Chapter 7Better regulation of the supermarket industry

7.1This report's first chapter briefly outlined the regulatory framework which supermarkets operate under. However, as the evidence to the committee has shown, and as detailed throughout this report, it is clear that the regulatory framework is not fit for purpose and does not properly promote and support a competitive supermarket sector, offering affordable food and groceries.

7.2This chapter examines in further detail the existing regulatory frameworks, while highlighting the concerns and issues raised during this inquiry about concerns and need for reform. The committee also heard that current regulations were being flouted with limited or no consequences, and as a result, the monitoring and enforcement regime over supermarket business practices needs strengthening.

Existing regulatory regime

7.3Oversight of the supermarket sector in Australia is mostly administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), which administers and enforces the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CompetitionAct) that 'provides a number of protections to both consumers and suppliers through the promotion of competition and fair trading'.[1]

7.4Box 7.1 below provides more detail on the current legislative provision relating to market power, unconscionable conduct, and price surveillance.

Calls for greater regulation

7.5Many inquiry participants, from all sectors, called for greater government intervention in the supermarket sector—particularly with regard to strengthened regulation, monitoring and enforcement.

7.6In addition to detailed recommendations from experts citing economic reasons for intervention, many organisations told the committee of the need for government action simply on the basis of the positive impact this would have on the lives of so many individual Australians.

7.7For instance, COTA Australia advised that in its January 2024 survey, 'respondents had a close to unanimous agreement that the Australian Government has a responsibility to intervene to':

a) protect consumers from unfair pricing practices

b) ensure all households can afford necessities – for example, food and hygiene products

c) create environments that enable robust and fair competition rather than those that breed monopolistic behaviour

d) ensure transparency re how prices are derived inclusive of costings pertinent to all major milestones in the journey.[5]

7.8COTA Australia further noted there is an 'increasing mistrust in regulatory institutions being able to enforce relevant legislation and/or champion consumer rights by taking appropriate action when they are, or at risk of, being compromised'.[6]

7.9The National Farmers' Federation (NFF) was of the view that 'Australia's existing competition policy frameworks are not fit-for purpose to prevent the abuse of market power that occurs in Australia's agricultural supply chain', primarily due to:

consumer-centric focus on market power provisions, providing minimal protections to supply chain abuses

equal consumer centric focus of fair-trading provisions

unconscionable conduct provisions are so narrowly defined to render them of little use for small to medium businesses, such as farmers.[7]

7.10The NFF stressed that it was seeking 'a competition policy environment that allows businesses of any shape and form to compete, find their niche and find their ability to win or lose in negotiations from their own merit', to ensure the supply chain is 'resilient, dynamic and diversified', which in turn will 'ensure proper outcomes from the farm gate to the consumer'.[8]

7.11The NFF also made a range of recommendations for greater regulation including:

… making the food and grocery code mandatory, attaching significant civil penalties to that, ensuring a truly independent arbiter through that code and a lot of what the government is looking at at the moment such as advancing those efforts to increase market price transparency through grants to different organisations, clearer price reporting, addressing any information asymmetries and those types of measures ...[9]

7.12The Public Health Association of Australia likewise recommended enhanced regulatory frameworks that were mandatory and government-led and ensured equitable access to healthy and affordable foods.[10]

7.13The ACCC has itself called for strengthening of the regulation of supermarkets in a number of areas, which are outlined throughout this chapter.[11]

Unfair trading practices

7.14Evidence provided to the committee—and detailed in this report—showed that supermarkets are engaging in forms of unfair trading practices in their dealings with suppliers—with direct impacts on the price of food and groceries for consumers. There is clearly a need for action in this area.

