2. The proposed amendments

Introduction

2.1This Chapter considers the London Protocol and its predecessor, the London Convention and briefly looks at its history and implementation. It also explores the 2009 and 2013 amendments respectively providing an outline of the changes proposed by each amendment and the context for the changes.

2.2This chapter also considers the evidence received by the Committee against each of the terms of reference.

2.3The Committee notes from the outset that this is not an inquiry into the science or merits of carbon capture and storage (CCS) which has been considered by past committees, such as the report of the House Standing Committee on Science and Innovation, Between a rock and a hard place the science of geosequestration.[1]CCS was considered in the course of the inquiry but only in the context of how it relates to the respective amendments.

London Convention

2.4The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,1972 (London Convention) came into force on 30 August 1975.[2] It was designed to ensure the protection of the marine environment from human activities and currently 87 States are Parties to the Convention.[3] The London Convention entered into force for Australia on 20 September 1985.[4]

2.5The London Convention was one of the first international conventions designed to protect the marine environment from human activities by prohibiting the dumping of certain hazardous materials.[5] The London Convention introduced the requirement for a special permit prior to dumping certain identified materials, such as dredged material or man-made structures at sea, and a general permit requirement for other wastes or matter.[6]

London Protocol

2.6The London Protocol entered into force generally and for Australia on 24 March 2006[7] and is intended to eventually replace the London Convention. There are currently 53 Parties to the London Protocol.[8]

2.7According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the London Protocol has a similar purpose to the London Convention, but is ‘more restrictive’ and applies a ‘precautionary approach’.[9] This requires that ‘appropriate preventative measures are taken when there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the marine environment are likely to cause harm even when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects’.[10]

2.8The London Protocol prohibits all dumping into the sea, except for ‘possibly acceptable’ wastes as identified in annex 1 of the Protocol on the ‘reverse list’.[11] The following wastes or other matter may be considered for dumping, though require a permit to do so:

• dredged material
• sewage sludge
• fish waste, or material resulting from industrial fish processing operations
• vessels and platforms or other man-made structures at sea
• inert, inorganic geological material
• organic material of natural origin
• bulky items primarily comprising iron, steel, concrete and similarly unharmful materials for which the concern is physical impact limited to those circumstances where such wastes are generated at locations, such as small islands with isolated communities no practicable access to disposal options other than dumping
• Carbon dioxide streams from carbon dioxide capture processes sequestration.[12]
  9. The Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW) confirm that Australia complies with its international obligations under the London Protocol through the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Sea Dumping Act).[13] As well as regulating the creation of artificial reefs in Australian waters, the Sea Dumping Act:
• prohibits the ocean disposal of material considered too harmful to be released into the marine environment
• regulates permitted ocean waste disposal to minimise its environmental impacts
• regulates the placement of artificial reefs for the purposes of enhancing the marine environment, and
• applies to all vessels, aircraft, and platforms in Australian waters, and to all Australian vessels and aircraft in any part of the sea.[14]

Amendments

2.10The Strategic Plan for the London Protocol and the London Convention adopted by the Parties to the Convention and Protocol on 18 October 2016 notes:

The Parties to the Protocol have responded to new activities such as carbon capture and storage and marine geoengineering through amendments to the Protocol adopted in 2006, 2009 and 2013.[15]

2.11As noted, the amendments adopted in 2009 and in 2013 respectively are the subject of this inquiry.

2009 Amendment provisions

2.12DCCEEW explain that the 2009 amendment permits the export of carbon dioxide (CO2) streams from a Contracting Party to another country for the purpose of sequestration into sub-seabed geological formations as a climate change mitigation measure.[16]

2.13Sub-seabed sequestration involves a series of processes in which CO2 is captured, through a process known as CCS (carbon capture and storage) or CCUS (carbon capture, utilisation and storage), from large-scale emitting sources (such as power plants or heavy industrial manufacturing) and transported to a secure and permanent storage site. The CO2 is then sequestered in deep underground spaces in the ocean.[17]

2.14The Centre for Environmental Law outline that the 2009 amendment to the London Protocol ‘reflects an evolution in the regulatory regime and permits the sub-seabed geological storage of CO2 across international boundaries.’[18] The CEL further added that ‘parties to the London convention recognised that not everyone has the adequate storage capacity to meet these requirements.[19]

