To achieve these Priority Industry Capabilities, closer
relations between DSTO and industry were required so that the technologically
advanced military force envisaged in the white paper could be developed and
maintained. Additionally, emphasising softening of the language on
self-reliance, the Government would ‘seek to make greater use of off-the-shelf
purchases, especially where the additional capability from Australian-specific
modifications does not justify the increased cost and risk’.[294]
The paper acknowledged that some industrial consolidation
had occurred but not to the levels experienced in the United States and Europe—the
Australian experience saw larger companies absorbing smaller businesses rather
than mergers between larger companies.[296]
The 2000 Defence White Paper promised to provide better
guidance to industry on defence capability proposals through the release of the
Defence Capability Plan (DCP). The DCP would include details about the Government’s
proposed naval shipbuilding program, aviation systems and communications and
information systems over a ten-year period.[297]
As part of the acquisition reform program, and to further
improve Department of Defence’s relationship with industry, the Government
announced a key reform which established the Defence Materiel Organisation
(DMO) by consolidating the Defence Acquisition Organisation with Support
Command Australia.[298]
In addition, the Department of Defence established a unit to promote and
monitor its relationship with industry and annually report progress to the
Defence and Industry Advisory Council (DIAC).[299]
-
obtain earlier information and guidance on Defence’s long-term
capability plans
-
identify the skills, technology and infrastructure development
requirements needed to support defence capability
-
identify opportunities for involvement in defence capability
delivery and support
-
better understand Defence’s capability requirements and
-
provide meaningful contributions to Defence’s capability
definition processes.[302]
The public version of the 2001 DCP was released in June 2001
and contained 88 capability proposals, including 165 phases, with an estimated
expenditure worth $47 billion (in December 2000 prices) over the period of the
DCP.[303]
The Howard Government updated the DCP in 2004 and again in 2006, both with ten-year
outlooks.[304]
The 2000 Defence White Paper considered Australia’s defence
capabilities under five groupings—Land Forces, Air Combat, Maritime Forces,
Strike, and Information Capability.[305]
It was, however, reportedly constrained in its approach because, as Hugh White later
recalled, Prime Minister Howard ‘himself directed that all capabilities then in
the ADF were to be preserved and upgraded, without considering whether the
resulting force would be cost effective’.[306]
To ensure the ADF would have the required equipment, the
2001 DCP set out more than two dozen capability enhancements with an estimated
$13.7 billion in capital expenditure over the decade through to 2010–11.[307]
The Land Forces element of the ADF would now be structured
to ‘meet a wider range of possible contingencies, both on Australian territory and
beyond’.[308]
The latter were, however, expected to be ‘contributions to lower intensity
operations’.[309]
The development of heavy armoured forces was specifically rejected as they ‘would
be expensive, and are most unlikely to be needed in the defence of Australia or
in our immediate region’.[310]
As stated earlier in the section on strategic objectives,
for the Army to sustain simultaneous operations, with, for instance, a brigade
on deployment for extended periods and at least one battalion group deployed
elsewhere, the Regular Reserve forces would be required to shift their focus
away from only providing partially trained personnel to the Army. Instead, the
clear priority for Army Reserve units ‘will be to provide fully-trained
personnel to our ready frontline forces deployed on operations’.[311] This strategy
would also require the overall full-time ADF strength of 51,500 (year 2000
figures) to be increased to ‘about 54,000 full time personnel by 2010’.[312]
The Army’s strengthened posture would be bolstered by:
-
around 20–24 new Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, entering
service from 2004–05
-
an additional squadron of troop lift helicopters (12 to enter
service from 2007) capable of operating from the RAN’s two troop ships, HMA Ships
Manoora and Kanimbla
-
upgrading 350 of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier fleet (from
2005)
-
better personal equipment and weapons (from 2003)
-
