Suggestions for improving domestic coordination
Introduction
3.1
This chapter summarises suggestions heard by the committee for how
Australia could better respond to climate threats, and reduce the future risks
of climate change. Many of these involved further integrating climate security
considerations across Commonwealth agencies, including by developing strategic
documents and creating dedicated leadership roles. Submissions also made
suggestions for improving coordination between agencies, other Australian governments
and stakeholders outside government.
Commonwealth coordination
3.2
The committee heard criticism that the government response to climate
security concerns has not been sufficiently coordinated, including in
comparison with other countries.[1] This section notes suggestions for improving policy coordination, including
integrating climate security in agency planning and reporting processes,
developing a white paper, establishing new entities, and improving departmental awareness.
Australia's response to climate
security concerns
3.3
The Centre for Policy Development (CPD) argued that Australia's climate
security 'policy responses overall can be described as parts lacking a whole'.[2] The Center for Climate and Security from the US argued that climate change
remains 'underexplored' as a security threat, leaving Australian security
agencies 'under-prepared'.[3] In contrast, Professor Anthony Burke of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)
suggested the submissions from government agencies demonstrated 'a widespread
and very clear-headed awareness of the dangers of climate change and its
relevance to national security', and applauded the 'active thinking and
positive effort'.[4] Air Vice Marshal Mel Hupfeld, Head Force Design, Defence, described how the Commonwealth
is 'embarking on a whole-of-government response to both climate [mitigation]
and climate adaptation'.[5]
3.4
A number of submissions compared Australia's action on climate security unfavourably
with that of the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK).[6] Former Chief of the Defence Force, Honorary Professor Admiral Chris Barrie AC
RAN (retired) argued that by 2015 Australia's key allies and partners had 'overtaken
us comprehensively in terms of including climate change priorities in national
security assessments and integrating climate change impacts fully into their
defence planning'.[7]
3.5
The Climate Council similarly advised Defence must 'follow their
strategic allies and increase military preparedness and resilience in the face [of]
growing climate risks'.[8] The CPD described the 2016 Defence White Paper as 'only a first
step' that did not establish a 'comprehensive strategy for climate security
challenges'.[9] However, the CPD also commented on recent positive developments, noting:
...senior ranks of our
military have shown greater acceptance of the challenges, and defence colleges
conduct training on the topic. But we have a long way to go still to catch up
to best practice of the US and the UK.[10]
3.6
While submissions perceived that the US Department of Defense (US DoD) exemplified
best practice on issues of climate security, some recent US policy documents
have not raised it as a central issue.[11] Dr Michael Thomas described the US President's National Security Strategy as having 'airbrushed climate change out of existence'.[12] The Climate Council suggested 'future progression of some programs and case
studies are uncertain under the Trump administration'.[13] However, climate change was still identified as 'a direct threat to the
national security' of the US in the most recent US Defense appropriation
legislation, which calls for a report 'on vulnerabilities to military
installations and combatant commander requirements resulting from climate change
over the next 20 years'.[14] American Rear Admiral David Titley (retired) suggested the current US approach
to climate security could be awarded a 'B' grade, while he granted Australia a 'B-plus'.[15]
Commonwealth agency planning and
reporting
3.7
Submissions recommended climate security should be further integrated
across the policy frameworks, scenario planning and reporting processes of government
agencies. American climate security expert, Ms Sherri Goodman, urged:
Make climate-fragility risks a central foreign policy
priority by integrating climate-fragility responses into planning,
implementation, and evaluation processes across Australian Government
departments, recognising that this requires new capacities within departments
and new cross-sectoral policy processes, and direct the government to report
regularly on the development of climate-strategic evaluation capacity, and
policy and process integration.[16]
3.8
Submissions advocated Australian agencies undertake scenario planning as
part of a risk-management approach to climate security.[17] The ARC Centres of Excellence for Climate System Science and Climate Extremes described
the limitations of '[t]raditional assessments of climate extremes and their
impacts' which examine each climatic driver in isolation, instead of
considering how these interact to exacerbate the risk of compound events and catastrophic
system failure.[18] Dr Paul Barnes, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), recommended
that strategic horizon scanning capabilities should be developed to support 'both
general policy development and specific climate impact assessments operating at
two levels—an agency focus and a strategic focus (national)'.[19]
3.9
The Home Affairs Portfolio 'recognises climate change as both a threat
or risk multiplier, and as a risk in its own right'.[20] It described how:
...the Portfolio is proactively responding to, and positioning
the nation to prepare for, changes in natural hazard intensity and frequency
triggered by climate change. For example, the Portfolio engages in scenario
exercises designed to further our understanding of climate change implications
across multiple areas of policy and what can be done to address these.[21]
3.10
Mr Mark Crosweller, Director General of Emergency Management Australia
(EMA) expanded on this, noting:
We have participated in many exercises involving many
government departments at state and federal level to fully understand the
context of what we're dealing with and, I stress, to understand the limitations
in the system and how we can move past those limitations when these things
