3.1
This chapter discusses the evidence received in relation to the role of publicly funded foreign policy research in guiding and improving government policy formulation and implementation. This includes evidence regarding the existing capacity within the Australian Public Service (APS).
Geostrategic challenges
3.2
The current geopolitical context is complex. Professor Rory Medcalf noted that 'since the end of the Second World War, there has hardly been a time when a dynamic and policy-relevant understanding of the world has been more vital to Australia’s security'.
3.3
Professor Medcalf explained that 'Australia's national interests, values and identity as a multicultural liberal democracy are under intense pressure'. Of particular note is China's coercive use of a range of 'levers of power' including economic weight, military force, and cyber and information capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region. Professor Medcalf also noted that:
The international order is under immense strain, the consensus-building role of multilateral institutions is not a given, the reliability of allies and partners has come into question, and the benefits – or the continuation – of recent decades of globalisation, peace and order can no longer be taken for granted. Great connectedness has brought great vulnerability.
3.4
Other transnational issues in the region include: the COVID-19 pandemic; climate change; and violent extremism. Further, strategic and transnational risks are combining and compounding in ways which are extremely difficult to gauge or anticipate. Of particular note:
The COVID-19 pandemic is a profound discontinuity with cascading consequences across all dimensions of the international system and Australia’s interests. There will likely be more such shocks, affecting Australians directly and personally, and raising expectations that government will have a policy playbook of effective preparedness and responses. Our resilience has only begun to be tested.
3.5
Mr John McCarthy AO, Senior Advisor, Asialink told the committee that:
…the external challenges facing us are quite as important, and arguably more important than, say, the immigration challenges of the '50s and '60s and the economic challenges faced by the Hawke, Keating and Howard governments, when huge changes were made in the way in which Australia governed itself.
In-house APS capacity and use of public research
3.6
As noted above, foreign policy is complex and rapidly evolving and submitters highlighted that while 'a lot of excellent research, analysis and policy thinking goes on in government agencies within the Australian Public Service', the APS requires support. Professor Rory Medcalf explained:
…the Public Service is responding constantly to day-to-day events—disruptions, shocks and surprises—in the world, the imperatives of bureaucracy and the pressures of the political cycle, the media cycle and ministerial expectations and so forth; in other words, they need support and help from every quarter.
3.7
Professor Medcalf stated that while 'there are plenty of strong individual analysts and policy thinkers in the policy agencies', it should be noted that this 'capability is often very stretched, and it's often better at surging in response to crises than it is at developing comprehensive strategic pictures'.
3.8
Mr Lawrence Flake, Chief Executive Officer, Perth USAsia Centre, University of Western Australia, also noted the work pressures faced by public servants which limit their ability to research and process information. Mr Flake stated:
We know that public servants are extremely busy, and increasingly so. They, like every one of us in modern society, are dealing with an absolute flood of information. It's not that they don't have enough information; they've just got too much to go through and prioritise and process.
3.9
Similarly, Professor John Langmore AM, Chair of the Board, Initiative for Peacebuidling, University of Melbourne, stated:
There are many fine, highly effective diplomats who work very long hours in order to try to get done what they have to do, but many of them told us when we did our survey that they really couldn't do all that they would have liked to have done given the responsibilities they bear. I think overwork is a significant problem. They can, of course, use the expertise of universities and other places, no doubt business, too, when they're looking for particular kinds of information. Quite commonly, that might be a very good thing to do in order to complement what's available in the department. If the department doesn't have the capacity to have as much expertise as it thinks is desirable, that's a real hindrance to their work.
3.10
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) highlighted both the speed at which issues arise and evolve, and the increasing complexity of foreign policy and the challenges this poses to the department. Mr Nigel Stanier, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Policy Contestability and Futures Branch, DFAT, told the committee:
…foreign policy is…becoming increasingly deep. By that I mean that the issues that we have to deal with—just to name a few, cybersecurity, new security challenges, vaccine diplomacy, economic coercion and supply chains, and new forms of technology—are increasingly complex and require specialist skills and technical knowledge. These aren't just new issues but also technical issues. They require a lot of expertise to understand, and sometimes that expertise takes a long time to build up.