air defence weapons to supplement the RBS-70 system (from 2005)
and replacement of the Rapier system (from 2009)
-
20 new mortar systems on light armoured vehicles (from 2006)
-
new surveillance systems from 2003 and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
from 2007 and
-
maintaining and investing in existing capabilities, such as field
artillery.[313]
The initiatives detailed in the 2000 Defence White Paper
constituted ‘the most significant enhancements to Army’s combat power in many
years’.[314]
The air combat element proposed that four new Airborne Early
Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft and up to five air-to-air refuelling
aircraft (with ‘substantial’ air cargo capacity) would be in service by about
2006 with the possibility of the purchase of a further three ‘AEW&C later
in the decade’.[315]
To forestall the F/A-18A/B Hornets from becoming outclassed
over the coming decade, the 2000 Defence White Paper supported a continuation
and expansion of the upgrade program to include (by 2007) advanced tactical
data links, a helmet-mounted missile cueing system and structural upgrades.[316] In addition,
it envisaged the acquisition of up to 100 new combat aircraft to replace both
the F/A-18 and F-111 fighter aircraft, with the first aircraft expected to
enter service in 2012.[317]
The maritime forces element proposals included:
-
upgrading the ANZAC Class frigates to provide anti-ship missile
defences and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, to commence in 2001 and be completed
by 2007[318]
-
a project beginning in 2005–06 for three new air-defence capable
ships to replace the Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs), which were due to be
decommissioned from 2013 (the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer program was
initially approved in May 2005 [first pass approval] but was placed on the
Projects of Concern list in June 2014 due to program delays and cost increases)[319]
-
replacement of the support ships HMAS Westralia in 2009
and HMAS Success in 2015
-
mid-life upgrade of the Seahawk helicopters, beginning in 2003
-
improved capability of the Collins Class submarines including new
combat system to be installed from
2005–06, new and more capable torpedoes (commencing 2002–03, completion 2006),
and a program of ongoing upgrades and
-
from 2001, planning for the replacement of 15 Fremantle Class
Patrol Boats to enter service from 2004–05.[320]
(The first of the replacement Armidale Class Patrol Boats were commissioned
into service in July 2006).[321]
The strike capabilities mentioned in the 2000 Defence White
Paper were expected to provide the ADF with options to contribute to regional
coalitions at acceptable levels of risk to crew and aircraft, even if ‘against
more capable adversaries’.[322]
The 2001 DCP envisaged Defence’s key strike platform, the F-111 fighter
aircraft, remaining in service until ‘between 2015 and 2020’, but considered it
unlikely that any suitable and comparable strike aircraft would be available at
that time.[323]
The RAAF’s F-111 aircraft was retired in December 2010 after 37 years of
service.[324]
In practical terms, the 2000 Defence White Paper identified
more than two dozen capability enhancements, which were expected to cost $13.7
billion in capital expenditure over ten years within a total defence
expenditure of $141 billion for that period (see Table 1 below).[325] Over the same
period, personnel and operating costs associated with these enhanced
capabilities were expected to reach $2.3 billion. This would result in a total
of $16 billion over the decade specifically related to capability enhancement.
A further $12.5 billion would be required each year for ‘maintenance of
current capabilities’.[326]
The 2000 Defence White Paper took into account through-life
costing estimates for the components of capability.
Table 1: Total expected costs for decade 2001–02 to
2010–11
|
|
Capability
|
Total for decade
(year
2000 $ billion)
|
|
Expenditure item
|
Land forces
|
Air combat
|
Maritime forces
|
Strike
|
Information
capability
|
|
Maintenance of current capabilities
|
59.0
|
13.0
|
35.0
|
5.0
|
13.0
|
125.0
|
|
Capital expenditure required for capability enhancements
|
3.9.
|
5.3
|
1.8
|
0.8
|
1.9
|
13.7
|
|
Additional personnel & operating costs due to enhanced
capability
|
1.1
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
0.0
|
0.6
|
2.3
|
|
TOTAL ($ billion)
|
64.0
|
18.6
|
37.1
|
5.8
|
15.5
|
141.0
|
Source: Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future
Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, December 2000, pp. 84‑97.
