Overview of on-shore prevention and detection biosecurity activities
4.1
The core focus of this chapter is on-shore surveillance activities. These measures are designed to detect and assess the size and severity of an incursion, and support the necessary proof of freedom from disease should an incursion take place. The chapter considers these surveillance measures within the context of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and lumpy skin disease (LSD), and national bee pest surveillance and biosecurity programs. The chapter concludes with consideration of the management of feral and invasive populations, including internal varroa mite pest control measures.
On-shore surveillance—FMD and LSD
4.2
Animal Health Australia (AHA) 'manages the national animal health surveillance and monitoring programs,' such as the National Significant Diseases Investigation Program and the National Arbovirus Monitoring Program, under the authority of federal, state and territory governments. It also plays a central role in data capture, analysis and reporting and related policy. Wildlife Health Australia's activities include managing national wildlife disease surveillance programs, as well as facilitating investigations of disease incidents and providing input into emergency animal disease (EAD) preparedness.
4.3
The Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) works with a range of stakeholders including state and territory governments and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, including supporting the Northern Australia Surveillance network. NAQS undertakes a range of activities including feral and other animal health surveys, monitoring of sentinel animals, vector trapping, and community reporting projects targeting a number of animal pests and diseases including FMD and LSD.
4.4
Between January 2021 and March 2022, five routine tests were conducted for LSD under the NAQS, with no animals testing positive for the disease. In the same period testing for FMD and LSD was conducted as part of national notifiable animal diseases investigations, with all 11 cattle investigations finding negative for FMD, all 11 cattle investigations finding negative for LSD, and all four sheep investigations finding negative for FMD.
4.5
One of the National LSD Action Plan's objectives is to improve LSD surveillance, through a range of activities including the development of a national LSD surveillance strategy, as well as the development and review of bovid and arthropod monitoring programs, and training and awareness programs.
4.6
Other FMD-related surveillance programs include the successful Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Charles Sturt University and Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) partnership on the ten-year project, FMD Ready. The project was aimed at increasing EAD preparedness, especially for FMD, improving disease surveillance, including by producers, to aid reporting and incursion identification and management.
4.7
The committee heard that, with FMD and LSD on Australia's doorstop, further resources should be devoted to surveillance programs. Australian Pork Limited advised the committee of the need for a more collaborative, coordinated, and robust national surveillance (and diagnostic) system, including through a greater focus on harmonised methodologies.
4.8
Other witnesses advised of the need to better use sentinel herds in South Asia, and that greater surveillance of feral populations is required, including using non-government resources such as hunters, landowners and Indigenous communities, as well as community supported or citizen science surveillance. The Australian Veterinary Association (AVA) and other submitters called for greater surveillance through the engagement of private veterinary practices and public-private surveillance initiatives, as well as companion, and wildlife disease surveillance.
4.9
However, the Invasive Species Council observed that producer and citizen surveillance is not sufficient, advising that 'relying on livestock owners to be vigilant and observe feral pigs and buffalo near their properties for symptoms is not enough to adequately address this risk'.
4.10
The Cattle Council of Australia (CCA) recommended the introduction of specific FMD and LSD surveillance activities targeted at disease pathways, including weather and vector modelling for potential LSD incursions, as well as the take up of new and innovative surveillance techniques to improve detection, a view supported by the Invasive Species Council and Northern Territory Government.
4.11
Illumina supported the utilisation of more innovative surveillance tools through genomic technologies, research and data in order to detect and understand an incursion and plan a response. Australian Pork Limited called for better use of technology such as pen side testing, application of artificial intelligence and analytics in relation to disease spread, and access to better resources to enable producers to identify EADs, while the Northern Territory government called for the deployment of remote sensors, environmental deoxyribonucleic acid (eDNA) techniques and a northern coordination network to improve surveillance.
Committee view
4.12
There are substantial benefits—including economic benefits—in keeping pests and diseases out of Australia rather than trying to manage them after they have entered Australia. The committee notes that the October 2022 budget has committed $61.6 million over two years from 2022–23 to strengthen Australia's frontline biosecurity capability, including enhancing the domestic detection and response capability in northern Australia, amongst other measures.