3.11
Similarly, Professor Simon Jackman, Professor of Political Science and Chief Executive Officer, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, noted:
…the pace of geostrategic change in the Indo-Pacific and the breadth of the policy challenges and what it is that we are demanding of our policymakers at this time, the intellectual and practical dexterity and creativity that's being sought. We see this real-time fusion between matters that were once the domain of national security but now are easily and with every day, it seems, working their way into the world of trade, investment, commerce, technological development, infrastructure and public health—you name it. As that fusion takes place at a pace that I think even surprises those of us who watch this for a living, the demands on the policymaking community rise exponentially.
3.12
Mr Flake, University of Western Australia noted that:
The practices and procedures of years gone by are no longer purpose built for the world that we live in, as the pace of change is so much faster, the flow of information is so much greater and the actors are so much more dynamic. I think we're starting to see that at a strategic level with government documents, where there's a process. But then to presume that the same really qualified civil servants and legislatures and legislative staff are going to have the capacity to deal with the ever-changing environment alone implies to me that there needs to be something additive; there needs to be something more.
3.13
Mr Stanier, DFAT, told the committee that as such, public foreign policy research has the 'potential to be really valuable for foreign-policy makers'. Mr Stanier explained:
It helps us get across issues fast, it helps us understand the nuances of complicated issues, and, where we have the opportunity to commission research ourselves, it provides us with up-to-date data and information that help make our policies effective and efficient and targeted at the effect that they're seeking to achieve.
3.14
Mr Flake, University of Western Australia similarly stated:
I'm someone who believes in the think-tank sector as having a mandate to help sort through that flow of information and then take that case to public servants in order to try to get attention on issues that are not making it through in the media or in the normal workday lives of very busy public servants.
3.15
Professor Langmore, University of Melbourne, stated that research that is conducted 'on the ground and [that] is attentive to the complexity of particular situations…is very valuable'. Professor Langmore concluded that 'researchers have the capacity to do more in-depth study of particular situations than most diplomats could ever—no matter how well funded and how well staffed—have the chance to do'.
3.16
Foreign policy research can also contribute to improved policy outcomes more broadly. For example, the Northern Territory Government stated that:
…think tanks can improve the quality of governments by providing ideas, intellectual resources for debate. Think tanks can provide a bridge between the world of policy and other voices and help anchor debate in research-based evidence, applying long-term thinking.
3.17
Similarly, Professor Rory Medcalf outlined that 'the broader research and analytical community beyond government can be not only helpful but also, in fact, vital contributors to good policy outcomes'. He further detailed:
I do think there's a particular responsibility on research institutions, particularly those that receive taxpayers' money through government funding, to play a role in supporting good policy outcomes. That does not mean that the work of researchers should be forensically directed in some way by the Public Service, the intelligence community or the national security community—there's a very important place for scholarly independence in this conversation—but it does mean that the national interest should be a higher consideration in determining, if you like, the research agenda and the framing of research questions than perhaps it would have been in the past.
3.18
Mr Trent Hagland noted that research has identified that 'governments (and oppositions) actively make use of think tanks to prosecute a particular policy issue.' He noted that different think tanks 'target different parts of the policy cycle', with some targeting policy formulation while others 'focus their activities very early in the policy process and attempt to define issues or set agendas.'
APS recruitment and employment practices
3.19
The committee received evidence in relation to the recruitment and employment practices of the APS, and notably DFAT, which have an effect on the development of foreign policy capability and capacity. This includes language proficiency; security clearance requirements; and the provision of generalist or specialist training for employees.
3.20
The committee received evidence in relation to DFAT's policy of employing generalists rather than specialists, and the impact this has on foreign policy capability and capacity in the department. For example, the Initiative for Peacebuilding, University of Melbourne, noted that there is a long-standing 'debate about the degree of specialisation or generalist training that diplomats require. The DFAT tradition is for diplomats to be generalists' and to contract consultants where specialisation is required.
3.21
The committee heard that DFAT's employment practices can be contrasted to other countries such as the United Kingdom which employs specialists in its foreign service.