2.15Article 6of the London Protocol provides that Contracting Parties shall not allow the exporting of wastes or other matter to other countries for dumping or incineration at sea.[20] The 2009 amendment proposed to add to Article 6an allowance for the export of carbon dioxide streams for the purpose of disposal through sequestration in accordance with annex 1 of the London Protocol, provided that an agreement or arrangement has been entered into by the countries concerned.[21]

2.16The proposed amendment provides, for example, for consistency between parties with provisions in the Protocol and applicable international law as well as provisions if exporting to a non-Contracting Party and for notifying the IMO.[22]

2.17To bring the 2009 amendment into force, two-thirds of the 53 Contracting Parties to the London Protocol must ratify the amendment (approximately 35 Contracting Parties).[23] At present, ten Contracting Parties have ratified the amendment.[24]

2.18In 2019, six of the ten Contracting Parties to have ratified the 2009 amendment agreed to a ‘provisional application’ to allow Contracting Parties to make use of the amendment before it formally enters into force, provided that necessary steps including amending domestic legislation and the deposit of an instrument of ratification with the IMO are undertaken.[25]

2.19CEL explain to the Committee that Norway has a separate law for ‘subsea CO2 injection for storage, regulations relating to exploitation of subsea reservoirs on the continental shelf.’[26] Norway’s stated objective for those regulations is to contribute to ‘sustainable energy generation in industrial production by facilitating exploitation of subsea reservoirs on the continental shelf.’[27]

2.20DCCEEW advised the Committee that the Australian Government intended to ratify the amendment which would require two further steps: The first is to pass amendments to the Sea Dumping Act, and the next is to deposit an instrument of ratification for each amendment, and a declaration of provisional application for the 2009 amendment at the International Maritime Organization.[28]

2.21DCCEEW further advised that the domestic movement of CO2 streams within a sovereign nation’s territorial area is already permissible under the existing London Protocol.[29]

2.22CEL told the Committee that the lack of acceptance and ratification of the 2009 amendment has been described as ‘an obstacle to the development of many planned CCS projects across the world, hindering the use of this technology at scale as a tool for mitigating climate change.’[30]

2013 Amendment provisions

2.23The 2013 amendments to the London Protocol were proposed to address ongoing work being undertaken on geoengineering and recognition that the scope of the London Convention and London Protocol include ocean fertilisation activities.[31]

2.24The amendments made changes to Article 1 and inserted three new articles or annexes: Article 6bis, Annex 4, and Annex 5. The 2013 amendments also contain several consequential amendments.[32]

2.25In summary, the 2013 amendment allows for the placement of matter into the sea for the purpose of legitimate scientific research into marine geoengineering activities (such as ocean fertilisation). The 2013 amendment also establishes an international regulatory framework for ocean fertilisation activities.[33]

2.26As with the 2009 amendment, a two-thirds majority of the 53 Contracting Parties must ratify the 2013 amendment before it comes into force. To date, only six countries have ratified this amendment.[34]

2.27DCCEEW advised the Committee that Australia is considering ratification of the amendment. To do so, Australia must:

… amend the Sea Dumping Act, followed by deposit an instrument of ratification with the IMO. This will ensure that Australia is ready to administer applications for this type of scientific research when the 2013 London Protocol amendment comes into force. Until then, research and industry groups cannot apply for a permit to undertake marine geoengineering research activities.[35]

2.28Once the amendment is ratified and comes into force Australia would be required to ensure that all marine geoengineering activities were regulated in a manner consistent with this framework.[36] DCCEEW noted that Australia would apply a ‘precautionary approach’ in evaluating activities which were looking to undertake legitimate marine geoengineering research for climate change mitigation purposes.[37]

Consideration by the JSCT

2.29In 1998 the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (Treaties Committee) Thirteenth Report considered Australia’s proposed ratification of the London Protocol, and also its proposed acceptance of the 1993 amendments to Annexes I and II of the London Convention which concerned the phasing out of sea disposal of industrial waste. The report supported both the ratification of the London Protocol when ‘all the necessary legal and administrative measures have been taken’[38], and of the 1993 amendments to Annexes I and II of the London Convention.