4.13
The committee supports this greater focus and investment in on-shore surveillance, monitoring and early detection activities, particularly in northern Australia, and including the development and implementation of the National LSD Action Plan. These measures will help safeguard the country's trade status and clean, green reputation, the natural environment, and the livelihoods and lifestyles of Australian producers and residents.
On-shore surveillance—bee biosecurity
4.14
Australia's bee pest surveillance program incorporates surveillance activities surrounding high to medium-risk ports. These surveillance activities are designed to ensure any incursion is swiftly detected and eradicated. Supporting that program is the National Bee Biosecurity Program, which supports the management of established bee pests and disease, and preparedness for and surveillance of exotic bee pests within the honey bee industry.
National Bee Pest Surveillance Program
4.15
The backbone of Australia's bee biosecurity program is the National Bee Pest Surveillance Program (NBPSP). The NBPSP establishes a network of sentinel hives and catch boxes at 25 port locations across Australia (see Table 4.1 for locations). The program acts as an early warning system for a varroa mite incursion, as well as other pest beetles, viruses, pest bees, hornets and wasps. High-risk ports have four to six sentinel hives that are inspected every six weeks by bee biosecurity officers. General port surveillance activities and industry awareness activities complement the NBPSP to ensure exotic bee swarms, pests and diseases are promptly detected. In addition to sentinel hives, other activities such as catchboxes, floral sweep netting and swarm/feral nest capture are used to assist bee biosecurity functions.
4.16
Nationally, the NBPSP is administered and coordinated by Plant Health Australia (PHA) and is delivered by state and territory primary industry departments in their respective jurisdictions. The program has been an industry-government partnership since 2012, with Horticulture Innovation Australia (Hort Innovation) as a major funder, with other funds leveraged from horticulture industries, grains, the Australian Government and through Emergency Plant Pest Response and PHA levies.
4.17
Eight of the 25 ports subject to the NBPSP are classified as high-risk ports. These high-risk ports are operationally funded through the NBPSP, with the remaining surveillance activities at other locations operationally funded through in-kind contributions by state and territory jurisdictions.
Reviews of the NBPSP
4.18
The NBPSP has been subject to a number of reviews and assessments that have sought to improve and focus bee biosecurity activities and resources. A 2016 review of the NBPSP by Hort Innovation considered inspection periods and the number and location of sentinel hives across Australia's air and sea ports. The report utilised the Varroa Spread Model 'to identify surveillance components that would be required to achieve the highest likelihood of detection'. The report subsequently made recommendations on the number of sentinel hives located at all high and medium risk ports, along with increasing the frequency of inspection periods.
4.19
The review by Hort Innovation resulted in several amendments to the NBPSP. PHA reported that these amendments included:
surveillance activities incorporating 33 sea and air ports;
the number of sentinel hives increasing from 26 in 2011 to 178 in 2018;
the inspection and testing of sentinel hives every six weeks;
reposition of sentinel hives around ports;
the incorporation of surveillance methods for exotic honey bee viruses, African hive beetle and Asian hornets;
improved remote surveillance catchboxes deployed nationwide; and
increased floral sweeping activities at 17 of the highest risk ports.
4.20
As detailed above, surveillance activities were in place at 33 sea and air ports, with 178 sentinel hives operating in 2018. However, evidence provided to the committee by DAFF on behalf of PHA revealed a reduction in both the number of ports subject to surveillance activities (25 ports) and the number of sentinel hives (107 sentinel hives). Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of the NBPSP as of August 2022:
Table 4.1: Breakdown of the National Bee Pest Surveillance Program, August 2022
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Qld
|
Port of Brisbane,
Port of Townsville.
|
6
|
16
|
6
|
|
NSW
|
Port Botany,
Port Kembla,
Newcastle.
|
18
|
10
|
5
|
|
Vic
|
Port of Melbourne,
Port of Geelong,
Port of Portland,
Westernport.
|
18
|
29
|
6
|
|
Tas
|
Port of Bell Bay,
Port of Hobart,
Port of Devonport,
Port of Burnie,
Port Latta,
Triabunna.
|
19
|
11
|
3
|
|
NT
|
Port of Darwin.
|
4
|
8
|
0
|
|
SA
|
Port Adelaide,
Adelaide airport.
|
10
|
13
|
5
|
|
WA
|
Fremantle Harbour,
Port of Bunbury,
Geraldton Port,
Kwinana,
Perth Airport,
Esperance Port,
Port of Albany.
|
32
|
30
|
4
|
|
Total
|
|
107
|
117
|
27
|
Source: DAFF, Answers to questions on notice, p. 3, 10 August 2022 (received 22 August 2022)
2021–2024 National Bee Pest Surveillance Program
4.21
The most recent iteration of the NBPSP for 2021–24 has incorporated many of the accumulated findings from various reviews. This revised program has established a risk-based methodology, which according to PHA has 're-prioritised the resources available … to target the eight highest risk ports of entry'.
