Commercial Utilisation of Australian Native Wildlife

CHAPTER 2 - ETHICS AND OPINIONS

Introduction

2.1 The degree to which individual members of the public accept commercial utilisation of wildlife varies greatly. In the first instance, acceptance depends primarily on the ethical stance taken (that is, whether they believe that it is morally or ethically right to use animals). A decision at this point is usually based on a value judgement which relates to an individual's general moral viewpoint. Should there be acceptance at this point, the next level is whether 'wildlife', as opposed to European agricultural species, should be subject to commercial use. A decision at this point is also frequently based on a value judgement as to whether 'wildlife' is sacrosanct. Curiously, at this point there is often acceptance of the use of native plant species but not native animals, or of some animals but not others. Should there be acceptance of commercial use of wildlife in theory, the next question is whether wildlife can be used in an ecologically sustainable manner. Critically, a decision at this point is most likely to be based on the degree to which there is education and understanding about the management of wildlife utilisation, the ways it can assist conservation and the potential for mitigation of detrimental impact. If it is accepted that ecologically sustainable utilisation of wildlife is possible, often an element of animal welfare is then raised, whereby proponents concede that wildlife can be used as long as the welfare of the animal is given due consideration.

An Ethical Approach to Commercial Utilisation of Wildlife

2.2 The need for an ethical starting point has been an underlying theme to this inquiry. This need was sometimes expressed and at other times an underlying assumption which witnesses found hard to articulate.

2.3 A number of witnesses claimed they were operating from an ethical basis against those who held an opposing point of view but, when asked, most witnesses did not find it easy to spell out exactly what their ethical basis was. An exception to this was the written submission by the Australian and New Zealand Federation of Animal Societies (ANZFAS) and oral presentation by the Director, Glenys Oogjes, who quoted Professor Singer, a well known ethicist, especially in the area of animal rights. However, the value of this submission was diminished as Professor Singer was not available to be cross examined and Ms Oogjes felt she was unable to answer questions about this section. [1]

An Ethic In Favour Of Commercial Utilisation?

2.4 Those witnesses who argued for the commercial utilisation of native wildlife often did not explain clearly their starting points, nevertheless there were assumptions behind what they were saying (or had written).

2.5 One of those assumptions was the broad argument that the demand for animal protein to feed the world's human population provides sufficient justification for the use of animals as food. This argument is based on the notion of the greatest good for the greatest number. However, witnesses did not address the counter claim that feeding animals with grain, for example, is inefficient in terms of the conversion rate of grain into protein when consumed by animals compared with the direct consumption of grain as food by humans.

2.6 A sub-set of this debate is about which animals may be consumed as food. While some witnesses argued against any consumptive use of animals, others argued that they would allow the use of domestic animals for food for humans but not the use of native wildlife.

2.7 Reasons advanced for making this distinction included claims that centuries of selective breeding make domestic animals much more suitable as food because they provide a much greater mass of meat per animal. Also, the argument was advanced that, should there be a greater consumptive use of native wildlife, this will inevitably lead to farming of such animals followed by selective breeding and genetic manipulation. Should this occur there is the possibility of a change in the nature of species and a loss of original genetics.

2.8 Another variation of the debate is the argument that the consumptive use of some native animals (for example, fish) is preferable to the consumptive use of others (for example, marsupials). However, it is difficult to sustain an ethical argument based on a graduation in the intrinsic worth of species. At its crudest it seems to be an argument about which species is more 'cuddly'.

2.9 The debate about the use of animals as food also involves arguments about animal welfare and whether Codes of Practice are enforceable and therefore whether they work. This debate is taken up elsewhere in this Report (Paragraph 6.63).

2.10 A separate argument in favour of commercial utilisation was not expressed directly but at times was an unspoken justification for the use of animals. This was the assumption that, because humans are seen to be the most advanced species in terms of evolution, then this gives humans right to dominate other species - the 'survival of the fittest' argument. This is sometimes given a theological justification as discussed below.