7.15The ACCC outlined some of the unfair trading practices it has identified across many sectors in the economy that are not currently addressed in competition law. Thisincludes conduct that can be:

harmful but does not reach the legal threshold for unconscionable conduct;

not misleading or deceptive, but distorts consumer choice by creating confusion or hiding or omitting relevant information; or

is not captured by the unfair contract term provisions because the conduct is not undertaken pursuant to a written term of a contract or is otherwise outside the scope of a contract.[12]

7.16Per Capita argued that although competition law prohibits 'misleading, deceptive, and unconscionable conduct', there remains 'systematic unfair business practices that target vulnerable consumers, which are not caught by these prohibitions'. Per Capita noted that the High Court has consistently interpreted unconscionable conduct in a conservative fashion, which 'imposes a high threshold before conduct can be considered unconscionable, so that conduct that is simply unfair or unjust is not captured'.[13]

7.17Per Capita recommended the introduction of a prohibition on unfair trading which would:

… aid in empowering consumers to address the sorts of unfair business practises that we have witnessed over recent years, which have helped to deliver massive profits for big companies and made it more difficult for small businesses to enter the market during a cost-of-living crisis.[14]

7.18CHOICE shared a similar view, submitting that supermarkets use a number of pricing and other deceptive tools 'that could result in consumers spending more than they intended or making purchasing decisions they otherwise wouldn't'. CHOICE recognised that many of these practices may not be illegal and recommended 'a strong ban on unfair trading practices' to 'cultivate a healthier marketplace, ensure more equitable economic transactions and benefit vulnerable individuals and small businesses who may be unable to protect their own interests'. CHOICE recommended this ban should:

be drawn broadly, and be able to respond to conduct and practices that exist today and that could develop over time;

be accompanied by a guiding principle that requires the consideration of consumer vulnerability and should include a blacklist prohibiting certain practices that should be specified and managed by the ACCC; and

should be economy-wide and include penalties and remedies, including civil penalties and actions for damages and compensation, for each breach of the prohibition.[15]

7.19Ms Rosie Thomas, Director of Campaigns and Communications at CHOICE, pointed out that prohibitions on unfair trading are 'a protection that exists in many international jurisdictions, and it's time for the Australian consumer law to catch up'.[16]

7.20The ACCC has offered its support for the introduction of an economy-wide prohibition on unfair trading practices and 'considers this will set an improved standard for business behaviour and promote better conduct across all markets, including the financial services sector'. The ACCC also stated such a prohibition 'would empower the ACCC to address unfair practices in the supermarket sector and across the economy which are not currently captured by existing laws'. However, the ACCC stressed that this reform would not be a 'complete solution to address all of the harms to consumers and small businesses identified in this Inquiry'.[17]

7.21The Australian Government recently consulted on options to address unfair trading practices, as outlined in Chapter 2, with a decision on potential reforms likely in 2024. As part of the consultation, one of the options being considered is the introduction of a combination of general and specific prohibitions on unfair trading practices, for the most targeted and comprehensive approach.[18]

Price gouging

7.22The issue of price gouging was raised consistently with the committee. The term price gouging refers to 'sudden increases in prices that people think are too high and without justification'.[19]

7.23The Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of NSW (CPSA) noted that anti-price gouging laws are used in other countries, but there is nothing to prohibit or outlaw such behaviours in Australia.[20]

7.24A submitter with significant experience as a grocery supplier informed the committee that throughout the COVID pandemic, it was widely understood that 'Woolworths tasked its commercial buying teams with recovering an additional 200 basis points of 5th margin from any CPI [consumer price index] negotiations'. The submitter went on to say:

There is evidence, through CPI negotiations, of retailers engaging in 'margin grabbing' by raising recommended retail prices (RRP) beyond the CPI requirements from suppliers.[21]

7.25An anonymous submitter, who had previously worked in the Coles head office, presented evidence to the committee about Coles, saying that during 2022 there was an 'unprecedented amount of cost increase requests from suppliers'. Thiswould be negotiated between the parties, until an agreement was reached on the final cost increase. The former employee explained that:

Coles then decides how much of that cost increase to pass on to consumers – in my experience this was always 100%. In addition, they would increase the price by more than 100% to ensure they were holding gross margin % [ensuring that the gross margin % does not change even though the absolute gross profit $ may change].[22]

7.26Mr Abdel Badoura similarly submitted evidence of a grocery item where the margin expectation went from 39.5 per cent to 45 per cent in the span of just sixmonths, and further submitted that margin expectations are increased year on year to enhance profits.[23]

7.27Price gouging was the focus of the February 2024 Professor Allan Fels AO report, Inquiry into price gouging and unfair pricing practices (Fels Inquiry). Thatreport concluded:

