Part III
Defence and security in the Indian Ocean rim, including counter piracy and
port state control
The Indian Ocean has long been of central importance to
trade; DFAT described the security of the Indian Ocean shipping lanes as 'vital
to both Australia's economic interests and the energy security of the wider
region, due to the centrality of the Indian Ocean's maritime trade routes to
the energy security of many Asian states.'*
In their article 'Our western front: Australia and the Indian
Ocean', Drs Bateman and Bergin argued that the threats and risks in the Indian
Ocean rim are extensive and varied—including: maritime security concerns (risks
of interstate or intrastate conflict; threats to good order at sea, such as
maritime terrorism, piracy, people smuggling and illegal fishing).**
Part 3 of the committee's report examines the strategic
significance and key defence and security issues of the Indian Ocean rim.
Chapter 10
Defence and security in the Indian Ocean
The convergence of...strategic and economic interests is
driving major Asian powers, such as China, Japan, South Korea and India, to
increase their security presence in the region.[1]
Strategic significance of the Indian Ocean rim
10.1
The Department of Defence's (Defence) submission identified the Indian
Ocean as being of 'critical importance as a global trading thoroughfare'. The
2009 Defence White Paper determined that the Indian Ocean would continue to
grow in significance with Asian states relying on the sea trade routes for
transportation of resources.[2]
Mr Michael Shoebridge, Defence, elaborated on this point noting that China,
Japan, South Korea and India are all reliant on sea lane access to the Middle
East and Africa in order to service their energy needs.[3]
10.2
DFAT also highlighted on the extent of the Asian countries' reliance on
the Indian Ocean for transport of energy and resources noting that 'the Indian
Ocean, in its totality, carries around one third of the bulk cargo traffic and
around two thirds of the world's maritime oil shipment':[4]
10.3
The reliance on secure sea transportation routes places great strategic
significance on the Indian Ocean rim choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz
and Malacca.[5]
DFAT drew attention to the extent of trade through these choke points:
- the Strait of Hormuz carried roughly 35 per cent of all seaborne
traded oil, or almost 20 per cent of oil traded worldwide in 2011;
- some estimates put the proportion of global and regional trade
(by volume) shipped annually through the Strait of Malacca at around 40 per
cent and 80 per cent, respectively;
- by some estimates the Mozambique Channel carries an estimated 30
per cent of the world's oil supplies; and
- an estimated 20 per cent of total world trade passes through
Bab-el-Mandeb (Gulf of Aden).[6]
10.4
With trade a major part of Indian Ocean maritime traffic, the most
significant security threats are those that affect merchant vessels—in
particular piracy and terrorism. Other associated problems include drug
trafficking and arms trafficking.[7]
Significance for Australia
10.5
Drs Bateman, Bergin and Russell Trood argued that despite the importance
of the Indian Ocean for Australia's strategic and security interests,
'Australia often forgets that it is a three-ocean country.' They stated:
[Australia] rediscovers the Indian Ocean at roughly fifteen
year intervals: in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Soviet Union moved
into Afghanistan, and again in the mid-1990s when Australia took a leading role
in attempting build cooperation across the IOR.[8]
10.6
The Defence White Paper 2013 identified the Indian Ocean as a vital
strategic interest for Australia—in particular protection of the sea lanes
crossing the region from piracy. It stated that the key to regional stability
was Australia's partnership with India and its other relationships with
emerging naval powers in the region.[9]
10.7
The Defence White Paper 2013 emphasised the concept of the
'Indo-Pacific', a region defined as an arc from India through to the Pacific
Ocean. It listed 'the continued rise of China, the increasing economic and
strategic weight of East Asia, and the emergence of India as a global power as
key trends developing the Indian Ocean as an area of strategic significance. In
its assessment, 'In aggregate, these trends are shaping the emergence of the
Indo-Pacific as a single strategic arc.'[10]
The paper described Australia's strategic interest in the Indian Ocean:
Australia's Indian Ocean coastline is longer than those
bounded by the Pacific or Southern Oceans. Australia is responding to the rise
of the Indian Ocean region as an area of global strategic significance, and as
an integral part of the Indo-Pacific strategic system. The security of its
waters, and the trade which flows through them, is important to global,
regional and Australian strategic interests. [T]he Indian Ocean is surpassing
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the world's busiest trade corridor.[11]
Counter-terrorism
10.8
Mr Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, a defence analyst, pointed out the scale
of counter-terrorism cooperation within the Indian Ocean rim, noting:
Some 11 of Australia's 17 bilateral counter-terrorism MOUs [Memoranda
of Understanding] have been signed with Indian Ocean-region countries.