2.11 Probably the most serious argument advanced for the commercial utilisation of native wildlife was put by witnesses such as Professor Gordon Grigg [2] and Dr John Wamsley. [3] They argued that commercial utilisation can lead to an enhanced conservation value in terms of preservation of habitat, recovery of threatened species and enhanced support for biodiversity. For example, Dr Wamsley's Warrawong Sanctuary in the Adelaide Hills has re-established a number of threatened species which had almost been wiped out through human intervention. He argued that he has achieved this because the animals were given a monetary value.

2.12 Professor Grigg has conducted extensive research in marginal rangelands and proposes that domestic animals such as sheep, goats and cattle should be removed from these areas and replaced with the harvesting of kangaroos. He argued that this kind of commercial utilisation of native wildlife would enable these areas to gradually recover, especially where there has been serious soil degradation.

2.13 The above elements of the debate are not necessarily all ethical in nature as they rely also on biological and ecological arguments. However, they lead to the following important questions:

• Are human beings a part of, or separate from other living things?
• That is, are human beings one species amongst other species and part of the inter-relatedness of all species, or unique in the sense that they stand apart from and above all other species?
• On what ethical basis do human beings have the right to use other species for human benefit but to the detriment of those species?

Animals versus Humans

2.14 What follows is simply an outline of where some of the answers to these questions may be found. It is not possible in a report of this nature to canvass all the implications of these questions.

2.15 Those who argue against the commercial utilisation of native wildlife usually do so from the perspective that animals are 'sentient creatures' which are similar to us and therefore should not be treated as things. The ANZFAS submission quoted Professor Peter Singer:

Commercialisation sees sentient beings as things, and asks how we can best profit from them. An ethical attitude sees wild animals as sentient beings, and asks how we can best protect and preserve their interests, while recognising that our own interests must also count, especially where our own survival is at stake. [4]

2.16 Those who are for commercial utilisation argue that human beings have a right to use animals because this is part of the natural order of things or that it is necessary for human survival, or at least permissible in order to enhance the quality of human life. These arguments also usually assume or state that human beings are superior to other animals and therefore, in an evolutionary sense and as the apex of evolution, have the right to exploit inferior species.

2.17 There are theological arguments as well which are sometimes advanced to justify the use of animals by human beings. The ANZFAS submission is critical of this kind of theology:

The entire mind-set that lies behind that of 'sustainable use' and 'harvesting a resource' is derived from a Western (Christian) tradition that makes animals merely of instrumental value is therefore fundamentally wrong. [5]

2.18 The reference is to an on-going debate between ecologists and some aspects of Christian theology about the meaning of such passages in the Bible as Genesis 1:27-28:

So God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them, God blessed them and said to them, 'Be fruitful and increase, fill the earth and subdue it, rule over the fish in the sea, the birds of heaven, and every living thing that moves upon the earth'.

2.19 It is assumed from this passage that words such as 'subdue' and 'rule' justify a kind of 'divine right' to dominate and use animals in whatever way human beings determine. While in the past these words have been interpreted in this way, modern scholarship does not support this interpretation at all. Contextual, exegetical and linguistic considerations all point to the meaning of this passage as being about human beings living in a responsible, dynamic relationship with all other living things and with the earth itself.

2.20 There are other aspects to this debate such as the nature of this relationship before and after the 'fall' (Genesis 3) but these cannot be pursued here. Readers of this report are referred to recent writings by Christian thinkers such as Animal Theology by Andrew Linzey and The Good Earth by Paul Collins.

Ethics and Economics

2.21 Dr John Hatch from the University of Adelaide made some telling points in his submission to the Committee about the relationship between commercial utilisation and market forces. [6] He warned about depending on the market to achieve a good ecological outcome given that markets are 'not easily predicted or controlled'. To quote him more fully:

To be more specific. When you turn a wild creature into a commercial good, you willy nilly release forces, market forces, which may well be largely outside society's immediate and close control. It is something of a gamble to assume, as some do, that these forces will further environmental and biodiversity goals. Markets, particularly competitive ones, create information and incentives. They are organic not mechanical and therefore not easily predicted or controlled. [7]