The often-weak state of competition in many sectors of the Australian economy provides a platform which enables many businesses to charge higher prices to consumers than they would if there were effective competition. Businesses seek to capture as many consumer dollars (or 'consumer surplus') as they can whether by charging high prices uniformly to all consumers or by charging different consumers different prices according to their willingness to pay – that is price discrimination.[24]

7.28The Fels Inquiry made two recommendations to address price gouging. The first was to reinstate past provisions that allowed for the naming of businesses and industries that overcharge.[25] The second recommendation was to amend the Competition Act to 'make it an offence to charge excessive prices in terms similar to the European Union provisions'.[26]

Unit pricing

7.29Chapter 3 outlined how unit pricing helps consumers to compare prices and find the best value for money by showing the cost of a product using standard units of measurement.[27]

7.30Unit pricing is enforced by the ACCC via the Unit Pricing Code (UPC), which is a mandatory industry code that outlines the rules regarding where, how, and for what products unit prices are displayed.[28]

7.31CHOICE noted that unit pricing 'is an objective tool that empowers people to make well-informed decisions and ensures they are getting value for money on their purchases' but that supermarkets 'are making it increasingly difficult for consumers to see, read and understand unit pricing both instore and online'.[29] CHOICE further noted that '80% of shoppers who are aware of unit pricing, use it regularly and yet, when in store, an alarming 71% say that they have encountered issues with the unit pricing provided', including the unit price was not always displayed, it was difficult to read for reasons such as the text being too small, or it was obstructed or covered up by another label.[30]

7.32The Queensland Consumers Association argued that the current situation with unit pricing:

… greatly reduces the ability of consumers to easily compare the unit prices and the relative value of grocery products and thus the ability to save significant amounts of money or to get much more for the same expenditure. It is a major issue for Australian consumers and the economy.[31]

7.33The Queensland Consumers Association suggested that an independent, comprehensive review of the unit pricing system was needed, to ensure it was effective and to determine whether any changes were needed to the UPC and to national measurement legislation.[32]

7.34CHOICE recommended the ACCC should be given further resourcing to prioritise the monitoring and enforcement of retailer compliance with the UPC, as supermarkets currently in breach of the code are not being penalised, andthat the Government prescribe a specific mandatory labelling standard for unit pricing.[33]

7.35The ACCC noted that the UPC was reviewed in 2019 by the Government with no substantive changes made. The ACCC noted that while it receives few complaints about the UPC, it recommended the inclusion of 'more prescriptive requirements to improve the legibility and prominence of unit prices in the next review' which could be 'pro-consumer by improving consumers' access to unit pricing'.[34]

Food and grocery code of conduct

7.36As outlined in Chapter 1, the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct (Grocery Code) is a voluntary agreement that is central to the ACCC enforcing standards of business behaviour in the food and grocery sector, particularly between supermarkets and their suppliers.

7.37The Grocery Code will automatically sunset on 1 April 2025 and is currently under review by The Treasury, with Dr Craig Emerson appointed as the independent reviewer (Grocery Code Review). As outlined in Chapter 2, the interim report of that review made a number of recommendations, including:

the code being made mandatory with all supermarkets with a revenue threshold of $5 billion subject to the code;

the code placing greater emphasis on addressing fear of retribution against suppliers including through protections and supermarkets monitoring their commercial decisions;

annual reporting on disputes and results of confidential supplier surveys, by the Grocery Code Supervisor; and

significant penalties for non-compliance.[35]

7.38In addition to the recommendations above, the interim report of the Grocery Code Review drew attention to other areas which may need additional protections, including:

fresh produce, given its perishable nature;

contracted prices and volumes;

compliance checks by the ACCC.[36]

7.39Elsewhere in the report, the detailed evidence showed the difficulties faced by grocery and fresh food suppliers, particularly the difficulties faced by fruit and vegetable suppliers to supermarkets.

