13
September 2022
PDF Version [949KB]
Bernie Lai
Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Security Section
Executive
summary
-
The significance of Hong Kong to Australia goes beyond being a
‘Free World’ outpost linking China to the West. The West’s strategic and
economic interests regarding China have long been embedded in Hong Kong and
reliant on Hong Kong’s stability.
-
Hong Kong’s recent democracy and human rights crisis serves as a
cautionary tale for Taiwan, which will have implications for Australia’s
strategic environment in the Indo–Pacific. The crisis also has an enduring
domestic dimension in Australia, with protests by the Hong Kong diaspora across
Australia being met with counter-protests from the pro-Beijing diaspora.
-
Between June 2019 and May 2022, the Australian Government
published or was signatory to over 40 unilateral or joint statements specifically
on or referring to the Hong Kong situation.
-
In October 2020, Australia suspended its extradition and mutual
legal assistance treaties with Hong Kong in response to China’s passage of the
national security legislation.
-
The Australian Government has announced a series of extended and
new visa arrangements for eligible Hongkongers, and reportedly granted visa to
a former Hong Kong legislator in exile.
-
The Australian Government has adjusted its travel advice for Australians
travelling to Hong Kong in light of the national security legislation and the
Hong Kong Government’s policy change on recognition of dual nationality.
-
Australian federal parliamentarians across the political spectrum
have shown sustained interest in the Anti-Extradition Amendment Bill Movement,
and consistently raised concerns about the implementation and impacts of the
national security legislation in Hong Kong.
-
In December 2019, despite contrasting positions among federal
parliamentarians, the Australian Government ratified the Australia – Hong Kong
Free Trade Agreement.
-
While Australia has introduced a Magnitsky-style sanctions regime,
it has not imposed sanctions in response to the Hong Kong situation.
Contents
Executive
summary
Introduction
Democracy in Hong Kong
Australian Government statements on
Hong Kong
Suspension of bilateral treaties with
Hong Kong
Immigration measures for Hongkongers
Granting of visa to Ted Hui
Changes to travel advice for Hong
Kong
Multi-partisan support from
Australian federal parliamentarians
Ratification of the Australia – Hong
Kong Free Trade Agreement
Introduction of a Magnitsky-style
sanctions regime
China’s reactions to Australia’s
actions
Appendix
Introduction
Recent events
in Hong Kong, particularly in the years since 2014, have been of continued
interest in Australia and led to ongoing consideration by the Australian
Government and Parliament.
This paper summarises the Australian Government’s response
so far to Hong Kong’s democracy and human rights crisis since the onset of the
Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in 2019, and surveys some of the
commentary and analysis on it.[1]
It examines the various responses by Australian federal parliamentarians across
the political spectrum, their reactions to the ratification of the Australia –
Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement, and Australia’s introduction of a
Magnitsky-style sanctions regime. The hyperlinks in this paper were correct as
at September 2022.
Democracy in Hong Kong
Efforts to build democracy in Hong Kong have a long and
fraught history, particularly during the post-Second World War period when Hong
Kong’s status as a British colony was challenged by emerging anti-colonial sentiment
and emerging international norms of self-government and democracy.
Amid Hong Kong’s recent democracy and human rights crisis,
Beijing has maintained a narrative that ‘Under
British Colonial Rule There Was No Democracy in Hong Kong’. However,
according to declassified
documents reportedly released by the UK National Archives, in 1958, in
response to an alleged London-backed ‘plot, or conspiracy … to make Hong Kong a
self-governing Dominion like Singapore’, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai warned
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that ‘China would regard any move
towards Dominion status as a very unfriendly act.[2]
China wished the present colonial status of Hong Kong to continue with no
change whatever’. The documents also quote Liao Chengzhi, Director of the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Office of China, as saying in 1960 that Beijing ‘shall not
hesitate to take positive action to have Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New
Territories liberated’ if the British granted Hong Kong self-governance.
Also in 1960, the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was
adopted in the UN General Assembly, granting colonised peoples the right to
self-determination via referendum. At the time, British Hong Kong was on a list
of ‘Non-Self-Governing
Territories’ to which the Declaration applied. Fearing the prospect of Hong
Kong gaining self-governance or even independence under the Declaration, China
refused to recognise Hong Kong as having been a British colony. Instead, China
deemed it ‘part of
Chinese territory occupied by the British’ due to the ‘unequal treaties’
signed following the Opium Wars in the 1800s. In 1972, China requested and succeeded
in having Hong Kong de-listed
as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, which effectively deprived the peoples
of Hong Kong of their right to self-determination.
Beijing’s historical reluctance for Hong Kong to achieve
self-governance offers some perspective on its refusal to concede to demands
from pro-democracy protesters for the right to genuine universal suffrage
during the Umbrella
Revolution in 2014. Five years on in 2019, Hong Kong’s democracy and human
rights crisis was exacerbated when its government attempted to introduce the Fugitive
Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation
(Amendment) Bill, which aimed to establish a mechanism for extraditions to
mainland China and, therefore, triggered the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment
Bill Movement. Eventually, the crisis culminated in China’s imposition of the Law of
the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong National Security Law) in
June 2020.[3]
The law criminalises acts of dissent and has been used by authorities to
suppress opposition, with some
suggesting that the imposition of the law has ended the democratisation of
Hong Kong.[4]
Nevertheless, the significance of Hong Kong to Australia
and, indeed, to the West, goes beyond the much-discussed ideological clash
between democracy and authoritarianism at the forefront of the recent Hong Kong
situation. As an international financial centre and a separate
customs territory from mainland China, Hong Kong has long been viewed as a ‘Free
World’ outpost that links China to the West. The West’s strategic and economic
interests regarding China have been deeply
embedded in Hong Kong and reliant on Hong Kong’s stability. This has been
due to not only Hong Kong being a former British colony, but also its supposed
status as a highly autonomous special administrative region of China with its
own legal, political and economic systems under a ‘one country, two systems’
framework for 50 years from 1997 – as agreed upon by China and the UK in the
1984 Sino–British
Joint Declaration (the treaty governing the 1997 handover of Hong Kong) and
enshrined in the Basic
Law (Hong Kong’s quasi-constitution).
Many have asserted that China’s imposition of the Hong Kong
National Security Law in 2020 amounted to a premature end to the ‘one country,
two systems’ arrangement well before the 2047 deadline. Despite being a treaty
registered with the UN, the Sino–British Joint Declaration has been labelled
by Beijing as ‘a historical document’ that ‘no longer has any practical
significance’ and ‘is not at all binding for the central government’s
management over Hong Kong’. Thus, China’s crackdown on Hong Kong serves as a
cautionary tale for its anticipated power projection across the Taiwan Strait
in the form of ‘Taiwan’s
reunification with the mainland’, for which the ‘one country, two systems’
model was originally intended. The Taiwan question is expected to continue to escalate
the US–China strategic rivalry, which will shape the strategic environment in
the Indo–Pacific region for Australia as a middle power (or a
‘pivotal power’).
For Australia, various issues stemming from the recent Hong
Kong situation also have an enduring domestic dimension. The 2019 uprising in
Hong Kong sparked protests by the Hong Kong diaspora across Australia in
solidarity with their pro-democracy compatriots in Hong Kong. This expectedly
drew counter-protests
from the ‘self-motivated patriotic’ Chinese diaspora, resulting in conflict
between both camps in Australia. It is also notable that Revolution of our
times, a documentary about the 2019 uprising, was named
‘Doco of the Month’ in July 2022 by the National Film and Sound Archive of
Australia and screened across Australia, but is reportedly banned
in Hong Kong. The documentary’s title is taken from the political slogan ‘liberate
Hong Kong, revolution of our times’. The display of this slogan has been
ruled by Hong Kong’s High Court as ‘capable of inciting others to commit
secession’ contrary to the Hong Kong National Security Law.[5]
Given the extraterritorial jurisdiction asserted by that law over any
individual in any country pursuant to its article 38, this may have
implications for organisers of the documentary’s screenings in Australia.
It is against this backdrop, along with Australia’s
longstanding commitment to human rights, that Australia’s response to the recent
Hong Kong situation is notable. It is significant, for example, that the issue
has transcended party politics on the floor of the Australian Parliament.
Australian federal parliamentarians across the political spectrum have shown
sustained interest in the Anti-Extradition Amendment Bill Movement and have
consistently raised concerns about the implementation and impacts of the Hong
Kong National Security Law. The new Labor Government will likely follow in its
predecessor’s footsteps by monitoring the Hong Kong situation. As Penny Wong
stated on 30 June 2022 in her
first media release on Hong Kong as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Australia
remains deeply concerned by the continuing erosion of Hong Kong’s rights,
freedoms and autonomy, two years since the imposition of the National Security
Law’.
Australian Government
statements on Hong Kong
Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Morrison
Government, Marise Payne, stated in November 2020, ‘The importance of
continuing to monitor and speak in defence of the rights and freedoms of people
in Hong Kong is an ongoing focus of the Australian government’.[6]
Between June 2019 and May 2022, the Australian
Government published or was signatory to over 40 unilateral or joint statements
specifically on or referring to the Hong Kong situation. These statements are
outlined in Table 1 in the Appendix.
Notably, Australia was signatory to various joint statements
with its Five Eyes partners (Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US), which
expectedly drew criticism from the Chinese Government. For example, in response
to the Five Eyes joint
statement on Hong Kong’s Legislative Council elections in December 2021,
the Chinese embassy in Australia accused Australia of ‘finding
various excuses to violently interfere in China’s internal affairs’.
Meanwhile, the coordination of the joint statements across the Five Eyes was
regarded as ‘one sign of hope’ by Hong Kong Watch, a UK-based NGO that focuses
on Hong Kong’s human rights issues, during an Australian Senate committee
hearing in August 2021.[7]
Suspension of bilateral
treaties with Hong Kong
The Australian Government has made representations ‘many
times’ to the Chinese Government about the Hong Kong National Security Law, as confirmed
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) during a Senate Estimates
hearing in October 2021.[8]
One of the most significant steps that the Australian
Government has taken in response to the passage of the national security
legislation is its suspension of 2 bilateral treaties with Hong Kong on crime
cooperation.
Extradition
treaty
Extradition is the surrender of an individual from one country
to another to face criminal prosecution or serve a sentence. Australia’s
extradition regime is governed by the Extradition Act
1988.
On 9 July 2020, the Australian
Government announced that it was suspending Australia’s extradition treaty
with Hong Kong, the Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted
Persons between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong
(Extradition Agreement).[9]
Australia notified Hong Kong of the proposed suspension via diplomatic note on
the same day.[10]
In a 9
July 2020 statement, the Australian Government attributed the proposed
suspension to its ‘[deep concern] about China’s imposition of a broad national
security law on Hong Kong’ that ‘erodes the democratic principles that have
underpinned Hong Kong’s society and the One Country, Two Systems framework’ and
‘constitutes a fundamental change of circumstances in respect to [Australia’s]
Extradition Agreement with Hong Kong’. This mirrored the language of a National
Interest Analysis prepared by the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD). The
National Interest Analysis elaborated that article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which ‘enables a treaty to be suspended
where a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred’, was the legal
authority relied on by the Australian Government to suspend the Extradition
Agreement.[11]
Article 62 of the VCLT provides:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the
extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
…
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a
fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing
from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the
operation of the treaty.
Given Australia’s reliance on article 62 of the VCLT to
justify the suspension, it is relevant to note the interpretation by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the phrase ‘a fundamental change of
circumstances’ in the case of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia):
… A fundamental change of circumstances must have been
unforeseen; the existence of the circumstances at the time of the Treaty’s
conclusion must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties
to be bound by the Treaty. The negative and conditional wording of Article 62
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a clear indication moreover
that the stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental
change of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases …[12]
The ICJ also noted that any changes of circumstances invoked
must be:
… so closely linked to the object and purpose of the Treaty
that they constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties and, in
changing, radically altered the extent of the obligations still to be performed.[13]
In the National Interest Analysis, AGD posited that although
the Extradition Agreement did not contain any mechanisms for suspension,
China’s adoption of the Hong Kong National Security Law had constituted a
fundamental change of circumstances and therefore justified suspending the
treaty under article 62 of the VCLT:
… Australia’s consent to be bound by the Extradition
Agreement in 1993 was premised on Hong Kong having a high degree of autonomy,
judicial independence and fundamental human rights … Suspension of the
Extradition Agreement will ensure that the application of the NSL [National
Security Law] will not compromise the intent or integrity of the extradition
process for any individuals who may be surrendered by Australia to Hong Kong in
criminal matters.[14]
Further, when questioned about this issue by the Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) on 24 September 2020, AGD elaborated:
… The national security law supersedes Hong Kong’s laws to
the extent that any inconsistency provides the Chinese mainland government the
jurisdiction over certain cases, in what we are concerned are loosely defined
circumstances. We say this radically transforms the extent of obligations still
to be performed under the treaty, due to the uncertainty of those laws that
will apply in Hong Kong in criminal matters. These circumstances will affect
the core obligations in the extradition agreement such as the surrender of a
person wanted for criminal prosecution and the enforcement of a sentence … [W]hat
the government has made clear is that the legally binding Sino-British Joint
Declaration contains certain assumptions regarding the rule of law and the
protection of rights which form the basis [inaudible] to the original treaties,
and that this new law calls those into question.[15]
At the same hearing before JSCOT, DFAT added:
Just to note that the foreign minister has been very
consistent and clear that we remain very troubled by the law’s implications for
the judicial independence and rule of law in Hong Kong and obviously for the
rights and freedoms enjoyed by the people there. Both of these aspects have
really underpinned the city’s success. It’s also concerning that the decision
to impose the NSL was made without the direct participation of Hong Kong’s
people, legislature or judiciary. Really it’s the implications for judicial
independence and the erosion of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law
under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework that are the underpinning of the
fundamental change.[16]
There was immediate outcry from China in response to both
Australia’s proposed suspension of the Extradition Agreement and introduction
of visa extensions for Hongkongers (as explored below), which were both
announced on 9 July 2020. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, said
in a press conference on that day:
… the Australian side’s comments and measures are in serious violation
of international law and the basic norms governing international relations.