Looking ahead to 2010–11, the Government estimated:
...defence spending will need to
grow by an average of about three per cent per annum in real terms over the
next decade. (Real spending is measured by reference to the GDP deflator.) The
Government is committed to meeting this funding requirement, and it has
directed Defence to plan within that budget. The Government intends that
funding for 2001–02 and 2002–03 will increase by $500 million and $1,000
million respectively, to provide substantial initial funding for a number of
key initiatives.[327]
According to the 2000 Defence White Paper, ‘defence spending
in cash terms will stand at approximately $16 billion per year in today’s
dollars’ by the end of the decade, compared to $12.2 billion for the year 2000.[328] However,
by the time the 2000 Defence White Paper was released, this figure was out of
date. Defence revenue from the Government for the year 1999–2000 was $15
billion; however, part of that increase was due to the commitment of the ADF in
Timor Leste, which required additional funding.[329]
In contrast to previous defence white papers, the 2000
Defence White Paper set out and linked strategic priorities to the subsequent
capability requirements, and then attached them to a long-term program to fund
the necessary acquisitions and enhancements. In addition, the Government retained
flexibility to vary the list of projected enhancements, promising ‘any
alternative, more cost-effective means of achieving the desired capability
result will be considered before final government approval for specific
projects’.[330]
Nevertheless, the content of the 2000 Defence White Paper
raised questions about the Government’s funding model, the relevance of
specific capabilities to achieving strategic objectives, the adequacy of
certain capabilities and the level of confidence in whether some capabilities
could actually be delivered. As the Secretary of the Department of Defence,
Alan Hawke, pointed out, the 2001 DCP represented a mindset change from ‘one
where proponents say “this is what we want—give us the money”; to one where we
say “this is the money available for this capability, how do we get the best
possible result within the funding envelope”‘.[331]
These funding arrangements were, however, quickly challenged
as potentially inadequate.[332]
The Government had committed to increasing spending by three per cent per year
in real terms, as measured by reference to the Non-Farm GDP Implicit Price
Deflator.[333]
This replaced the former ‘defence deflator’, a series of adjustments which
reflected compensation for price and exchange fluctuations and different
inflation measures that applied to individual components of the Defence budget
producing, in general terms, a consolidated price indexation.[334] The latter approach
recognised that not all costs would increase at the same rate, or necessarily
in parallel with GDP. In general, military costs increased faster than the rate
of inflation. For example, the cost of maintaining ageing aircraft was rising
by seven per cent per year during the 2000 Defence White Paper’s ten-year
timeframe, well ahead of the Government’s GDP growth prediction of
approximately three per cent. [335]
If the price of overseas-sourced assets rose faster than Australia’s GDP, or
the exchange rate moved against the Australian dollar, then the GDP deflator
would offer less protection to the defence budget than had the former defence
deflator.[336]
Amphibious lift capability was to be maintained ‘at its
present level of three major ships’.[337]
This undertaking glossed over the fact that, at the time of the INTERFET
deployment to Timor Leste, the existing three ship sealift capability proved to
be inadequate. There was, according to David Stevens of the Sea Power Centre:
[a] most significant shortfall... in heavy sealift, due in
part to delays in modernising two Newport class amphibious transports purchased
from the US Navy in 1994 [HMA Ships Kanimbla and Manoora]. This
left available only the heavy lift ship HMAS Tobruk, which was itself
long overdue for an extended maintenance period. [338]
In this case there was a notional capability, but inadequate
capacity in practice. The inoperability of two-thirds of the major transports
was remedied by chartering a civilian fast wave-piercing catamaran.[339] For future ‘substantial’
contingencies, again according to David Stevens, ‘additional sealift capacity would
still be needed and must either come from other Coalition partners or involve
further short-notice commercial charters’.[340]
Increasing the ADF personnel strength from 51,500 to 54,000
over the decade was acknowledged as a ‘challenge’ in the 2000 Defence White
Paper, particularly in light of a 25 per cent shortfall in recruiting.[341] In
addition, as military historian Peter Charlton pointed out:
... at the height of the Vietnam conflict... Australia
maintained in Phuoc Tuy province a task force of three battalions—slightly more than a [deployable] brigade as
envisaged in this White Paper. This was achieved by conscription, and by having
nine battalions on the order of battle. This White Paper plans for six
battalion groups.[342]
Despite these issues, Paul Dibb characterised it as ‘arguably
the best Defence White Paper Australia has produced’.[343]
According to the ASPI defence budget brief in 2009–10, the
commitment to increase defence spending by three per cent per annum over a
decade was ‘more than achieved’.[344]
Included in this apparent overall growth, however, was the supplementation
provided for ADF deployments and for unscheduled acquisitions, such as the C-17
Globemaster aircraft, but according to ASPI ‘it is difficult to give a
definitive figure for the value of additional funds provided post-2000’.[345]
Despite maintaining funding commitments, by the eve of the
next white paper in 2009, the delivery of new or upgraded equipment that had
been envisaged in the 2000 Defence White Paper was ‘slower than anticipated’.[346] This
was due to shifts in strategic priorities (such as the purchase of the Abrams
main battle tank, an acquisition not envisaged by the 2000 Defence White Paper
or the 2001 DCP), the refining of projects that then required re-approval by
the Government, a lack of personnel, etc.[347]
The following table summarises the fate of some of the major capabilities which
were expected by 2009–10.