7.40Many farming organisations spoke about price negotiations taking place in an unfair context, where supermarkets have access to the prices of other farmers, while each farmer is 'flying blind':

Immediately, the growers are behind the eight ball. The supermarkets now have a national snapshot of all prices and volumes across the country. The growers are essentially flying blind because they only have the data that's in front of them.[37]

7.41The committee also heard that farmers hesitate to share such pricing information between themselves, as they are concerned that may be considered collusion under Trade Practices law.[38] The NFF, for example, expressed concerns, telling the committee:

… we do want to see the collective bargaining power more widely advertised so that growers who don't understand or may have concerns around it or fear using it because of the potential to fall outside the lines or whatever can have those issues addressed. So there is a communications piece there for government, for the ACCC and, mostly likely, for us to make sure that growers understand that that is available to them and, as we have said, ensure that the limit doesn't preclude businesses from participating in that where it would be beneficial and address some of the issues we have outlined today.[39]

7.42AUSVEG offered its support for price transparency but cautioned it should not be done in a way that itself could cause an artificial distortion of the market, or an increased compliance burden on producers. AUSVEG further noted that price negotiations for the vegetable sector was much more complex that for dairy and beef, due to the greater variance in produce.[40]

Independent arbitration

7.43This report has also outlined the fear that many farmers have in making complaints under the Grocery Code, due to fears of retaliation.[41] The NFF observed that the arbitrators of the Code 'are often, or in most cases, put in place by retailers', with Mr Young of the NFF stressing that:

Of course I would make no assertions about the credibility of the judgements made by those arbitrators, but you can understand why producers looking to raise issues might perhaps feel more comfortable doing that with someone independently appointed.[42]

7.44AUSVEG similarly noted:

The growers definitely have concerns about voicing anything to the code arbiters, because the code arbiters are appointed by the retailers. Once again, we're not questioning the integrity of the arbiters … But I just feel that if they're paid for and appointed by a retailer, no matter what, there is no confidence in the system from our growers.[43]

7.45Another submitter, a grocery producer, noted that while suppliers with a solid understanding of the Grocery Code could use it to limit punitive behaviours from supermarkets, the burden still lies on the supplier to file a formal complaint. The submitter further contended that:

… the fact that not a single supplier has ever lodged a formal complaint in this concentrated market speaks volumes … it is clear that the fear of retribution and reliance on both Woolworths and Coles in Australia is a factor suppliers cannot overlook.[44]

Mandatory code

7.46The NFF called for the Grocery Code to be mandatory and include 'substantial civil penalties attached to noncompliance'. The NFF argued that 'without that threat there is a fear that it will not be followed'.[45]

7.47The Fels Inquiry noted that the 'disproportionate market power held by supermarkets and food processors compared to farmers is a significant concern in the agricultural sector and that this imbalance 'manifests in several ways, profoundly impacting the dynamics of food pricing and distribution'.[46] Toaddress this, the Fels Inquiry recommended:

the Grocery Code be fully mandatory i.e. membership of retailers is mandatory and the rules are mandatory; and

the Grocery Code should investigate creating a price register for farmers to assist them in understanding market prices across primary industries.[47]

7.48The ACCC similarly noted that while the Grocery Code had led to improvements in dealings between signatories and suppliers, 'it is the ACCC's view as the regulator of the code that it is not achieving all its intended purposes and improvements can be made to address these issues'.[48]

7.49The ACCC therefore recommended:

the Grocery Code should be made mandatory;

there should be financial penalties available for non-compliance with the code; and

signatories should not be able to opt out of minimum standards set out in the code.[49]

Non-compete clauses

7.50Non‑compete clauses are conditions in employment contracts that restrict an employee from moving to a competitor. As noted by The Treasury, such clauses usually define a specific period of time and/or geographic area over which the clause applies after the employee leaves the employer.[50]

7.51The Government's 2023 Employment White Paper suggested that:

There is emerging evidence that non-compete clauses in workers' employment contracts may be hampering job mobility, innovation and wage growth in industries where their use is prevalent … While there is uncertainty around enforceability of individual contracts in Australia, noncompetes may nonetheless deter workers from switching jobs. InAustralia, initial survey evidence suggests that up to 22 per cent of Australian workers may be subject to non-compete clauses, ranging from child care workers to management consultants.[51]

7.52In improving competition and employment law, the Fels Inquiry called for a ban on all non-compete contacts, in line with emerging American practice. The FelsInquiry argued that such clauses have a 'chilling effect' on employees moving between employers, and:

… inhibit the transfer of talent to more efficient firms. These clauses are also used to prevent part-time and casual employees from finding employment elsewhere, stifling employment growth.