They constitute gross interference in China’s internal affairs, and China doesn’t
accept it. We express strong condemnation and reserve the right to make further
reaction, and Australia should bear all the consequences.
… The attempt to pressure China will never succeed.
China urges Australia to immediately change course, stop
intervening in Hong Kong affairs and China’s domestic affairs, and prevent
further harm to China-Australia relations.
When asked to clarify which ‘basic norms governing
international relations’ were allegedly breached by Australia, Mr Zhao said ‘Isn’t
“non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs” a basic norm governing
international relations? Do I have to elaborate?’.
The Chinese embassy in Australia also released
a similar statement on 9 July 2020, asserting that if Australia does not
‘stop meddling in Hong Kong affairs and China’s internal affairs under any
pretext or in any way … it will lead to nothing but lifting a rock only to hit
its own feet’.
Mutual legal assistance treaty
Mutual
legal assistance is the process countries use to obtain
government-to-government assistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions,
or in identifying and recovering the proceeds of crime. Australia’s mutual
assistance system is governed by the Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters Act 1987.
On 28 July 2020, ‘[in]
accordance with the instruction of the Central People’s Government’, Hong
Kong notified Australia that it was suspending the Agreement
between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong concerning
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Mutual Legal Assistance
Agreement).[17]
The Hong Kong Government announced that the reason for this move was
Australia’s proposed suspension of the Extradition Agreement due to the
enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law, which ‘has
seriously damaged the basis of juridical co-operation’ between Hong Kong
and Australia. This echoed the words
of the Chinese foreign ministry on the same day:
… Under the framework of these [extradition] agreements, the
Hong Kong SAR, with the Central Government’s assistance and mandate and in
accordance with the Basic Law, has offered assistance to the Canadian,
Australian and British sides. By wrongfully politicizing judicial cooperation
with Hong Kong, the three countries have seriously damaged the foundation for
such cooperation and deviated from its purpose of upholding justice and rule of
law … Therefore … China has decided that the Hong Kong SAR will suspend its
agreements on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with Canada,
Australia and the UK.
According to a National Interest Analysis subsequently
prepared by AGD, the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement ‘does not contain a
mechanism for suspension and Hong Kong’s note did not provide any legal basis
for the purported suspension’ of the treaty.[18]
However, Australia eventually agreed to the proposed suspension by mutual
consent under article 57
of the VCLT.[19]
At the hearing before JSCOT on 24 September 2020, AGD
clarified the reason for this decision:
… Given Hong Kong’s diplomatic note on 28 July, we consider
it unlikely that Hong Kong will provide assistance in response to any current
or future mutual assistance requests from Australia. However, the unilateral
action by Hong Kong has no effect under international law and has led to
uncertainty to the operation of the treaty … [Suspending the mutual legal
assistance agreement under article 57 of the VCLT] gives certainty as to the
basis on which the mutual legal assistance agreement is suspended as well as
the date from which it will take effect …[20]
AGD also confirmed at the time that there were 7 outstanding
legal assistance requests from Australia to Hong Kong on foot, which were
‘effectively … put on hold’, before commenting on the impact of the suspension:
… We have been in touch with the relevant Australian law
enforcement agencies. There will be some impact on potential active matters if
that request was not provided by Hong Kong, but for most matters law
enforcement agencies have indicated that we’ll be able to proceed without the
relevant evidence being provided.
… [G]iven prosecutions rarely depend on one source of
evidence we can expect that the vast majority of matters will be able to
proceed …[21]
JSCOT ‘unanimously
endorsed’ both proposed treaty actions in its Report
190: matters relating to two treaties with Hong Kong. The suspension of
both the Extradition
Agreement and the Mutual
Legal Assistance Agreement came into effect on 9 October 2020.
Australia is one of several countries that has suspended both
its extradition
treaty and mutual
legal assistance treaty with Hong Kong, following China’s imposition of the
Hong Kong National Security Law. Other countries include Canada, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the US. France has
also suspended its mutual legal assistance treaty with Hong Kong and decided not
to ratify its extradition treaty with Hong Kong.
Immigration
measures for Hongkongers
A high-profile response by the
Australian Government to Hong Kong’s democracy and human rights crisis has been
to provide extended and new visa arrangements for eligible Hongkongers.
Visa
extensions announced in July 2020
On 9 July 2020, Prime Minister Scott Morrison and the acting
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural
Affairs, Alan Tudge, jointly
announced policy changes to existing visa arrangements for Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) passport holders, including:
-
a 5-year extension of visa rights in Australia for holders of a Subclass
485 (Temporary Graduate), Subclass
457 (Temporary Work [Skilled]) or Subclass
482 (Temporary Skill Shortage) visa in addition to the time they have
already spent in Australia, with a pathway to permanent residency at the end of
that period
-
a 5-year Subclass 485 (Temporary Graduate) visa for current and
future students upon the successful completion of eligible tertiary studies,
with a pathway to permanent residency at the end of that period
-
a 5-year Subclass 482 (Temporary Skill Shortage) visa for future
applicants, with a pathway to permanent residency at the end of that period
-
continued application of existing arrangements for those
applicants who study and work in regional areas to help address skills
shortages in those areas, with pathways to permanent residency after 3 years.[22]
According to this announcement, almost 10,000 temporary
skilled, temporary graduate and student visa holders from Hong Kong in
Australia would be eligible for the above arrangements, with a further 2,500
people outside Australia and 1,250 applications on hand.[23]
At the time, the visa measures package was criticised
by Labor in Opposition for ‘[leaving] many behind’ as ‘many in Australia
and Hong Kong would be ineligible for the pathways proposed’. This reflected concerns
expressed by some Hongkongers that those at the forefront of the pro-democracy
movement in Hong Kong ‘that
need it the most’ were unlikely to be eligible for these visa measures.
However, the Morrison Government appeared to be treading a
fine diplomatic line in offering extended visas to eligible Hongkongers already
in Australia, as opposed to their compatriots in Hong Kong. This move, if
challenged, could be explained as a
domestic political decision or an
exercise of Australian sovereignty within which relevant risks had been calibrated,
according to some commentators.[24]
The extended visa measures may also have been intended to
strike a balance between any economic concerns about immigration generally amid
the COVID-19 pandemic and increased expectations on Australia to follow or
match other democratic countries’ visa measures for Hongkongers. As Ben
Bland (Lowy Institute) observed:
… The limited proposal has been designed not to trigger fears
about immigration during a recession in Australia. But it is still a welcome
symbol of solidarity, coming alongside the much more generous offer from the
UK, Hong Kong’s former colonial master, and efforts by Taiwan to facilitate
immigration by Hong Kongers …
Further, David Brophy, a lecturer in modern Chinese history
at the University of Sydney, has even suggested that ‘a large dose of economic
self-interest’ informed the second tranche of the visa measures package, which
was to attract Hong Kong-based businesses to relocate to Australia, with
‘skills and capital [remaining] the priority in Australia’s immigration policy
for Hong Kong’.[25]
Appearing to anticipate criticisms that Australia’s offer of
visa extensions was less
generous than the UK’s
offer at the time, Prime Minister Scott
Morrison said on 9 July 2020:
… You shouldn’t draw any, I suspect, parallels between what
Australia is announcing here than with what you would have seen announced in
the UK … The UK has a very special relationship with Hong Kong and a very
special set of responsibilities …
On these comments by the Prime Minister, it is relevant to
note that Australia’s visa measures package came as the UK had raised with its
Five Eyes partners, including Australia, the prospect of ‘burden sharing’
should there be ‘a mass exodus from Hong Kong’.[26]
Further, Dennis Chan, who was a Sydney-based student from Hong Kong and a spokesperson
for Australia-Hong Kong Link, told
SBS News around 10 July 2020 [transcribed below], ‘I think it’s really
important that Hongkongers have to understand [the] Australian Government has
no responsibility to help Hongkongers and they do not have to volunteer for
us’, before expressing his concerns about many Hongkongers’ ineligibility for
the visa measures.
Nevertheless, the visa measures package was described
by the Sydney Morning Herald at the time as ‘the most diplomatically
heated migration decision by an Australian Prime Minister since Bob Hawke
offered 27,000 Chinese students refuge after the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989’. The 9 July 2020 announcement was predictably met with immediate
opposition from the Chinese
foreign ministry and the Chinese
embassy in Australia.
There were also concerns among the Hong Kong diaspora that
individuals who were supportive of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or
affiliated with the Hong Kong Police Force might take advantage of the special
visa measures and become ‘sleeper agents’ for the CCP in Australia, according
to the Australian.[27]
A spokesperson for Australia-Hong Kong Link ‘pointed to past instances in which
Chinese nationals had been allowed permanent residency but remained loyal to
Beijing’ and urged the Australian Government to conduct ‘political background
checks’ on visa applicants from Hong Kong. On this issue, the acting
Immigration Minister, Alan
Tudge, was reported to have said, ‘Our national security is our number one
priority. Our strict character and security checking regime applies to all applicants’.
There were subsequent developments in relation to the visa
extensions announced in July 2020:
-
On 21 August 2020, the Migration Amendment
(Hong Kong Passport Holders) Regulations 2020 were registered. The
Amendment Regulations retrospectively amended the Migration Regulations
1994 to implement the visa policy changes announced on 9 July 2020, ‘except for
the pathway to permanent residence, which [would] be developed at a later
stage’.[28]
-
On 7 July 2021, the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) reportedly
began fast-tracking skilled visa applications lodged by HKSAR and British
National (Overseas) (BNO) passport holders ahead of other cohorts. At the
time, this initiative was described
by Senator Paterson as ‘not just in Australia’s national interest, [but] also
the right thing to do after the Chinese Communist Party broke its promise to
protect the freedoms of the people of Hong Kong’.
-
On 19 August 2021, DoHA
announced that the extended visa arrangements previously announced on
9 July 2020 would apply to BNO passport holders, subject to amendments
being made to the Migration Regulations.[29]
New
visa measures announced in November 2021
In late October 2021, the Migration Legislation
Amendment (Hong Kong) Regulations 2021 (Cth) amended the Migration Regulations
and the Migration Amendment (New Skilled Visas) Regulations 2019 to complete
the implementation of concessions for certain visa holders from Hong Kong that
were announced on 9 July 2020.[30]
These concessions, announced
on 1 November 2021 by the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship,
Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, Alex Hawke, included pathways
to permanent residence for eligible HKSAR and BNO passport holders who
could apply for permanent residency from 5 March 2022. These pathways included:
This initiative was reportedly
welcomed by Hongkongers in Australia who had been lobbying the Australian Government
to streamline the pathway to permanent residency.
Australia’s visa measures in response to the recent Hong
Kong democracy and human rights crisis have often been compared
to its visa measures in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre.[32]
For years to come, it is likely that Australia’s visa measures responding to
any future human rights situations in China or elsewhere will
be judged against its recent visa measures in relation to Hong Kong.[33]
Humanitarian
assistance
To date, there have been no dedicated humanitarian intakes
for Hongkongers who may have well-founded fears of being persecuted for reasons
of political opinion within the meaning of the Refugee Convention.[34]
However, when announcing the visa extensions on 9 July 2020, Prime Minister Scott
Morrison said that ‘the refugee and humanitarian stream remains available
for those who are seeking to apply through that channel and that is available
to people all around the world’. Similarly, the acting Immigration Minister,
Alan Tudge, was
reported to have said on 12 July 2020 that if Hongkongers are facing a
greater risk of political persecution, ‘[they are] entitled to apply for a
humanitarian visa. Just as anybody who is facing persecution is able to apply
for a humanitarian visa. Those options are available to them’.
In December 2020, DoHA granted
Subclass 866 (Onshore Protection) visas to fewer than 5 individuals from
Hong Kong. This marked the second time such visas were granted to Hongkongers since
at least July 2010, according to relevant
statistics on the DoHA website and documents
released by DoHA in response to a freedom of information request (DoHA
reference: FA 20/05/00116).[35]
Granting
of visa to Ted Hui
In early March 2021, the Australian
Government was reported to have
granted tourist visas and travel exemptions to Ted Hui Chi-fung and his
family. Ted Hui is a former Hong Kong legislator who
fled to Europe while on bail for criminal charges over his participation in the
Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill protests and subsequently decided to move
to Australia. This move by the Australian Government was described
by the Sydney Morning Herald at the time as ‘a significant
escalation in Australia’s response to Beijing’s ongoing suppression of
democracy in Hong Kong’.
On 9 March 2021, in a Facebook
post [Chinese-language source; translated below], Mr Hui announced his
arrival in Australia, and expressed his gratitude to the Australian Government
for granting him a travel exemption to its COVID-related closed border policy
and coordinating his flight arrangements. He added that at this stage he did
not intend to apply for political asylum in Australia, which would only be a
last resort if he ran out of options. On the reasons for his move to Australia,
Mr Hui elaborated:
… Although there is no shortage of Hongkongers living and
studying in Australia, there is a limited presence of Hong Kong political
leaders who are in exile and engaged in lobbying work here. This is one of the
reasons why I have decided to shift the battleground to Australia. Australia
and New Zealand are both important members of the Five Eyes alliance; and have had
many conflicts and seesaw battles with Beijing over universal values such as
democracy and freedom, as well as trade. I hope my lobbying work would make
both countries take a more hard-line stance towards China, and would make both
countries provide stronger support for and take substantive actions towards the
freedom of Hong Kong …
Around 10 March 2021, without naming Mr Hui or identifying
Australia, Hong Kong’s Security Bureau reportedly told
Hong Kong Free Press that ‘[P]olice will track down the whereabouts
of the fugitive offenders through various means in accordance with the law and
pursue them’ and that ‘We strongly object to jurisdictions harbouring criminal
fugitives’.
Further, when the Guardian Australia contacted
the Chinese embassy in Australia for comment on the matter, the embassy
pointed to previous remarks
made by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
China’s position on Hong Kong-related issues is consistent
and clear. Hong Kong is China’s Hong Kong, and every bit of Hong Kong affairs
belongs to China’s internal affairs, in which no other country has the right to
interfere. The Chinese side urges the Australian side to stop meddling in Hong
Kong’s affairs and China’s internal affairs in any way. Otherwise the
China-Australia relations will only sustain further damage.