manifest. So it's probably best to say it's an unfolding space of complexity
but also an unfolding space of competency.[22]
3.11
When asked if scenario contingency planning for worst-case scenarios was
available, Air Vice Marshal Hupfeld indicated they were being developed:
We're using simulation modelling and testing to assess the
scenarios and the work to try and answer the questions that you're asking...and
we use the terms 'most likely' and 'most dangerous'. 'Most dangerous' is 1½ to
two degrees. We're still looking at three degrees; I think there's more work to
be done on that. That is across all agencies, particularly Home Affairs and the
Department of the Environment and Energy, when we work through these. There are
scenarios conducted at the secretaries group level on the climate risk; we
actually put some of these scenarios in front of the secretaries of the
departments to assess their response.[23]
3.12
Some submissions highlighted the need for agencies, particularly Defence,
to report on climate security planning, analysis and adaptation. For example,
Ms Goodman recommended Defence 'report regularly on vulnerabilities to
military installations, and combatant commander requirements, across the full
spectrum of planning and operations'.[24] The CPD similarly called for an 'audit of all military installations, physical
infrastructure and other key assets that are vital to maintain the readiness,
capability and capacity of the ADF'.[25] This could be partly modelled on the recent US DoD report on climate-related
risk to military infrastructure.[26] As further detailed in chapter 4, Defence has undertaken preliminary
investigations into climate-related risks to Defence estate.[27]
Climate security white paper
3.13
As outlined in chapter 1, the Australian Government has acknowledged
climate security threats in a number of strategic documents, including the 2015 National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy, 2016 Defence
White Paper and 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. Some
submissions called for a climate security white paper or a Defence strategy, or
both, to further incorporate climate security considerations into national
security and Defence planning.
3.14
For example, the Center for Climate and Security from the US and the
Climate Council called for the release of a white paper on the national
security implications of climate change.[28] The former suggested this would 'act as an overarching document to guide
security agency responses to climate change', and:
- establish the basis and context of the climate security
risks to Australia and the region; b. identify the key agencies and their roles
to deal with climate risks in a more coordinated, systemic and strategic
fashion; c. synthesize the national security effort into a whole-of-nation
and whole-of-region framework; and d. clearly communicate the security risks to
the Australian public.[29]
3.15
Dr Thomas, representing the Climate Council, explained a white paper was
required because the current policy response is 'so fragmented', stating:
...there is no central driving narrative that gives an
institution like the ADF [Australian Defence Force] a requirement—a green
light, if you like—to discuss the ideas in open forums, to discuss what their
strategic response will be...something to actually draw all these disparate
matters together into a coherent form I think would be really important.[30]
3.16
The Climate Council nominated the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
and the Department of Defence to coordinate a climate security
white paper.[31]
3.17
Alternatively, the CPD proposed the development of an 'integrated policy
framework on climate change preparedness across defence, foreign affairs and
aid'.[32]
New climate security entities
3.18
Submissions advocated the establishment of new bodies and roles with
explicit responsibility for coordinating climate and security policy. For
example, Professor Anthony Burke and Professor Shirley Scott of ADFA argued for
the re-establishment of the Department for Climate Change, to coordinate Australia's
broad response to climate change, including change mitigation and adaptation
activities.[33] This proposal was reiterated by Dr Thomas, who supported 'having a
centralised, coordinated government agency or portfolio—whatever that may be—to
drive the necessary changes that are needed at a national level on climate
change'.[34]
3.19
Submissions proposed the establishment of an additional interagency
taskforce or working group focused specifically on climate security. For
example, Professor Jon Barnett, University of Melbourne, commented:
A whole of government response would improve the range and
effectiveness of Australia's efforts to enhance climate security, and to this
end there is value in an interagency working group that meets regularly, and is
comprised of members from relevant [departments].[35]
3.20
Mr Ian Dunlop recommended the creation of a new climate and conflict
taskforce, to report to the Parliament within six months.[36] The ARC
Centres of Excellence suggested the establishment of a 'high-level taskforce to
examine risks associated with climate change and national security' and
undertake modelling and scenario planning to understand these risks as a matter
of urgency.[37] An international example of a climate security taskforce is the US Navy Task
Force Climate Change, which was established in 2009 to prepare for the
challenge of sea-ice collapse in the Arctic.[38] This included
representatives from 'various naval staff and program offices and the
operational fleet, with the close collaboration of the U.S. Coast Guard and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration'.[39]
3.21
Other submissions recommended incorporating climate security policy
responsibility into the structure of the Australian Public Service. For
example, The Center for Climate and Security suggested the creation of a Climate
and Security Office in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).[40] This would be responsible for interdepartmental 'integration of climate change
and security concerns, working with international partners and embassies on
climate change and security issues'.[41] If established, this
could support the climate security envoy with responsibility for international
engagement proposed by the CPD.