Table 2: 2000 Defence White Paper—major capability
delivery delays
|
Project
|
Planned delivery date
|
|
|
Original
|
Expected (at May 2009)
|
|
Armed reconnaissance helicopters
|
2004–05
|
2010
|
|
Multi-role helicopters
|
2007
|
2010
|
|
Air defence command and control
|
2003
|
2009–10
|
|
Air refuelling capability
|
2006
|
2010
|
|
Global Hawk—unmanned reconnaissance
|
2007
|
post-2015
|
|
Artillery replacement
|
2008 to 2010
|
2011–13
|
|
New heavyweight torpedo
|
2006
|
unknown
|
Source: M Thomson, The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence
Budget Brief 2009–2010, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra,
2009, p. 93.
[241].
Australian Government, Defence
2000: our future defence force (2000 Defence White Paper), White
paper, December 2000, accessed 13 January 2015, p. vii; J Howard, ‘Ministerial
statements: Defence 2000—our future defence force‘, House of
Representatives, Debates, 6 December 2000, accessed 13 January
2015.
[242].
The Defence Capability Plan (DCP) replaced previous iterations of the
Defence New Capital Equipment Proposals (the Pink Book) which traditionally
spanned five-year periods—2000 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. v and p. 77;
Australian Government, Defence
capability plan 2001–2010 (Public version), Department of
Defence, Canberra, 2001, accessed 13 January 2015.
[243].
K Beazley, ‘Ministerial statements: Defence 2000: our future defence force’,
op. cit., a similar statement was made by S Martin (Shadow Minister for
Defence), Defence
white paper 2000—new policy for new times?, Australian Defence Studies
Centre Forum, Canberra, speech, 12 December 2000, accessed 13 January
2015.
[244].
Australian Government, Future directions
for the management of Australia’s Defence: report of the defence efficiency review,
Department of Defence, Canberra, March 1997, accessed 13 January 2015.
[245].
Ibid., p. i.
[246].
Ibid., p. 6.
[247].
Ibid.
[248].
Ibid., Annex C.
[249].
I McLachlan (Minister for Defence), Defence
reform program, media release, 11 April 1997, accessed 13 January 2015.
[250].
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence annual report 1996–1997,
Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997, p. 12.
[251].
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence annual
report 1999–2000, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000, p. 6, accessed
13 January 2015.
[252].
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence annual
report 2000–2001, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2001, p. 3, accessed 13 January 2015.
[253].
Commonwealth of Australia, Future directions for the management of
Australia’s defence, op. cit., Annex E-1.
[254].
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s
strategic policy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997, accessed 13
January 2015; I McLachlan, ‘Ministerial
statements: Australia’s strategic policy‘, House of Representatives, Debates
, 2 December 1997, accessed 13 January 2015.
[255].
P La Franchi, ‘Strategic review under way’, Australian Defence News,
9(48), 2 December 1996.
[256].
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s strategic policy, op. cit.,
p. 3; A Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and T Fischer (Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Trade), Foreign
and trade policy white paper, media release, 28 August 1997, accessed
13 January 2015.
[257].
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s strategic policy (1997), op.
cit., pp. 9–10.
[258].
Ibid., p. 29.
[259].
Ibid., p. 36.
[260].
Ibid., p. 51.
[261].
Ibid., p. 38.
[262].
Ibid., p. 51.
[263].