On China’s criticism of Australia’s decision to accept Mr
Hui, Liberal senator James Paterson, Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Intelligence and Security, told
the ABC on 11 March 2021:
… Well Australia has been very outspoken, rightly, about the
way in which the Chinese government has not lived up to the promises that it
made to respect the autonomy and freedom of Hong Kong and its people. But I don’t
think we should over interpret or over-read Australia’s decision to welcome Ted
Hui as a visitor. And in fact, in some ways, this perfectly illustrates the
problem in the relationship with China that arises from time to time. What we
regard as a purely domestic sovereign issue for Australia, our immigration
policies, and which visitors we choose to welcome or not, the Chinese
government and the Chinese Communist Party regards as interfering in its
domestic affairs. I have to say to put it politely that’s a fairly expansive
definition of domestic affairs. It’s a fairly extraterritorial definition of
domestic affairs. I think any genuinely independent observer who looked at this
would say, why would Australia’s immigration policies be a domestic issue for
the Chinese government?
… Well, [Ted Hui] hasn’t actually come to Australia from
China or even Hong Kong. He’s come from elsewhere. And why should someone
coming from the United Kingdom, for example, to Australia be a matter for the
Chinese government? Why should the Australian government hand over control over
its immigration policy to any foreign government, the Chinese government
included? This is solely a domestic matter for Australia, a sovereign matter
for Australia. And no self respecting government, left or right, Labor or
Liberal, could ever allow a foreign government to dictate to us those sorts of
things.
… Well, any Australian citizen is welcome to campaign on any
political issue and in fact, any visitor to Australia, whether they’re a
citizen or not, enjoys all the rights and freedoms that Australians enjoy. They
enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of political campaigning. So [Ted Hui’s]
welcome to do that here, just as any other citizen is welcome to do that, too.
And by the way, citizens or other visitors who have a different view to him are
welcome to put their arguments too and that’s the great virtue of a [sic] open liberal
democracy like Australia …
On the first anniversary of Mr Hui’s exile in Australia,
SBS Chinese reported
on 2 March 2022 that his previous 12-month tourist visa had been replaced
by a bridging visa, which allowed him to work and study. Mr Hui also reportedly
said, ‘I’m currently in discussions with the Australian government on how to
keep me here ... [Obtaining asylum is] a diplomatic issue so I wouldn’t rule
that possibility out’.
Changes
to travel advice for Hong Kong
DFAT has changed its travel advice
for Hong Kong over time in response to the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill
Movement, the introduction of the Hong Kong National Security Law and Hong
Kong’s policy change on recognition of dual nationality.
Travel
advice level
On 6 August 2019, DFAT raised
its travel advice level for Hong Kong from ‘Level
1: Exercise normal safety precautions’ to ‘Level
2: Exercise a high degree of caution’ on its Smartraveller website. According to point-in-time
snapshots of the Smartraveller website available on the Wayback Machine,
the Level 2 advice for Hong Kong remained in place throughout the protests in
late 2019 until it was changed
in March 2020 to ‘Level
4: Do not travel’ due to the outbreak of COVID-19. The Level 2 advice for
Hong Kong resumed
in late October 2021 in anticipation of the lifting of Australia’s outbound
travel ban for its citizens and permanent residents on 1 November 2021. This
DFAT advice level remained
unchanged as at June 2022.
Travel
advice on the Hong Kong National Security Law
On 2 July 2020, after the enactment of the Hong Kong
National Security Law, DFAT
inserted the following paragraph to the ‘Local laws’ section of its travel
advice for Hong Kong on the Smartraveller website:
National security legislation for Hong Kong came into effect
on 1 July 2020. This law could be interpreted broadly. You could break the law
without intending to. The maximum penalty under this law in Hong Kong is life
imprisonment. Under the law, you could be deported or face possible transfer to
mainland China for prosecution under mainland law.
On 9 July 2020 DFAT added
the following clause and sentence to the above paragraph:
… and the full extent of the law and how it will be applied
is not yet clear … You may be at increased risk of detention on vaguely defined
national security grounds …
This DFAT advice remained
unchanged as at June 2022.
When asked about the wording of the above travel advice
during a Senate Estimates hearing on 28 October 2021, DFAT
stated:
… The travel advice for Hong Kong has language reflecting our
judgement about the risk there, including as a result of the introduction of
the national security law.
… that law gives the authorities scope to define much more
broadly national security offences, so the risks for travellers have changed
and that’s what that advice seeks to capture …[36]
Travel
advice on dual nationality
On 10 February 2021, DFAT
updated its travel advice on the Smartraveller website on the recognition
of dual nationality in Hong Kong (which remained
unchanged as at June 2022):
The Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China applies
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Under this law, dual
citizenship is not legally recognised in Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong’s law
allows dual nationals of Chinese descent to register their Australian
nationality.
Register with the Hong Kong Immigration Department if you
wish to be considered a national of Australia.
If you’re an Australian-Hong Kong dual national, you can make
a Declaration of Change of Nationality. Find out what the consequences of this
are from the Hong Kong Immigration Department.
If local authorities consider you a citizen of China they may
refuse you access to Australian consular services. This can happen even if you
entered Hong Kong on an Australian or other foreign passport, and you:
-
haven’t renounced your Chinese citizenship according to Chinese
law
- haven’t formally advised the Chinese authorities of your
Australian citizenship
-
continue to maintain a passport issued by the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region or by China.
Authorities may not allow certain
categories of Chinese citizens, such as state officials, to renounce their
Chinese nationality under Chinese law.
Get professional legal advice if you’re not sure of your
citizenship status under Chinese law.
If you plan to enter mainland China from Hong Kong, travel on
your Australian passport.
If you travel on other documents, you can’t get access to our
services.[37]
This change of travel advice immediately followed the 9
February 2021 announcement by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive at the time, Carrie
Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, that dual nationality was not recognised in Hong Kong.
Chief Executive Lam cited ‘two authoritative documents that one has to refer
to’. First, she cited ‘the Vienna Convention, which governs this sort of dual
nationality’, although reliance on it as authority may be problematic.[38]
Second, she cited the 1996 Interpretations
of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Some Problems
Concerning the Implementation of the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic
of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which states at
paragraph 4:
Any Chinese national who resides in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and has the right of abode in a foreign country may use
the relevant document issued by the foreign government for the purpose of
travelling to other countries or regions, but he or she shall not be entitled
to the consular protection of the foreign country in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region or in any other part of the People’s Republic of China on
account of his or her holding the foreign documents mentioned above.[39]
This meant that, generally, individuals with dual
Australian and Chinese citizenship would not be able to access Australian
consular protection in Hong Kong, unless they renounced their Chinese
citizenship and the renunciation was approved by Hong Kong’s Immigration
Department – in which case, however, they risked losing their rights of abode
in Hong Kong.[40]
Thus, Chief Executive Lam’s announcement brought into action an aspect of
Chinese nationality law, as applied in Hong Kong, that had not been strictly
enforced since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997.[41]
The Chinese Government had previously adopted a more flexible approach to the
dual nationality issue in Hong Kong to avoid another mass migration wave from
Hong Kong post-1997, which would have meant ‘brain drain’ and capital flight
from the city, following the pre-1997 wave triggered by the 1989 Tiananmen
Square Massacre.
Chief Executive Lam’s announcement was considered a
concrete policy change by Western diplomats who had previously experienced
no issues with visiting dual nationals in custody in Hong Kong. One
of these diplomats said, ‘Any ambiguity in terms of consular rights has
generally been ignored in our favour … It has always been out there hanging
over us, and the change has finally come’. This was reflected by Australia’s
Consul-General to Hong Kong and Macau, Elizabeth Ward, who commented on this
issue in an exclusive interview with Stand
News reported on 27 March 2021 [Chinese-language source; translated
below]:[42]
… Elizabeth Ward emphasised that there had always been close communication
with the Hong Kong Government, but that there was a set of longstanding
norms/rules that had ‘been developed through centuries of engagement’ for
communications between countries—one also needs to be careful not to break any
mutual promises/commitments between countries, such as international law.
Although the Hong Kong Government had always been ‘well known for its
transparent, efficient and transactional communication’ and [Elizabeth Ward’s]
communication with it had always been pretty good, there had been times when
she was at a loss to know what to do. It turned out that around mid-January
[2021], the Hong Kong Government quietly changed its customary practice with
each consulate [in Hong Kong] regarding dual nationality such that prisoners
with [both Chinese and] foreign citizenships might be required to have Chinese
chosen as their nationality. The Hong Kong Government did not at all give [the
Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong] a heads up about the change, let
alone discussing it with [the Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong] …
These comments were consistent with Canada’s
revelation that authorities in Hong Kong forced an imprisoned dual national
of Canada and China to declare a single nationality in January 2021. On
Consul-General Ward’s response to the Hong Kong Government’s policy change at
the time, Stand
News also reported [Chinese-language source; translated below]:
… Elizabeth Ward described that she was taken aback by the
change at the time and only realised relevant Hong Kong authorities had
unilaterally changed their practice, which had always been agreed upon with
[the Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong], after she took the initiative
to seek clarification from the Hong Kong Government about it …
On 18 March 2021, HK01 also reported that Consul-General
Ward had commented on this issue in another
interview [Chinese-language source; translated below]:
… Elizabeth Ward emphasised that the consular agreement
signed by Australia and China in 2000 covered Hong Kong, so anyone who entered
China with an Australian passport, even if they were a dual national, should be
entitled to consular protection.
When asked whether the change in practice by the Hong Kong
Government had violated the consular agreement, Elizabeth Ward said that ‘the
agreement is not a simple or straightforward instrument’; whether relevant
provisions of the agreement were valid ‘depends on which passport a dual
national is entering Hong Kong, so it is hard to say whether the Hong Kong
Government has violated [the consular agreement]’. She emphasised that the crux
of the issue laid in the fact that the ‘longstanding’ practice had changed and this
change ‘had come too soon’—of which the Hong Kong Government was well aware but
to which the Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong was oblivious. This
‘raises questions of administrative fairness and transparency which are the
things that of course the Hong Kong government always praises Hong Kong’…
Consul-General Ward was referring to the Agreement on
Consular Relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China
(Consular Agreement).[43]
The purpose of the Consular Agreement is to ‘confirm and amplify the provisions
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations which remains in force as
between [Australia and China]’ and applies to Hong Kong.[44]
Article 10(3) of the Consular Agreement provides that an Australian citizen who
enters China (including Hong Kong) on an Australian passport is entitled to Australian
consular access and protection in China (including Hong Kong). However, it does
not appear to address the issue of whether a dual national who enters Hong Kong
on a Chinese travel document (such as a Chinese passport, or a HKSAR passport)
or a Hong Kong
identity card (which can be used by most card holders to enter Hong Kong without
presenting their travel documents to immigration) is entitled to Australian
consular access and protection in Hong Kong. This reflects the Chinese
Government’s position before signing the Consular Agreement that Chinese
nationality law would not recognise dual nationality even under the Consular
Agreement, as understood by JSCOT and DFAT in 1999.[45]
The Australian Government’s understanding of this Chinese
position is also evident in a DFAT response dated 7 February 2022 to a question
on notice posed by Senator Rex Patrick about the detention of a dual
Australian-Chinese national under the Hong Kong National Security Law:[46]
We are aware that one person, a dual Australian-Chinese
citizen, was arrested in Hong Kong on 6 January 2021 for conspiring to subvert
state power, a charge under the National Security Law. The person was released
on bail on 7 January 2021. Hong Kong Police Force, National Security Division,
notified the Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong on 11 January 2021.
As the person was born in Hong Kong and deemed to be a
Chinese national under the Chinese Nationality Law, which does not recognise
dual citizenship, we were not granted consular access. Our bilateral consular
agreement with China (including Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) allows
us access only to Australian citizens who have entered China on an Australian
passport.
On 28 February 2021 Hong Kong Police advised the individual
that he was to be charged for “subversion” and was required to attend West
Kowloon Magistrates’ Court on 1 March 2021, where he was again placed under
arrest. The individual remains in detention.
As the matter is currently before the court, and for privacy
reasons, we are unable to disclose further details.[47]
In early February 2022 this response was widely
reported by the Australian media, which also quoted a DFAT spokesperson as
stating that ‘we have been denied consular access despite multiple attempts’.
To date, DFAT has not publicly named the individual concerned, although it has
used the pronoun ‘he’ to refer to the individual. Nevertheless, the media in
Hong Kong, such as Apple
Daily [Chinese-language source], first reported as early as 6 January
2021 that Gordon Ng Ching-hang was ‘reportedly’ an Australian citizen who had
been arrested under the Hong Kong National Security Law on that day.[48]
Mr Ng joined over 50 other pan-democracy politicians and campaigners who were
arrested on that day for organising or participating in unofficial primaries
for the Hong Kong Legislative Council election scheduled for September 2020 (but
later postponed to September 2021). The pro-democracy primaries were
denounced by the Chinese
Government [Chinese-language source] and the Hong
Kong Government at the time as ‘illegal’.[49]
Hong Kong’s policy change on
recognition of dual nationality appeared to have been triggered by ‘a
diplomatic row between China and Britain centred on nationality’ shortly
before Chief Executive Lam’s 9 February 2021 announcement.[50]
In order to ‘[reflect] the UK’s historic and moral commitment to
the people of Hong Kong who have had their rights and freedoms restricted’, the
UK launched a
bespoke immigration route for BNO status holders and their immediate family
members on 31 January 2021 – the same day China ‘no longer [recognised] the BNO
passport as a valid travel document or for identification’, as foreshadowed
by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 29 January 2021.
Indeed, Chief Executive Lam framed her comments on the
dual nationality issue in the context of the UK’s visa initiative at the time
for BNO status holders. In her 9
February 2021 announcement, she echoed the Chinese foreign ministry’s words
from 29 January 2021, asserting that the UK’s visa initiative had ‘breached’
the exchange
of memoranda between the Chinese and UK governments on the BNO passports
issue when the Sino–British
Joint Declaration was signed in 1984. Therefore, Hong Kong’s policy change
on the dual nationality issue appeared to be in line with Beijing’s ‘[reserving]
the right to take further actions’ in response to the UK’s visa initiative.