Existing interagency coordination
3.22
There are already some formal mechanisms for coordination on climate
security matters across Commonwealth agencies, including through the Disaster
and Climate Resilience Reference Group (Reference Group) and the Maritime
Border Command.
3.23
Some national security agencies are involved in the Reference Group,
including Defence and the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs).[42] The rationale provided for establishing this Reference Group noted:
Improved integration of disaster and climate resilience
planning, policies and programmes at the national level can help to deliver a
sustainable and coordinated national approach to natural disasters and climate
change.... The benefits of a coordinated approach to natural
disasters and climate change could be achieved through the formation of the
Australian Government Disaster and Climate Resilience Reference Group.[43]
3.24
Departments are represented in the Reference Group by people at the
deputy secretary or first assistant secretary level, and the Reference Group is
supported by an Officer Group on Climate Risk coordinated by DoEE.[44] The Reference Group 'is particularly focussed on the strategic implications of
climate change and natural hazards across portfolios, including complex issues
that affect multiple agencies'.[45] Mr Crosweller stated that the Reference Group 'has a progressive agenda',
and is:
...deepening understanding of the current and future impacts of
climate change and provides a forum for sharing experiences of how we can
respond through engagement with the Commonwealth's expert science and research
organisations in the private sector.[46]
3.25
The Reference Group's current activities include:
- Developing and endorsing a set of guiding principles to
assist Australian Government agencies to consider disaster and climate resilience
in policies and programs and for assets.
- Identifying tools, guidance and case studies that are
required to enable Australian Government agencies to consider disaster and
climate resilience in policies and programs, and for assets.
- Developing and endorsing tools, guidance and case studies
as required.
- Overseeing the mapping of Australian Government policies,
programs and assets that relate to disaster and climate resilience, and
identify linkages and interdependencies.
- Establishing an Officer-Level Network with representatives
from all member agencies.
- Identifying existing mechanisms that members use to engage
with the private sector.
- Developing and agreeing an approach for further engagement
with the private sector on disaster and climate issues.