Australia needs to follow laws which are emerging in the United States and elsewhere which ban no compete clauses in employment contracts.[52]

Grocery pricing regulation and transparency

7.53The Consumer Action Law Centre observed that as supermarkets 'are selling groceries and food to some of the most disadvantaged people in our community' there should be strong oversight and transparency.[53]

7.54As noted by Fair Food Western Australia (WA) and the WA Council of Social Service (WACOSS), there is currently no system to routinely monitor the cost of food and grocery items in supermarkets across Australia. While there are some surveys conducted on healthy food pricing, these lack consistency and are therefore not able to be compared either across time or geographic regions.[54]

7.55Fair Food WA and WACOSS noted that establishing such routine monitoring of food and grocery items prices nationally would also assist in efforts to develop greater transparency on comparing 'farm-gate prices, wholesale prices and those set by supermarket retailers' and would be 'critical to ensuring that food system policy minimises the risk of unequal market concentration'.[55]

7.56The CPSA provided an example of price monitoring that did not end up in any meaningful outcomes:

CPSA is particularly concerned that instances such as [misleading pricing] go largely unpunished, especially as our constituents may face barriers to shopping online or to accessing available information relating to opportunities for refunds. As such, they are at greater risk of missing out on reimbursement in these situations. CPSA argues that there should be mandatory penalties put in place for these cases to ensure the highest standard of compliance and to protect customers who may otherwise be less able to seek a refund.[56]

7.57Many submitters and witnesses argued the need for an independent pricing regulator. TasFarmers recommended the establishment of an independent pricing regulator, with the authority to:

… monitor and regulate the pricing practices of major supermarket chains. This regulator would ensure adherence to fair pricing standards, investigate complaints, and impose penalties for non-compliance. The regulator should be empowered to publish regular reports on pricing trends and market competition.[57]

7.58Dr Greg Jericho, Chief Economist for The Australia Institute also recommended the establishment of such as commission or regulator, with sufficient powers to:

… enable it to say to companies, 'You say you're doing it tough and that you are raising prices in line with cost. Show us the books. Let's have a look.' We think transparency would bring much greater benefits for consumers.[58]

7.59The Fels Inquiry likewise recommended the government 'could establish a Commission on Competition and Prices to review Government and other restrictions on competition and high prices caused by a lack of competition'. The Fels Inquiry suggested that a commission:

… would review government and other anticompetitive restrictions, and high prices caused by a lack of competition. The ACCC would continue to enforce the law and where appropriate undertake pricing and market studies.[59]

7.60The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) informed the committee that such a body was its core 'ask' coming from its review:

Emerging from the price gouging inquiry, our core ask is the establishment of a national prices and competition commission. There is clear need for a permanent and ongoing focus on prices by government.[60]

Increased funding for ACCC

7.61The committee heard that in addition to strengthening of the regulatory regime around supermarkets, the ACCC should also be bolstered—not just to administer new powers, but also to have sufficient funding and resources to appropriately enforce its existing powers. The NFF drew attention to insufficient resources at the ACCC and its repercussions:

The under-resourcing of the ACCC has meant it is unable to investigate and prosecute the full extent of firms that break existing laws and regulations. The ACCC has also not been able to adopt new capabilities to proactively monitor firms and supply chains for increasing market concentration, abuse of market power and the use of unfair business practices. The ACCC is also not able to review natural changes in the distribution of firms that impact market concentration. This includes changes in the location of activities and changes in market share due to organic firm growth.[61]

7.62Per Capita recommended 'strengthening the powers of, and increasing resources to, the ACCC so it can actively monitor market supply chains and take swifter action on competition and consumer issues is needed'.[62]

7.63CHOICE also recommended increased funding for the ACCC, particularly to enforce the Unit Pricing Code.[63]

7.64The NFF pointed to remarks by a former ACCC chairperson, and their regular complaint that they 'do not have the teeth to do the job that we need to do to ensure fair competition in this country ...'.[64]

Additional safeguards

7.65The committee heard from many inquiry participants that regulation needs to be backed up by strong additional powers to be used when existing regulation fails to deliver an appropriately competitive environment.