Australia's engagement in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars again entailed
significant ADF logistic support across the Indian Ocean. Both before and after
these wars the ADF has been required to mount longstanding maritime operations
in the ocean directly, particularly through the RAN's participation in
sanctions enforcement, terrorist interdiction, anti-piracy and counter-people
smuggling operations. The ADF also continues to support Australia's widening
economic and diplomatic ties with Africa, bilateral defence co-operation with
Pakistan, and nascent but expanding bilateral strategic linkages with India.[12]
10.9
The AFP elaborated on Australia's work in capacity building in the
region—particularly of neighbouring countries to combat counter-terrorism.
Governance instruments such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) form the basis
of the AFP's police-to-police assistance to countries such as Indonesia, India
and Timor-Leste. The AFP currently has agreements and MoUs with 20 countries in
the Indian Ocean rim and neighbouring regions. On average, the objectives of an
MoU are wide-ranging and include:
...promoting police cooperation (to assist in combatting
transnational organised crime), information exchange and access to information,
provisions for joint activities or operations and the provision of training and
professional development.[13]
Naval presence in the Indian Ocean rim
10.10
Mr DeSilva-Ranasinghe observed that the Indian Ocean had recently seen
the expansion of naval influence of countries such as Pakistan, India and Iran.
He noted that 'Iran's naval chief has actually gone on record...claiming the
Malacca Strait, right up to Aden, as being a triangle of influence for Iran's
war ships to operate in'.[14]
Mr DeSilva-Ranasinghe argued that these comments by Iran, and Pakistan's 'look
east' policy, were creating a new dynamic in the region. He explained that
Pakistan was engaging 'their naval forces...in military or navy-to-navy diplomacy
with countries like Malaysia and Brunei'.[15]
Growing influence of China—US pivot
in the Indian Ocean rim
10.11
Mr Shoebridge noted that both China and India were working to modernise
their navies and maintain a presence in the region—a move driven by the need to
secure sea lines for resource transportation and which recognised the growing
significance of the Indian Ocean.[16]
10.12
Defence believes that strategic competition between the US, China and
India is likely to shape the security environment in the Indian Ocean out to
2030.[17]
Mr Shoebridge noted that the broader regional architecture in the Indian
Ocean remains 'immature' and contrasted this situation with the development of
'multiple fora in the Indo-Pacific as a means to resolve disputes, tensions and
conflict points'.[18]
Mr Shoebridge told the committee that Defence was also 'contributing to
multilateral initiatives in the region' and would look to expand this agenda:
Together with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, we
are supporting the development of the Indian Ocean regional architecture, such
as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation. The IOR-ARC's 20 members, for example, include key states
such as India, Indonesia, Iran, the UAE and South Africa, who will be
influential shapers of the Indian Ocean security environment.[19]
10.13
A contrary view was expressed by Mr Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe. While he agreed
that China was an emerging economic power in the Indian Ocean rim region, he
argued that China's naval ambitions had been exaggerated. Mr DeSilva-Ranasinghe
submitted that China's naval presence in the region is quite light and focused
more on its support of counter piracy measures than on creating a so-called
'string of pearls' strategy. This strategy refers to the Chinese purported plan
to set up a series of ports in friendly countries along the Indian Ocean's
northern seaboard.[20]
Mr DeSilva-Ranasinghe contended that the 'string of pearls' theory could be
debunked on two counts: firstly, that no country would want to invest in so
many bases so quickly, particularly given the cost, and secondly that such
expansion would bring China into conflict with India:
In fact, if they were to go down that track they would be
courting potentially conflict or a very serious change in the dynamic of their
relationship to one of confrontation. There is no indicator that any of those
countries intend to pursue such a policy with India, especially a rising and
more military capable India.[21]
India's growing significance
10.14
Both Defence and DFAT noted the growing significance of India as a naval
power and influence in the Indian Ocean rim.[22]
In particular, Defence noted that India had recently been engaged in a naval
modernisation program that would increase its maritime capacity in the region
significantly.[23]
Further:
In December 2001, India's Chief of Navy announced plans to
build infrastructure in four Indian Ocean island groups to enhance maritime
surveillance and forward operating capabilities in the region, enhancing its existing
military presence in the Andaman and Nicobar islands.[24]
10.15
Australia has recently worked to enhance its relationship with India,
both in terms of trade and political ties, and in strengthening its bilateral
security relationship.[25]
Defence noted that:
During the Minister for Defence's visit to India in December
2011 he visited Headquarters Western Naval Command in Mumbai, and agreed with
his Indian counterpart to establish annual Defence Policy Talks as well as a
bilateral 1.5 track defence strategic dialogue, as well as to work towards a
formal bilateral maritime exercise.[26]
10.16
The Defence White Paper explained that the strategic engagement between
Australia and India has included high-level visits, exchanges and dialogue and
cooperation across activities such as ship visits and professional exchanges. The
navy to navy relationship with Indian was seen as particularly important with
the White Paper noting that both countries would work towards establishing a
formal bilateral maritime exercise.[27]
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
10.17
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is an example of a regional
response to growing concerns about security matters in the Indian Ocean rim. It
is a voluntary initiative, formed with the assistance of India in 2008. The
symposium aims to increase maritime co-operation among the navies of the India
Ocean region littoral states and provides a forum for discussion of regional
maritime issues. Discussions at their workshops and seminars cover a range of
threats to the security of the Indian Ocean and its coastal areas including
piracy, people smuggling, narcotic trafficking, gun running and illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing. They also consider topics such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the region. Meetings
are held every two years and various seminars and workshops held each year.