- Inviting Geoscience Australia, CSIRO, the Bureau of
Meteorology, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and others to deliver
briefings to the Reference Group on disaster and climate science and research.[47]
3.26
At the time of writing, the Reference Group had met six times since its
establishment in July 2016.[48]
3.27
Defence noted the 'impact on future operations from climate change
related security challenges cannot be solely met by the ADF and is more likely
to require an inter-agency response such as the Maritime Border Command (MBC)'.[49] The MBC is a multi-agency taskforce 'within the Australian Border Force [ABF],
which utilises assets assigned from ABF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF)
to protect Australia against civil maritime security threats within its
maritime jurisdiction'.[50] Home Affairs noted these threats include:
- Illegal exploitation of natural resources;
- Illegal activity in protected areas;
- Illegal maritime arrivals;
- Prohibited imports/exports;
- Maritime terrorism;
- Piracy, robbery and violence at sea;
- Compromise to bio-security; and
- Maritime pollution.[51]
3.28
The Commander of the MBC is a Navy (two-star) Rear Admiral whose dual
command authority allows them to control both ADF and ABF assets.[52]
3.29
As outlined in chapter 2, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) are also
expected to face additional challenges in the context of climate change, and
establish more multidisciplinary and multi-agency teams in response. In
addition to responding to regional instability, the AFP can expect an increase
in operational missions related to global fragility and the mass movement of
people, critical infrastructure, environmental crime, and fraud and corruption.[53] Home Affairs stated:
The use of multidisciplinary and multi-agency teams,
comprising detectives and specialist investigative capabilities, to resolve
standard investigations will become the norm. This will require a recalibration
of the AFP's existing workforce and greater public sector partnerships.[54]
Knowledge and skills
3.30
Some submissions identified a need to improve climate security
capability and knowledge across government and Defence.[55] Defence introduced a Climate Change and Security elective in its Centre for
Defence and Strategic Studies course in 2016.[56] In addition, Defence partnered with the Australian National University (ANU)
Climate Change and Energy Change Institutes to develop short courses on climate
change and security and energy literacy.[57] Defence also worked with ASPI to develop a whole-of-government 'executive
master-class in risk and resilience'.[58] Professor Scott said:
...it's an area we are hoping to expand on in the education of
the training officers and the midshipmen—a greater understanding of the
interaction between the different issues which can come under the umbrella of
climate security.[59]
Emissions reductions
3.31
Submissions strongly recommended the Australian Government reduce
national greenhouse gas emissions through mitigation activities to avoid the
effects of climate change as far as possible. Submissions described effective
emissions reductions as 'critical', 'necessary' and 'essential' for limiting
the national security risks of climate change.[60] Professor
Matt McDonald reasoned 'addressing climate insecurity should ultimately focus
on addressing the problems itself rather than simply responding defensively to
manifestations of it'.[61] The Public Health Association of Australia noted mitigation 'has multiple
benefits for the ecological and social determinants of health and for security'.[62]
National emissions reduction
targets
3.32
The Paris Agreement is the 'international community's core vehicle for
addressing climate change'.[63] Australia has
committed to a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 26-28 per cent
below 2005 levels by 2030.[64] Mr Patrick
Suckling, Ambassador for the Environment, described Australia's commitments as 'among
the more ambitious of those of G20 countries, effectively representing a
halving of emissions per person in Australia by 2030, or a two-thirds reduction
per unit of GDP'.[65] The Department of the Environment and Energy (DoEE) asserted this 'is in step
with the efforts of other developed countries'.[66] However, this was rejected by many submissions. Mr Dunlop described the targets
as 'far below a reasonable contribution in comparison with other countries, and
even further from proportionally meeting the Paris 1.5-2.0°C temperature limit
objective'.[67] Submissions were also critical
of the likely effectiveness of the nationally determined contributions under
the Paris Agreement. For example, Ms Goodman stated:
Whilst the Paris climate accord's goal are to ''keeping the
increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial
levels [and] to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C'', the present commitment by
governments will result in warming of 3°C or more. Such an outcome would have
national security consequences so severe that some nations would cease to exist
and the viability of many others would be severely challenged.[68]
3.33
Professor Timothy Stephens, University of Sydney, similarly
characterised Australia's targets as 'weak' and 'inconsistent with the Paris
Agreement's 1.5/2°C temperature goal'.[69] Many
submissions urged the Australian Government to strengthen greenhouse gas
emissions reductions to protect Australia's national security.[70] Recommended targets
included reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 per cent below 2000
levels by 2025, and 60 per cent below 2000 levels by 2030.[71]
3.34
Ms Helen Wilson, Acting Deputy Secretary, Climate Change and Energy
Innovation, DoEE, explained to the committee:
While it is true that, globally, we are not yet on track to
achieve the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, the agreement is designed so
that all countries ratchet up ambition through five-yearly submissions of
nationally determined contributions. The Australian government has decided, as
part of the 2017 review of climate change policies, to establish a five-yearly
review and refine cycle in line with the Paris Agreement review cycle. [72]