3.22
Professor Jackman, University of Sydney, also told the committee that the United States has a system which 'creates…the deep ability to invest in a country or in an area of specialisation'. Professor Jackman noted that these subject matter experts cycle between working for government, and think tanks. Professor Jackman stated this approach allows for the 'deep accretion of expertise in regions or issues'.
3.23
Witnesses noted DFAT's practice of rotating staff between embassies may be affecting the ability of staff to develop deeper subject matter expertise. Mr John McCarthy AO, Senior Advisor, Asialink, stated:
…there has long been an issue in DFAT—I don't know whether it's still an issue but it certainly was for a long period—is where somebody would come back full of expertise, say, after four years in Thailand and be put on the Denmark desk, for example. That didn't happen all the time, but it happened enough for people to say, 'We're not actually using our talent as best we can.' Again, I stress that wasn't a universal problem, but it happened enough for people to wonder about it.
3.24
Mr McCarthy also noted that the work of DFAT, particularly by staff in embassies, is increasingly focused on Australia related issues rather than broader assessment. Mr McCarthy stated:
…because staffing has narrowed and there are simply fewer people in embassies now, the focus has moved to where, essentially, it's on getting things done that are very much relevant to the Australian relationship and there's much less assessment going on. In government, I think there is the same issue. DFAT, I don't think—although I'm out of date—does much assessment.
3.25
It was however noted that other sectors of the APS have considerable expertise and capacity in foreign policy analysis. Professor Medcalf specifically noted the work of the Office of National Intelligence (ONI), for which 'looking at a comprehensive strategic picture and plausible future, deep-thinking analysis, is bread and butter'.
3.26
The committee heard that consideration of recruitment and training practices should be given in order to ensure the capacity of the future APS workforce. For example, Professor Jackman, University of Sydney, stated that given:
…the strategic challenges that confront Australia, it is all hands on deck; we want to cast our net for recruiting talent as broadly as we can. I think we also need to think really differently about the way in which we are training people for careers and what it means to answer a question of great national strategic importance in 2030, 2040 and 2050.
3.27
DFAT acknowledged that the department is particularly conscious of the need to maintain and utilise subject matter expertise. Mr Nigel Stanier, DFAT, told the committee:
I would say over the last two or three years [DFAT] has made a real effort to ensure that the expertise that we build up, sometimes slowly, does not, as you say, go to waste, so when people return from post we take advantage of the particular expertise that we have.
3.28
As such, DFAT stated that it is entering the second of a three-year Human Resources (HR) modernisation program that will 'reform the way the Department identifies its capability needs and mobilises people with the right skills at the right time, place and cost'. It further outlined:
As part of this program, DFAT is developing a Capability Framework that will help build, develop and sustain the capabilities DFAT needs into the future. The Framework will be designed to be flexible and open to changes as the world shifts around us. An annual review schedule will be established to ensure that the Framework continues to address emerging capabilities as they arise.
3.29
Mr Stanier, DFAT, stated that one of the longer term goals of the DFAT HR modernisation process 'is to ensure that when we have expertise within the department that we place it in the place where it's most likely to be valuable'. Mr Stanier noted that while there is 'quite an internal churn within DFAT and people do move around within DFAT', the department has 'a high retention rate'. As such:
When, for example, people return from a posting, we often keep them in the department and find ways to use their expertise. For example, when someone comes back from a posting in China, and has spent several years building their expertise within China, we make an effort to place them in an area that capitalises on their expertise. It might be in the China area itself. But China is so central to our foreign policy that there are many areas within DFAT that value China expertise really highly—for example, the trade area or the multicultural area.
3.30
Mr David Lawrence, Acting Chief Financial Officer, DFAT, also told the committee that staff are encouraged to develop 'career anchors' which provide a balance between career specialisation and being a generalist. Mr Lawrence explained:
The secretary encouraged that DFAT officers try to develop one or two career anchors over the course of their career. Typically you might be an expert in trade and develop that, and have a posting that relates to trade and a position in Canberra that develops your trade skills. But you might also have another trade anchor in the Pacific or in a geographic area; you might have a posting there and develop that area of specialisation. It's about having general skills but also having some areas of specialisation.