2.30In 2007 the Treaties Committee Report 83 considered the 2006 amendments to annex 1 of the London Protocol which allowed ‘sequestration of carbon dioxide in sub-seabed geological formations’, and ensured carbon dioxide stream ‘consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide’.[39] The Treaties Committee supported the amendment, stating that it:

…supports the sub-seabed geo-sequestration of CO2 streams as one of a suite of measures to mitigate climate change and ocean acidification and recognises that the amendment to Annex 1 of the London Protocol will allow Australia and other countries to pursue this option.[40]

2.31In 2020, the Treaties Committee considered the 2009 and 2013 London Protocol amendments as ‘minor treaty’ actions and determined not to hold formal inquiries and agreed that binding treaty action may be taken.[41]

Environmental benefits and impacts of importing and exporting carbon dioxide streams

2.32The Committee heard evidence about the environmental benefits and impacts of importing and exporting carbon dioxide streams if the 2009 amendment was ratified. The DCCEEW noted that both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) ‘recognise the role that CCS can play in emissions scenarios with the aim of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C or under 2°C of pre-industrial levels’.[42]

2.33The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) observe that offshore and onshore CCUS in Australia has the potential to drive ‘significant international investment into Australia.[43]

2.34Geoscience Australia note that the geological capture of carbon dioxide is a ‘widely recognised strategy for helping to mitigate the potential impacts of global climate change, and for reducing acidification within the world’s oceans.’[44]

2.35deepC store contend that CCUS is a key contributor and ‘indispensable for Australia and the world to materially reduce emissions as per the interim 2030 and 2050 Paris Agreement terms.’[45] They add that the favourable position of Australia to enable a series of domestic and transboundary CCS projects means that Australia can ‘offer significant contributions to the world for materially reducing CO2emissions.’[46]

2.36CEL propose that from an energy security perspective, new and emerging technologies such as CCS may provide a bridge between improved energy security in light of recent global events and ensuring that emissions reductions ambitions are not compromised.[47]

2.37The CO2CRC consider that CCS and Transboundary CCS are ‘safe, reliable, necessary and urgent’[48], explaining:

It has been shown that the storage of CO2 within the many suitable geological formations and settings presents no risk to the environment or to Australia’s emission profile. Similarly, the transport of CO2 via ships and pipelines has also been demonstrated to be safe through decades of large-scale industrial use and has taken place within a well-established regulatory and safety framework.[49]

2.38Industry participants, such as APPEA were supportive of the 2009 amendment being ratified, which would allow transboundary import and export of CO2 noting that the technology has been used for decades to store CO2 overseas.[50]

2.39A range of submitters provided examples of some of the benefits that would flow from ratification of the amendment, these included:

• Emissions reduction including for ‘hard-to-decarbonise sectors such as cement and fertilizer production’.[51]
• Supporting the existing domestic CCS project pipeline with some 15 large CCS projects which are in the concept selection, development or operational phases, with many more in the earlier evaluation phase.[52] Many of these projects will involve the construction of large CCS storage ‘hubs’ into which imported CO2 from overseas could be stored.[53]
• Improving economic outcomes for regional partners through the export of CO2 produced and captured in Australia to CCS storage hubs in nearby overseas jurisdictions, such as Timor-Leste.[54]
  40. Additionally, industry submitters such as CO2CRC and APPEA contend that Contracting Parties which have already accepted the ‘provisional application’ have a competitive advantage over Australia already due to the roll-out of CCS projects fully supported by legislation, legislative processes and ‘very attractive government financial incentives.[55]
  41. In contrast, community stakeholders including an individual and a local community group concerned about development proposals in Victoria’s Westernport Bay were more cautious about further expansion of the CCS industry, proposing that it would:
• not remove or reduce CO2 from the atmosphere,[56]
• significantly magnify the climactic, financial, social and long-term risks, especially to oceans,[57] and
• not generate commensurate employment due to the need to reduce costs, use of remote technology and the effects of decarbonisation on fossil fuel use.[58]
  42. Geoscience Australia note that there were several risks and impacts. These include CO2 leakage, CO2 purity in imported CO2 and induced seismicity. They noted that with induced seismicity, the injection of CO2 could ‘induce some seismic activity and possibly reactivation of faults located some distance from the injection site.’[59] They advised that further research is required in this area, and further advised that they are currently conducting a fault injection experiment with CO2CRC and also geomechanical research to understand the behaviour of CO2 and faults in the subsurface.[60]
  43. Other issues that were raised with the Committee include:
• Groundwater contamination, geologic hazards, injuries to marine ecosystems, harm to human health, and other damages resulting from hydrocarbons where CO2 injection is linked with enhanced oil recovery operations.[61]
• Impacts to marine flora and fauna and sensitive deep sea species through pipeline constriction.[62]
• Further encouragement of the production of greenhouse gas emissions, without addressing systemic issues of production.[63]