3.35
Rear Admiral Titley encouraged the committee to 'not lose sight of the
big picture: how to move the world's energy system to a predominantly
non-carbon based energy source to power the world'.[73] A number of submissions shared this view, variously recommending a target of
net zero emissions and a decarbonised economy by 2030, 2040 or 2050.[74]
Energy sources
3.36
Some participants discussed the use of specific energy sources,
including coal, nuclear power, and liquid fuels. Mr Dunlop warned 'by
continuing to invest heavily in fossil fuels, which is what Australia is doing,
we are effectively locking in catastrophic outcomes today which you won't be
able to unwind'.[75] When asked whether the 'vested
interests that are keeping fossil fuels front and centre' of Australia's
economy are 'a threat to climate change action and a threat to national
security', Mr Dunlop agreed 'those vested interests are themselves a major
threat to national security.[76] He told the committee 'we
are hinging our foreign policy argument about the future development of our
industries on something that is completely unsustainable from a climate point
of view'.[77] Oxfam Australia argued there is 'certainly no space for new coal', and called
for a ban on 'new coalmines or coalmine expansions in Australia'.[78]
3.37
The committee also sought some witnesses' views on the use of nuclear
power. Admiral Barrie cautioned the use of nuclear power as 'a stopgap measure
to bridge Australia away from its current dependence on coal into renewable
energy' would entail 'building a very, very long-term eventual problem, even
though these days, with new technologies, the amount of residual waste is very
much reduced from the earlier years'.[79] Dr Simon Bradshaw,
Oxfam Australia, described nuclear power as 'a very expensive solution' and 'not
a solution for people who don't currently live with electricity'.[80] Acknowledging the dangers of nuclear proliferation, Mr Dunlop stated:
My personal view is that the problem is so acute that you
cannot actually ignore any option at this point. I think nuclear has to be a
consideration. I personally don't think it will stack up....the nuclear industry
hasn't been able to actually demonstrate a clear-cut business case and
technological case on a lot of these new developments anywhere. If it can
happen, then fine. I think we should look at it carefully.[81]
3.38
The ANU Climate Change Institute also raised the risk of nuclear
proliferation.[82]
3.39
Following the hearing on 20 March 2018, Commonwealth agencies provided
an overview of their approach to Australia's liquid fuel supply chain. This
includes working to implement Australia's compliance plan to address the
current shortfall in oil stockholdings, and preparing to respond in the event
of an emergency in accordance with relevant legislation and the National Liquid
Fuel Emergency Response Plan.[83] The Commonwealth encourages the development and use of alternative fuels through
grants, emissions reductions policies and excise relief, and is supporting
research into hydrogen technologies.[84] Chapter 4 provides some information on Defence's energy use, including
non-traditional fuel sources.
Commonwealth leadership roles
3.40
Participants recommended the appointment of senior climate security leaders.
Proposals included a climate security envoy with responsibility for
international engagement, and an adviser within the Home Affairs Portfolio to
facilitate interagency coordination on national security and resilience.
3.41
The committee heard the Australian Government should consider
establishing new climate security roles modelled on international examples. In
2009, the UK Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
jointly appointed a Climate and Energy Security Envoy as the UK 'voice' on climate
and resource security. The Envoy was tasked with broadening and deepening the
climate security debate, and integrating the Ministry's climate strategy across
government departments.[85] Both CPD and the Climate Council suggested Australia establish a similar envoy
role responsible for facilitating policy integration across government and
representing Australia internationally on climate security policy.[86]
3.42
CPD recommended the creation of a Climate and Resource Security Envoy jointly
funded by DFAT and Defence, and emphasised adequate resourcing would be
required to signal Australia's prioritisation of climate security.[87] The Climate Council recommended the appointment of a Military Climate Change
Envoy, with the 'ability to be engaged, particularly regionally, to act with
confidence and authority throughout the region when we are engaging,
particularly with other militaries, on the matters of climate change''.[88] The Center for Climate and Security recommended assigning a 'Departmental
Secretary to assume a publicly visible leadership role on domestic and regional
climate change and security issues', and coordinate with the Prime Minister,
the National Security Committee of Cabinet, and national security agencies.[89]
3.43
Domestically, Dr Anthony Bergin of ASPI raised the possibility of
appointing a climate security adviser within the Home Affairs Portfolio, with
broad responsibility for considering the national security implications of
climate change.[90] Another proposal was made by Dr Barnes, who suggested a new statutory authority
or a senior advisory role could be established within the Home Affairs
Portfolio to focus on climate resilience and infrastructure planning.[91] He emphasised:
...the individual needs to be able to coordinate with state
governments and local governments and within the federal sphere, obviously,
with central agencies, but the critical issue is that a national climate
resilience strategy also has to look at continuity planning in terms of
national continuity.[92]
Coordination between the Commonwealth and domestic stakeholders
3.44
This chapter ends with an overview of suggestions for improving Australia's
national resilience, including establishing communities of practice, sharing
climate information, increasing funding for pre-disaster resilience measures, and
adopting a national climate health strategy.