IONS Chair and Secretariat are rotated every two years—South Africa is the
current Chair and will transfer responsibility to Australia in 2014 at the
Conclave of Chiefs.[28]
10.18
IONS has 35 member countries—this list includes all 20 members of
IOR-ARC, as well as three IOR-ARC dialogue partners (France, Egypt and Japan).[29]
Twelve countries are members of both IONS and the Combined Maritime
Forces, a multi-national naval partnership led by the US to promote maritime
security.[30]
Six members of IOR-ARC participate in the Combined Maritime Forces, as well as
four IOR-ARC dialogue partners. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while both members
of IONS and the Combined Maritime Forces, are not members of IOR-ARC.
Importantly, both Pakistan and India participate in the symposiums.
10.19
Regional architecture, including forums for defence dialogue, is central
to bolstering Australia's relations with other countries in the region. Defence
noted that Australia supports the development of regional multinational
architecture in furtherance of this aim and explained the benefits of
Australia's involvement with IONS:
[T]he Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) brings together
Chiefs of Navy from twenty-six states...[and] provides a consultative forum for
discussion of maritime security issues...Australia will host the IONS Conclave of
Chiefs in Perth during 2014.[31]
10.20
Mr Shoebridge, Defence, described IONS as:
...the only real forum in the Indian Ocean that has a broad
range of participants where we can build those habits of cooperation. A strong
focus that it has, given the regional security environment, is around
piracy—and there we have been able to build those kinds of habits of
cooperation out of the very diverse set of navies that have been operating
there. So there are some useful lessons out of that for the other participants
in the naval symposium.[32]
10.21
Mr Shoebridge observed that IONS has been essentially about dialogue
between littoral states and sharing lessons learnt. He explained that it was
Australia's intention as Chair of IONS in 2014 to use the symposium structure
to examine some practical matters—namely counter-piracy measures.[33]
Defence advised the committee that 368 delegates had attended the 2012 IONS
Chiefs' Conclave in South Africa in 2012 and that a similar number was planned
for the 2014 conclave to be held in Perth.[34]
In its submission, DFAT noted that India's recognition of the threat to its
maritime and trading interests posed by piracy was key to India's drive for the
formation of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2008.[35]
10.22
Mr Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe spoke of the benefits of IONS as a regional
forum for the development of networks between navies in the Indian Ocean rim.
He observed that from his own research, he believed that the forum had so far
been effective in building a trans-Indian Ocean partnership.[36]
Bilateral versus multilateral approaches to defence and security in the Indian
Ocean rim
10.23
Australia's current policy perspectives on defence, strategic security
and soft security approaches are based on bilateral relationships and single
issue sub-regional groups (for example piracy). The committee believes that the
diversity of challenges in the region prevents development of a strategy for
the region as a whole, encompassing all the countries of the Indian Ocean rim. Mr
Shoebridge advised the committee that:
The Australian Defence Force and the broader Defence
organisation have a critical role in supporting Australia's interests in the
Indian Ocean region and capitalising on these strategic opportunities. We are
moving to establish stronger foundations for long-term defence partnerships in
the Indian Ocean region. Our engagement initiatives are underpinned by the
understanding of the importance for countries with an interest in Indian Ocean
security to secure their interests collectively rather than individually. While
the security architecture and broader regional architecture remains immature in
this environment, our legacy of building relationships in the region and also
our commitment to this collaborative approach to security we think puts us in a
good position to help shape that environment.[37]
10.24
Defence acknowledged that multilateral engagement could yield benefits,
provided common interests were identified and momentum and agreement achieved.