Environmental benefits and impacts of marine geoengineering activity, such as ocean fertilisation, for scientific research

2.44Much of the environmental benefits and impacts of marine geoengineering activity for scientific research are still emerging and under development. DCCEEW note that the many of the environmental benefits and impacts of marine geoengineering activities, such as ocean fertilisation, for scientific research are still being explored.[64]

2.45DCCEEW explain that the 2013 amendment established a ‘capacity to deal with marine geoengineering’, noting that the amendment is expressly focused on large-scale scientific experimentation.[65] DCCEEW further explain that due to there not being a regulatory framework for ‘large intervention’ the amendment is ‘really just to address what we think will be a growing area of interest internationally.’[66] They noted that there has been an increase in research, in response to the increasing international interest in marine geoengineering activities as possible measures to mitigate climate change.[67]

2.46Evidence to the inquiry in terms of the environmental benefits and impacts of marine geoengineering activity for scientific research was limited, however, Geoscience Australia provided the Committee with some factors to consider including:

• Geoengineering…includes a range of technologies with the potential to make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation and maintenance of healthy marine and coastal ecosystems through ‘nature based’ solutions.[68]
• …the suitability of geoengineering and nature-based solutions requires a scientifically rigorous approach to better understand the biophysical factors at play.[69]
  47. The Government of Western Australia had a cautious view in relation to the potential benefits of marine geoengineering activity, noting that:

The ‘farming’ or fertilisation of sea plants for fixation of carbon may alter natural cycles of productivity, with unknown consequences for the environment and the services it provides to the people of Western Australia.[70]

International market for carbon dioxide streams

2.48Resolution LP.3(4) on the amendment to Article 6 of the London Protocol notes that ‘not all countries have suitable sub-seabed geological formations for the sequestration of carbon dioxide streams.’[71]

2.49Evidence to the inquiry highlighted that there was a growing market for CO2 streams across the world. The DCCEEW noted Norway’s Northern Lights project as ‘an example of how international countries can work together to implement the 2009 changes to the London Protocol.’[72] Examples were provided to the Committee of how CCS technology is being considered in other parts of the world including:

• Germany: will release a carbon management strategy this year that will include CCUS. A recent blue hydrogen deal between the German Government and Equinor of Norway for CCS in the North Sea shows the Government is supportive of offshore CCS.[73]
• Japan: a program of research and development has commenced to assess the viability of injecting post-industrial CO2 into deep-sea aquifers[74] as well as the development of a domestic legal framework to permit underground or under-seabed CCS.[75]
• Singapore: views CCS technology as a critical part of the decarbonisation of its petrochemical sector, releasing a report on the nation’s approach to CCS, outlining a 2 million tonne target for carbon capture by 2030 and announcing an increase in its domestic carbon tax.[76]
• United States: significant increase in funding available for technologies that safely and efficiently capture, remove, and store CO2 including tax credits, infrastructure investment and carbon removal research and the development of a framework permitting offshore CO2 storage.[77]
• Saudi Arabia: views CCS projects as central to its efforts to achieve its net zero by 2060 target, with recent announcements targeting carbon capture of 44 million tonnes annually by 2035, establishing a carbon capture and storage hub on the east coast of Saudi Arabia in Jubail, aiming to have a storage capacity of up to 9 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually by 2027.[78]
  50. DFAT note that some countries including Canada,[79] and Republic of Korea,[80] had expressed the view that CCS technology would be essential to the reduction of domestic emissions.