National communities of practice
3.45
Submissions suggested Commonwealth agencies should improve their
cooperation on climate security issues with non-government organisations,
communities and the private sector.[93] Dr Barnes proposed the
development of a new national climate resilience strategy, to be overseen by a coordinator
with 'advisory and collaborative obligations to all three levels of government,
representative industry groups and dedicated national security agencies'.[94] He further suggested the development of 'communities of practice' involving all
levels of government and the private sector to 'provide joined-up thinking on
current and future vulnerability and mitigation strategies for addressing
climate impacts'.[95]
3.46
CPD proposed Defence create 'an informal working group' to draw on the 'expertise
and resources of relevant actors outside government' to 'improve strategic
planning and preparedness activities'.[96] It suggested participants
should include Australian corporations from industries affected by climate
change, such as the transport, agribusiness, and property development sectors.[97]
3.47
A review of the 2011 National strategy for disaster resilience described
existing multi-stakeholder groups, including the Australian Business Roundtable
for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities, which 'was formed with the aim
of supporting the development of a more sustainable, coordinated national
approach to making our communities more resilient and Australian people safer'.[98] It also noted the Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management
Committee (ANZEMC) 'has been successful in driving partnerships across
governments, enabling high levels of cross-jurisdictional engagement'.[99] The review
identified a future focus 'on developing meaningful partnerships between
governments and stakeholders outside the traditional emergency management
governance structure, such as with local government, the private sector and
non-government organisations'.[100]
Sharing climate science, data and expertise
3.48
Submissions agreed that agencies should share information on climate
science and risks with other stakeholders, such as industry groups and
scientists, to better inform responses to climate security threats. The
committee raised the issue of information sharing between government agencies
and insurance and reinsurance companies.[101] At the most recent Disaster and Climate Resilience Reference Group meetings
members discussed:
- the role of the insurance industry in climate and disaster
risk management and ways of addressing climate risks within the public service
and how to better identify them, and
- risk management within the public service, and considered
tools and scenarios that can assist with public service climate risk decision
making.[102]
3.49
Mr Crosweller described how the Reference Group has an 'ongoing
dialogue' with 'the Australian Business Roundtable, which includes a reinsurer,
plus an insurer, plus the banking sector, plus the telecommunications sector'.[103] He stated:
EMA is working, through Home Affairs, on specific initiatives
around knowledge and data. Part of that is about knowledge and exchange with
the private sector, with insurance and other sectors, of government data that
can assist them and insurance data that can assist us in terms of better
positioning for government programs and investments....They're certainly ahead on
the insurance data, but we're probably well ahead on the natural hazard data
and the impacts and effects. There's a very open and generous dialogue that's
currently occurring, which is being formalised through good program development
and policy advice.[104]
3.50
He further explained:
For example, at the last meeting, we engaged the insurance
industry through IAG [Insurance Australia Group], and the chief executive of
IAG will talk about the insurance challenges in climate change and what they
might mean for the federal government, particularly around the release of
federal government data that may assist insurance in doing better-quality assessments
around risk.[105]
3.51
Dr Craig James, Research Program Director, CSIRO, added:
...we're looking at scenarios of complex interactions between
events, so multiple events at the same time and maybe different sorts of
events—fires in one spot, floods in another. Those [insurance] industries do
not have access to the data that's necessary to try to do that more complex
assessment of hot spots of where activities are going to basically become
problematic...