2.22 Dr Hatch's point also serves as support for those who warn against turning living things such as animals into commodities. He argued that commercialisation (commodification) 'changes the nature and/or our perception of things' so that a wild animal is less wild and therefore different once it is treated as a commodity to be used, or disposed of, without any thought as to whether it has an intrinsic value for its own sake. [8]

2.23 This dichotomy is perhaps illustrated best by reference to the way in which many traditional, indigenous societies understand other non-human species. These societies see themselves as being related to other species and deriving meaning from such relationships. So, whilst indigenous people may kill animals for human consumption, they do not do so in any causal way or regard it as a right derived from a superior status as human beings. Rather, they acknowledge that the animal is in some way offering itself to sustain human survival. Perhaps this is what Professor Singer means when he writes that human beings have an obligation to care for animals whilst, at the same time, 'recognising that our own interests must also count, especially where our own survival is at stake'. [9]

2.24 So, it cannot be argued that there is only one ethical starting point. Nor should it be argued that one's own position is the only ethical one and that those on the other side of the argument are motivated by an agenda which is unethical.

2.25 What can be said is that there are strong ethical grounds for human beings to see themselves in relationship with all other living things. So, whether or not the decision is made for the commercial utilisation of native wildlife, this should be done always with an eye to the intrinsic worth of non-human species. The final words of Dr Hatch's submission are a timely reminder to all sides in the debate:

The point is that markets evolve, incentives are created and they are driven substantially by individual self interest, albeit an aggregation of individual self interests. None of these ensure collective interest especially when our knowledge base is so poor. In much more practical terms, it may well be true that in the immediate future we can only defend some environmental assets by commercialising them. It may be that it is the only strategy that will work. However, I do not believe that bringing everything into the narrow ambit of the market is a long term and sustainable solution for environmental conservation in general or preservation of biodiversity which is a major part of that. Biodiversity is the continuing and changing product of forces largely outside human control. Markets are another set of forces, partially outside human control, but following a set of incentives which operate on humans. Ultimately, it may be seen as extreme hubris on our part as a species to want to integrate the two and become the managers of the environment, using our most potent and yet dangerous weapon - market forces. [10]

Review of Submissions Spectrum of Views

2.26 The submissions sent to the Committee revealed a high degree of disagreement about the ethical desirability of commercial utilisation of wildlife, aside from any impact on the environment, economics or biodiversity. Most submissions could be classed in one of five categories:

1. animals have a right to exist without interference from humans and therefore commercial utilisation of wildlife is wrong, as is any use of animals;
2. wildlife has an intrinsic value and is different from domesticated animals and therefore commercial use of native animals is wrong;
3. Australian wildlife is already threatened in many ways and the conservation value of most native species, and in particular animals, would be threatened by commercial use;
4. commercial utilisation of wildlife is acceptable if it can be proved to be ecologically sustainable and if it has a conservation benefit to the species involved or its habitat; and
5. commercial utilisation of wildlife is acceptable if it does not have any detrimental impact on the environment and is economically sustainable.

2.27 Submissions belonging to the first three groups were more philosophically aligned to each other than to the last two groups and, similarly, the last two groups had many views in common.

(1) Objections Based on Animal Rights

2.28 The well-being of all animals, whether they are native or exotic, wild or domesticated, is of concern to many people in Australia. The degree of concern, however, ranges from absolute protection of animal rights, to a position where use of animals for varying purposes is acknowledged, but that use is tempered by considerations of the welfare of the individual animal. Animal rights groups, most usually represented by branches of the non-government organisation (NGO) Animal Liberation, are totally opposed to any use of animals for any purpose. They believe that animals have a right to live untouched in any way by human interference. From this fundamental premise, animal rights groups oppose commercial utilisation of wildlife, just as they oppose use of any animal, other than for strictly regulated eco-tourism activities. [11]