Multi-partisan
support from Australian federal parliamentarians
On 4 June 2020 Labor senator, Kimberley
Kitching, tweeted:
Greens leader @AdamBandt, Liberal Foreign Minister @MarisePayne,
Labor Senate leader @SenatorWong, Labor’s @PeterKhalilMP, Liberals David
Fawcett & Connie Fierravanti-Wells don’t often agree but all unite to stand
with the people of Hong Kong … #auspol[51]
Indeed, Australian federal
parliamentarians across the political spectrum have shown sustained interest in
the Anti-Extradition Amendment Bill Movement, and consistently raised concerns
about the implementation and impacts of the Hong Kong National Security Law. Table
2 in the Appendix lists select statements made by federal parliamentarians
on the Hong Kong situation during parliamentary proceedings or via media
releases.
Until her death in March 2022, Senator Kitching and
(Liberal) Senator Paterson co-chaired the Inter-Parliamentary
Alliance on China (IPAC), which includes 13
other sitting Australian federal parliamentarians.[52]
Labor
MP Peter Khalil replaced Senator Kitching as the Australian co-chair of the
IPAC in April 2022. The IPAC is ‘an international cross-party group of
legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China’,
comprising ‘senior politicians drawn from a representative cross-section of the
world’s major political parties’. It has a specific campaign entitled
‘Democracy in Hong Kong’ and lists 4 campaign highlights
on its website, namely ‘No extradition to Hong Kong’, ‘Magnitsky sanctions’,
‘Protection of Hong Kong activists’ and ‘National Security Law response’.
In September 2019, Australian Greens parliamentarians Richard Di
Natale and Janet Rice, and Liberal
MP Tim Wilson, met with Hong Kong singer and pro-democracy activist Denise
Ho Wan-see and Chinese political dissident artist Badiucao, who were speakers
at a panel event in Melbourne titled Be Water: Hong Kong vs China.
Also in September 2019, Senator Kitching and Liberal MP
Kevin Andrews were reported to have been intending to establish a Parliamentary
Friends of Democratic Hong Kong group, calling for the protection of
democracy in Hong Kong and promoting a peaceful end to the violence. Senator
Kitching and Mr Andrews issued media releases on the Hong Kong situation on 4
December 2019 and 21
April 2020 as co-chairs of the group now called the Australian Parliamentary
Friends of Hong Kong.
In December 2019, Liberal parliamentarians Tim
Wilson and James
Paterson, Labor senators Tony Sheldon and Tim Ayres, and the then Greens
leader, Richard Di Natale, were reported
to have met with 3 Hong Kong pro-democracy political leaders
[Chinese-language source] who were in Canberra lobbying
the Australian Government about the Hong Kong situation.
On 24 May 2020, twenty Australian state, territory and
federal parliamentarians were part of a cross-party international coalition of
201 parliamentarians and policymakers from 23 countries that issued
a statement decrying Beijing’s unilateral introduction of the Hong Kong
National Security Law. The statement called for sympathetic governments to
unite against this ‘flagrant breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration’. By
3 July 2020, the number
of signatories had increased to 904, which included the addition of 7
Australian parliamentarians.
On 2 June 2020, Liberal senator David Fawcett, Chair of the
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade (JSCFADT), joined
his counterparts from the parliaments of Canada, New Zealand and the UK – who
were also chairs of their respective foreign affairs committees – in penning
a joint letter to the UN Secretary-General in light of Beijing’s decision
to impose the Hong Kong National Security Law. The 4 legislators cited concerns
over ‘the Chinese Communist Party’s record of abuses when faced with dissent to
their rule’ and ‘called for action to protect the legal right to freedom for
the people of Hong Kong guaranteed under the Sino-British Joint Declaration’.
Specifically, they asked that the UN Secretary-General work with the United Nations
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) to approve a mandate for the establishment of a
UN Special Envoy for Hong Kong.
On 20 June 2020, Liberal parliamentarians Eric Abetz, James
Paterson and Tim Wilson, and Labor MP Peter Khalil provided messages of support
for Hongkongers during an online event called Sydney
for Hong Kong Online Assembly. It was organised by NSW HongKongers, a
Sydney-based Hong Kong diasporic group, to commemorate the first anniversary of
the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement.
In October 2020, Liberal parliamentarians Eric Abetz, Andrew
Hastie, James Paterson, Tim Wilson, Alex
Antic and Claire Chandler, as well as Senator Kitching, supported a social
media campaign titled #save12hkyouths. The campaign called for the release
of the 12 pro-democracy activists who had tried to flee Hong Kong to Taiwan by
sea only to find themselves intercepted
and detained by Chinese authorities in late August 2020.
In June 2021, which marked the second anniversary of the
start of the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, Senator Abetz, Peter
Khalil and Greens parliamentarians Adam Bandt and Janet Rice recorded video messages
of encouragement for Hongkongers.
In August 2021, various Hong Kong diasporic groups in
Australia provided to DoHA a report on their recommendations for Australia’s
‘safe haven’ visa arrangements for Hongkongers.[53] In a
Facebook post [Chinese and English-language source], Australia-Hong Kong Link,
which co-authored the report, thanked Senator Abetz, George Christensen,
Senator Fawcett and Senator Penny Wong for their assistance in passing the
report to relevant government departments. According to Australia-Hong Kong Link,
the report’s recommendations on pathways to permanent residency for Hongkongers
were adopted by relevant government departments after research and
consultations.
In November 2021, facilitated by Liberal MP Gladys Liu, the
Immigration Minister Alex Hawke met with representatives from various Hong Kong
diasporic groups, including the Hong
Kong Cultural Association of Victoria [Chinese-language source], Australia-Hong
Kong link [Chinese-language source] and Victoria
Hongkongers Association (Australia) [Chinese-language source]. Minister
Hawke was reported to have explained the recently announced visa measures to
the groups and to have answered their questions about those measures.
Further, between 2020 and 2021, Australia-Hong Kong Link met
with and lobbied various federal parliamentarians on issues relating to the
Hong Kong situation. They included, but were likely not limited to, Liberal
parliamentarians Andrew Hastie,
Kevin
Andrews, Eric
Abetz and James
Paterson, and the Greens leader Adam
Bandt.
In September 2019, three months into the Anti-Extradition
Law Amendment Bill Movement, Elizabeth Ward advised JSCOT in her then capacity
as Australia’s Chief Negotiator for the Australia – Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement
that ‘a FTA with Hong Kong … had the benefit of also underscoring our support
for “one country, two systems”’.[54]
Australia
and Hong Kong commenced negotiations of a free trade agreement and an
associated investment agreement in May 2017, and concluded the negotiations in
November 2018. They signed the agreements in Sydney on 26 March 2019 – just a
few months before the onset of the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill
Movement.
On 18 December 2019, Australia ratified the agreement
officially titled Free
Trade Agreement between Australia and Hong Kong, China (A–HKFTA) and the
associated Investment
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s Republic of China (IA)
that contains the investment rules linked to the A–HKFTA. Both agreements entered
into force on 17 January 2020.
The timing of the JSCOT
inquiry into the A–HKFTA, and its subsequent ratification, coincided with
the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, thereby seeing the
ratification subject to controversy. There were also calls to delay the ratification
and suspend
the trade deal after its ratification. Even though
the ratification of the A–HKFTA was not directly connected to Hong Kong’s
democracy and human rights crisis, it has remained a point of contention on the
floor of the Australian Parliament in relation to Australia’s overall response
to the crisis.
In September 2019, when giving evidence to the JSCOT inquiry,
DFAT stated:
… Despite the protests, the purpose and import of the
agreements negotiated here remain unchanged: to deliver architecture between
the Australian and Hong Kong governments to build certainty around our strong
economic relationship. It is because the Australian Government supports a
stable, prosperous Hong Kong, with a high degree of autonomy, under the ‘one
country, two systems’ framework, that the government intends to proceed to
ratify the agreements which deliver the next milestone in this important
relationship …[55]
At the same JSCOT hearing, Michaela Browning, Australia’s
Consul-General to Hong Kong and Macau at the time, added:
[Hong Kong] is one of our biggest commercial presences in
Asia for a reason. There are very strong and enduring reasons why we have that
enormous commercial presence in Hong Kong. And it’s not just to do business
with China; it’s also to do business with Japan and the whole of North Asia.
Australian businesses felt very comfortable in Hong Kong for a long time and
really see the advantages of that common law jurisdiction and the freedoms and
advantages that Hong Kong offers. And those advantages are still strongly
present, notwithstanding that the economy is not performing as well at this
moment as it might otherwise be. That is why locking in these sorts of freedoms
in a legally binding agreement is a substantial advantage for those [Australian]
businesses.[56]
In October 2019 JSCOT endorsed the proposed ratification,
but stated in its inquiry report:
… The Committee acknowledges concerns over the current
political situation in Hong Kong but takes the view that ratification of the
Agreement will strengthen Hong Kong’s unique status under ‘one country, two
systems’ and reaffirm and buttress the high measure of autonomy this provides
Hong Kong over its own affairs …[57]
Consistent with this JSCOT statement, on 8 October 2019 the Chair
of JSCOT, Liberal MP Dave Sharma, was reported to have said
in a personal capacity:
… any attempt by Australia to halt the trade deal because of
the protests could be seen as a ‘crude attempt to interfere’ in Hong Kong’s
affairs by setting conditions for the A-HKFTA.
“While being mindful of the current political instability in
Hong Kong, I think the FTA can reaffirm Hong Kong’s unique status within ‘one
country two systems’ and reaffirm its unique constitutional arrangements[.]”[58]
The Government’s proposed ratification also received bipartisan
support from the Opposition, which had 6 Labor parliamentarians sitting on
JSCOT. According to the Sydney
Morning Herald, Labor MP Peter Khalil, Deputy Chair of JSCOT, said it
was valid to argue that ratifying a trade agreement with Hong Kong recognised
the unique nature of its autonomy including the rule of law, democratic
freedoms and an independent judiciary. However, he
reportedly acknowledged:
If the ongoing political and security instability in Hong
Kong leads by degrees to the diminution of its unique autonomous status … that
in my personal view would be cause for the government to reconsider the
timeline for ratification.
On the other hand, the Australian Greens issued a dissenting
report to JSCOT’s inquiry report, opposing the proposed ratification and
stating:
… The Greens are disappointed that the majority report
glosses over the significant human rights abuses and repression currently
occurring in Hong Kong.
… it is the Greens’ firm view that the Australian Government
should not consider any Free Trade Agreement with Hong Kong while peaceful,
pro-democracy protesters are being violently suppressed …
… The Greens disagree with the majority report view that
ratification of the Agreement will “strengthen Hong Kong’s unique status under ‘one
country, two systems’ and reaffirm and buttress the high measure of autonomy
this provides Hong Kong over its own affairs”. Rather, this is an opportunity
for the Australian Government to back up its words of concern with action, and
demonstrate to the Chinese Government and Hong Kong authorities that repression
will not stand …[59]
The Greens also criticised the A–HKFTA for, among other
things, ‘the lack of provisions which ensure compliance with human rights,
labour rights, and environmental protections’. This echoed recommendations made
in submissions to the JSCOT inquiry by the Canberra
Hong Kong Concern Group, Hong
Kong Watch, Australia-Hong
Kong Link, Demosistō
and Simon
Henderson that human rights protection clauses be included in the A–HKFTA.
Further, the Greens pointed out that ‘there is no explicit
evaluation of … rights-based standards in the NIA of [the A–HKFTA]’. This
statement echoed stakeholder concerns about this aspect of the National
Interest Analysis conducted by DFAT, as expressed by the Australian
Fair Trade and Investment Network and the National
Tertiary Education Union in their submissions to the JSCOT inquiry.
In response to JSCOT’s inquiry report, the Australian
Government accepted and implemented JSCOT’s recommendations to ratify the
A–HKFTA and the IA.[60]
In response to the Greens’ dissenting report, the Australian Government
rejected its recommendations and stated:
… The Government … decides on the inclusion and content of
labour and environment chapters on a case-by-case basis, however, typically the
Government only includes trade related matters in FTAs. These, and other issues
negotiated under our FTAs, are informed by our broader relationship with FTA
partners, and through public consultations including with civil society and
industry. Through these consultations, the Government hears directly from
interested parties on many matters, including labour, environmental
protections, and human rights …[61]
In September 2020, the Greens sought to refer the A–HKFTA
to the Senate FADT References Committee for a reassessment with particular
reference to:
- the appropriateness of the A-HKFTA given the passage
and imposition of China’s national security law in Hong Kong;
- whether Hong Kong still enjoys the high degree of
autonomy valued by Australia through the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework;
- ongoing human rights abuses and repression in Hong Kong
…[62]
On this motion, Greens senator Jordon
Steele-John criticised the Government and the Opposition for insisting that the
implementation of the A–HKFTA would strengthen Hong Kong’s autonomous status
within the ‘one country, two systems’ framework:
… If you now navigate to the FTA section of the DFAT home
page, the government still confidently tells browsers that the deal:
… reaffirms the value Australia places on the high degree of
autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong through the “One Country, Two Systems” framework
…[63]
In opposing the Greens’ motion, Liberal senator Zed
Seselja stated:
The Australia-Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement provides
certainty and transparency for Australian businesses trading and investing in
Hong Kong. To terminate the agreement would remove that certainty of the
operating environment in doing business with and in Hong Kong. Australia supports
a rules based system that provides recourse for Australian businesses and
investors. The Australian government has clearly and consistently expressed our
deep concern regarding Beijing’s decision to impose a national security law in
Hong Kong …[64]
Similarly, Labor senator Don Farrell expressed Labor’s
‘[deep dismay]’ over China’s imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law,
but proceeded to oppose the Greens’ motion:
In opposing this motion, Labor strongly believes that it is
in our national interest to signal our support for one country, two systems;
uphold the international rules based order, including through a robust trading
system and regional economic engagement; and provide certainty and transparency
for all Australian businesses operating in Hong Kong.[65]
In October 2020 during a Senate
Estimates hearing, independent senator Rex Patrick posited that there was ‘this
paradox or, in some sense, a duplicity’ where the Extradition Agreement had
been suspended on the basis of a fundamental change in circumstances but the
A–HKFTA was not being suspended ‘even though it also meets that criteria
[sic]’.[66]
In response, DFAT stated:
… We have looked very carefully at our arrangements with Hong
Kong. The extradition treaty and the free trade agreement are two very
different agreements which have different provisions underneath them. Our
judgement on the extradition treaty was that, under the circumstances, it was
best to suspend that treaty, whereas the free trade agreement continues to
support the interests of Australian businesses operating in Hong Kong. We have
100,000 expatriates there and we want to support their interests. We continue
to believe that the FTA does support their interests.[67]
Senator Patrick went on to praise the suspension of the
Extradition Agreement as ‘a very, very sensible move’ and ‘a very, very
principled approach … noting the change in circumstances’ but criticised ‘on
the other front, [the Government] might perhaps be putting business before
those same principles’.[68]
In response, Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated:
They are quite different agreements and serve quite different
purposes. The free trade agreement … does provide what we think is very
important certainty and transparency for Australian investors in Hong Kong. We
do support a rules based system that provides recourse for Australian business
and investors, and the free trade agreement offers that.[69]
As the contrasting positions among federal
parliamentarians on the A–HKFTA’s ratification and continued operation amid the
Hong Kong situation indicate, this issue has remained a point of contention in
the Australian Parliament in relation to Australia’s response to Hong Kong’s
democracy and human rights crisis.