Department of Defence, Defence
review 2000 – our future defence force: a public discussion paper,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, June 2000, p. v, accessed 13 January 2015.
[264].
Ibid., p. 1.
[265].
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s strategic policy (1997), op.
cit., p. 22.
[266].
Australian War Memorial, Australians and
peacekeeping, website, accessed 13 January 2015.
[267].
C Fernandes, ‘The
road to INTERFET: bringing the politics back in‘, Security Challenges,
4(3), September 2008, pp. 95–96, accessed 13 January 2015; ANAO, Management
of Australian Defence Force deployments to East Timor: Department of Defence, op. cit., pp. 12–13 and 16,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[268].
D Stevens, ‘Strength
through diversity: the combined naval role in Operation Stabilise‘, Sea
Power Centre—Australia, Working paper, 20, 2007, p. 3, accessed 13 January
2015.
[269].
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence annual report 1999–2000, op.
cit., p. 8.
[270].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 2.
[271].
J Moore (Minister for Defence), Community
consultation team report released, media release, 9 November 2000,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[272].
Ibid.
[273].
Community Consultation Team, Australian
perspectives on defence: report of the community consultation team,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, September 2000, accessed 13 January 2015.
[274].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. xi.
[275].
Ibid., p. xi.
[276].
Ibid., pp. 35–36.
[277].
Ibid., p. x.
[278].
Ibid.—’Direct approaches’ includes land and sea approaches (pp. xi and 30)
and, by reference to ‘hostile lodgement in our approaches’ (p. 47), also
implies inclusion of land in the maritime approaches. There is also reference
to ‘extended’ air and sea approaches in the context of submarine deployment
(pp. xiv, 88 and 95), air cover for the Christmas and Cocos (Keeling) Islands
(pp. 84–85), and surveillance (p. 95).
[279].
Ibid.—’Immediate neighbourhood’ includes Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New
Guinea, the island states of the Southwest Pacific and New Zealand, pp. ix, xi
and 20.
[280].
Ibid.—’South East Asia’ includes Singapore and Malaysia (through the Five
Power Defence Agreements between Australia and those two countries and the
United Kingdom and New Zealand) and at least the Philippines, Thailand,
Vietnam, Cambodia and Brunei, (pp. 17–18 and 40–41).
[281].
Ibid.—’Wider Asia-Pacific region’ includes at least the USA through ANZUS
(p. 34), Japan (p. 37), China, Russia, India, South Korea (p. 38), and Thailand
and the Philippines (p. 35), with the area also affected by the nature of the
relationships between China, Japan, India, Russia and the United States (pp. ix
and 17–19). Note that other definitions of the Asia-Pacific generally include
the entire Pacific rim, South East and East Asia, and sometimes South Asia.
[282].
R Lyon, ‘Assessing
the defence update 2007‘, Policy Analysis, Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, Canberra, 10 September 2007, p. 2 and p. x, accessed 13
January 2015.
[283].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 32.
[284].
Ibid., p. 80.
[285].
Ibid.
[286].
Ibid., pp. viii, 12–13.
[287].
Ibid., p. 12.
[288].
D Williams (Attorney-General), E-Security
initiative: protecting the national information infrastructure, media
release, 22 May 2001, accessed 13 January 2015.
[289].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 98–106; Commonwealth of Australia,
Defence
and industry: strategic policy statement, Department of Defence, June
1998, p. iii [available from Library
Catalogue].
[290].
2000 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 99.
[291].
Ibid., p. 99.
[292].
Ibid., p. 99.
[293].
Ibid., pp. 99–100.
[294].
Ibid., p. 100.
[295].
Ibid., p. 101.
[296].
Ibid., p. 102.
[297].
Ibid., pp. 103–104.
[298].
Ibid., p. 105.
[299].
Ibid., p. 106.
[300].
Department of Defence, Defence New Major Capital Equipment Proposals
1995-1999 (The Pink Book), Defence, Canberra, 1995.
[301].
Department of Defence, Defence capability plan 2001–2010, op. cit.
[302].
Ibid., p. i.
[303].
Ibid., p. iv; P Reith (Minister for Defence), Historic
defence capability plan 2001–2010, media release, 26 June 2001,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[304].