2.29 Animal Liberation takes the view that it is immoral to exploit any sentient being for purely commercial gain, even if the exploitation is carried out in a humane manner, because animals are not the property of human beings. Just as people have come to understand that having power over other people does not bestow a right to treat them as disposable items, having power over animals does not bestow a right to treat them in any way we want. Animals have the same right that people have to live their lives without interference. [12] Commercial utilisation of wildlife is 'inherently cruel' because codes of practice are inadequate, because there is no such thing as humane shooting of kangaroos or cruelty free emu and crocodile farming practices, and because wild animals are not adapted to co-habit with humans as are domestic species. 'The rights of these animals are being abused and they go through much physical and emotional suffering in the process'. [13]

2.30 Groups objecting to the commercial utilisation of wildlife primarily on the basis of animal rights included (submission number given in parenthesis):

• Native Bird Liberation Alliance (57);
• Animal Liberation, ACT (66);
• South Australian Federation of Animal Societies (76);
• Animal Liberation, Vic (87);
• Antivivisection Union (132);
• RSPCA (169);
• Australian and New Zealand Federation of Animal Societies (178); and
• NSW Animal Societies Federation (339).

(2) Objections Based on Intrinsic Value and Sanctity of Wildlife

2.31 The objections to using wildlife in a commercial manner presented by this group of submissions can be summed up as:

• by its very nature, wildlife is different from domesticated animals or cultivated plants;
• wildlife has an innate right to exist and should not be exploited;
• wildlife belong to the public, not to the government or to specific commercial interests;
• the public should value and preserve wildlife solely for its intrinsic qualities.

2.32 One of the points raised repeatedly by people who objected to commercial utilisation of wildlife was that it was philosophically wrong to consume the very animals that were a symbol of Australia and, in particular, were represented on Australia's coat of arms (emus and kangaroos). Groups such as ANZFAS considered that it was hypocritical to, on one hand, praise the glory and uniqueness of Australia's wildlife as tourist icons and then, on the other hand, use them commercially for consumer products. [14] As expressed by wildlife carer, Mrs Lorraine Conley:

As a nation, we are so downright hypocritical. We support our country in sport by barracking for the Wallabies, the Hockeyroos, the Socceroos, the Boomers, the Ollyroos. Qantas has a kangaroo on the tails of its planes, there is the 'buy Australian made' campaign, the preview of the 2000 Olympics opening ceremony and the like. Then this country condones and promotes the massacre of millions of these very same species of animals. And for what? The almighty dollar, of course. Then there is the most hypocritical thing of all: Australia's coat-of-arms. [15]

2.33 However, other submissions argued that claims of this type were susceptible to the 'cuddly syndrome'. Noting that there has been little objection to the use and export of freshwater crustaceans such as marron and yabbies and to the crocodile industry, one observer commented: 'The arguments against commercial utilisation of wildlife seem more to do with 'cute and cuddly' than sound scientific argument. [16]

2.34 Major submissions objecting to the use of wildlife primarily on the basis of its sanctity included:

• Bird Care and Conservation Society, SA (61);
• Australian Wildlife Protection Council (92 & 93);
• Kangaroo Protection Co-operative (129);
• Nascaring Wildlife Carers (297);
• Central Coast Concerned Citizens About Native Wildlife (311);
• Wildlife Foundation (319 & 320); and
• Australians Against Commercialisation of Wildlife (333).
  1. Objections Based on Threat to Conservation Values

2.35 Quite a number of submissions argued that commercial use of any species of native wildlife would represent a threat to the conservation status of that species and would diminish the conservation values of the environment in which it lived. Many of these submissions argued that a major impediment to commercial utilisation of wildlife was lack of sufficient scientific knowledge to allow an adequate assessment of 'sustainability'. [17] The Arid Lands Environment Council, for example, argued that 'until basic information about population dynamics and life histories are known, as well as interaction with other species in an ecosystem, it will be impossible to set realistic sustainable culling quotas'. [18] Generally, groups taking this stand were those listed at Paragraph 2.41.