7.66Not only would such powers provide an avenue for action when regulation was unable to enforce competition and appropriate pricing, but they would most likely ensure that supermarkets take such regulation more seriously, as non‑compliance would lead to the use of these additional powers—which they presumably would want to avoid. Suggestions for such powers included making individuals accountable for regulatory breaches; excess profits taxes; and divestiture powers.

7.67The NFF recommended that regulation should extend beyond corporations to individuals, 'because once you make individuals accountable for their actions that changes behaviours within organisations'.[65]

7.68With regard to excess profit taxes, The Australia Institute noted that competition regulation is not always an effective control on market power, and it argued in these instances such a tax could be 'an effective way of recapturing the benefit firms extract from their excessive market power, and at the same time compensating consumers'. The Australia Institute noted that such compensation for consumers could be targeted to the most vulnerable consumers.[66]

Divestiture

7.69The committee heard from many participants that a final power to have—if all else fails—would be divestiture powers, where supermarkets can be forced to divest certain stores if there is no other way to ensure appropriate market competition, and if it was proven they had abused their position in the market.

7.70Professor Allan Fels, whose evidence on divestiture is captured in greater detail in Chapter 8, noted that divestiture would have a significant long-term effect on competition, and ultimately deliver a large 'payoff' for consumers.[67]

7.71Likewise The Australia Institute, also discussed further in Chapter 8, advised that divestiture would bring a whole new set of tools to the ACCC and the courts to bring improved competition into the market.[68]

7.72The CEO of TasFarmers told the committee that divestiture was 'definitely something that should be kept on the table. I think the view for myself would be that it's something that should be looked at if everything else has failed'.[69]

7.73The NFF advised that divestiture as a government policy option should never be 'taken off the table' as doing so would essentially be 'giving a licence to print money to the existing duopoly'.[70]

7.74Mr Danny Carney from the Grassroots Action Network Tasmania, put it succinctly from the point of view of food being a basic human right that is being impacted by the power of the supermarket duopoly:

I very much feel like—I'll just put it out there—the supermarket duopoly should be broken up. That's the role of government. You can't live without food. We shouldn't have certain demographics of Australians skipping meals, stealing food, eating from bins, having to rely on charity for their whole life simply because we have these companies that make millions of dollars in profit, that have CEOs that make tens of thousands of dollars a day to maintain a profit line … With the power of duopoly, they can do whatever they want, and that's what we're seeing … The government should use its powers to bust that open.[71]

7.75The question of divestiture powers is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, where the committee presents its report on the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Divestiture Powers) Bill 2024.

Footnotes

[1]Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Submission 107, p. 2.

[2]Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s. 46.

[3]Rod Simms, Address to the Australian Food & Grocery Council Industry Leaders Forum, Canberra, 11October 2012.

[4]Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Part VIIA.

[5]COTA Australia, Submission 21, p. 13.

[6]COTA Australia, Submission 21, p. 9.

[7]National Farmers Federation, Submission 97, p. 11.

[8]Mr Christopher Young, General Manager, Trade and Economics, National Farmers Federation, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 2.

[9]Ms Charlotte Wundersitz, General Manager, Rural Affairs, National Farmers Federation, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 2.

[10]Public Health Association of Australia, Submission 19, p. 8.

[11]ACCC, Submission 107, p. 3.

[12]ACCC, Submission 107, p. 13.

[13]Per Capita, Submission 10, pp. 6–7.

[14]Per Capita, Submission 10, p. 7.

[15]CHOICE, Submission 72, p. 31.

[16]Ms Rosie Thomas, Director of Campaigns and Communications, CHOICE, Committee Hansard, 13March 2024, p. 24.

[17]ACCC, Submission 107, pp. 3 and 13.

[18]The Treasury, Protecting consumers from unfair trading practices: consultation regulation impact statement The Treasury, August 2023, p. 27.

[19]Per Capita, Submission 10, p. 2.

[20]Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of NSW Inc., Submission 18, p. 23.

[21]Name Withheld, Submission 138, pp. 3–4.

[22]Email from former Coles employee, received 16 April 2024, p. 1. Emphasis in original.

[23]Mr Abdel Badoura, Submission 129, p. 2.

[24]Professor Allan Fels AO reporting to the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Inquiry into price gouging and unfair pricing practices: final report (Fels Inquiry), p. 62.

[25]These was the GST pricing legislation of 2000 to 2003.