4.22
The rationale for a risk-based approach was criticised by the AHBIC. It observed that the 'delivery of the wide range of surveillance techniques across the large number of sites in the 2016–21 program' had resulted in 'severe pressure across project partners … jeopardising delivery at the highest risk ports'. The Australian Honey Bee Industry Council (AHBIC) contended that 'this pressure was a result of the [2016–21] program being significantly under-resourced'. It added that the 'true costs of the program across all partners was not captured'.
4.23
The application of a risk-based methodology was also criticised by the Queensland Beekeepers' Association (QBA). It expressed concern with the development of the 2021–24 program, namely that the Australian beekeeping industry had agreed to increase its financial contribution to the program, with the expectation that these additional funds would result in the ongoing surveillance activities under the NBPSP. However, the rationalised and pared back program meant NBPSP activities in Queensland went from seven sites to two. QBA added that the contract negotiations 'relied on state jurisdictions to act in good will to continue to undertake surveillance'. QBA reported that during a general meeting of the AHBIC, the industry agreed to write to PHA 'to express [its] disappointment in the reduced number of surveillance location[s] and the timeliness of the contract negotiations'.
4.24
With respect to the current outbreak, the AHBIC noted that its risk assessment had not identified the current outbreak to have originated from a high-risk entry point. It noted that the primary limitation regarding surveillance is funding, and should there be infinite funding then the NBPSP would be made available at all Australian ports, including airports and Royal Australian Air Force bases.
Adequate and long-term funding
4.25
An overarching and longstanding concern shared by many stakeholders of the NBPSP is access to sustainable and long-term funding. In a 2016 review of the program, Hort Innovation concluded that 'a significant increase in resources is required simply to maintain the program' and that the costings at the time did 'not reflect the activities undertaken'. This analysis found there to be significant shortfalls in the contracted amount ($871,640) versus the actual costs of running the NBPSP ($2,314,500). At the time, Hort Innovation recommended that there be an 'increase in investment for the NBPSP to maintain and enhance components of the program'.
4.26
There have also been calls for increased funding to the NBPSP by the Australian Parliament. In 2014, the committee recommended the Australian Government enlarge its commitment to the NBPSP. The Australian Government noted this recommendation explaining that the then Department of Agriculture had requested a review of the program, which would inform future investment. Similarly, the House Standing Committee on Agriculture in 2017 inquired into Australia’s bee biosecurity system. It recommended an enhanced NBPSP with an appropriate proportion of funds to be provided by relevant Commonwealth agencies.
4.27
A 2020 review of the NBPSP (Glanville review) reiterated the need for long-term funding for the program. The Glanville review forewarned that a sustainable funding model would be needed to support ongoing core programs beyond 2024. This warning was made despite a substantial increase of funding to the NBPSP. The 2016–21 NBPSP received $2.5 million from Hort Innovation, which included contributions from nine pollination-dependent industry research and development levies, $500,000 from the AHBIC, $100,000 from Grain Producers Australia and matched contributions from the Australian Government. An additional $587,000 from the Australian Government was provided to the program, through the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper. In total, over the 2016–21 period the program received $3 million in funding.
4.28
On 21 December 2021, Hort Innovation and PHA announced a three-year funding arrangement for the NBPSP until 2024. The DAFF noted that the Australian Government and PHA were 'actively seeking to establish a partnership arrangement with the bee industry to sustain the program into the future'.
4.29
Various witnesses and submitters shared the view that a more sustainable funding arrangement for the NBPSP is needed, including the program's administrator PHA. It submitted accessing ongoing government funding was a challenge, particularly long-term and sustainable funding. PHA advised the committee that the NBPSP receives $750,000 per annum, whereas it is estimated that between $2.1 million or $2.8 million per annum is required. The AHBIC called for the Australian Government to increase its funding to the NBPSP to 'cover all identified medium and high-risk entry points'.