CCS in Australia

2.51DISR note that Australia is well placed to take advantage of the emerging offshore CCS industry, having:

• large geological resources (storage formations) which are likely to be greater than our domestic needs,
• the technical capacity of the oil and gas sector of the Australian energy industry, and
• existing oil and gas infrastructure, which could be repurposed for CCS.[81]
  52. Chevron Australia describe the significant capacity for ‘geological storage of both domestic and international CO2 emissions’, presented by Australia’s large sedimentary basins.[82] Geoscience Australia further identified that Australia has significant experience in the development of commercial-scale CCS projects.[83]
  53. Evidence to the Committee from DISR demonstrate that the Australian Government already has initiatives in place to support investment in offshore CCS opportunities including provisions to make ‘offshore CCS acreage available in response to industry demand and subject to government priorities for energy sector development’.[84]
  54. APPEA consider that the Australian Government has ‘comprehensive regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage’ which they consider would make certain that any ‘local environmental risks are identified and mitigated effectively’.[85]
  55. In their submission DISR outlined the existing domestic regulatory framework:

• Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (OPGGS Act), administered by DCCEEW and ‘which provides a framework for the grant and administration of offshore greenhouse gas storage titles’. Titles approvals by the Responsible Commonwealth Minister under the OPGGS Act cover the project lifecycle from exploration for suitable greenhouse gas storage formations, injection and storage activities, through to project decommissioning and post- closure monitoring activities.[86]
• The National Offshore Petroleum Titles Administrator (NOPTA), within the Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR), provides technical advice (such as the geology of the formation and the geophysics of the sub-seabed to determine the suitability of identified formations) to the responsible Commonwealth Minister for the purpose of administering offshore greenhouse gas storage titles.[87]
• Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981, which provides for domestic implementation of the London Protocol.[88]
• The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, which makes provision for where an offshore CCS injection or storage activity may have impacts on a matter of national environmental significance.[89]
  56. Should the Australian Government ratify the 2009 amendment, inquiry stakeholders were of the view that a clear domestic regulatory framework to regulate both the import and export of CO2 would be required.[90] The need for regulatory certainty underpinned some industry views to the inquiry, with one submitter stressing that:

‘[w]ithout this support, Australia’s CCS industry is unlikely to flourish, and Australia will forgo significant economic and emissions reduction opportunities on the journey to achieving net zero’.[91]

2.57The framework used in Europe was cited by CEL as a model for Australia. This was because it:

• is the first comprehensive legal framework for the management of environmental risks related to CCS.[92]
• sets out a uniform set of legal requirements for the safe and ecologically sound sub-seabed storage of CO2, including provisions for monitoring and reporting and for granting authorisations for CO2 transport, sequestration, and storage projects.[93]
• requires that CCS storage be rock-based and not water-column-based.[94]
• requires that ‘geological formation shall only be selected as a storage site, if under the proposed conditions of use there is no significant risk of leakage, and if no significant environmental or health risks exist.’[95]
• Provides that EU Member States must cooperate to prevent transboundary injuries.[96]
• mandates that EU Member States ensure that ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties are brought to bear on the operators operating within and across EU borders.[97]
  58. DISR suggest that this is a relatively new area of policy, and:

There are complex policy, legal, environmental and economic issues that will require consideration depending on the potential source and destination of a carbon dioxide stream. Close consultation and coordination across the DISR and DCCEEW portfolios will be required to ensure the interactions between assessment and approval processes are recognised and a consistent approach adopted.

2.59DISR further suggest that consideration should include clarification of the roles and responsibilities of respective parties to a transboundary movement of CO2, including:

…responsibilities for managing risks and liabilities associated with the potential for leakage during transportation, as well as considerations of the frameworks for managing the carbon accounting frameworks and other mechanisms for the sequestered carbon dioxide.[98]

2.60Woodside Energy explain that offshore major infrastructure projects take time due to complicated engineering and regulatory and assessment processes.[99] Woodside Energy provided further detail to the Committee in relation to the legislation:

We have to get regulated, as any oil and gas project would, by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act and the Environmental Protection Act and then get assessed under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act.[100]