3.31
Some witnesses drew the committee's attention to the security clearance process and the possibility that it is acting as a barrier to APS entry for people with desirable skill sets, for example Chinese Australians. For example, Professor Medcalf told the committee:
…our national security clearance system is in need of reform and review because, in many ways, it's a model that was developed originally, I would say, probably in the 1950s or 1960s. It has evolved and, in many ways, hardened over the past 50 years. What it hasn't done, though, is turn from an ethos about, if you like, the forensic checking of the backgrounds of individuals based on their lives, their past and their behaviour and so forth. It should evolve instead into a system that's much more based on the assessment of risk going forward, including the willingness of individuals to subject themselves, as holders of high clearances, to monitoring of their lives and their contacts going forward. I think that's the direction in which the clearance process is going to have to go, if we are to make full use of the diversity of the Australian population in the national security community.
3.32
Ms Yun Jiang similarly noted that:
Having access to sensitive material is essential for numerous policy roles, especially in foreign affairs, defence, and national security, and requires employees to obtain formal security clearances from government. The security clearance process is notoriously slow for many applicants, who are given no guarantee of time frame.
Language proficiency and cultural competency
3.33
The committee received a range of evidence in relation to the need for increased capability and cultural awareness, including through language capabilities. For example, the Group of Eight Australia, submitted that:
A key requirement in developing greater Asia-capability and cultural awareness is ensuring more Australians can fluently communicate in Asian languages. This is not a new concept – for example, the 2011 white paper Australia in the Asian Century recommended the Australian Government “[s]upport universities to increase the number of students who undertake Asian studies and Asian languages as part of their university education”. This goal requires ongoing renewal. Given Australia's geographical location and the ever-changing geopolitical challenges emerging in our region, open and transparent communication is critical to our nation's security and economic development prospects. The decline in Asian language study in Australia is an issue that could benefit from dedicated investment in public research.
3.34
Some submitters noted the particular need for the APS to build expertise in countries such as China, given the current shifting geopolitical environment. For example, Ms Yun Jiang stated that China expertise was needed across the APS because '[a]lmost every governmental policy decision made today has a China angle'. She further detailed:
With China-related issues becoming more prominent in Australia's foreign and domestic policies, Australia needs China-literate policymakers in the public service more than ever. Issues such as freedom of speech on university campuses, trade disputes and diversification, technology competition, cyber security, and foreign interference all involve an aspect of Australia-China relations and are relevant across the breadth of the public service — from the Foreign Affairs and Trade to Home Affairs and Attorney-General's, as well as the education, treasury, industry, and communications portfolios.
3.35
Ms Jiang argued that the most effective way to address the lack of China literacy in the APS would be to 'harness the experience and skills of Chinese-Australians who speak a Chinese language fluently, understand the Chinese political system and its economy, and have significant cultural awareness.' Ms Yun Jiang noted that '[d]espite the urgent demand within the Australian public service for China expertise and language skills, the existing skills of many Chinese-Australians are being overlooked.' Ms Jiang also reported that some Chinese-Australians in the APS had 'raised concerns that they are less likely to be offered a place working on China-related topics due to their Chinese heritage.'
3.36
In noting the importance of proficiency in languages other than English, DFAT told the committee that the department has 'an extensive language capability' through its language school. Mr Lawrence, DFAT, stated:
As you'd appreciate, the assessment of our capability needs in languages has changed across time and so has our capability. For instance, at the moment, more of our staff hold formally tested proficiency in Mandarin than in any other language. That certainly has evolved over recent times; not too many years back, that wasn't the case. So there is a real assessment of the capability need as far as language training is concerned, and it is through that diplomatic academy language school that we train our staff in languages. It is different levels of language: it might be survival-level language or it could be quite highly proficient language skills.