It's a good partnership to think about accessing some of what they've
got, but putting it into the context of information that would be held by the
people on this panel [departments].[106]
3.52
Many submissions emphasised the importance of Defence cooperating with
climate scientists. For example, Rear Admiral Titley called for Australia to
leverage its civilian scientific investments to 'support wise climate related
decisions in the security enterprise'.[107] Ms Goodman noted the
military is 'not the place where we should be doing primary climate science,
but we need to understand how climate change affects military operations,
military strategy and military bases'.[108] Dr Bergin and Ms
Glasson recommended that Defence further engage with climate scientists through
'seminars, workshops and focus groups on specific issues'.[109]
3.53
Dr Bergin noted many military assets collect environmental data,
and called for this to be shared with other Australian agencies involved in
climate research and emergency management, potentially through a formal
communication mechanism.[110] The Center for Climate and Security extended this proposal, advocating the
release of climate security analysis publicly to develop 'national awareness
and knowledge of the risks'.[111] It suggested the establishment of 'a central government-wide climate change
information repository for consolidating and assessing multiple climate
forecasts and associated risks (including data from both the physical and
social sciences)'.[112]
3.54
Defence described its ongoing collaboration on climate change with
various government and non-government bodies, including 'CSIRO, Bureau of
Meteorology, Geoscience Australia, the Australian National University, the
University of New South Wales, ASPI and the Centre for Policy Development and
Engineers Australia'.[113] Dr Stuart Pearson spoke highly of Defence's work with the National Climate
Change Adaptation Research Framework.[114] Mr Crosweller told the committee a series of modelling on climate change risks
had been undertaken with states and territories and the Bureau of Meteorology,
Geoscience Australia and CSIRO.[115]
3.55
Some submissions recommended increases to government funding for climate
research, noting the importance of evidence for Australia's national security.[116] The Crawford Fund, an Australian non-profit organisation, cautioned 'cuts to
the agricultural and natural resource management areas of the CSIRO have eroded
our capacity to deal with climate change impacts'.[117] Rear Admiral
Titley asked the committee to support the CSIRO 'to better understand and
forecast the complex ice, ocean and glacier dynamics on Antarctica...Both our
countries' long-term security depends on understanding the magnitude and rate
of rapid sea level rise'.[118] Expanding on this point,
Ms Goodman said:
I'm deeply, deeply concerned that we will underfund science
and research in this area and that we also are at risk of underfunding the
social science research that needs to accompany the physical science to give us
a better understanding of how these climate risks are evolving.[119]
Funding for domestic disaster
prevention, response and recovery
3.56
The Commonwealth, state and territory governments contribute funding
relating to domestic disasters such as extreme weather events. Through the
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRAA) the Commonwealth
Government provides financial assistance directly to the states to assist them
with the costs associated with disaster relief and recovery assistance measures.[120]
Disaster prevention
3.57
The Commonwealth Government supports domestic resilience in partnership
with state and territory governments, which have 'primary responsibility for
protecting life, property and environment within their borders'.[121]
3.58
A report by the Productivity Commission (PC) into national disaster
funding arrangements found governments over-invest in post-disaster
reconstruction but under-invest in mitigation to reduce the impact of
disasters.[122] After consultation with states and territories, the Commonwealth Government did
not support the recommendation to reduce its funding for post-disaster recovery
while increasing its funding for disaster mitigation to $200 million per year
over time.[123] However, in its response the Government indicated that it 'is actively
exploring the option of states using any efficiencies realised following the
actual reconstruction of essential public assets on future disaster mitigation
activities'.[124]
3.59
Home Affairs noted that the proposed reforms to the Natural Disaster
Relief and Recovery Arrangements will:
...see Australian Government funding provided to states for the
rebuilding of essential public infrastructure based on upfront assessments of
damage and estimated reconstruction costs, rather than on actual costs some
years after the severe weather event. The proposed reforms also provide
incentives for the states to deliver their reconstruction projects more
efficiently in order to realise efficiencies that can be put towards mitigation
activities and projects.[125]
3.60
The Australian Business Roundtable for Disaster Resilience and Safer
Communities supported the PC recommendation and called on the Australian
Government to:
- Increase the total Australian Government investment in
disaster risk reduction and mitigation to $200 million per year or takes a
first and significant step toward this total; and
- Continue the National Partnership Agreement beyond June
2017 with appropriate funding attached as a part of its overall commitment to
mitigation.[126]
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The National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience is
designed to 'strengthen community resilience and minimise the impact of a range
of natural disasters in Australia'.[127] The National Partnership Agreement:
...is a joint funding arrangement that provides the flexibility
for States to address their specific natural disaster risk priorities. This
arrangement recognises that the Commonwealth and the States have a mutual
interest in reducing the impact of, and increasing resilience to, natural
disasters.[128]
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It contributes to delivering the strategic priorities under the National
Strategy for Disaster Resilience, but is expected to cease at the end of
2017–18.[129]
3.63
Home Affairs provided examples of other Commonwealth initiatives that
support resilience building, including those relating to infrastructure,
noting:
In total, the Australian Government has committed over $75
billion to transport infrastructure over the next decade. This commitment
includes projects and programs that mitigate the impacts of natural hazards on
Australian communities, infrastructure, and the economy. For example, the
Government is investing $700 million on Northern Australian roads through
programs announced as part of the Northern Australia White Paper. The
Government, in partnership with the Queensland Government, has also committed
$6.7 billion to an $8.5 billion program of works on the Bruce Highway, which is
providing, among a range of other improvements, greater flood immunity to this
critical freight route.[130]
3.64
Home Affairs also outlined the following disaster resilience
initiatives:
- The Australian Government has provided $7.25 million since
2015 to the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience (AIDR), which provides
guidance material to states and territories, business, NGOs and communities, in
the implementation and adoption of disaster resilience strategies.