2.61APPEA describe the competitive advantage that Australia has, but echoed the concerns of the CO2CRC, that it is a very ‘competitive space’[101] and that the advantage ‘doesn’t last forever’.[102]

Interaction of the proposed amendments with greenhouse gas inventories and regulatory and reporting streams

2.62The DCCEEW explains that there will be a direct association between both amendments, once they are in force, and greenhouse gas inventories and regulatory and reporting systems.[103] DCCEEW notes that Australia already has obligations as a Party to several international treaties and agreements.[104]

2.63deepC store contend that Australia can manage the interaction of the proposed 2009 Amendment for transboundary CCS activities with its greenhouse gas inventories and regulatory and reporting streams by using its existing CCS policies and legal frameworks.[105]

2.64deepC store further note that Australia’s National Inventory Reports 2020, which fulfils Australia’s international greenhouse gas inventory reporting requirements,[106]

• already includes information on fugitive emissions of greenhouse gases associated with CCS (CO2 underground injection system for the Gorgon LNG project)[9], and
• states that for the Gorgon and future commercial CCS projects, the (Australian) Commonwealth Government will source estimates of fugitive emissions of greenhouse gases from data collected under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme.[107]
  65. The Global CCS Institute suggest that the import and export of CO2 ‘as part of the Carbon Capture and Storage value chain produces clear environmental benefits, with the capacity of delivering deep CO2 emissions reductions.’[108] They note that the integrity and credibility of national greenhouse gas inventories and regulatory and reporting schemes are ‘dependent on the extent to which these benefits are real and quantifiable.’[109]
  66. The Global CCS Institute describe how reporting responsibilities can be allocated as per the example in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, which ‘...includes guidance on accounting for greenhouse gas emissions and removals that result from the CCS value chain’.’[110]
  67. APPEA also contend that the IPCC Inventory Guidelines provide for the treatment of CCUS and cross-border transport of CO2, noting that Volume 2 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines of the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories provide guidance or the accounting of CCUS in national inventories.[111]
  68. APPEA also point to the usefulness of internationally recognised standards for CO2 transport, storage and monitoring noting that they can support alignment between countries who are importing and countries who are exporting.[112]
  69. Pilot Energy note that the proposed amendments should ensure that the importation and permanent storage of CO2 does not result in an increase to Australia’s carbon budget.[113]
  70. DISR explained to the Committee that there is a regulatory difference between the CCS offshore framework and that of petroleum in relation to the States and Territories, noting that for petroleum there are joint authority arrangements with the states. In contrast, DISR clarified:

That doesn't exist for carbon capture and storage in the offshore area, so it is the responsible Commonwealth minister who makes decisions in relation to the tidal areas. If it extends to safety and environment plans and approvals, that's NOPSEMA. The state would intersect where there were pipelines or other infrastructure that went into interstate state waters. And so the states would be involved at that point.[114]

2.71The Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council express that if CCS is expanded in Australia there needs to be

…strong, unambiguous, independent, relevant and transparent assessment frameworks, legislation, monitoring and provisions must accompany any project. Accountability to the public at large through accessible reports is essential, given the dire consequences of global warming/climate change to ocean and human life and the proposed investment to CCS.[115]

Committee comment

2.72The Committee recognises that the 2009 amendment and the 2013 amendment to the London Protocol provide a means for countries to respond to the real urgency of climate change.

2.73There are 53 Contracting Parties to the London Protocol and at this point, ten of the 35 required have already ratified the 2009 amendment. Also six of the 10 have taken the further steps required to enable them to commence the export of CO2 for sequestration, as a provisional application. The Committee notes that Australia has already publicly stated that it would ratify the 2009 amendment.

2.74The Committee heard from a range of submitters about the environmental benefits and impacts of the import and export of CO2. The Committee considered that the evidence about the environmental benefits was convincing and that any impacts should be able to be addressed through the current and proposed regulatory environment.

2.75The Committee is of the view that the Australian government would need to provide a close regulatory environment and operational framework over private sector or even public-private partnership proponents of the CCS project pipeline that would develop as a result of the ratification of these amendments. This would include ensuring that appropriate monitoring and measuring continues to be able to take place, for example, around identified risks such as induced seismicity.