3.37
Noting the number of staff in the department with proficiency in Mandarin, Mr Nigel Stanier, DFAT, advised:
As of May 2021, we have 92 staff with formally tested proficiency in Mandarin. I'm sure you can recognise that that's quite an investment of DFAT's resources, considering that it can take up to two years to train someone from scratch in Mandarin…Mandarin is our highest, most formally tested proficiency in DFAT. Just to add a qualification to that: the 92 people are the people who have been tested formally. There are probably more people who have Mandarin-language skills who, for whatever reason, have let their formal proficiency lapse. So there are probably more skills than that in DFAT.
3.38
Similarly, the Department of Defence provided the committee with evidence regarding its approach to developing language capability. Ms Celia Perkins, First Assistant Secretary, Strategic Policy, Department of Defence stated:
The whole of the national intelligence community has been working jointly to develop a broader language base of a range of languages, of which Chinese is one. Certainly our Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Geospatial Organisation are part of those efforts to lift the number of staff proficient in Chinese and other foreign languages. We also have programs for the ADF and staff in our International Policy Division. We have a longstanding school of languages…Of the suite of languages we train people in, Chinese has long been a language set. For those members of the ADF who serve in China—and we continue to have a defence attache in China—they will typically have language training here in Australia. I couldn't tell you the current status of the training, but historically they have completed their language training in China before undertaking a posting.
Broader awareness of foreign policy
3.39
It is important to note that the work of the APS in foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, the development and implementation of foreign policy involves a range of stakeholders with varying levels of knowledge and understanding. This includes business, the media, and the broader Australian community. For example, Mr John McCarthy AO, Asialink, stated that good government:
…doesn't just require a few good people at the top and a few good advisers to advise them; it requires good community understanding of the issues which we face; and this, of course, demands considerable knowledge and considerable education.
3.40
Mr McCarthy noted that over the past 50 years the global strategic context has changed significantly, and that 'at this juncture, the Australian community as a whole is not sufficiently equipped in terms of education, knowledge and outlook to deal with these huge foreign policy challenges'. Mr McCarthy stated:
I would argue that the external challenges we currently face require not only the same amount of explanation to the community from the political leadership but also much greater community understanding of the situations and challenges that we face.
3.41
Similarly, Professor Simon Jackman described foreign policy as 'quintessentially a top-down type of issue' where the community do not experience 'foreign policy most of the time in the way that they experience the price of milk at the corner store, what's happening with their mortgage, how secure they feel about their job and whatnot'. As such, the ways in which foreign policy is communicated, and the media through which foreign policy is communicated is 'fundamental'.
3.42
Mr Phil Turtle, National President of the Australia Indonesia Business Council (AIBC), told the committee that there is a 'paradox between Australia's economic interests and the understanding of those interests'. Mr Turtle stated:
Such misapprehensions and even misinformation inevitably influence foreign policymaking about key relationships, trade and investment, and that is why the committee's considerations are important to Australia's economic future and regional security. The quality of knowledge and understanding about foreign policy among a wide cohort of stakeholders will dictate the quality of policy and its effectiveness in delivering outcomes that are in Australia's interests.
3.43
The Australia China Business Council (ACBC) submitted that business councils 'form an essential part of the architecture of Australia’s international engagement. Business councils can play an important role in the shaping and influencing of government policy, and in providing a discreet channel for the communication of key messages'. It noted however that:
…in the current environment when sentiment around China has deteriorated, ACBC’s ability to continue to self-fund important market analysis, business sentiment surveys and practical programs to allow Australian companies to de-risk their China operations has become more challenging. The China relationship is difficult and more challenging, but it remains important.
3.44
As such, the ACBC concluded that:
Government support for research around the new opportunities and challenges and for the presentation to government of considered policy recommendations has never been more important. The bilateral relationship is changing and becoming more constrained but a productive relationship with China remains in Australia’s national interest.
3.45
Mr Michael Clifton, Interim Chief Executive Officer, ACBC, also called for business to be 'invited into the tent' to inform government and discuss the way in which Australia's relationship with China is managed. Mr Clifton explained that bringing 'the voice of business into the room' would allow 'a diversity of opinions and voices being heard'.
