7. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

7.1 The Committee has given scant regard to the enormous problem of nuclear proliferation through the use of Australian uranium. The Committee, and successive Australian Governments, have ignored the visible risks of proliferation that come with the export of Australian uranium to countries with nuclear weapons capability and countries with nuclear energy programs.

7.2 The Australian public has been given to understand by successive Federal Governments that Australia's uranium would only be used for peaceful purposes. This is not the case. Australia's bilateral agreements with countries importing Australian uranium do not guarantee that Australian uranium will not be used in military nuclear technology. This view was supported by much evidence to the Committee[72]. It was also voiced by the head of the Australian Safeguards Office during a previous Senate Inquiry into Nuclear Testing and Non-Proliferation in 1995. During that inquiry he agreed that Australian uranium could have been used for French nuclear tests in the Pacific despite safeguards which are meant to prevent Australian material from being used for military purposes.[73]

7.3 The failure of Australia's bilateral agreements and the limitations of bilateral agreements in general are a function of the failure of the regime of IAEA and Non Proliferation Treaty safeguards. The regime is fundamentally flawed because the primary regulator, the IAEA, is also in charge of the promotion of nuclear energy and therefore faces a serious conflict of interest. The primary regulator is responsible for both promoting the transfer of technology for nuclear energy, and for stopping the use of that technology for a nuclear weapons program at the same time. It is also a practical impossibility to enforce safeguards in countries where there is no separation between military and civilian fuel cycles.

7.4 The IAEA suffers from a lack of resources which prevents it from making frequent inspection visits. It is also prevented from making spot inspections without giving countries adequate warning and cannot undertake inspections without permission. There is also a problem with the inspection requirements applying to different countries. Countries with existing nuclear weapons programs are favoured and inspected far less than suspected proliferators.

7.5 A fundamental problem of the safeguards system is that it is not universally applied. Facilities in the UK and France, for example, are not subject to full safeguards. This has meant that the IAEA has not been able to account for reprocessed plutonium internationally. Greenpeace presented evidence to the Committee which showed that less than one third of the Plutonium in civilian stockpiles is actually safeguarded by the IAEA, as is less than 50% of the plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel [74]. Only 116 out of 265 nuclear facilities in France are subject to safeguards inspections, 8 under the IAEA and 108 under Euratom. Even France's major reprocessing facility, La Hague is not subject to full safeguards inspections.

7.6 A further major problem is that the NPT is effectively voluntary. Even countries that have signed up must only give 3 months notice if they want to withdraw [75]. Australia has no way of forcing a country to maintain its agreement for reasons of national security, yet companies with long term contracts for the supply of uranium might be legally required to keep supplying uranium to countries suspected of developing nuclear weapons.

7.7 The key reasons for nuclear proliferation extending to include countries such as Iraq, South Korea, North Korea, South Africa, Israel, Pakistan and India are the deficiencies in the IAEA, the NPT and deficiencies in intelligence data. However, in the case of Iraq, technology transfer occurred openly via the US, in a strategy of Iraqi militarisation to counter the perceived threat from Iran. Therefore some proliferation has been sanctioned by the key members of the nuclear weapons states.

7.8 The Australian Government regularly gives permission for its uranium to be used in international nuclear energy programs from which it is easily siphoned off into nuclear weapons production. This occurs through weak bilateral safeguards. Between 1986 and 1994, the Australian Government gave permission for spent nuclear fuel containing 327 tonnes of Australian-origin uranium to be reprocessed. This would result in the separation of 2.88 tonnes of plutonium which has the potential to make 250 nuclear weapons [76]. Australia has bilateral agreements with importing countries in which Australia permits the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel containing Australian Obligated Nuclear Material. Australian permission or consent is based on 'advanced generic consent' for the reprocessing of nuclear material. This is an open door policy for dealing with a material which cannot be tracked or tagged and can be 'lost' during the nuclear fuel cycle.

7.9 The amount of plutonium 'lost' through the commercial separation accounts for 1-3% of all plutonium processed. The IAEA admits it can only account for only 97%-99% of the plutonium separated from spent fuel in commercial reprocessing plants. Key examples include La Hague in France losing up to 24 kilograms of weapons useable plutonium per year (enough for 2 bombs) and Tokai-mura in Japan losing 70 kilograms, another facility where Australian sourced uranium is processed. Despite this fact, and the lack of universality of safeguards application, Australia continues to sell uranium to France and Japan and allows it to be reprocessed.

7.10 Uranium sales to countries with nuclear potential such as Japan and North Korea exacerbate tensions which increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. Japan has the technical capacity, and the materials, to assemble a nuclear weapon in only weeks. Australia's uranium trade with Japan and South Korea promotes tensions with China and North Korea - adding to North Korea's fears and fueling its desire to achieve a nuclear capability. It also encourages China to improve its nuclear weapons arsenal and not work towards disarmament.

7.11 Proliferation can also occur because of the illegal trade in nuclear materials, via places such as the former Soviet States which are uncontrollable by IAEA and NPT safeguards. Proliferation is also rife through the practice of flag swapping that undermines the whole system of safeguards.

7.12 The flag swapping scandal was exposed in 1988 by Senator Sanders who showed that origins swaps and safeguards swaps were the means by which countries could facilitate the uranium trade with countries that were either banned from receiving uranium exports from some countries or had strict safeguards attached to the end use of the uranium which was being completely circumvented. [77]

7.13 It is important to note in this regard that the Australian Safeguards Office does not keep track of Australian uranium and the by-products of its use. Instead it keeps track of what is called Australian Obligated Nuclear Material. While Australian uranium is designated as AONM when it is exported, the practice of mixing material during processing and the use of flag swaps means that the correlation between Australian Obligated Nuclear Material and Australian sourced nuclear material quickly disappears. As was noted earlier, even the Australian Safeguards Office is unable to say whether any nuclear material originally mined in Australia has entered the French nuclear weapons program. All it can say with any certainty is that an amount of nuclear material, equivalent to the amount mined in Australia, is subject to Australian safeguard obligations.

7.14 The evidence presented to the committee was overwhelmingly critical of loopholes and the selective application of NPT and IAEA/Euratom safeguards which has completely undermined the effectiveness of safeguards. The risks of proliferation are enormous when safeguards simply do not work.

 

LEGALITIES OF URANIUM MINING

7.15 On July 10, 1996, the International Court of Justice ruled that the use, or threatened use of nuclear weapons was illegal except in cases of self-defence. They ruled that "in general terms the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law and in particular, to the principles of humanitarian law". Although the ICJ decision is nonbinding, the ICJ opinion has made illegal all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle leading to nuclear weapons production. Uranium mining is a part of the nuclear fuel cycle which provides the raw materials for nuclear weapons production.

7.16 Countries around the world have begun to take steps to implement the ICJ decision on the illegality of nuclear weapons. It is now time that Australia reconsidered its uranium policies in light of the ICJ decision. Australia's supply of uranium to any country capable of making nuclear weapons is in contravention of the finding of the ICJ and therefore is in contravention of both international and humanitarian law. [78]

 

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