Introduction of a Magnitsky-style
sanctions regime
In August 2021 Ted Hui told a Senate committee that ‘Hongkongers
are hoping the Australian government and parliament will impose targeted
sanctions on Hong Kong and Beijing officials for their human rights abuses’.[70]
The Senate passed the Autonomous
Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Bill 2021
on 1 December 2021, and the House of Representatives passed it the following
day. The Autonomous
Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Act 2021
commenced on 8 December 2021.[71]
The Bill followed the Australian
Government’s August 2021 response to the report
of the inquiry into the use of targeted sanctions to address human rights
abuses conducted by the Human Rights Sub-committee of JSCFADT. The report recommended,
among other things, that ‘the Australian Government enact stand alone [sic] targeted
sanctions legislation to address human rights violations and corruption,
similar to the United States’ Magnitsky Act 2012’.[72]
Under the Autonomous
Sanctions Act 2011, the Australian Government now has the
power to impose sanctions to address particular issues or conduct (known
as thematic sanctions), which include, but are not limited to, threats to
international peace and security, serious violations or abuses of human rights,
activities that undermine good governance or the rule of law, and serious
violations of international humanitarian law.[73]
While previously sanctions imposed by Australia were
country-focused, the Government can now impose sanctions to address a wider
range of conduct (for example, human rights abuses), irrespective of where the
conduct occurs.
There were no suggestions by the Australian Government that
the passage of the Bill was necessarily a direct or targeted response solely to
the Hong Kong democracy and human rights crisis. Indeed, the Hong Kong
situation was merely one of many examples of human rights concerns cited by
stakeholders in their submissions
to the inquiry. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that according to the
inquiry report, ‘the Sub-committee received over 400 form letters, expressing
concern for human rights in Hong Kong and calling for Australia to develop a
Magnitsky-style targeted sanctions regime consistent with other jurisdictions’.[74]
Notably, in his second reading speech on the Bill, Labor MP Tim Watts cited ‘the
erosion of the democratic system and the one country, two systems arrangement
in Hong Kong’ as one of the examples of ‘increasing and disturbing human rights
violations around the world’ during the preceding 12 months.[75]
To date, the Australian Government has not imposed sanctions
with respect to the Hong Kong situation under the Autonomous Sanctions Act
2011 or other legislation. Of relevance is that in August 2020, the US Government
imposed for the first time asset-blocking sanctions and travel/visa
restrictions on 11 senior Hong Kong and Chinese officials ‘for undermining Hong
Kong’s autonomy and restricting the freedom of expression or assembly of the
citizens of Hong Kong’. Since then, the US has sanctioned at
least 66 individuals in relation to the Hong Kong situation (as at June
2022). The sanctions have frozen the US assets of those individuals and
prohibited US entities from conducting financial transactions with them. For
example, Carrie Lam, one of the sanctioned individuals, said
in November 2020 that she had been forced to stockpile cash at home because
she did not have a bank account after the sanctions were imposed.
China’s
reactions to Australia’s actions
An Australian Parliamentary Library paper published in June
1997, just before Hong Kong’s handover from the UK to China, made these eerily
prescient comments:
… Australia cannot afford political unrest during or after
the handover or a collapse in confidence in the local or international business
community … The issue of Hong Kong is of course intimately connected with
Australia’s relations with China, one of the country’s most important but often
difficult relationships …
… Hong Kong will be one of the major tests for the Australian
Government’s efforts to develop an independent diplomatic position in Asia,
balancing demands created by issues in trade, human rights and security.[76]
Over 2 decades on, in response to Hong Kong’s recent
democracy and human rights crisis, Australia has indeed faced a dilemma over
how ‘to calibrate a response that sends the strongest signal to Beijing while
serving the cause of democracy in Hong Kong and our own interests’.[77]
To understand how this supposedly ‘strongest signal’ from Canberra
has been received by Beijing, one cannot simply ignore the ‘Century of
Humiliation’ that has been a driving trope in China’s contemporary domestic and
foreign policies. The Century of Humiliation is rooted in China’s semi-colonial
past, starting with the First Opium War that saw the Hong Kong Island ceded to
the British in 1842. This aspect of Chinese historiography was a motif in one
of the speeches by President Jiang Zemin at Hong Kong’s handover on 1
July 1997 [Chinese-language source; translated below]:
… Hong Kong’s return [to China] indicates that the Chinese
people have wiped out the Century of Humiliation from the invasion of Hong Kong.
… In the 1840s and 1850s, the UK launched two Opium Wars to
invade China, forcing the Qing Government to sign the Treaty of Nanking and the
Convention of Peking which humiliated the country and ceded the Hong Kong
Island and Kowloon to Britain … The Chinese people have never acknowledged any
of the unequal treaties and never forgotten the national humiliation of Hong
Kong’s occupation.
… The invasion of Hong Kong was a historical microcosm of the
humiliation suffered by China in modern times …
Two decades later on 1 July 2017, this sentiment still
resonated and was repeated by President
Xi Jinping [Chinese-language source; translated below]: ‘Chinese history at
that time [when the British occupied Hong Kong] was written with national
humiliation and the Chinese people’s grief’. In fact, the ‘Chinese Dream’
of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation propounded by President Xi
Jinping is said to have been founded upon and perpetrated by the Century of
Humiliation sentiment.[78]
As alluded to above, Australia’s response to the Hong Kong
situation has sometimes been compared to other countries’ responses, even
though each country’s response to a human rights situation in another country
will differ according to its own ideologies, local economic conditions,
domestic politics, national interests and foreign policies. However, against
the historical backdrop of the Century of Humiliation narrative, it may be more
apt to see Australia’s response as one part of a broader united response of the
5
core Anglosphere countries that also constitute the Five Eyes. It is this
united response that may have struck a historical nerve for China.
This ‘collective trauma’ from China’s semi-colonial past manifests
itself in China’s ‘never again’ mentality, ‘which dictates that the Century of Humiliation
is not just a grim lesson of the past, but also a warning about a possible
future … to prevent a second century of humiliation’, according to Mark
Tischler (The Diplomat).[79]
Thus, one may perceive that this mentality has been manifested in China’s
reactions to external joint statements on or initiatives in respect of Hong
Kong since 2019 by the Five Eyes or any other international alliances that are
seen by China to be ‘anti-China’. For example, after the Group of Seven (G7)
published a
joint statement on Hong Kong in March 2021, the CCP-backed Global Times
analogised
the G7 to the Eight-Nation Alliance, a multinational military coalition
that occupied northern China around 1900 in response to the Boxer Rebellion.
It follows that the ‘Century of Humiliation’ sentiment has
likely shaped China’s reactions, some of which are cited above, to Australia’s
statements and actions in response to the Hong Kong situation – among many
other Chinese human rights issues. This aspect of Beijing’s collective
mentality, which is said to have been often overlooked
by Western observers of China, may provide an additional lens through which
relevant stakeholders and policymakers in Canberra might view China’s recent
‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy towards Australia and the deteriorating bilateral
relationship. This may also assist in understanding the 14
grievances China reportedly had with Australia in late 2020, which included
Australia’s alleged ‘incessant wanton interference in China’s Xinjiang, Hong
Kong and Taiwan affairs; spearheading the crusade against China in certain
multilateral forums’.
Meanwhile, Australia’s statements and actions responding to
the Hong Kong situation between 2019 and 2021 came amid the Morrison
Government’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the
coronavirus, escalated Australia–China trade tensions, Australia’s diplomatic
boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, as well as Australia’s
participation in AUKUS and the Quad that have been seen as counterweights to
China. Thus, to better understand the strained Australia–China relationship,
these intertwined events should also be viewed in tandem with the Morrison
Government’s pursuit of a more value-based foreign policy in calling out issues
arising from Hong Kong’s democracy and human rights crisis.
There is strong indication that the Albanese Government will
continue its predecessor’s pursuit of a more value-based foreign policy in
relation to China. While in Opposition as the Shadow Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Penny
Wong said in May 2021 at a book launch at Old Parliament House:
… It is simply not in Australia’s interests, for example, to
abandon our positions on the application of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea in the South China Sea, or Huawei in the NBN or 5G network, or on foreign
interference, or on Hong Kong, or on the universality of human rights.
Labor will continue to do everything we can to maintain
bipartisanship on these issues …
Appendix
Table 1 Key Australian
Government statements on Hong Kong since June 2019
|
Date
|
Details
|
Source
|
|
12 June 2019
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs released her first statement on the Anti-Extradition Law
Amendment Bill Movement after the first major protest on 9 June 2019.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Statement
on Protests in Hong Kong’, media release, 12 June 2019.
|
|
16 June 2019
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs stated that Australia welcomed Hong Kong’s announcement that
it was suspending legislative consideration of the extradition Bill.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Suspension
of Legislative Consideration of Hong Kong Extradition Bill’, media
release, 16 June 2019.
|
|
16 June 2019
|
The Australian
Consulate-General Hong Kong and Macau similarly stated:
Australia welcomes the Hong Kong
Chief Executive’s decision to indefinitely halt legislative consideration of
the proposed extradition law amendments and values Hong Kong and the freedoms
provided for under the One Country, Two Systems.
|
Australian
Consulate-General Hong Kong and Macau, Facebook,
16 June 2019.
|
|
7 August 2019
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted:
Australia is concerned by
increasing violence in #HongKong
impacting tourist & residential areas. Right to peaceful protest is in HK
Basic Law. We again urge peaceful resolution and support Hong Kong’s ‘one
country, two systems’ model. https://bit.ly/33fZcwG
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), Twitter,
7 August 2019.
|
|
14 November 2019
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs stated that Australia was ‘deeply concerned by the violence
in Hong Kong and the increasing divide between the authorities and Hong Kong
people’ and encouraged the Hong Kong authorities to address recommendations
by an international expert panel, which provided advice to Hong Kong’s
Independent Police Complaints Council, that there should be further
independent investigation into police responses to the protests.
|
Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Statement
on Hong Kong’, media release, 14 November 2019.
|
|
23 November 2019
|
Reflecting upon the
G20 foreign ministers meeting held in Nagota City, Japan, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs described her UK counterpart Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon as ‘a
strong partner on issues such as keeping the Commonwealth strong & on
human rights’ and said they both “affirmed [their] commitment to the ‘One
country, two systems’ principle in Hong Kong”.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), Twitter,
23 November 2019.
|
|
19 April 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs stated that she was concerned by news of the coordinated
arrests on 18 April 2020 of 14 high-profile pro-democracy figures in Hong
Kong for allegedly participating in unauthorised protests in 2019.
|
Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Statement
on Arrests of Pro-democracy Figures in Hong Kong’, media release, 19
April 2020.
|
|
23 May 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs released a joint statement with Canada and the UK, stating
that they were ‘deeply concerned at proposals for introducing legislation
related to national security in Hong Kong’.
|
Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Joint
Statement on Hong Kong National Security Legislation’, joint media
release, 23 May 2020.
|
|
28 May 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs released a joint statement with Canada, the UK and the US to
‘reiterate [their] deep concern regarding Beijing’s decision to impose a
national security law in Hong Kong’ and stated:
… China’s decision to impose the
new national security law on Hong Kong lies in direct conflict with its
international obligations under the principles of the legally-binding,
UN-registered Sino-British Joint Declaration. The proposed law would
undermine the One Country, Two Systems framework. It also raises the prospect
of prosecution in Hong Kong for political crimes, and undermines existing
commitments to protect the rights of Hong Kong people – including those set
out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights …
|
Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Joint
Statement on Hong Kong’, joint media release, 28 May 2020.
|
|
2 June 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted that ‘Five Eyes is an indispensable part of
[Australia]’s international cooperation’ and revealed that she discussed
‘Hong Kong autonomy’, among other ‘global challenges’, with all of her Five
Eyes counterparts in a
recent meeting.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), Twitter,
2 June 2020.
|
|
5 June 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted that she ‘had a very productive discussion today’
with Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Motegi Toshimitsu about ‘Hong Kong’
among other things.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), ‘I had a very productive
discussion today with Japan’s Foreign Minister @moteging about our respective …’ Twitter,
2 June 2020.
|
|
30 June 2020
|
At the 44th
regular session of the UNHRC, Australia joined 26 other countries in
delivering a joint statement ‘to raise [their] deep and growing concerns at
the imposition of legislation related to national security on Hong Kong, with
clear implications for the human rights of people in Hong Kong’.
|
Julian
Braithwaite (Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UK Mission to the
World Trade Organization, United Nations and Other International
Organisations in Geneva), ‘UN
Human Rights Council 44: Cross-regional Statement on Hong Kong and Xinjiang’,
30 June 2020.
|
|
1 July 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs expressed Australia’s ‘deep concern’ about Beijing’s
imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law and commented:
… Australia is troubled by the
law’s implications for Hong Kong’s judicial independence, and on the rights
and freedoms enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong, both of which underpin the
city’s success …
|
Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Statement
on Hong Kong’, media release, 1 July 2020.
|
|
9 July 2020
|
The Prime
Minister and the acting Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant
Services and Multicultural Affairs announced policy changes to visas for HKSAR
passport holders.