3.46
The committee received evidence that cultural awareness, particularly of the Asia-Pacific region has reduced, with fewer people undertaking language studies at both the school and tertiary level. For example, Mr Ian Satchwell, Trade and Investment Adviser, Australia Indonesia Business Council, noted that:
…the number of young people studying the Indonesian language in primary and, in particular, secondary school has declined dramatically. It's a bit of a mystery as to why, other than foreign language studies seem to have declined overall. But Indonesian language study in our schools has declined even faster, and that has played into the university space, where a number of universities have abandoned their Indonesian programs because there are just not enough students to feed those programs. It's really quite self-defeating, but it's the reality…But, of course, Indonesian studies is far more than language; it's understanding the Indonesian economy, understanding the Indonesian society and just the Indonesian way of thinking, and it's about having Indonesians understand our way thinking and hoping that we can come together.
3.47
Witnesses also noted a perceived lack of depth in coverage and understanding of foreign policy issues within Australia's media. For example, Mr McCarthy, Asialink stated that there is now a:
…dearth of Australian media who have the capacity to report back from Asia on issues of interest to Australia. Right now, only six Australian print journalists cover the region from the subcontinent right across to East Asia. That's a real decline from what was the case 20 or 30 years ago.
3.48
Asialink suggested that the government may wish to give 'serious thought to better in depth media briefing on foreign policy issues, where necessary on a confidential basis.' Asialink also noted that, unlike some other countries and Australia itself in the 1970s and 1980s, Australia does not currently issue unclassified in depth policy papers, 'which can assist comprehension by the media and the public of foreign policy issues'.
Public outreach
3.49
The committee received evidence that think tanks play a role in enhancing public understanding of foreign affairs, and are generally better placed to do this than government departments. Think tanks can also act as neutral spaces for government ministers and officials, and academics, to engage with the public. For example, Mr Bryce Wakefield, National Executive Director, Australian Institute of International Affairs, told the committee:
We want to promote education and debate on foreign affairs. Our motto is that we want Australians, and that's all Australians, to know more, understand more and engage more in international affairs. We may wade into policy debates sometimes, we may provide contestable policy advice but it's not our core function.
3.50
Similarly, universities build public understanding of foreign policy through undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, executive education, as well as targeted media engagement.
3.51
Asialink noted that 'while government has the ultimate responsibility for setting foreign policy…there are more people than ever before contributing to the fabric of Australia’s international relationships. Conversely, there are more influences on Australian life from abroad'. Asialink stated:
Whether businesspeople and professionals, private and university sector researchers, non government organisation employees, or students and travellers, these individuals represent a ‘politically interested’ public that are both a resource for policymakers in helping to shape external relations and a key constituency to engage.
3.52
Asialink noted that the 'wider two way engagement of citizens in the conduct of international relations' requires the government to 'forthrightly address and engage Australia as a whole, its institutions and its people'. Asialink concluded that:
The better informed our population is, the greater the likelihood that resultant external policies will be in the national interest. Public research into foreign policy issues can act as both an important source of ideas and advice to government and a means of increasing awareness and knowledge of important matters in the public domain.
3.53
DFAT also informed the committee of its activities to enhance public understanding of Australian foreign policy, including through 'high quality engagement with the Australian media' and online engagement, 'notably through social media posts across DFAT's 280 social media accounts globally.' DFAT also uses forums organised with think tanks and institutes to communicate 'the value of DFAT's work to the Australian public'. DFAT provides around $85,000 per annum to the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) 'for projects and activities that help promote public understanding of international issues and Australian foreign policy', including 'website publications, blogs, the AIIA National Conference, publications, and international collaboration'.
3.54
Ms Dimity Fifer called for an increase in the use of traditional and social media to promote and discuss both domestic and international foreign policy challenges. Ms Fifer stated that 'access to media debate and programming on global themes and challenges is an important way to continue regional dialogue at this time'. Ms Fifer submitted:
Australians are no longer travelling and building relationships and sharing their positive traits of an Australia that is engaged and interested in the world. Australians are no longer learning on their international travels different ways of relating and being and experiencing the world. An insular Australia is not a useful foundation for reflective and engaged foreign policy. We have the on-line means, and the media and educational initiatives available, the government must increase funding mechanisms for Australia’s people to people links to continue long-term – for all age groups and for all communities.