Structural change

VIRTUALLY NO LIABILITY?: SECURITIES MARKETS IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE AN ISSUES PAPER
Table of Contents


CHAPTER 2 - 1

Structural change

2.31 If growth in the availability and timeliness of information will benefit many investors, changes in the roles performed by intermediaries may lead to significant structural change in securities markets. Established groups of participants in such markets, and their activities, underpin the existing regime of corporate regulation. [28] However, developments in electronic commerce threaten to blur and even eliminate many of the traditional distinctions between the roles and related activities of these participants.

2.32 One commentator has observed that the effect of the new technology will be to eliminate intermediaries who add little value. Those seeking to stay in business would need to rearrange their operations to ensure that they did add value. [29]

2.33 Another commentator has pointed out that the extent to which particular classes of intermediaries might be vulnerable depends on the specific nature of the services they provide.

Implications for stockbrokers and stock exchanges

2.34 The changes implied in the above discussion can be analysed by looking at the activities of specific market participants. For example, stockbrokers provide securities advice to their clients, and undertake trades in securities on their clients' behalf. They may also trade in securities as principals, may be involved in the management of investment funds, and may be involved in underwriting the issue of new securities. Each of these activities may be affected by technological change.

2.35 Increasing competition in, and the proliferation of, securities advice from all sources on the Internet is considered in paras 2.17 - 2.29 above. With regard to share-trading on the Internet, evidence suggests that this can be conducted directly, at a greatly reduced cost. In 1996, Business Week magazine introduced Mr Ed Harrison, a client of Lombard Institutional Brokerage Inc - a discount brokerage that began offering Internet trading in September 1995:

2.36 Another firm, E*Trade Group, claims to process more than 6000 Internet-based share trades a day, at a transaction cost of less than $20 (as against $80 for a typical trade through a discount broker):

2.37 E*Trade apparently opens 500 new accounts, and brings in between $8 million and $10 million in new assets, each day. More generally, it has been estimated that the number of online brokerage accounts in America will grow from a current 1.5 million to 10 million in five years. [33] On 7 May, E*Trade announced that it proposed to open its trading service to Australian investors. [34]

2.38 Not all brokers accept that the new technology will directly affect their activities. Many major US brokerage houses doubt the threat posed by Internet share trading. Noting that they had retained most of their clients in the face of competition from discount brokers during the 1980s, and that most Internet firms lacked the financial strength and credibility of the major firms, these firms concluded that the Internet simply could not replace "a flesh-and-blood broker's counsel". As Business Week observed, at present full-service firms appear to have little to worry about - very few investors trade electronically, either on the Internet, or through proprietary online services. [35]

2.39 However, in the near future, it seems reasonable to surmise that simply facilitating trading on behalf of clients is likely to become more competitive, less profitable, and perhaps, ultimately, redundant. This prediction was echoed by the Chief Executive of the ASX, Mr Richard Humphry:

2.40 There is some evidence from America that supports this predicted migration to the provision of market information. For example, Business Week cited the case of Quote.com - an Internet news and advice organisation - which successfully charged subscription fees of between US$10 and US$42 to active investors wanting instant access to financial analysis and news and research, even though some of this information was also provided free on a time-delayed basis. [37] Active investors grew to depend on the service, and the prosperous subscriber-base enticed profitable advertising to the site.

2.41 While collecting fees for providing specialist investment information seems one likely response to technological change, such an approach will have to contend with an Internet culture that remains conditioned by the expectation that information is free. Broker-provided information will also have to compete with the many other sources of information that exist on the Internet.

2.42 Another response from brokers may be to emphasise their service role as client advisers. Some broker-sponsored Internet sites are actually the private sites of individual adviser's engaged by the firm. [38] Permitting advisers to set up private sites under a firm name or the firm's 'umbrella' may enable those advisers to better service, and so retain and attract, clients.