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Hong
Kong’, joint media release, 9 July 2020.
|
|
9 July 2020
|
The Prime
Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General announced
the Australian Government’s decision to suspend Australia’s extradition
agreement with Hong Kong.
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Extradition
Treaty with Hong Kong’, joint media release, 9 July 2020.
|
|
9 July 2020
|
A joint
statement by the prime ministers of Australia and Japan, released after their
Leaders Meeting, noted ‘The leaders shared grave concern about the imposition
of a national security law in Hong Kong, as it eroded Hong Kong’s autonomy
under the “One Country Two Systems” framework’.
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Japan-Australia
Leaders’ VTC Meeting’, joint media release, 9 July 2020.
|
|
28 July 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence released a joint statement with
the US following the 30th Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations
(AUSMIN 2020), stating:
… The United States and Australia
expressed deep concern about the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
government’s efforts to undermine the “One Country, Two Systems” framework
and to erode Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms in violation of its
obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. In particular, the
principals expressed deep concern at the imposition of sweeping and vague
“national security” legislation on Hong Kong that has imperiled the rule of
law and undermined the rights to freedom of expression, including for members
of the press, and to peaceful assembly …
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Joint
Statement Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2020’, joint
media release, 28 July 2020.
|
|
29 July 2020
|
In a joint media
appearance at AUSMIN 2020, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated:
… The rules-based global order is
a constant, notwithstanding, or perhaps even more so given, the impact of the
pandemic. We reiterated our commitment to holding states to account when they
breach international norms and laws, as we have done and will continue to do
so in relation to China’s erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong …
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Transcript
of Press Conference: Washington DC, Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations
(AUSMIN): 29 July 2020: AUSMIN, COVID-19, US-Australia Alliance; Relationship
with China; Return of ISIS Wives and Children to Australia; and South China
Sea’, joint media release, 29 July 2020.
|
|
10 August 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs published a joint statement with all of her Five Eyes
counterparts stating they were ‘gravely concerned by the Hong Kong
government’s unjust disqualification of candidates and disproportionate
postponement of Legislative Council elections’ and expressing their ‘deep
concern at Beijing’s imposition of the new National Security Law, which is
eroding the Hong Kong people’s fundamental rights and liberties’.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Statement
on Hong Kong’, media release, 10 August 2020.
|
|
14 September
2020
|
In her address
to the 45th regular session of the UNHRC, the Minister for Foreign Affairs cited
‘legislation related to national security on Hong Kong, which has eroded
rights and freedoms guaranteed to the people on Hong Kong’ as an example of
human right concerns for which ‘more remains to be done to address’.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Dignitary
Address to the 45th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights
Council’, media release, 14 September 2020.
|
|
6 October 2020
|
At the UN
General Assembly Third Committee, Australia was signatory to a joint
statement with 38 other countries stating that they ‘share concerns expressed
separately by a group of UN experts that a number of provisions in the Hong
Kong National Security Law do not conform to China’s international legal
obligations’ and ‘have deep concerns about elements of the National Security
Law that allow for certain cases to be transferred for prosecution to the
Chinese mainland’.
|
Christoph
Heusgen (Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations), ‘Statement
by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on Behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee
General Debate, October 6, 2020’, 6 October 2020.
|
|
12 November 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs published a statement after the Chinese and Hong Kong
governments disqualified
4 pro-democracy members of the Legislative Council.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Statement
on Hong Kong’, media release, 12 November 2020.
|
|
17 November 2020
|
After their
Leaders Meeting, the prime ministers of Australia and Japan stated:
The Leaders shared their grave
concerns over the situation in Hong Kong, and emphasised the importance of upholding
Hong Kong’s democratic processes and institutions, as well as the high degree
of autonomy set out in the Basic Law and Sino-British Joint Declaration.
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Japan-Australia
Leaders’ Meeting Joint Statement’, joint media release, 17 November 2020.
|
|
19 November 2020
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs published a joint statement with all of her Five Eyes
counterparts to ‘reiterate [their] serious concern regarding China’s
imposition of new rules to disqualify elected legislators in Hong Kong’ which
‘further undermines Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and rights and
freedoms’.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Join
Statement on Hong Kong’, joint media release, 19 November 2020.
|
|
6 January 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs expressed the Australian Government’s concern about the arrests
of more than 50 pro-democracy lawmakers and figures who were accused of
violating the Hong Kong National Security Law by holding primaries for Hong
Kong’s Legislative Council election.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Hong
Kong Statement’, media release, 6 January 2021.
|
|
10 January 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs published a joint statement with Canada, the UK and US to ‘underscore
[their] serious concern at the mass arrests of 55 politicians and activists
in Hong Kong for subversion under the National Security Law’.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Join
Statement on Arrests in Hong Kong’, joint media release, 10 January
2021.
|
|
1 March 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted the Australian Government’s concern about the Hong
Kong Police Force having charged
47 former pro-democracy candidates in Hong Kong.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), ‘The Australian Government is concerned that charges have been
laid against 47 pro-democracy candidates ...’, Twitter,
1 March 2021.
|
|
12 March 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted the Australian Government’s serious concern about a
decision on changes to Hong Kong’s electoral system imposed by National
People’s Congress in Beijing.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), ‘Australia is seriously concerned about changes by Beijing to
Hong Kong’s electoral system, which weaken …’, Twitter,
12 March 2021.
|
|
13 March 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs released a joint statement with her New Zealand counterpart
to express their deep concern about changes to Hong Kong’s electoral system
passed by the Chinese Government on 11 March 2021.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Joint
Statement on Electoral Changes in Hong Kong’, joint media release, 13 March
2021.
|
|
31 May 2021
|
After the Leaders
Meeting held in Queenstown, the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand
noted in a joint statement:
… The Prime Ministers expressed
deep concern over developments that limit the rights and freedoms of the
people of Hong Kong and undermine the high degree of autonomy China
guaranteed Hong Kong until 2047 under the Sino-British Joint Declaration …
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Joint
Statement: Prime Ministers Jacinda Ardern and Scott Morrison’, joint
media release, 31 May 2021.
|
|
9 June 2021
|
After a video
conference meeting, the Australian and Japanese foreign affairs and defence
ministers stated:
… We also urge the Hong Kong and
Chinese authorities to uphold their commitments to the Hong Kong people. We
share grave concerns about recent moves that weaken Hong Kong's democratic
institutions and undermine the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Hong
Kong Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration …
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Ninth
Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations’, joint
media release, 9 June 2021.
|
|
18 June 2021
|
DFAT tweeted:
Australia is concerned at the
arrest of journalists from Apple Daily, and the impact this will have on freedom
of expression in Hong Kong, as provided in the Basic Law underpinned by the
Sino-British Joint Declaration.
|
DFAT (@dfat), Twitter, 18 June
2021.
|
|
22 June 2021
|
At the 47th
regular session of the UNHRC, Australia was signatory to a
cross-regional joint statement with 43 other countries on the human rights
situation in Xinjiang, which mentioned in passing ‘we continue to be deeply
concerned about the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong under
the National Security Law’.
|
Leslie E. Norton
(Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in
Geneva), ‘Joint
Statement on Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang at 47th Session of UN Human
Rights Council’, 22 June 2021.
|
|
24 June 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs retweeted DFAT’s tweet of 18 June 2021 and stated, ‘With the
closure of Apple Daily, Australia stands with those raising legitimate
concerns about the future of #pressfreedoms
in Hong Kong’.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), Twitter,
24 June 2021.
|
|
10 July 2021
|
Australia was
signatory to a joint statement with 20 other countries from the Media
Freedom Coalition, which expressed their ‘strong concerns about the
forced closure of the Apple Daily newspaper, and the arrest of its staff by
the Hong Kong authorities’ and criticised ‘the use of the National Security
Law to suppress journalism’ as ‘a serious and negative step which undermines
Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and the rights and freedoms of people in
Hong Kong’.
|
US Department of
State, ‘Media
Freedom Coalition Statement on Hong Kong’s Apple Daily’, joint media
release, 10 July 2021.
|
|
30 August 2021
|
After the Inaugural
Australia–France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations, the foreign affairs and
defence ministers from both countries mentioned in their joint statement that
they ‘expressed grave concerns … about the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy
and freedoms’.
|
Jean-Yves Drian
(Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France) et al., ‘Inaugural
Australia-France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations’, joint media release, 30 August
2021.
|
|
17 September
2021
|
At AUSMIN 2021,
Australia and the US ‘expressed continued concern for the erosion of autonomy
and democratic institutions and processes in Hong Kong’ and ‘stated that
actions taken by the PRC, including imposing a National Security Law, weakening
the electoral system, and suppressing media freedoms, have fundamentally
undermined the “One Country, Two Systems” framework’. They urged the PRC to ‘abide
by its binding commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration’.
|
Antony Blinken
(Secretary of State, US) et al., ‘The
Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations Joint Statement: An Unbreakable
Alliance for Peace and Prosperity’, joint media release, 17 September
2021.
|
|
22 October 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted about the disqualification
of elected pro-democracy district councillors whose oaths of allegiance
to the government during a swearing-in ceremony were deemed invalid by the
Hong Kong Government.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), ‘The disqualification of more than 50 elected representatives
undermines Hong Kong’s democratic institutions ...’, Twitter,
22 October 2021.
|
|
1 November 2021
|
The Minister for
Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
announced the introduction of 2 new permanent residence visa streams for HKSAR
and BNO passport holders.
|
Alex Hawke
(Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural
Affairs), ‘New
Permanent Residence Visa Streams for Hong Kong’, media release, 1
November 2021.
|
|
20 December 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs released a joint statement with her Five Eyes counterparts to
‘express [their] grave concern over the erosion of democratic elements of
[Hong Kong’s] electoral system’. They noted the outcome
of the Legislative Council elections held on 19 December 2021, which
occurred after the overhaul
of Hong Kong’s electoral system in March 2021 that had ‘eliminated any
meaningful political opposition’.
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Joint
Statement on Legislative Council Elections – Hong Kong’, joint media
release, 20 December 2021.
|
|
30 December 2021
|
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs tweeted about the Hong Kong Police Force’s raid on Stand News
and arrests of its staff members in late December 2021.
|
Marise Payne
(@MarisePayne), ‘The raid on #StandNews
& arrests of journalists continue the suppression of free speech &
media in Hong Kong …’, Twitter,
30 December 2021.
|
|
6 January 2022
|
A joint
statement by the prime ministers of Australia and Japan, released after their
Leaders Meeting, noted:
They also expressed their grave
concerns over the erosion of democratic elements of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region’s electoral system and the undermining of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed under the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint
Declaration.
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Australia-Japan
Leaders’ Meeting Joint Statement’, joint media release, 6 January 2022.
|
|
21 January 2022
|
At the Australia–UK
Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) 2022, Australian and UK foreign affairs
and defence ministers:
… agreed that imposition of the
National Security Law, overhaul of the electoral system and suppression of
media freedoms have fundamentally undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy and
freedoms and eliminated any meaningful political opposition …
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘AUKMIN
2022 Joint Statement’, joint media release, 21 January 2022.
|
|
8 February 2022
|
Australia was
signatory to a joint statement with 20 other countries from the Media Freedom
Coalition. The statement expressed their ‘deep concern at the Hong Kong and
mainland Chinese authorities’ attacks on freedom of the press and their
suppression of independent local media in Hong Kong’ following the closures
of Stand News and Citizen News.
|
US Department of
State, ‘Media
Freedom Coalition Statement on Closure of Media Outlets in Hong Kong’,
joint media release, 8 February 2022.
|
|
17 February 2022
|
A joint
statement by the prime ministers of Australia and the UK, released after
their virtual meeting, noted ‘The leaders … called on China to protect the
rights, freedoms and high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong enshrined in the
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law’.
|
Scott Morrison
(Prime Minister) et al., ‘Joint
Statement on UK–Australia Virtual Summit’, joint media release, 9 July
2020.
|
|
1 March 2022
|
In her address
to the 5th annual Tom Hughes Oration, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said:
… We know that some authoritarian
nations are knowingly taking advantage of the vulnerability of others during
the Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, the pandemic has not only added a layer of
complexity but in many cases it’s exacerbated the challenges our own
Indo-Pacific region is facing: whether it is the erosion of democracy in Hong
Kong, attempts to undermine international law and freedoms in the South China
Sea …
|
Marise Payne
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Fifth
Tom Hughes Oration: Speech, Melbourne’, 1 March 2022.
|
|
12 May 2022
|
DFAT tweeted:
The Australian Government is
highly concerned by the arrest of Cardinal Joseph Zen & 4 other
pro-democracy figures overnight under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. We
again urge authorities to respect the rights & freedoms guaranteed under
HK’s Basic Law & international law.
|
DFAT (@dfat), Twitter, 12
May 2022.
|
Table 2 Select statements by Australian federal
parliamentarians on Hong Kong since June 2019
|
Date
|
Details
|
Source
|
|
11 June 2019
|
The Australian
Greens published its first media release on the 2019 protests in Hong Kong.
|
Richard Di
Natale (Leader of the Australian Greens), ‘Greens
Statement on Hong Kong’, media release, 11 June 2019.
|
|
4 July 2019
|
The then Greens
leader Richard Di Natale and Greens senator Sarah Hanson-Young put forward a
formal motion in the Senate ‘to show solidarity with those people in Hong
Kong who are protesting to defend their democratic rights and freedoms: the
right to freedom of speech, to freedom of the press and to freedom of
assembly’.
|
Richard Di
Natale, Motions:
Hong Kong Senate, Debates, 4 July 2019, 221.
|
|
4 September 2019
|
The then Greens
leader called on the Morrison Government ‘to immediately offer permanent
protection for anyone from Hong Kong who currently resides in Australia’, ‘in
light of escalating violence in Hong Kong and the looming threat of
intervention by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’.
|
Richard Di
Natale (Leader of the Australian Greens), ‘Grant
Permanent Protection for all Hong Kongers Residing in Australia’, media
release, 4 September 2019.
|
|
5 September 2019
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Penny Wong, published her first media release on
the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, in addition to previous public statements and
social media posts, in which she stated, ‘Labor welcomes the announcement by
the Chief Executive of Hong Kong that the proposed extradition bill has been
withdrawn’.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Withdrawal
of Hong Kong Extradition Bill’, media release, 5 September 2019.
|
|
16 September
2019
|
In her
address-in-reply to the Governor-General’s 2 July 2019 speech in the Senate,
Liberal senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells stated:
… The dream of freedom remains
distant for the Chinese people. And while Beijing still pays lip service to
“reform and opening,” Deng Xiaoping’s famous policy now rings hollow.