2.76In relation to the 2013 amendment, which allows for the placement of matter into the sea for the purpose of legitimate scientific research into marine geoengineering activities, the Committee notes that this is an emerging area. In respect to the increase in research in marine geoengineering as heard in evidence, the Committee agrees with the precautionary approach to research proposed by the Australian Government, considers that the scale of increase in research needs to be carefully monitored and that there is appropriate consideration of both the potential benefits and risks.

2.77The Committee notes the emerging industry for carbon dioxide streams and offshore CCS storage and that Australia could be at the forefront of regional CO2 storage given our natural geological advantages and industry experience. The Committee notes that domestic CO2 is already able to be stored offshore, and that industry appears well placed to respond to scaling up if the 2009 amendment is ratified.

2.78Industry concerns about the time for gaining permits and approval are noted however the Committee agrees that the individual assessment of the environmental impact on each site and continuous monitoring is critical.

2.79In the Committee’s view, ratification of the 2009 amendment would place Australia in good stead regarding its regional foreign policy objectives, given the clear interest from traditional trading partners.

2.80The Committee recommends that the Australia Government ratify both the 2009 and the 2013 amendments to the London Protocol.

Mr Tony Zappia MP

Chair

Footnotes

[1]House Standing Committee on Science and Innovation, 2007, Between a Rock and a Hard Place the science of geosequestration: Report of the inquiry into geosequestration technology

[2]International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/London-Convention-Protocol.aspx, viewed 2 June 2023, hereafter London Convention

[3]International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/London-Convention-Protocol.aspx, viewed 2 June 2023, hereafter London Convention

[4]International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London, Mexico City, Moscow, Washington, 29 December 1972) [1985] ATS 16

[5]London Convention

[6]International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/London-Convention-Protocol.aspx, viewed 2 June 2023

[7]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ‘Treaties – 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution and Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972’, viewed 19 December 2022

[8]International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/London-Convention-Protocol.aspx, viewed 2 June 2023

[9]International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/London-Convention-Protocol.aspx, viewed 2 June 2023, hereafter London Convention

[10]London Protocol, Article 3, paragraph 1

[11]IMO, ‘Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter’, annex 1, viewed 31 March 2023

[12]1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972’, (London, 7 November 1996) [2006] ATS 11, hereafter London Protocol, Article 4, paragraph 1(2)

[13]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 20, p. 3

[14]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, ‘Sea Dumping’, viewed 31 May 2023

[15]IMO, Strategic Plan for the London Protocol and the London Convention leaflet May 2017, p. 2

[16]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 20, p. 4

[17]Centre for Environmental Law, Macquarie Law School. Submission 3, p. 2

[18]Dr Constantinos Yiallourides, Centre for Environmental Law, School of Law, Macquarie University, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, page 3

[19]Dr Constantinos Yiallourides, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, page 3

[20]London Protocol, Article 6.

[21]IMO, Resolution LP.3(4) on the amendment to Article 6 of the London Protocol, adopted 30 October 2009, hereafter 2009 amendments to the London Protocol

[22]2009 amendments to the London Protocol

[23]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 4

[24]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 4. The Contracting Parties which have ratified the 2009 amendment are: Norway, the UK, Netherlands, Islamic Republic of Iran, Finland, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Republic of Korea and Belgium

[25]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 3. See also: Centre for Environmental Law, Macquarie Law School. Submission 3, p. 10

[26]Dr Constantinos Yiallourides, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, page 1

[27]Dr Constantinos Yiallourides, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, page 2

[28]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 11

[29]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 3

[30]Centre for Environmental Law, Macquarie Law School. Submission 3, p. 9

[31]IMO, Resolution LP.4(8) on the amendment to the London Protocol to regulate the placement of matter for ocean fertilization and other marine geoengineering activities, adopted 18 October 2013, hereafter 2013 amendments to the London Protocol

[32]2013 amendments to the London Protocol

[33]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 5. See also: Centre for Environmental Law, Macquarie Law School, Submission 3, p. 11

[34]Contracting Parties that have ratified the 2013 amendment are: the United Kingdom, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Estonia, and Germany