2.43 If the ultimate effect of electronic and Internet-based share-trading by brokers on behalf of retail investors remains somewhat speculative, there is likely to be a profound effect on trading by or on behalf of institutional investors, and on securities exchanges generally. As the Chief Executive of the ASX has observed, "people trading on the Net won't be forced to go through a trading exchange". [39]

2.44 Both the ASX and the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) are seeking in various ways to anticipate the implications of new technology. The SFE has apparently been considering the merits of establishing a new electronic share trading system known as LOCAM (or Large Order Call Market) for some time. The system would enable institutions to place their trades anonymously, masking both their identity and the size of the share block to be traded:

2.45 Institutions have repeatedly sought direct access to the ASX's SEATS trading system. Responding to these demands, the ASX recently referred to a proposed trial of a market to match up institutional orders after the close of normal trading:

2.46 Trading systems potentially in competition with "member-run markets" such as the ASX already exist. Participants at an ASC electronic commerce workshop instanced emerging principal-to-principal systems (embracing both primary and secondary trading in a full range of financial products), and broker-sponsored systems (where an electronic order matching system owned by an individual broker in effect became a full trading platform). An Australian example of a principal-to principal trading system was AUSMAQ.

2.47 An Australian example of a "broker-sponsored" system is POSIT - an order-matching system used by the stockbrokers Burdett Buckeridge and Young. POSIT is used for trades in excess of $1 million and operates outside normal SEATS trading hours. Workshop participants noted that its development as a full trading platform depended on user acceptance and regulatory approval. The system was said to have particular appeal to institutional investors in providing an anonymous way for the conduct of major trades. [43] The Reuters Instanet system apparently operates in a similar manner, again outside the ASX. [44]

2.48 Potential competition to established exchanges may also be provided by company-conducted 'passive' listing services. Some American examples of such services are noted in para 1.6 of this Paper.

2.49 It is worth noting that the Corporations Law currently prohibits the establishment of an unauthorised stock market, and provides for Ministerial approval of a stock exchange where that exchange satisfies a detailed series of requirements. [45] In this area, the Wallis Committee recommended that:

2.50 It seems inevitable that there will be greater competition within Australia between systems for trading securities. In addition to the developing mechanisms noted in paras 2.44 and 2.47 above, on 15 April, Austock Brokers received government approval to operate a computer-based, exempt stock market outside ASX regulation:

2.51 There will be also be greater competition between markets and trading systems internationally. The ASX has regularly referred to the need for brokers, and for the exchange itself, to remain internationally competitive or risk losing clients overseas. One commentator contends that, as investors become more international in their outlook, so might the companies in which they invest. Companies may choose to make their primary listing on an exchange that offers them the most favourable regulatory regime or the cheapest listing fees, knowing that investors in their home country can access them electronically on that exchange. Such a move would simply represent an extension of the existing trend to competition among stock exchanges to attract companies from other countries to list. [48]

2.52 As a result, exchanges might themselves become specialists, as have some brokers and advisers. For example, just as NASDAQ had become a world centre for trading technology stocks, so the ASX might eventually become a world centre for trading resource stocks. [49]

2.53 While the ramifications of change remain speculative, the fact of change and the need to plan for change remain undeniable. To quote the Chief Executive of the ASX:

2.54 In summary, the move to an international electronic market provides brokers and exchanges with obvious opportunities and challenges. Australian brokers and the ASX should gain access to an international (rather than a national or regional) pool of issuers, investors or clients. [50] However, some of the activities currently performed by these organisations will become more competitive, less profitable and may ultimately be performed by traders directly.

2.55 While some brokers will continue to offer the range of services currently provided, others may evolve into information specialists, or more specialised client advisers, or market-makers - increasingly trading in securities as principals. This may have implications for the degree of risk in securities markets.

2.56 Other brokers may offer order-matching services in competition with existing exchanges. These will not necessarily seek to duplicate what is offered by those exchanges, but may target particular groups of investors, or trades of a particular size. The minimum standards to be met by such new 'markets', and whether they should differ from the standards imposed on the ASX, represent a challenge for regulators.

2.57 Exchanges themselves will face more vigorous international competition for the listing of companies including, perhaps, competition from totally electronic exchanges situated in 'cyberspace'. In this regard it is worth referring in passing to Wit Capital Corp - an American investment bank "that also aspires to become an electronic stockmarket on which the shares of Internet offerings will be traded". Exchanges may respond to this increasing competition in a number of ways, including by seeking to specialise in certain types of stocks.