(4) Agreement Based on Sustainability and Conservation Benefit

2.36 Quite a number of submissions acknowledged that the survival of many species could not be assured simply through protection in national parks and other government reserves, and that protection of broad areas of habitat was now crucial to biodiversity conservation. Those submissions generally supported sustainable use of wildlife on the basis that it was carried out in an ecologically sustainable basis on private lands, that scientifically based monitoring procedures were established and that it was strictly regulated. For example, the Wildlife Preservation Society of Australia argued that: 'if the native wildlife provides an acceptable use, there is no problem with the harvesting given adequate controls as well as no cruelty in the gathering'. [19]

2.37 Some submissions, while objecting generally to the harvesting of wildlife, accepted that species which had become 'out of balance' with their natural population numbers could be harvested. [20] Other submissions accepted captive-breeding of wildlife provided that there was no detrimental impact to the environment, but did not accept wild harvesting. [21] Other submissions pointed out that farming of wildlife was one way in which the impact of illegal taking from the wild could be reduced. [22] The Humane Society International takes the position that if trade in wildlife or wildlife products is allowed, 'the criteria devised to control and manage that trade should be the strictest criteria possible'. [23]

2.38 However, many submissions that agreed with conditional commercial utilisation of wildlife also argued that any commercial utilisation of wildlife must have a direct positive environmental outcome; that is, it should have a conservation benefit for the species involved or for the habitat of that species. Generally, groups taking this stand are those listed at Paragraph 2.42, plus the scientists listed at Paragraph 2.44.

(5) Agreement Based on Sustainable Use

2.39 The view that appropriate management of Australia's wildlife resources could have a beneficial economic impact to individuals and to the nation was expressed in many submissions to the Committee. In addition to industry groups and governments, a number of other independent agencies put submissions arguing the important role that both existing and new wildlife industries could play in benefiting the Australian environment and economy. These submissions did not necessarily advocate a direct link between commercial use and conservation benefit.

• National Farmers' Federation (106);
• Far North Queensland Network (83);
• Northern Land Council (300).

Disparity Among Conservation Groups

2.40 The issue of commercial utilisation of wildlife is clearly one which does not have consensus among conservation groups. Some favoured the ecologically sustainable use of wildlife with conditions and some emphatically and dogmatically rejected it. Conservation groups which favoured commercial utilisation of wildlife usually did so on the considered premise that it could result in benefits to conservation. Those which opposed it, usually did so on the grounds that no commercial use of wildlife was ecologically sustainable and that all uses of wildlife would have a detrimental impact on ecological systems. In some instances, conservation groups which opposed commercial utilisation of wildlife also held a strong ethical view against the commercial use of animals (although many of those submissions did not substantiate their views) and it appeared that those groups were aligned with animal rights organisations.

2.41 Conservation groups which opposed commercial utilisation of wildlife included:

• Johnstone Ecological Society (6);
• North Coast Environment Council, NSW (22);
• Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland, Capricorn Branch (37) and Pine Rivers Branch (134);
• Sunshine Coast Environment Council (54);
• Queensland Conservation Council (65);
• Waterbird Conservation Group (67);
• Nature Conservation Council of NSW (mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians) (99);
• Conservation Council of Western Australia (101);
• Stradbroke Island Management Organisation (139);
• Blackwood Environment Society, WA (156);
• Tasmanian Conservation Trust (203);
• Gold Coast and Hinterland Environment Council (253);
• Australian Conservation Foundation; [24]
• Nambucca Valley Conservation Association (315); and
• Threatened Species Network (317).

2.42 Conservation groups which agreed conditionally with the commercial utilisation of wildlife included:

• Wild Life Preservation Society of Australia (9);
• Latrobe Valley Field Naturalists Club (48);
• Nature Conservation Council of NSW (plants and animals other than mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians) (99);
• World Wide Fund for Nature, Australia (102);
• Arid Lands Environment Centre, Alice Springs (111);
• Australasian Wildlife Management Society (176);
• Victorian Herpetological Society (190);
• TRAFFIC Oceania (299);
• Nature Conservation Society of South Australia (301);
• Cape York Herpetological Society (308);
• Spencer Gulf Environmental Alliance (farming of wildlife is more acceptable than harvesting) (328); and
• Conservation Council of SA (330).