[26]Fels Inquiry, p. 64.

[27]ACCC, Unit prices for groceries, accc.gov.au/consumers/pricing/unit-prices-for-groceries (accessed 27 March 2024).

[28]ACCC, Unit Pricing Code, accc.gov.au/business/industry-codes/unit-pricing-code (accessed 26 March 2024).

[29]CHOICE, Submission 72, pp. 9 and 20.

[30]CHOICE, Submission 72, pp. 20–21. See also: Queensland Consumers Association, Submission 2, p.1.

[31]Queensland Consumers Association, Submission 2, p.2.

[32]Queensland Consumers Association, Submission 2, p.2.

[33]CHOICE, Submission 72, p. 21.

[34]ACCC, Submission 107, p. 17.

[35]Dr Craig Emerson, Independent Review of the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct: interim report, April2024, p. 7.

[36]Independent Review of the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct: interim report, pp. 56, 58 and 69.

[37]Mr Jeremy Griffith, Representative, National Farmers Federation Horticultural Council (NFFHorticultural Council), Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, p. 16.

[38]Mr Michael Crisera, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 45.

[39]Ms Charlotte Wundersitz, National Farmers Federation, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 7.

[40]Mr Michael Coote, Chief Executive Officer, AUSVEG, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 16.

[41]See, for example: Mr Nathan Calman, Chief Executive Officer, TasFarmers, Committee Hansard, 7March 2024, p. 28.

[42]Mr Christopher Young, National Farmers Federation, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 6.

[43]Ms Lucy Gregg, General Manager Public Affairs, AUSVEG, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p.15.

[44]Name Withheld, Submission 138, p. 9.

[45]Ms Charlotte Wundersitz, National Farmers Federation, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 7.

[46]Fels Inquiry, p. 53.

[47]Fels Inquiry, p. 69.

[48]ACCC, Submission 107, p. 13.

[49]ACCC, Submission 107, p. 14.

[50]The Treasury, ‘Non-compete clauses and other restraints’, treasury.gov.au/review/ competition-review-2023/non-compete-clauses (accessed 1May2024).

[51]The Treasury, Working Future: The Australian Government’s White Paper on Jobs and Opportunities – Chapter 3: Promoting job security and strong, sustainable wage growth, 25 September 2023, p. 55.

[52]Fels Inquiry, p. 66.

[53]Ms Stephanie Tonkin, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 13 March 2024, p. 35.

[54]Fair Food WA and WA Council of Social Service, Submission 6, p. 6.

[55]Fair Food WA and WA Council of Social Service, Submission 6, p. 6.

[56]Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of NSW Inc., Submission 18, p. 17.

[57]TasFarmers, Submission 3, p. 3. See for example: Mr Abdel Badoura, Private capacity, CommitteeHansard, 15April 2024, p. 13.

[58]Dr Greg Jericho, Chief Economist, The Australia Institute, Committee Hansard, 11 April 2024, p.28.

[59]Fels Inquiry, p. 64.

[60]Mr Joseph Mitchell, Assistant Secretary, Australian Council of Trade Unions, Committee Hansard, 15April 2024, p. 39.

[61]National Farmers Federation, Submission 97, p. 11.

[62]Per Capita, Submission 10, p. 9.

[63]Ms Rosie Thomas, CHOICE, Committee Hansard, 13March 2024, p. 27. See also Queensland Consumers Federation, Submission 2, p. 5, and Consumers Federation of Australia, Submission 109, p. 2.

[64]Mr Jeremy Griffith, NFF Horticultural Council, Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, p. 17.

[65]Mr Jeremy Griffith, NFF Horticultural Council, Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, p. 17.

[66]Mr Jeremy Griffith, NFF Horticultural Council, Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, p. 17.

[67]Professor Allan Fels AO, Committee Hansard, 15 April 2024, p. 6.

[68]Mr Matt Grudnoff, The Australia Institute, Committee Hansard, 11 April 2024, p. 27.

[69]Mr Nathan Calman, TasFarmers, Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, p. 27.

[70]Mr Jeremy Griffith, NFF Horticultural Council, Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, p. 17.

[71]Mr Danny Carney, Grassroots Action Network Tasmania, Committee Hansard, 7 March 2024, pp.14–15.