The RBA advised that non-performing small business loans have increased
from approximately 1 per cent during 2005-07 to approximately 2.5 per cent of
banks' total small business loan portfolios as of September 2010. Figure 3.2 shows
that the growth in the number of non-performing assets on the banks' books in
the business sector now far exceeds those in the housing sector.
Figure
3.2 Bank's Non-performing assets[51]
![Figure 3.2 Bank's Non-performing assets[51]](/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010_13/sme_finance/report/c03_2_gif.ashx)
3.32
Westpac Group also submitted that the higher interest rates were an
appropriate response to the default rate of SME loans:
[S]lightly higher interest rates for SME lending when
compared to residential mortgage lending is consistent with the performance of
SME loans across Westpac Group portfolios. Currently, small business '90 days+'
delinquency rates are approximately two-and-a-half to three times greater than
that of residential mortgages. Further, SME borrowers have a significantly
higher net bad debt rate when compared to the consumer mortgage portfolio.[52]
3.33
Treasury also argued that the higher costs were a proportionate response
to the probability of SME loans defaulting, stating that:
While the Australian economy performed well during the
financial crisis, it is likely that loans were re-priced by lenders to reflect
the higher probability of default on SME loans.
While many loans to SMEs are secured by residential property,
banks take into account several factors, in addition to the type of collateral
used, when pricing a loan. The average probability of default on small business
loans is around 2.4 per cent. This compares to residential mortgages, whose
probability of default is less than half that, at around 1.1 per cent. Further,
once a borrower has defaulted, banks stand to lose different amounts on
different loans. The loss given default on loans to small business is
approximately 30 per cent of the loan's value. This figure is around 20 per
cent for housing loans.[53]
3.34
Third, the ANZ submitted that the higher capital requirements for SME
loans increased the cost of providing SME loans relative to residential
mortgages.[54]
This was confirmed by the RBA, which also stated that the higher interest rates
result from 'the larger amount of capital that banks hold as a buffer against
unexpected losses.'[55] The CBA
supported the additional capital requirements, stating that 'there are
legitimate reasons why APRA requires additional capital be held for small and
medium business lending, which carries a higher risk than mortgage lending.'[56]
3.35
NAB argued that the prudential framework contains 'an inherent bias in
favour of residential mortgage lending', and further stated:
The operational impact of such prudential settings is that
Australia's commercial banks can do significantly more residential mortgage
lending relative to business lending in terms of capital management.[57]
3.36
However, this did not appear to be a view widely shared by other lenders
or oversight bodies. As previously explored in this report, it appears that
risk was less rigorously priced prior to the GFC. On this point, Treasury
stated:
We think that the banks themselves or the lenders have
become—maybe you could call them—risk adverse, but at the same time it is more
likely than not that they are pricing in risk much better post-GFC than they
probably were beforehand.[58]
3.37
The CBA argued that 'the GFC is the most recent reminder of why higher
risk lending must be priced accordingly.'[59]
Australia's response to the GFC, including the actions of ADIs, has received
international approval. For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) has concluded:
Australia’s financial system has proved very resilient during
the global crisis. This is partly due to solid domestic banking supervision,
which was substantially reinforced after sizeable banking sector losses in the
early 1990s, and low exposure to toxic assets...Banks have remained profitable
with stable capital ratios, and the largest Australian banks are now among the
soundest in the world.[60]
3.38
The OECD has further stated:
The good performance of the financial sector has improved the
ranking of Australian institutions by international standards. Reviews of Basel
II implementation and stress tests give good marks to the solidity of the
system.[61]
Committee view
3.39
On the basis of the evidence submitted to the committee, it appears
there are sound reasons for the higher interest rates for SME loans compared to
residential loans, and the increased cost of SME lending that resulted from the
GFC. It would be of significant concern were the prudential framework
misapplied to attempt to justify inappropriately high interest rates or other
charges. However, the committee has not received evidence of inappropriate
application of the prudential framework. On the contrary it appears that the
prudential framework has served Australia well throughout the GFC.