4.30
According to the AHBIC, an additional challenge has been achieving an agreement between financial contributors to the program, and it warned of ongoing financial issues should more sustainable funding not be forthcoming. Its representative, Daniel Le Feuvre, outlined the reluctance across levy paying industries to contribute to the NBPSP, prior to the most recent varroa mite outbreak:
Another three-year deal for that surveillance program, luckily, was just re-signed in November or December last year, and it was an incredibly hard job for Hort Innovation to convince their levied industries to contribute to the surveillance program. Whilst you're in peacetime and not in an incursion situation, it's very hard to convince growers to put money into these types of activities whilst they're not affecting their bottom line.
Committee view
4.31
The New South Wales (NSW) varroa mite incursion has highlighted the importance of the sentinel hive program as a means of detecting bee pests and diseases. Whilst the origin of the varroa mite remains unknown, it was Newcastle Port's sentinel hive program that alerted NSW authorities that an incursion had taken place in the region. This incident is in addition to previous detections discovered as part of port surveillance activities.
4.32
The committee is disappointed that under-resourcing of the sentinel hive program remains a longstanding matter of concern, despite repeated calls for increased and long-term funding. Presently, funding to the program is chequered and fails to meet minimum requirements. Of concern is evidence which suggests stakeholder investment in the program was waning prior to the latest NSW incursion, and that a risk-based approach adopted by the NBPSP was partly due to inadequate funding. The committee is also concerned by evidence showing a reduction of ports and sentinel hives included under the NBPSP.
4.33
The committee believes the NSW incursion has acted as an important reminder for governments and industry that an adequately funded and operational NBPSP is a vital defence measure for Australia's honey bee and agricultural industries. For this reason, it is imperative that the NBPSP has access to long-term and sustainable funding into the future. Whilst this need has been acknowledged, and work has commenced on negotiating a sustainable model beyond 2024, the committee believes the Commonwealth should make a formal commitment to contribute adequate funding to the NBPSP.
4.34
The committee recommends the Australian Government, in partnership with industry and state and territory governments, commits to long-term and sustainable funding to the National Bee Pest Surveillance Program.
4.35
The committee recommends that the Australian Government reviews the balance between sentinel hives and bait hives as part of the National Bee Pest Surveillance Program.
National Bee Biosecurity Program
4.36
An additional bee biosecurity measure is the National Bee Biosecurity Program (NBBP). Established in 2014, the NBBP ensures the sustainability and viability of Australia's honey bee industry through the management of established pests and diseases (such as American foulbrood) and increases preparedness for and surveillance of exotic bee pests. The program assists with the maintenance of and improvement of Australia's bee biosecurity status through the promotion of biosecurity awareness and reporting of exotic bee pests and diseases. These post-border awareness and preparedness activities support the adoption of best-practice within industry and by hobbyists.
4.37
The Australian Honey bee Industry Biosecurity Code of Practice (2016) (the Code) guides NBBP activities. The Code establishes a clear framework for beekeepers to engage in best practice biosecurity, with specific guidelines for commercial beekeepers. Within some jurisdictions, the Code has been incorporated into respective biosecurity legislation.
4.38
The NBBP is a partnership between industry and governments. National management and governance of the program is conducted by PHA, with the honey bee industry providing funds and state governments delivering activities and providing regulatory support (including significant in-kind financial support).
4.39
PHA raised several issues about funding of the NBBP. In its submission, PHA pointed out that funding allocated to communication activities that support hobby beekeepers' engagement with the NBBP had ceased in 2019. PHA also commented that overall funding to the NBBP was inadequate:
The [National] Bee Biosecurity Program, which is that post-border program which has the bee biosecurity officers who engage with the producers, is currently funded to the tune of $436,850 per annum. We estimate that a figure of approximately $1.4 million per annum would see delivery of a program that is better furnished to provide the necessary steps to keep us free from varroa in the event that we're going to eradicate this current incursion. This figure would support a full-time equivalent in six states and half a person in the Northern Territory, as well as the national coordination and communication efforts that are required.