One only has to look at what is
happening in Hong Kong today …
|
Concetta
Fierravanti-Wells, Governor-General’s
Speech: Address-in-Reply, Senate, Debates, 16 September 2019,
2222.
|
|
17 October 2019
|
Labor MP Peter
Khalil spoke of his meetings with Hong Kong students in Melbourne, some of
whom ‘have been threatened over the phone, on social media and even
physically’ for being ‘involved in peaceful protests on campuses in Australia’.
|
Peter Khalil, Adjournment:
Human Rights, House of Representatives, Debates, 17 October 2019, 4637.
|
|
21 October 2019
|
The acting Greens
leader, Adam Bandt, moved to amend relevant legislation to delay
implementation of Australia’s free trade agreement with Hong Kong ‘to allow
time for those human rights safeguards to be negotiated … to send a message
that we have heard the Hong Kong democracy leaders’.
See also Adam
Bandt’s media
release of the same day.
|
Adam Bandt, Consideration
in Detail Speech: Customs Amendment (Growing Australian Export Opportunities
Across the Asia-Pacific) Bill 2019, Customs Tariff Amendment (Growing
Australian Export Opportunities Across the Asia-Pacific) Bill 2019, House
of Representatives, Debates, 21 October 2019, 4795–4796.
|
|
12 November 2019
|
Liberal senator
Amanda Stoker made a statement specifically on the Hong Kong situation,
commenting that ‘the Hong Kong protesters are fighting for values that we too
hold dear—those of individual freedom, free markets and the rule of law.
These values made Hong Kong free and prosperous and they are key to its
continued growth and prosperity’ and criticising the extradition bill.
|
Amanda Stoker, Adjournment:
Hong Kong, Senate, Debates, 12 November 2019, 3649.
|
|
15 November 2019
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that ‘Labor is deeply concerned by the
escalation of violence in Hong Kong’, while urging Hong Kong authorities to
‘engage in a genuine dialogue with the public that addresses widespread
concerns, including police conduct, and builds trust between all parties’.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Hong
Kong’, media release, 15 November 2019.
|
|
2 December 2019
|
Ahead of United
Nations Human Rights Day, Labor MP Alicia Payne spoke of ‘the suppression of
the rights and freedoms that the residents of Hong Kong have come to value so
highly since the end of British rule’.
|
Alicia Payne, Private
Members’ Business: Human Rights Day, House of Representatives, Debates,
2 December 2019, 6736–6737.
|
|
23 May 2020
|
The Greens
leader stated that ‘[t]he Australian Greens condemn the Chinese Government’s
plans to enact sweeping new national security laws in Hong Kong’ and offered ‘solidarity
to protesters who have resisted months of recriminations’.
|
Adam Bandt
(Member for Melbourne), ‘Australian
Greens Condemn Efforts to Ratchet Up Repression in Hong Kong’, media
release, 23 May 2020.
|
|
29 May 2020
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed Labor’s deep concern at Beijing’s
decision to impose the Hong Kong National Security Law.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Hong
Kong National Security Legislation’, media release, 29 May 2020.
|
|
4 June 2020
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs stated
‘Labor reiterates its deep concern about Beijing’s decision to impose
national security legislation in Hong Kong’ and noted ‘the United Kingdom's
reported request for Australia to consider assistance for British National
Overseas passport holders in Hong Kong’.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Supporting
the People of Hong Kong’, joint media release, 4 June 2020.
|
|
30 June 2020
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs called on the Morrison Government to make
concerns about the Hong Kong National Security Law clear to the Chinese
Government and called on the Chinese authorities ‘to be transparent about the
details of the legislation’.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Passage
of Hong Kong National Security Legislation’, media release, 30 June 2020.
|
|
1 July 2020
|
The Greens
leader stated, ‘the Australian Greens condemn in the strongest possible terms
the Chinese Government’s decision to override Hong Kong’s legislature and
pass draconian national security laws aimed at repressing the people of Hong
Kong’ and ‘called on the Morrison Government to, at an absolute minimum and
as a first step, grant permanent protection for all Hong Kongers who
currently reside in Australia’.
|
Adam Bandt (Leader
of the Australian Greens), ‘Greens
Call on Morrison Government to Take Action Over Hong Kong National Security
Law’, media release, 1 July 2020.
|
|
2 July 2020
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs called
on the Government to ‘provide pathways to support the people of Hong Kong’
and ‘again note[d] the United Kingdom’s reported request for Australia to
consider assistance for British National Overseas passport holders in Hong
Kong’.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Supporting
the People of Hong Kong’, joint media release, 2 July 2020.
|
|
9 July 2020
|
In a joint media
release, 3 Labor frontbenchers criticised the Morrison Government’s announcement
of new visa arrangements for HKSAR passport holders, stating that it ‘lacks
clarity and leaves many behind’.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Hong
Kong’, joint media release, 9 July 2020.
|
|
1 September 2020
|
Senator Rachel
Siewert, Australian Greens Whip in the Senate, asked the Senate FADT
References Committee to reassess the A–HKFTA.
|
Rachel Siewert, Speech
on Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Senate,
Debates, 1 September 2020, 4617.
|
|
1 September 2020
|
On Senator
Siewert’s motion cited above, Greens senator Jordon Steele-John called on the
Government and the Opposition to review the A–HKFTA, and urged the Government
to provide ‘protection for all those in Hong Kong who are at risk of
persecution because of the new laws, on top of our existing humanitarian
quotas’ and ‘more than just extension schemes for some visa categories’.
|
Jordon
Steele-John, Speech
on Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Senate,
Debates, 1 September 2020, 4617–4618.
|
|
1 September 2020
|
Labor senator
Don Farrell opposed Senator Siewert’s motion cited above.
|
Don Farrell, Speech
on Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee,
Senate, Debates, 1 September 2020, 4619.
|
|
1 September 2020
|
Liberal senator
Zed Seselja opposed Senator Siewert’s motion cited above.
|
Zed Seselja, Speech
on Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee,
Senate, Debates, 1 September 2020, 4619.
|
|
12 November 2020
|
The Leader of
the Opposition in the Senate (and Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), Penny
Wong, associated the Opposition with statements
made earlier by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed Labor’s ‘continued
bipartisan support for the principles and the concerns raised in relation to
Hong Kong’.
|
Penny Wong, Speech
on Question Without Notice: Hong Kong, [Questioner: James Paterson], Senate,
Debates, 12 November 2020, 6123.
|
|
12 November 2020
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs published a statement after Beijing’s Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Hong Kong Government disqualified
4 pro-democracy members of the Legislative Council.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Hong
Kong Legislative Council’, media release, 12 November 2020.
|
|
7 January 2021
|
Independent
senator Rex Patrick criticised the Australian Government’s new visa
arrangements announced in July 2020 and ‘called on the Australian Government
to further widen its immigration criteria to increase the eligibility of Hong
Kong residents to migrate to Australia’.
|
Rex Patrick
(Senator for South Australia), ‘Australia
Should Open the Door Wider for Hong Kongers’, media release, 7 January
2021.
|
|
4 February 2021
|
Commenting on
the report of the SFADTRC’s inquiry
into issues facing diaspora communities in Australia, Liberal senator Concetta
Fierravanti-Wells stated:
… I also want to touch on the
effect of the Hong Kong security law. This is a very bad law and I know that
so many people in Australia fear its application, not just if they go back to
Hong Kong but also because so many people in the diasporas have connections
in these countries—in China, in Vietnam and in other countries—where they
fear repercussions for their citizens …
|
Concetta
Fierravanti-Wells, Speech
on Committees: SFADTRC Report, Senate, Debates, 4 February 2021, 425.
|
|
16 February 2021
|
The Greens
spokesperson on foreign affairs described the Hong Kong situation as one of
the Chinese Government’s ‘most egregious recent attacks on human rights’ and
stated:
… I recently met with Hongkongers
who were incredibly sad for the assault on democracy we’ve seen in Hong Kong
and concerned about the changes impacting Hongkongers with dual citizenship.
We welcome the Australian government’s safe haven, offering visa extensions
of five years and potentially a permanent pathway to residency, but we call
on the government to do more and to grant permanent protection for all
Hongkongers who currently reside in Australia. I’m also glad to see that the
Australian government has changed its travel advice to highlight the risks to
Australian citizens who are Hongkongers …
|
Janet Rice, Adjournment:
Myanmar: Human Rights, Senate, Debates, 16 February 2021, 752–753.
|
|
17 June 2021
|
Liberal MP Tim
Wilson, who once marched
with pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong in October 2019, paid tribute
to the protesters ‘who rose against the Chinese Communist Party’s deception
and oppression [on 12 June 2019]’ and ‘understood that they were not fighting
for a strip of land but for the freedom of people to choose their own destiny’.
|
Tim Wilson, Statements
by Members: Hong Kong, House of Representatives, Debates, 17 June
2021, 6150.
|
|
22 June 2021
|
Liberal MP Kevin
Andrews delivered a speech on China’s human rights violations during a
grievance debate, in which he stated:
I grieve today for the people of
Hong Kong, whose freedoms and liberties are being trampled on and destroyed
by the communist regime of Xi Jinping. Let's recall that the Sino-British
Joint Declaration, which was signed in 1984, stipulates that Hong Kong would
retain its high degree of autonomy, rights and freedoms for 50 years after
the handover took place. But this agreement's been torn up by the Communist
Party, which has blatantly walked away from its obligations, has closed down
democracy and is now prosecuting and jailing anyone who dares question the
totalitarian regime. Leading human rights advocates, such as Martin Lee, have
been prosecuted; the proprietor of the democratic Apple Daily newspaper,
Jimmy Lai, has been jailed on trumped-up charges; and, just in the last week,
five journalists at the paper were arrested by 500 police—maybe a little
overkill in terms of that exercise—and charged under the draconian national
security laws …
|
Kevin Andrews, Grievance
Debate: China: Human Rights, House of Representatives, Debates, 22
June 2021, 6738.
|
|
24 June 2021
|
Liberal MP Trent
Zimmerman made a statement expressing his deep concern about the actions
taken by the Hong Kong authorities against Apple Daily under the Hong
Kong National Security Law.
|
Trent Zimmerman,
Statements
by Members: Hong Kong, House of Representatives, Debates, 24 June
2021, 7096.
|
|
23 November 2021
|
Senator James
McGrath of the Liberal National Party of Queensland said in parliament:
… Communist China is a bully. It comes
as the rest of the world turns a blind eye to the fact that China’s pressure
in Hong Kong has completely overthrown the one country, two systems
agreement. Hong Kong has gone. Hong Kong is one of the many tragedies arising
from COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, it was the first casualty …
|
James McGrath, Adjournment:
China, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Senate, Debates, 23 November
2021, 6576.
|
|
25 November 2021
|
In his call for Australia’s
diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, Liberal senator Eric
Abetz said in parliament:
This regime has ripped up an
international agreement that it signed with the United Kingdom, sanctioned by
the United Nations, in relation to the freedoms that would be enjoyed by the
people of Hong Kong—just discarded like a soiled tissue, with completely no
intention of abiding by its requirements.
|
Eric Abetz, Adjournment:
Beijing Winter Olympics, Senate, Debates, 25 November 2021,
6768.
|
|
29 November 2021
|
Rising to call
for ‘a boycott’ of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics in parliament, George
Christensen of the Liberal National Party of Queensland said that ‘We refused
to turn a blind eye to the rapidly-deteriorating human rights situation in
Hong Kong and the Tibet autonomous region’.
|
George
Christensen, Statements
by Members: China: 2022 Winter Olympic Games, House of Representatives, Debates,
29 November 2021, 11048.
|
|
2 December 2021
|
In his second
reading speech on the Autonomous
Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Bill 2021,
Labor MP Tim Watts cited ‘the erosion of the democratic system and the one
country, two systems arrangement in Hong Kong’ as an example of ‘increasing
and disturbing human rights violations around the world’ during the preceding
12 months.
|
Tim Watts, Second
Reading Speech: Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-Style and Other
Thematic Sanctions) Bill 2021, House of Representatives, Debates,
2 December 2021, 11365.
|
|
20 December 2021
|
The Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs released a statement on the outcome of Hong
Kong’s Legislative Council elections held on 19 December 2021.
|
Penny Wong
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Hong
Kong Legislative Council Elections’, media release, 20 December 2021.
|
[1]. References to
the Australian Government and relevant position holders in this paper are
references to the Morrison Government and relevant position holders during the
46th Parliament (2019–May 2022), unless otherwise stated.
[2]. An article
(updated 30 December 2021) by the Epoch Times reported that these
documents, originally held at the ‘Secret’ level by the then UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and now held by the UK National Archives, are contained in
a record titled Constitutional development of Hong Kong with the
reference number FCO 40/327. However, the UK National Archives’ website
indicates that ‘This
record has not been digitised and cannot be downloaded’.
[3]. Although this
source document has been gazetted
by the Hong Kong Government and provides an official English translation of
the Hong Kong National Security Law originally
in the Chinese language, this English translation has no legislative
effect. Hong Kong’s Secretary for Justice, Teresa Cheng Yeuk-wah, confirmed
on 4 July 2020 [Chinese-language source] that as the law was a nationwide
law enacted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, its
Chinese version prevailed over the English translation – first published around
1 July 2020 by the Xinhua News Agency, China’s official state press
agency, ‘for
reference only’ and later gazetted (with formatting and stylistic changes
to the Xinhua version) on 3 July 2020 by the Hong Kong Government ‘for
information’. There are reportedly
discrepancies between the Chinese version and the English translation.