Basel III requirements
3.40
In its report to the G20[62]
in October 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced the
introduction of the Basel III regulatory framework.[63]
The new regulatory framework was developed in response to the GFC, and is
intended to 'strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the
banking sector.'[64]
APRA stated that 'Basel III
remedies a number of weaknesses which were highlighted in previous global capital
standards, highlighted by the GFC.'[65]
As the RBA noted during an address at the Basel III Conference 2011,
the new requirements are 'about applying the lessons learned from the crisis to
the way we regulate banks.'[66]
3.41
The Basel Committee has advised that Basel III aims to 'improve the
banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic
stress, whatever the source, improve risk management and governance and
strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures.'[67]
The new requirement include the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, which will require
ADIs to 'have sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive an acute stress
scenario lasting one month', and the Net Stable Funding Ratio, which will
encourage ADIs to access 'more stable sources of funding (e.g. deposits or
long-term debt).'[68]
3.42
On 17 December 2010, it was announced that Australia will comply with
the new Basel III framework.[69]
APRA stated that staggered phase-in arrangements will apply in Australia,
advising that 'for the purpose of this
discussion we can say it is coming in a couple of years' time.'[70]
3.43
The Australian Financial Review has reported that banks are
concerned that the new requirements will lead ADIs to raise mortgage rates faster
than changes to the official cash rate.[71]
However, these concerns were not raised in the evidence banks provided this
inquiry. Referring to Basel III, CBA Australia noted the bank 'accepts the
scope to further improve the framework and the global agreements to do so (such
as the implementation of Basel III).'[72]
3.44
In contrast, ACCI submitted that the new requirements may increase the
cost of SME finance:
...ACCI is concerned that the Basel III requirements will put
small business borrowers at a substantial disadvantage compared to mortgage
borrowers and larger corporates, with the flow on impact of higher funding
costs and bank charges as well as further tightening in non-price lending
requirements imposed on the small business sector.[73]
3.45
This view was not shared by the RBA and APRA, both members of the Basel
Committee.[74]
APRA has advised ADIs that '[a]s a member of the Basel Committee, APRA has been
actively involved in developing these global reforms and it fully supports the
package.'[75]
In evidence to the committee, APRA stated that transitioning to the Basel III
framework was 'quite manageable without particular disruption', and further
advised that 'most of our banks have been quite happy to say quite publicly
that they are quite well placed and already very close to compliance with the
new requirements.' [76]
APRA further stated that the regulator does not consider that Basel III will
trigger significant changes in lending conditions:
The impact of Basel III on our ADI sector will be far less
than on many other similar sectors around the world, in other jurisdictions. We
see the Australian ADI sector as quite well placed to be able to meet these new
requirements without the need for large-scale capital raisings or substantial
changes to balance sheet structures. The point being made is simply to say that
we do not see it as being particularly disruptive or costly from the position
the banks are in today.[77]
3.46
Mr Guy Debelle, Assistant Governor, Financial Markets, RBA, stated that
'[f]rom my point of view, no, I do not think that should have any particular
impact. Certainly I do not see it having a disproportionate impact on small
business lending.'[78]
Similarly, in announcing Australia's commitment to Basel III, the Treasurer stated
that 'no Australian bank will be able to cite them [the Basel III requirements]
as justification for stinging customers with any additional costs.'[79]
Committee view
3.47
It appears from the evidence provided to the inquiry that there is
overall support for the introduction of Basel III. Even where concerns
were raised no evidence was provided, nor were there any suggestions that
Australia should not be part of Basel III. However, it would be a significant
concern were the new requirements to result in imposing further barriers to
finance for SMEs. The committee is of the view that it would be improper for
ADIs to use the introduction of Basel III as an opportunity for
'price-gouging'. Given the serious negative impact that this could have for the
SME financial market, the committee recommends that the impact of Basel III in
Australia be closely monitored. While not provided to the committee, it is
noted that similar concerns could be raised regarding the cost of residential
mortgages. The committee sees merit in also monitoring the impact of Basel III
on Australian residential mortgages.
Recommendation 2
3.48
The committee recommends that the Reserve Bank of Australia specifically
track the impact of the introduction of Basel III on the cost of small and
medium business finance and residential mortgages.
Changes to the conditions of
existing loans following the GFC
3.49
Business representatives reported that the GFC prompted significant
changes to lending conditions not only for new but also for existing SME loans.