2.43 An eloquent explanation for the divergence in views between groups of conservationists is provided by Canadian scientist Robert Hudson as follows:

Although seldom stated, the root of disagreement among conservationists may be simply that commercialization runs at cross-purposes with moral appeals. Much of the money donated to international wildlife conservation comes from people attracted to the thought of moral duty and wholesome love for nature. They are unlikely to be convinced that killing animals is good for them. The public votes with its donations and conservation agencies have been forced, for better or for worse, to modify policies and even fundamental views. [25]

Scientists

2.44 The Committee received a considerable number of submissions from individual scientists who supported sustainable use of wildlife. Mr David Millar, Exhibition Project Officer at the Australian Museum, who gave evidence in a private capacity, commented: 'Some degree of commercial utilisation of native animals is generally supported by those who are interested in their study '. [26] Submissions supporting commercial utilisation of wildlife provided by scientists included: [27]

• Dr John Wamsley, Earth Sanctuaries (77);
• Professor Eugene Moll, Department of Natural Systems and Rural Management, University of Queensland (103);
• Associate Professor Michael J Tyler, University of Adelaide (104);
• Dr Chris Tidemann, Department of Forestry, ANU (142);
• Dr Darryl Houston (148);
• Dr Grahame Webb, Wildlife Management International (157);
• Mr David Millar, Australian Museum (175);
• Australasian Wildlife Management Society (176);
• Australian Veterinary Association (187).
• Dr Michael Vardon, Wildlife Management International (192);
• Professor Gordon Grigg, Department of Zoology, University of Queensland (200); and
• Mr Melvin Bolton, conservation planner (337).

Indigenous People

2.45 Submissions were put to the Committee by a number of Aboriginal groups including:

• Central Aboriginal Land Council (298);
• Northern Aboriginal Land Council (300);
• NSW Aboriginal Land Council (174);
• Murwangi Community Aboriginal Corporation (310);
• Bama Ngappi Ngappi Aboriginal Corporation; [28] and
• Edward River Crocodile Farm. [29]

2.46 For the most part, these groups accepted commercial utilisation of wildlife and expressed a desire to be involved. However, the Central Land Council was of the opinion that commercial utilisation of native wildlife was not an appropriate conservation measure in arid regions for following reasons:

• few species have the potential to be harvested or farmed;
• harvesting would be logistically difficult because of the remoteness of resources from each other;
• transport limitations (distance of resources from markets);
• the conditions for captured animals may be quite harsh; and
• value adding would occur closer to the markets and thus minimal benefits would pass on to the harvester. [30]

Lack of Informed Debate

2.47 It was clear from the evidence presented to the Committee that the subject of commercial utilisation of wildlife and its potential benefits to biodiversity conservation is complex. It was equally clear that at times people and groups entered the debate without adequate scientific information and without a full appreciation of the issues and their intricacies, or without practical experience of conservation problems. For example, one submission stated: 'Our stance is not complex it will be similar to every other Conservation group in the country. We will add the weight of our society and its 200 members to the case for opposing any commercialisation of Australian native wildlife. We are not making a scientific or technical submission'. [31]

2.48 The lack of informed debate was of concern to a number of people who gave evidence to the Committee. For example, in criticising the statements made by some animal rights groups, Mr David Millar commented: 'while [animal liberationists] appear to me to be long on rhetoric and high on emotion, most seem uninformed and deficient in practical experience'. [32] To Mr Keith Cook, a crocodile farmer from Cairns, the public perception of how conservation operated was very limited:

there is very little understanding amongst either government or the public as to the realities of conservation and how they relate to the consumptive use of these things. It is easy to sit down and have your bowl of Weeties in the morning and forget the fact that we wiped out most of the wheat belt areas of Western Australia and southern New South Wales to produce the wheat; but try shooting a koala and it is the end of the world. [33]

2.49 Nadine and Paul Marshall of Endemica Furniture, a business based on the production of high quality furniture from recycled timber and kangaroo leather, stated in their submission:

The future benefits to Australia of commercial utilisation of native wildlife are immense. However the Australian government, together with businesses such as our own, must make concerted efforts to communicate to the Australian and international public the importance of changing our perceptions of the sanctity of native wildlife to embrace a broader and more informed environmental ethic. [34]

2.50 In the opinion of conservation planner, Mr Melvin Bolton: 'There is no doubt that Australians are concerned about their wildlife but in general people are not well informed about the science of wildlife conservation'. Mr Bolton highlighted the fact that misinformed debate was often perpetuated by a media which pandered to scandal and sensational headlines: 'To make an analogy, it is rather as if car thieves were publicly regarded as the major threat to traffic safety'. [35]

2.51 Finally, Dr Grahame Webb of Wildlife Management International noted in his submission that the image of Australian conservationists overseas was not positive: 'We are considered to be arrogant, narrow-minded and totally oblivious to the real conservation problems that most of the world and the world's people are faced with'. [36]

Conclusion

2.52 From the breadth and depth of submissions, the strong element of moral judgement and the expression of views not necessarily based on rigorous scientific information, it is clear that in Australia there is a strong and vocal minority who believe that there should be no commercial use of native wildlife. At the other extreme there are a few people who have little respect for native fauna or flora. In between, there is in all likelihood a large majority of people who hold the view that there could be some sustainable use of wildlife, with differing views on which species can be used and under what circumstances. This report explores the current and potential beneficial and detrimental impacts on the environment and on the economy, the conditions whereby commercial utilisation of wildlife is acceptable, problems with the regulatory environment and, in Part II of the report, the current diversity of wildlife use.

Footnotes

[1] Submission No. 178; Evidence, p. RRA&T 953.

[2] Submission No. 200.

[3] Submission No. 77, Evidence, p. RRA&T 609ff.

[4] Submission No. 178, p. 3.

[5] Submission No. 178, p. 2.

[6] Submission No. 56, Evidence, p. RRA&T 567ff.

[7] Submission No. 56, p. 2.

[8] Submission No. 56, p. 3.

[9] Submission No. 178, p. 3.

[10] Submission No. 56, p. 5.

[11] Submission No.s 35, 57, 66, 87, Evidence, p. RRA&T 537, 539.

[12] Submission No. 66, p. 1-2.

[13] Submission No. 87, p. 15.

[14] Evidence, p. RRA&T 952.

[15] Evidence, p. RRA&T 105.

[16] Submission No. 210, p. 5.

[17] See for example, Evidence, p. RRA&T 481.

[18] Submission No. 111, p. 4 (Note, however, that ALEC conditionally agree with commercial use of wildlife).

[19] Submission No. 9, p. 3.

[20] For example, a submission from Alice Springs, signed by 62 people, suggested that 'adult birds like the corella or the galah could be collected from wheat farming regions where the growing of wheat has produced an explosion of these species well out of balance with what the natural environment can or has supported' Submission No. 55, p. 2.

[21] For example, Submission No. 55.

[22] Submission No. 6.

[23] Evidence, p. RRA&T 38.

[24] ACF Policy Statement No. 61, Tabled by the Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 8 September 1997.

[25] Hudson, R J 1997 Paths to Conservation Department of Renewable Resources, University of Alberta, Edmonton, http://cervid.forsci.ualberta.ca/ENCS376/Lectures/Trade/Trade p. 2, quoting Bonner 1993.

[26] Evidence, p. RRA&T 740.

[27] Note: although the affiliation of each scientist is given, unless otherwise stated, submissions were usually made in a personal capacity. There were no submissions from individual scientists opposed to commercial use of wildlife.

[28] Evidence, p. RRA&T 284ff.

[29] Evidence, p. RRA&T 179ff.

[30] Submission No. 298, p. 4.

[31] Submission No. 61, p. 1.

[32] Supplementary Submission No. 175, p. 1.

[33] Evidence, p. RRA&T 277.

[34] Submission No. 147, p. 2.

[35] Submission No. 337, p. 4.

[36] Submission No. 157, p. 6.