Department of Defence, Defence
capability plan 2004–2014, Canberra, 2004; Department of Defence, Defence
capability plan 2006–2016, Canberra, 2006, accessed 13 January 2015.
[305].
Defence capability plan 2006-2016, op. cit. p. iv.
[306].
H White, ‘The new defence white paper: why we need it, and what it needs
to do’, op. cit.
[307].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 77–97.
[308].
Ibid., p. 79.
[309].
Ibid., p. 52.
[310].
Ibid., p. 79.
[311].
Ibid., p. 82.
[312].
Ibid., p. xii.
[313].
Ibid., pp. 82–83.
[314].
Ibid., p. 83.
[315].
Ibid., pp. 86–87.
[316].
Ibid., p. 86.
[317].
Ibid., p. 87.
[318].
Ibid., p. 89.
[319].
D Watt, Air
warfare destroyer program, Research paper series, 2014–15,
Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 10 November 2014, accessed 13 January
2015.
[320].
Ibid., pp. 89–91.
[321].
RAN, ‘Patrol
boats‘, op. cit.
[322].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 92.
[323].
Department of Defence, Defence capability plan 2001–2010, op. cit.,
pp. 37–38; ibid., p. 93.
[324].
J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Retired
‘pigs’ get a new home, media release, 4 October 2012, accessed 13
January 2015.
[325].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 77–97.
[326].
Ibid., pp. 84–97.
[327].
Ibid., p. 117.
[328].
Ibid.
[329].
Australian Government, Portfolio additional estimates statements
1999–2000: Defence Portfolio, p. 6.
[330].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 57.
[331].
A Hawke (Secretary, Department of Defence), One
year on, Defence Watch Seminar, National Press Club, speech, Canberra,
27 February 2001, accessed 13 January 2015.
[332].
S Martin (Shadow Minister for Defence), Defence
white paper 2000: new policy for new times, Australian Defence Studies
Centre Forum, speech, Canberra, 12 December 2000, accessed 13 January 2015.
[333].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 117.
[334].
The shift to the Non-Farm GDP Implicit Price Deflator in 2000 is described
in: Australian Government, Defending
Australia in the Asia Pacific century: force 2030 (2009 Defence
White Paper), White paper, May 2009, p. 137, accessed 13 January 2015; Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Funding
Australia’s defence, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, May 1998 p. 11,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[335].
P Barratt, ‘Farewell
to arms unless more is spent‘, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December
2000, accessed 13 January 2015; 2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 118.
[336].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 118.
[337].
2000 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 84.
[338].
D Stevens, ‘Strength through diversity: the combined naval role in
Operation Stabilise’, op. cit.
[339].
Ibid., p. 10.
[340].
Ibid.
[341].
2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 62.
[342].
P Charlton, ‘Shot
in the arm‘, The Courier Mail, 7 December 2000, accessed 13 January
2015.
[343].
P Dibb,’Defence
paper is evolutionary‘, Australian Financial Review, 7 December
2000, accessed 13 January 2015.
[344].
M Thomson, The cost of defence:
ASPI defence budget brief 2009–2010, Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, Canberra, 2009, p. 21, accessed 13 January 2015.
[345].
Ibid., pp. 98 and 145–146.
[346].
Ibid., pp. 92–93.
[347].
Ibid.
For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.
© Commonwealth of Australia
Creative Commons
With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, and to the extent that copyright subsists in a third party, this publication, its logo and front page design are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia licence.
In essence, you are free to copy and communicate this work in its current form for all non-commercial purposes, as long as you attribute the work to the author and abide by the other licence terms. The work cannot be adapted or modified in any way. Content from this publication should be attributed in the following way: Author(s), Title of publication, Series Name and No, Publisher, Date.
To the extent that copyright subsists in third party quotes it remains with the original owner and permission may be required to reuse the material.
Inquiries regarding the licence and any use of the publication are welcome to webmanager@aph.gov.au.
This work has been prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament using information available at the time of production. The views expressed do not reflect an official position of the Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion.
Any concerns or complaints should be directed to the Parliamentary Librarian. Parliamentary Library staff are available to discuss the contents of publications with Senators and Members and their staff. To access this service, clients may contact the author or the Library‘s Central Entry Point for referral.