Committee view
4.40
The committee agrees that the NBBP plays a vital role in the management of established bee pests and diseases, and preparedness for and surveillance of exotic bee pests within the honey bee industry. Should varroa mite become endemic in Australia, this program will play an important role in educating and supporting beekeepers and the honey bee industry with varroa mite control measures. Further, the committee is supportive of the NBBP promoting best-practice within the honey bee sector, especially with its alignment to the Code.
4.41
The committee is concerned that the scope of the program has been reduced due to inadequate funding, including for example communication measures targeting hobby beekeepers. For this reason, the committee is supportive of calls for the Australian Government to ensure that adequate funding is provided to the NBBP, along with other financial contributors.
4.42
The committee recommends the Australian Government, in partnership with other stakeholders, ensures that adequate funding is provided to the National Bee Biosecurity Program.
Management of feral and invasive populations
4.43
Various submitters drew attention to the inadequate and reactive management and control of feral and invasive populations, in particular animals, with the Red Meat Advisory Council (RMAC) advising that inaction and inadequate action have 'enabled a problem long-considered too difficult to address to now present a massive risk to Australia'.
4.44
In relation to FMD, the Invasive Species Council noted that wild populations may act as a reservoir of the disease and may make it difficult to demonstrate freedom from FMD as a precursor to returning to normal trade arrangements after an incursion. They observed that vaccination of livestock is 'difficult, costly, and potentially ineffective depending on which strain enters the country', exacerbated by the challenge of growing populations of feral animals which would fall outside the current response framework. This finding was also made by the Joint Interagency Taskforce: Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness:
Australia is also home to feral deer, goat, horse, pig and water buffalo populations. These animals could increase the speed, coverage and extent of an EAD outbreak. An EAD outbreak in the feral animal population could make controlling the outbreak more complicated and protracted.
4.45
Mike Darby from the CCA advised that feral animal control should be undertaken as a proactive, pre-incursion strategy including surveillance testing, identification and tagging, as well as eradication and management.
4.46
The Invasive Species Council drew attention to the lack of priority, funding and agreement for feral population control, the challenges of working across jurisdictions, and the detrimental role of minority community groups which advocate for the protection or promotion of feral or invasive populations.
4.47
To address these weaknesses witnesses called for ongoing, stable funding for the Centre for Invasive Species Solutions (CISS) to enable research and development, the urgent management and control of feral animals, including pigs, deer, goats, buffalo, and camels in strategic locations, as well as a control tool stockpile review and contingency planning in preparation for an FMD or other disease outbreak.
Varroa mite pest control measures
4.48
Should varroa mite become endemic in Australia, potential pest control measures could support the eradication of the mite without the destruction of hives. The committee was advised of research into the development of a pesticide that targets hormone receptors of varroa mites, as well as other honey bee pests, without impacting on the bees and other animals. Reference was also made to breeding programs designed to develop bees resistant to varroa mite.
Committee view
4.49
The committee heard that feral and invasive populations of cattle, water buffalo, pigs, goats, camels and other FMD-susceptible animals, pose a high risk to Australian producers and Australia's FMD- and LSD-free status. The geographic dispersion and isolation of these populations mean that FMD or LSD could reside in these populations for some time before it is detected, with the incursion of LSD through wind-borne vectors across the Torres Strait posing a real risk.
4.50
As well as the environmental harm that these feral and invasive populations cause, the committee notes their potential to prevent Australia achieving freedom from disease status and a return to normal trade arrangements after an incursion.
4.51
Given their wide-ranging impacts, the committee is strongly of the view that there needs to be greater management and coordinated control of feral and invasive populations, including on crown land, to ensure Australia’s future biodiversity and reduce its environmental biosecurity risk.
4.52
The committee supports long-term, coordinated, and collaborative approaches to managing and controlling feral populations, including through innovative research and development, partnerships with industry and the private sector, higher profile EAD response measures, and better coordination and collaboration between federal, state and territory jurisdictions.
4.53
The committee also supports appropriate funding to ensure the management of feral and invasive populations and plant pests, and makes wider funding recommendations in relation to this in Chapter Six.
4.54
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry coordinate a national response to control and manage feral and invasive species to safeguard Australia's biodiversity and environmental biosecurity.