For example, CPA Australia stated:
From the beginning of the GFC, the banks were acutely aware
that the fallout from this crisis would change the risk profile of most
businesses. One step they undertook to mitigate their risks was to review their
loan portfolios with additional rigour. The result was that many businesses
were required to agree to changed loan conditions.[80]
3.50
Similarly, the NSW Business Chamber reported that '[r]isk aversion
during the GFC saw small business lending conditions tighten significantly,
both in terms of tightening lending criteria and relative costs of funds.'[81]
The reported changes to lending conditions included increased security
requirements, a reduction in the kinds of security accepted, a decrease in the
loan-to-valuation ratio and increased reporting requirements that included requirements
outside the scope of the original loan agreement.[82]
CPA Australia also reported member feedback that ADIs are requesting personal
and directors' guarantees, and key man insurance.[83]
3.51
It appeared that the changes were prompted by prudential considerations.
Commenting on the impact of the GFC on the lending market, the ABA reported
that 'the banks and non-bank lenders took steps to re-evaluate risks associated
with business lending.'[84]
The ANZ stated that:
It is prudent for all banks to review their lending criteria
on a regular basis in response to the broader economic climate. In early 2009,
ANZ implemented moderately tighter business lending standards in response to
adverse economic conditions impacting certain segments of the portfolio.[85]
3.52
CPA Australia noted member feedback that the increased reporting
requirements may be appropriate as 'the banks are now doing what perhaps they
should have always been doing.'[86]
It was also noted that tighter lending conditions may ease as the economy
improves. For example, the RBA stated that 'you do get this tightening across a
range of standards and then, as the economy comes back into recovery, general
easing in the conditions as well.'[87]
3.53
However, evidence presented to the committee indicates three main concerns
with the changed lending conditions. First, it was put to the committee that
the new conditions may restrict SME's access to finance. NSW Business Chamber
stated that 'generally speaking the banks appear to be unwilling to lend
without very high levels of cash flow and security.'[88]
Participants in Victoria University's small business survey argued: '[T]he
Banks are not interested in you if you have no security' and '[i]f you have
equity in your house you can get finance – if not good luck.'[89]
APESMA Connect stated that there is an 'unwillingness of banks to lend where
there is limited non-personal collateral.'[90]
CPA Australia argued that the new requirements could impact business growth,
noting that 'the security required for such [additional] lending may not be
available as it is already pledged as security.'[91]
3.54
Second, CPA Australia raised concerns with the manner in which the
conditions were altered. The organisation reported:
Changed lending conditions (including implementing additional
reporting requirements) were, at times, imposed with great speed and (often)
lack of warning. In our view, the inadequate time many businesses had to adjust
their systems to meet the new conditions added to the pressure many businesses
felt during the GFC; the banks could have handled this better.[92]
3.55
Under the MBCOP, mutual ADIs undertake to provide 'clear and effective
communication' with customers.[93]
The Banking Code of Practice directs banks to notify customers of changes to
terms and conditions, including standard fees and charges, no later than the
day on which the changed conditions take effect. Notification may occur either
in writing or through advertising in the media.[94]
However, it is unclear whether changed lending conditions such as increased
security and reporting requirements are covered by the Code of Banking Practice
or the MBCOP. In response to the concerns, the ABA advised '[w]ithout having heard the
precise circumstances, I am not sure. I cannot tell you precisely whether the
code or the legislation would cover that sort of behaviour.'[95]
3.56
Third, submissions also questioned whether the changed lending
conditions, particularly the reporting requirements, were appropriate. CPA
Australia reported members' concerns that the reporting requirements are unnecessary,
arguing that 'the lack of experience and skills of many business bankers is in
fact counterproductive to accessing finance and is leading to unnecessary
information requirements.'[96]
The organisation further stated that members believe ADI staff request
unnecessary information 'as they do not have the skills to make a professional
judgement on what is necessary and not necessary to make an informed decision.'[97]
3.57
It seemed that underlying this is a concern about the quality of service
ADIs provide. A participant at CPA Australia's small business roundtable questioned
whether ADI staff have the technical expertise to understand the information
requested:
They don't seem to understand what is in the forecast,
because they keep asking questions – they just don't seem to get it. I don't
think they know what they are looking at, especially for a mining company,
unless they have a background in mining.[98]
3.58
Similar concerns were noted in the Victoria University small business
survey.[99]
ACCI reported that its March 2010 survey found that 34 per cent of the 215
respondents considered that business bankers 'do not have adequate
understanding of their business' cash flows and its ability to service any
current or prospective loan obligations.'[100]
The Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA) stated:
Many respondents to the March 2010 REIA survey in their
comments felt that the financial sector did not understand the small business
sector and furthermore tended to group all small businesses in the one basket
without any differentiation, neither of the factors affecting a particular
segment nor of the outlook for that segment.[101]
3.59
It appeared that there was a disconnect between the views of some SMEs
and the evidence submitted by ADIs. For example, ANZ stated that it provides
SMEs with 'dedicated specialists, who are trained to help small business
customers experiencing financial difficulty.'[102]
ANZ further advised:
In the small-business space, our team does not make
assessments, in the sense of the actual credit decision. They certainly work
with customers to put together the best possible submission for a loan...We
hire a lot of people from small business or who have had family working in
small business, so they really understand and have empathy with small business.