[35]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 5

[36]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 5

[37]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 5

[38]JSCOT, Report 13: Thirteenth Report

[39]JSCOT, Report 83: Treaties tabled on 20 June (2), 17 October, 28 November (2) 2006 and CO2 Sequestration in Sub-Seabed Formations, February 2007, hereafter Report 83, p. 26

[40]JSCOT, Report 83, p. 32

[41]JSCOT, ’Completed Minor Treaty Actions’, viewed 2 June 2023

[42]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 6

[43]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 7

[44]Geoscience Australia, Submission 5, p. 7

[45]deepC Store, Submission 9, p. 3

[46]deepC Store, Submission 9, p. 2

[47]Centre for Environmental Law, Macquarie Law School. Submission 3, p. 4

[48]CO2CRC, Submission 4, p. 3

[49]CO2CRC, Submission 4, p. 3

[50]APPEA, Submission 8, p. 2

[51]Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Submission 6, p. 3, APPEA, Submission 8, p. 1

[52]CO2CRC, Submission 4, p. 2

[53]CO2CRC, Submission 4, p. 2

[54]CO2CRC, Submission 4, p. 2; DISER, Submission 6, p. 5; DFAT, Submission 13, p. 3; APPEA, Submission 8, p. 3

[55]CO2CRC, Submission 4, p. 5. See also: APPEA, Submission 8, p. 2

[56]Mr Dale Stohr, Submission 11, p. 4

[57]Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council Incorporated, Submission 14, p. 3

[58]Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council Incorporated, Submission 14, p. 3

[59]Geoscience Australia, Submission 5, p. 9

[60]Geoscience Australia, Submission 5, p. 9

[61]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 5

[62]Dale Stohr, Submission 11, p. 5; Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council Incorporated, Submission 14, p. 5.

[63]Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council Incorporated, Submission 14, pp. 3-4.

[64]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 8

[65]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 8

[66]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 8

[67]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 8

[68]Geoscience Australia, Submission 5, p. 11

[69]Geoscience Australia, Submission 5, p. 12

[70]Government of Western Australia, Submission 2, p. 2

[71]2009 amendments to the London Protocol

[72]DCCEEW, Submission 20, p. 9

[73]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 3

[74]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 5

[75]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 37

[76]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 4

[77]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 4

[78]DFAT, Submission 13, pages 4-5

[79]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 4

[80]DFAT, Submission 13, p. 4; APPEA, Submission 8, p. 4

[81]DISR, Submission 6, p. 3

[82]Chevron Australia, Submission 15, p. 2

[83]Geoscience Australia, Submission 5, p. 13

[84]DISR, Submission 6, p. 3

[85]APPEA, Submission 8, p.1

[86]DISR, Submission 6, p. 2

[87]DISR, Submission 6, pp. 2 and 5

[88]DISR, Submission 6, p. 2

[89]DISR, Submission 6, p. 3

[90]Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council Incorporated, Submission 14, p. 2

[91]Name Withheld, Submission 16, p. 2

[92]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 3

[93]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 3

[94]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 3

[95]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 3

[96]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 4

[97]Centre for Environmental Law, Submission 3, p. 4

[98]DISR, Submission 6, p. 6; Name Withheld, Submission 16, p. 2.

[99]Ms Jayne Baird, Woodside Energy, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, p. 21

[100]Ms Jayne Baird, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, p. 21

[101]Dr Geoffrey O’Brien, Chief Scientist, CO2CRC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, p. 16

[102]Mr Brendan Beck, Director, Net Zero Technologies, Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, p. 21

[103]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 20, p. 10

[104]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 20, p. 10

[105]deepC Store, Submission 9, p. 3

[106]DCCEEW, National Inventory Report, www.dcceew.gov.au/climate-change/publications/national-inventory-report-2020, viewed 2 June 2023

[107]deepC Store, Submission 9, p. 3

[108]Global CCS Institute, Submission 7, p. 16

[109]Global CCS Institute, Submission 7, p. 16

[110]Global CCS Institute, Submission 7, p. 17

[111]APPEA, Submission 8, p. 5

[112]APPEA, Submission 8, p. 5

[113]Pilot Energy, Submission 10, p. 3

[114]Ms Norelle Laucher, Acting General Manager, Offshore Strategy Branch, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 May 2023, p. 33

[115]Westernport and Peninsula Protection Council, Submission 14, p. 2