2.58 The Corporations Law currently licenses and regulates participants in the securities industry, requires that securities exchanges be approved, and explicitly recognises the enforceability of their listing and business rules. While it regulates investment advisers, it deals only tangentially with information providers, and does not specifically address situations such as the provision of computer software that may assist investors to capture and interpret information. [51] Any blurring of existing distinctions, or changes to existing activities, may require amendments to the Law, and some reconsideration of the limitations of the existing enforcement regime.

Implications for corporate advisers and merchant bankers

2.59 Trends towards electronic capital raising are likely to affect other participants in securities markets, including corporate advisory and merchant banking firms. Among other activities, these firms advise companies seeking to raise funds through the issue of securities, or arrange funds for such companies. They may also advise shareholders seeking to acquire or dispose of securities, and provide experts' reports in connection with takeovers, mergers and privatisations. Technology is likely to affect the profitability of some of these activities, particularly those involving the funding requirements of small and fast-growing companies. For example, with reference to capital raising in America it has been claimed that:

2.60 Interestingly, the developers of CapScape are simultaneously attempting to develop a computer program to alert investors to the potential problems in any such offerings. [53]

2.61 Clearly, the extent of structural change that might occur with the adoption of new technology also remains speculative. However, some immediate issues are obvious.

Some issues:

Footnotes:

[28] Australian Securities Commission, Electronic Commerce Project Issues paper, (August 1995) p 3.

[29] 'Essential to embrace the future', Business Review Weekly, 24 February 1997, p 8.

[30] Ross Gittins, 'Will Electronic Commerce Drive Structural Change in the Financial Services Industry and Enhance Competitiveness of the Australian Capital Markets?' a Paper delivered at Regulating the Marketspace, ASC Electronic Commerce Conference, Sydney, 4-5 February 1997, p 7.

[31] 'With the World Wide Web, Who Needs Wall Street?' Business Week, 29 April 1996, p 48.

[32] 'E*Trade: Is This Investing's Future?' Fortune, 3 March 1997, p 125.

[33] 'E*Trade: Is This Investing's Future?' Fortune, 3 March 1997, p 124.

[34] 'Net broker to establish Australian operations', Australian Financial Review, 7 May 1997, p 23.

[35] 'With the World Wide Web' , Who needs Wall Street?' Business Week 29 April 1996, p 49.

[36] 'Brokers face up to the virtues of virtual trading', Sydney Morning Herald 11 January 1997, p 74.

[37] Martin Roth, The Internet for Investors, Wrightbooks, Melbourne (1996) p 10.

[38] Martin Roth, The Internet for Investors, Wrightbooks, Melbourne (1996) pp 11-12.

[39] 'Brokers face up to the virtues of virtual trading', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January 1997, p 74.

[40] 'SFE plans to pinch ASX's most lucrative trades', Australian Financial Review, 21 February 1997, p 10.

[41] 'ASX fights for its share', Australian Financial Review 26 February 1997, p 22.

[42] Australian Securities Commission, Electronic Commerce Project Issues Paper (August 1995) pp 7-8.

[43] See, generally, Australian Securities Commission, ASC Electronic Commerce Project Issues Paper (August 1995) pp 7-8, and Richard Salmons, 'ASX fights for its share' Australian Financial Review, 26 February 1997, p 22;

[44] 'ASX needs to guard flanks and create own niche', Australian Financial Review, 11 April 1997, p 65.

[45] Corporations Law ss 767 and 769.

[46] Wallis Committee Report, pp 283-4.

[47] 'New market outside ASX may provide share nursery', Australian Financial Review, 15 April 1997, p 23.

[48] Martin Roth, The Internet for Investors, Wrightbooks, Melbourne (1996) p 13.

[49] 'The ASX is talking Net worth', Australian Financial Review, 21 March 1997, p 77.

[50] See, for example, the case of Pont Securities as cited in 'Brokers face up to the virtues of virtual trading', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January 1997, p 74.

[51] See, generally, 'Smart agents on the Web to track down specialist data', Australian Financial Review, 4 April 1997, p 23.

[52] 'On-line capitalism', The Economist, 23 November 1996 p 102.

[53] 'Raising capital in cyberspace', Australian Financial Review Weekend Review, 7 February 1997, p 4.