They go through significant induction training and significant credit training.[103]
3.60
Westpac Group reported that Westpac Business Assist 'provides
personalised support to SME customers.'[104]
The CBA stated that '[s]ince 2006, CBA has achieved a fast growth rate in
business customer satisfaction.'[105]
The Code of Banking Practice also directs bank ADIs to ensure staff are
'trained so that they can competently and efficiently discharge their functions
and provide the banking services they are authorised to provide.'[106]
3.61
To address these concerns, CPA Australia advocated for the introduction
of a dedicated code of conduct for SME lending.[107]
The ABA advised, and the Code of Banking Practice states, that that Code
applies to small business lending.[108]
However, CPA Australia argued:
There are significant gaps that could be corrected in an
expansion of the ABA Code of Banking Practice or in a separate code of
practice. Such a specific Code would provide the framework for banks to improve
their relationship with small business and more clearly set out the rights and
responsibilities of banks and borrowers and enable banks "to get closer
than ever to business". This would no doubt lead to improved outcomes
in small business lending.[109]
3.62
The organisation stated that gaps exist in the areas of explaining the
requirements needed to obtain bank credit, estimating the time to process
credit applications, informing the SME that further information is needed to
process the loan, and informing the SME about the reasons for declining an
application.[110]
On the basis of requirements of banking codes in the United Kingdom and Canada,
CPA Australia recommended that a minimum of 15 days notice should be provided
of changes to lending terms and conditions, such as reporting requirements.[111]
The ABA informed the committee that the ABA and CPA Australia are discussing 'getting
together to talk about a lot of these small business issues.'[112]
3.63
CPA Australia also recommended additional technical training for
business banking staff 'so that such staff have a reasonable understanding of
financial matters and the industries in which their clients work.'[113]
The NSW Business Chamber stated 'we think there is room for improvement on the
part of credit providers; they could do more to evaluate individual loan
applications than simply applying a sectoral or regional template that they
have developed as part of their credit systems.'[114]
3.64
SME representatives also stated that there is scope for additional
training for SMEs. CPA Australia acknowledged that 'some businesses are finding
it difficult to meet the information requirements imposed by lenders for new
loans partly because of poor record keeping.'[115]
The NSW Business Chamber noted:
We find information deficiencies and differing rates of
capability are issues on both sides of lending transactions. There is always
more that can be done to improve the ability of small business to get across
their business opportunity and prospects to a prospective credit provider.
There is always room for that.[116]
Committee view
3.65
The committee notes the concern expressed by some stakeholders that
ADIs, and in particular banking staff, do not fully appreciate the conditions
peculiar to the SME sector and the nuances of SME finance. The committee
considers that a uniform definition of micro, small and medium business can
facilitate better policy analysis and development. Timely dissemination to
financial sector participants and business organisation of data about the SME
sector could assist lenders to more fully understand their clients'
circumstances and to develop lending practices that are tailored to each
client's needs.
3.66
It would be of concern were significant changes to lending conditions
introduced without providing SMEs sufficient opportunity to adjust to the new
requirements. The committee accepts advice from Abacus and the ABA that the
MBCOP and the Code of Banking Practice apply to SME products. However, the
codes should be amended to make clear the service standards required for ADIs
when altering lending conditions. In this regard, the committee notes CPA
Australia's advice that 15 days is the minimum lead time required under banking
codes in the United Kingdom and Canada.
3.67
The committee approves the measures many ADIs have taken to improve
services to SMEs. While evidence is inconclusive, the committee notes the
substantial anecdotal evidence of SMEs concerns with the skills and training of
business bankers. The committee encourages the ADI sector to take on board
these concerns, and to prioritise staff training in this area.
Recommendation 3
3.68
The committee recommends that the Code of Banking Practice and the
Mutual Banking Code of Practice be amended to include a standardised notice
period for notifying business borrowers of changes to loan terms and conditions
that may be materially adverse for them.
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