[4]. The Hong Kong
National Security Law creates 4 new criminal offences punishable by life
imprisonment: secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with a
foreign country or external elements to endanger national security (articles
20–30). In some cases, suspects could be extradited to mainland China (the very
prospect that sparked the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement),
before being handled and tried within the mainland’s civil law system, rather
than Hong Kong’s separate common law system (articles 55–58). The Hong Kong
National Security Law asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over any individual
in any country, including non-citizens of Hong Kong residing outside Hong Kong
(article 38). Further, it establishes the Office for Safeguarding National
Security in Hong Kong that is staffed by officials from mainland China’s
national security agencies and funded by the Chinese Government (articles 48,
51).
[5]. HKSAR v Tong
Ying Kit [2021]
HKCFI 2200, para. 171.
[6]. Marise Payne, Answer
to Question without Notice: Hong Kong, [Questioner: James Paterson],
Senate, Debates, 12 November 2021, 6122.
[7]. Sam Goodman
(Senior Policy Advisor, Hong Kong Watch), Evidence
to Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (Senate FADT
References Committee), Inquiry into Opportunities for Advancing Australia’s Strategic
Interests through Existing Regional Architecture, 19 August 2021, 19.
[8]. Senate Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee (Senate FADT Legislation
Committee), Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 28 October 2021, 44.
[9]. Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons between the Government of
Australia and the Government of Hong Kong, signed 15 November 1993,
[1997] ATS 11 (entered into force for Australia 29 June 1997), later amended by
the Protocol
between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China amending the Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons of 15 November 1993,
signed 19 March 2007, [2008] ATS 6 (entered into force for Australia 7 May 2008).
[10]. Attorney-General’s
Department (AGD), National
Interest Analysis [2020] ATNIA 15 with Attachment on Consultation—Suspension of
the Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons between the
Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong, (Canberra:
AGD, 2020), 1.
[11]. AGD, National
Interest Analysis [2020] ATNIA 15, 2.
[12]. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia),
[1997]
ICJ Rep 7, para. 104.
[13]. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project, para. 104.
[14]. AGD, National
Interest Analysis [2020] ATNIA 15, 2.
[15]. Sue Robertson
(First Assistant Secretary, International Division, AGD), Evidence
to JSCOT, Inquiry into Matters Relating to Two Treaties with Hong Kong, 24
September 2020, 3–4.
[16]. Geoff Bowen
(Acting Assistant Secretary, East Asia Branch, DFAT), Evidence
to JSCOT, Inquiry into Matters Relating to Two Treaties with Hong Kong, 24
September 2020, 4.
[17]. Agreement
between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong concerning
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed 23 September 1996,
[1999] ATS 20 (entered into force for Australia 6 November 1999).
[18]. AGD, National
Interest Analysis [2020] ATNIA 16 with Attachment on Consultation—Suspension
of the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong
Kong concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, (Canberra: AGD, 2020), 2.
[19]. AGD, National
Interest Analysis [2020] ATNIA 16, 2.
[20]. Robertson, Evidence
to JSCOT, 2.
[21]. Karen Moore
(Assistant Secretary, International Cooperation Unit, AGD), Evidence
to JSCOT, Inquiry into Matters Relating to Two Treaties with Hong Kong, 24
September 2020, 4–5.
[22]. See also Explanatory
Statement, Migration Amendment (Hong Kong Passport Holders) Regulations
2020; DoHA, ‘New
visa options for Hong Kong’, media release, 17 July 2020.
[23].
In addition to the extended visa measures, the Australian Government also announced
on 9 July 2020 that it ‘will bolster efforts to attract Hong Kong’s best
and brightest through the Global Talent and Business Innovation and Investment
Programs, both part of the permanent migration program’, and develop ‘new
incentives … to attract export-oriented Hong Kong based businesses to relocate
to Australia’ including ‘economic incentives’ and ‘permanent visa pathways
available for all critical Hong Kong based staff of the relocated business’.
[24]. Eryk Bagshaw, ‘What
is Australia’s Hong Kong Visa Package all About?’, Sydney Morning Herald,
10 July 2020; Stephen Dziedzic, ‘What’s
Behind Australia’s Response to the Chinese Government’s Crackdown on Hong Kong’,
ABC News online, 12 July 2020.
[25]. David Brophy, China
Panic: Australia’s Alternative to Paranoia and Pandering (Collingwood:
Black Inc., 2021), ProQuest Ebook Central, chapter 7.
[26]. Dominic Raab, Hong
Kong National Security Legislation: UK Response, UK, House of Commons, Debates,
2 June 2020, col. 688.
[27]. An article
(dated 9 August 2021) by the Times reported a similar issue in the
UK, stating that ‘[The UK] Government sources have said they are aware of
sleeper agents applying for British National (Overseas) visas under the
pretence of seeking refuge from the totalitarian state’.
[28]. Explanatory
Statement, Migration Legislation Amendment (Hong Kong) Regulations 2021, 2.
[29]. Schedule 1 of
the Migration
Legislation Amendment (Hong Kong) Regulations 2021 retrospectively
implemented this measure.
[30]. Explanatory
Statement, Migration Legislation Amendment (Hong Kong) Regulations 2021, 1.
[31]. See also Explanatory
Statement, Migration Legislation Amendment (Hong Kong) Regulations 2021; DoHA,
‘Visa
Options for Hong Kong - Update’, media release, 1 November 2020; DoHA, Australia:
Migration Pathways for Hong Kong SAR and BNO Passport Holders,
(Canberra: DoHA, updated 2 March 2022).
[32]. See also
Brophy, China Panic.
[33]. Arif Hussein
and Zaki Haidari, ‘As
the Taliban Seize Control, Here’s What Australia Can Do to Help our People’,
Sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 2021.
[34]. For the definition
of a refugee in international law, see Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July
1951, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force for Australia 22 April 1954), article 1.
[35]. An article
(updated 1 March 2021) by SBS Chinese observed, ‘The allocation marked the
first time that [the Subclass 866 onshore protection] visas were granted to
passport holders from [Hong Kong] since at least 2010 …’. SBS Chinese’s
assertion appears inconsistent with the FOI documents cited above, which
indicate that in November 2016 DoHA granted fewer than 5 such visas to
individuals from Hong Kong for the first time since July 2010.
[36]. Senate FADT
References Committee, Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 28 October 2021, 44.
[37]. Embedded links
have been omitted from this quotation and can be accessed in the source
document.
[38]. Chief Executive
Lam did not specify to which ‘Vienna Convention’ she was referring. On 9
February 2021, the Hong Kong Government’s news.gov.hk in a
separate media release retrospectively reported her to have cited ‘the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (VCLT), but the South
China Morning Post reported her to have cited ‘the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations’ (VCCR). In any event, the
VCLT, which regulates treaties between or among states, does not appear to
contain any provisions that regulate the dual nationality issue. Further, while
article 36 of the
VCCR governs the communication and contact between consular officers and
nationals of their country, it does not specifically address the dual
nationality issue or how dual nationality affects the provision of consular
services and protection to dual nationals – see US, Department of State, Foreign Affairs
Manual, para. 7 FAM 086; Australia, Senate FADT References Committee, Helping
Australians Abroad: a Review of the Australian Government’s Consular Services
(Canberra: The Senate, 1997), para. 2.35. However, Australia and China have
signed and ratified the Agreement
on Consular Relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China
to confirm and amplify the VCCR’s provisions and the agreement applies to Hong
Kong, as explored below in this paper.
[39]. This official
English translation of the Chinese legislative instrument ‘is
for reference only and has no legislative effect’.
[40]. ‘Frequently Asked
Questions about Chinese Nationality’, Hong Kong’s Immigration Department.
[41]. DFAT appeared
to be aware of this Chinese nationality law issue as early as 1997. See Senate
FADT References Committee, Helping
Australians Abroad: a Review of the Australian Government’s Consular Services
(Canberra: The Senate, 1997), paras. 2.43–2.44.
[42]. Stand News
is a now-defunct Hong Kong-based online news website. On 29 December 2021, Stand
News ceased
operation and dismissed its employees after the Hong Kong Police Force’s National
Security Department arrested or charged 6 of Stand News current or
former senior staff members for ‘conspiracy
to publish seditious publication’ under Hong Kong’s Crime Ordinance, and executed
a search warrant on its premises under the Hong Kong National Security Law.
[43]. Agreement
on Consular Relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China,
signed 8 September 1999, [2000] ATS 26 (entered into force for Australia 15
September 2000).
[44]. Agreement on
Consular Relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, articles
20–21.
[45]. JSCOT, Fourteen
Treaties Tabled on 12 October 1999, 28, 6 December 1999, 101; DFAT, National
Interest Analysis [1999] ATNIA 25.
[46]. Senate FADT
References Committee, Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 28 October 2021, 44.
[47]. DFAT, ‘Answer
to Question on Notice: Hong Kong’, [Questioner: Rex Patrick], Question 19,
Senate, Debates, 7 February 2022.
[48]. As a ‘political
amateur’ not affiliated with any political parties in Hong Kong, Mr Ng campaigned [Chinese-language
source] that electors should vote during both the pro-democracy primaries held
in July 2020 and the Hong Kong Legislative Council election scheduled for
September 2020, and should vote for the winners of the primaries in the actual
election to maximise the pan-democrats’ chance of winning all 35 electable
seats in the actual election. Mr Ng reportedly transferred
HK$135,000 to Apple Daily for a front-page
advertisement [Chinese-language source] on 3 July 2020 promoting the
primaries.
[49]. For Australia’s
and Five Eyes statements on the arrests at the time, see Marise Payne (Minister
for Foreign Affairs), ‘Hong
Kong Statement’, media release, 6 January 2021; Marise Payne (Minister
for Foreign Affairs) et al., ‘Joint
Statement on Arrests in Hong Kong’, joint media release, 10 January
2021.
[50]. Jerome Taylor
and Su Xinqi, ‘Western
alarm as HK enforces one nationality’, Australian, 5 February 2021.
[51]. Embedded links
and an emoji signifying the flag of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
have been omitted from this quotation and can be accessed or viewed in the
source document.
[52]. The Inter-Parliamentary
Alliance on China is not affiliated with the Australian Government.
[53]. For a
simplified version of this report, see Adelaide - Stand with Hong Kong et al., Preliminary
Recommendations Regarding Immigration Intention of HongKongers (self-pub.,
2021), Google Docs.
[54]. Elizabeth Ward
(Chief Negotiator, Regional Trade Agreements Division, DFAT), Evidence
to JSCOT, Inquiry into Australia-Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement and
Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 9
September 2019, 7.
[55]. Ward, 2.
[56]. Michaela
Browning (Consul-General, Australian Consulate-General, Hong Kong), Evidence
to JSCOT, Inquiry into Australia-Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement and Indonesia-Australia
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 9 September 2019, 5.
[57]. JSCOT, IA-CEPA
and A-HKFTA, 186, 3 October 2019, 90.
[58]. See also Dave
Sharma, ‘Opinion:
Free Trade Gives Wealth for Toil’, Australian, 11 October 2020, 12.
[59]. Australian
Greens, Dissenting report, JSCOT, Inquiry
into Australia-Hong Kong Free Trade Agreement and Indonesia-Australia
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, (Canberra: Parliament of
Australia, 2019), 111. Footnote references have been omitted from this
quotation and can be viewed in the source document.
[60]. Australian
Government, Australian
Government response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties report 186:
Inquiry into the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the
Government of Australia and the Government of Indonesia and the Free Trade
Agreement between Australia and Hong Kong, China and the Investment Agreement
between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, January 2020,
2–3.
[61]. Australian
Government, 6.
[62]. Rachel Siewert,
Speech
on Committees: SFADTRC Report, Senate, Debates, 1 September 2020,
4617.
[63]. Jordon Steele-John,
Speech
on Committees: SFADTRC Report, Senate, Debates, 1 September 2020,
4617–4618.
[64]. Zed Seselja, Speech
on Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Senate,
Debates, 1 September 2020, 4619.
[65]. Don Farrell, Speech
on Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee,
Senate, Debates, 1 September 2020, 4619.
[66]. Senate FADT
Legislation Committee, Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 29 October 2020, 37.
[67]. Senate FADT
Legislation Committee, Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 29 October 2020, 37–38.
[68]. Senate FADT
Legislation Committee, Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 29 October 2020, 38.
[69]. Senate FADT
Legislation Committee, Estimates, Official
Committee Hansard, 29 October 2020, 38. See also DFAT, ‘Answer
to Question on Notice: Australia-Hong Kong FTA’, [Questioner: Rex Patrick],
Question 112, Senate, Debates, 25 January 2021.
[70]. Ted Hui
(private capacity), Evidence
to Senate FADT References Committee, Inquiry into Opportunities for Advancing
Australia’s Strategic Interests through Existing Regional Architecture, 19
August 2021, 22.
[71]. For further
discussion of the Australian Magnitsky-style sanctions regime, see Leah Ferris,
‘Changes
to Australia’s Sanctions Laws: Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Thematic Sanctions)
Bill 2021’, FlagPost (blog), Parliamentary Library, 30
November 2021; Geoff Wade, ‘Australia
and Magnitsky Legislation’, FlagPost (blog), Parliamentary
Library, 20 August 2021.
[72]. JSCFADT, Criminality,
Corruption and Impunity: Should Australia join the Global Magnitsky Movement?,
7 December 2020, 98.
[73]. Autonomous
Sanctions Act 2011, subsection 3(3).
[74]. JSCFADT, 6.
[75]. Tim Watts, Second
Reading Speech: Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other
Thematic Sanctions) Bill 2021, House of Representatives, Debates, 2
December 2021, 11365.
[76]. Stephen
Sherlock, Hong
Kong and the Transfer to China: Issues and Prospects, Current Issues
Brief, 33, 1996–97, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 1997), 14, 19.
[77]. ‘Editorial:
Hong Kong Stance Mixes Compassion and Self-Interest’, Sydney Morning
Herald, 10 July 2020.
[78]. Zheng Wang, ‘The
Chinese Dream: Concept and Context’, Journal of Chinese Political
Science 19, no. 1 (March 2014): 1–13.
[79]. It appears that the
CCP was comfortable with having this view publicised, as Huanqiu (the Chinese-language
version of the Global Times) translated Mark Tischler’s article in full into
Chinese on
20 August 2020.
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