- Approximately $2.1 million per annum is provided under the
Disaster Resilience Australia Package to support emergency management projects of
national significance that improve the ability to prevent, prepare, respond to
and recover from disasters across social, economic, environmental and
governance elements. Funds are provided to both state and non-state agencies to
assist in building communities' resilience across Australia.[131]
Disaster response
3.65
Commonwealth and state and territory governments also contribute to
funding for emergency responses to disasters. While these broad arrangements
were not a focus of submissions, the committee received evidence specifically
relating to firefighting aircraft. Home Affairs outlined:
The National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC) is responsible
for managing the seasonal contracts for firefighting aircraft across Australia.
Contracted aircraft are based in a particular state and that state pays a
substantial proportion of the cost of the contract for that season. NAFC
currently contracts a fleet of 132 specialised aircraft to support
firefighters.[132]
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The Commonwealth currently contributes $14.8 million annually to the
standing cost of the fleet of at least $65 million, while the rest is
provided by states and territories.[133] States and territories also fund the variable annual operating costs of the
fleet, which vary significantly, and have exceeded $100 million in total on
occasion.[134] For the 2017–18 bushfire season, the fleet of 132 aircraft included:
...six Erickson Aircranes as well as a number of other heavy
lift helicopters. The fleet incorporated four large fixed wing airtankers,
including a DC-10 Very Large Airtanker, alongside more than forty other fixed
wing firebombing aircraft. The fleet also included four, very fast, specialist
fixed wing mapping aircraft, equipped with infra-red scanners to rapidly locate
and map bushfires.[135]
3.67
Home Affairs explained that the 'nationally contracted fleet is
complemented by around 20 specialised aircraft that are owned or contracted by
individual state or territory agencies', and approximately '300 additional
aircraft across Australia are registered for Call When Needed engagement'.[136]
Disaster recovery
3.68
The committee understands new disaster recovery funding arrangements are
expected to be implemented from July 2018, including funding based on an
upfront assessment of damages and estimated costs, rather than the current
reimbursement model.[137] The committee did not receive a great deal of evidence regarding these arrangements,
though Home Affairs noted the proposed arrangements:
...provide incentives for the states to deliver their
reconstruction projects more efficiently in order to realise efficiencies that
can be put towards mitigation activities and projects.[138]
Climate-related health effects
3.69
As outlined in chapter 2, the health and wellbeing of Australians is threatened
by longer-term changes to the climate as well as extreme weather events and
emergencies. However, the Australian Government National Climate Resilience
and Adaptation Strategy stated in 2015 that there were 'no national
programmes specifically targeting the health effects of climate change'.[139] The 2017 Climate and Health Alliance Framework for a National Strategy
on Climate, Health and Well-being for Australia similarly stated that 'human
health has not yet been afforded sufficient priority in Australia's mitigation
and adaptation policies and strategies'.[140] This Framework may offer
an opportunity to implement greater coordination between all levels of government,
the health sector and community to 'to work collaboratively to both protect the
health and well-being of present and future generations'.[141]
Australian economy
3.70
As noted in chapter 2, some submissions took a broad view of climate
security that included a resilient national economy and infrastructure. Dr
Barnes explained:
...there are different tones and colours to the notion of being
a secure economy from a national perspective—the notion of viable economies,
the notion of viable environmental conditions and the notion of viable
communities. With that slightly different lens, the notion of climate
variability and weather impacts on our financial systems are critical.[142]
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The committee notes that many of these issues are being considered
through other parliamentary processes, such as the recent Senate Economics
References Committee reports into the financial risk associated with carbon for
Australian businesses and climate change-related insurance issues.[143] The Senate Environment and Communications References Committee is
currently inquiring into the current and future impacts of climate change on
housing, buildings and infrastructure and is expected to report on 27 June
2018.
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