However it is clear that Defence values bilateral engagement, with Mr
Shoebridge noting that 'you can often have a deeper dialogue bilaterally than
you can have in a broader multilateral forum'. He observed that '[o]ur strong
direction is to strengthen multilateral fora and engagement but recognise that
a lot of that has to be on the foundation of close bilateral engagement and
relationships'.[38]
10.25
For example, the Defence White Paper 2013 cited the Defence Cooperation
Arrangement, signed in September 2012, between Australia and Indonesia. This
agreement provides a formal framework for 'practical defence cooperation under
the Lombok Treaty'.[39]
According to the White Paper, Australia will use the agreement to develop options
for expanding the current program of maritime, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation.[40]
10.26
Nevertheless, the committee sees significant benefits for future defence
and security policy development for government to focus on the challenges in
the Indian Ocean rim. The committee supports any strategic policy work being
done to examine synergies and opportunities for cooperation in the region,
particularly with a view to the role Australia can play in promoting
cooperation and security in the Indian Ocean rim. The committee would be
encouraged to see Defence, in future publications, promote the practical
engagement it has in leading multilateral engagement in the Indian Ocean rim.
The committee is all too aware that statements of support do not result in
tangible habits of cooperation between countries.
Security risks to Australia's North West—protection of infrastructure
10.27
With the second largest coastline bordering the Indian Ocean, Australia
also has a focus on domestic security, including protection of Australia's
external territories—Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island.
10.28
Drs Bateman, Bergin and Trood contend that, in the past, assessments of
the strategic security issues in the North West of Australia have reflected a
view that this part of the continent was 'remote with relatively little
national infrastructure.'[41]
However they noted that this view does not take into account the major
strategic importance of offshore oil and gas infrastructure for Australia's
prosperity and security.[42]
Drs Bateman, Bergin and Trood maintain that defence facilities in the North
West are limited and that defence activity has decreased in the area:
The 'bare' air bases at Learmonth (about 1200 kilometres from
Perth) and Curtin (about 1000 kilometres from Darwin) are rarely
activated...Operations of the Army Reserve regional force surveillance in the
Pilbara and Kimberly regions have been reduced due to budgetary restrictions
(Dodd 2009). There is not a naval base between Perth and Darwin. It is over
3000 kilometres from Perth to Darwin, and the ADF could be slow in responding
to an offshore contingency in the Pilbara region.[43]
10.29
Defence acknowledged the importance of the offshore resource exploitation
in Australia's North West, noting further that Australia is the world's fastest
growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter.[44]
Mr Shoebridge advised the committee of the result of work done by the Defence
Force Posture Review, released in May 2012, in regards to defence work in the North
West of Australia:
The ADF posture review released in May and assessed there is
a greater level of Australian Defence Force activity in the northern approaches
than realised. Under the review's recommendation, Defence is also improving
relationships with stakeholders in the north and north-west, including greater
engagement with industry and community representatives. The Defence Force is
also enhancing its familiarity with and preparedness for operations in the
north-west through more exercises and greater assessments to improve
infrastructure.[45]
10.30
On 7 June 2012, the then Inspector of Transport Security, Mr Mick
Palmer, presented his report on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Sector Security
to the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport. The report found that,
generally, Australia is considered a low-risk location for investment, with
good security and supply reliability. However the report noted that the oil and
gas industry is changing and 'Australia increasingly has a range of
characteristics within its operating environment that are likely to heighten
security implications in the future'. Further, in the Australian environment,
'security planning is a relatively new priority with Australian-based
management positions in company security being only reasonably recently
introduced'.[46]
10.31
The report recognised that responding to future security threats is a
challenge for industry, government, and the defence forces, noting:
While within Victoria and Western Australia relevant state
police engage on a regular basis in joint exercises with industry on near-shore
offshore facilities, it is understood that no Commonwealth agency has
participated in such exercise since about 2004.
Although the reasons are well known and understood, ADF
exercises on or in the vicinity of offshore facilities, as occurred in the Bass
Strait during the 1980s, have rarely been conducted in recent years, either in
the Bass Strait or in Australia's North West Shelf region.[47]
10.32
Defence disputed the observations made by the Office of Inspector of
Transport Security that no Commonwealth agency had participated in exercises in
the North West since 2004, but did accept that there had been a reduction of
activity, explaining the 'well known and understood' reasons:
Defence has conducted training events on Offshore Energy
Installations (OEI) since 2004, though the frequency of the training has
reduced as a result of the number of factors, including the following:
(a) The cost
to industry of conducting training of this nature on their installations when
factors such as economic, indemnity and workplace health and safety issues are
taken into consideration;
(b) The
reduction in the National CT [counter terrorism] Committee Whole-of-Government
CT exercise program that has led to fewer large scale CT exercises;
(c) High ADF
operational tempo impacting the availability of supporting air and maritime
platforms; and
(d)
Difficulty in scheduling mutually suitable times for training between the ADF
and industry.
As a result, smaller training events such as discussion
exercises and OEI platform familiarisations have been conducted in the interim.
Resourcing and location of bases are planning factors that are considered when
planning CT exercises, but are not a primary consideration.[48]
![LNG tankers at Port Dampier, Western Australia.](c10_1.jpg)
LNG tankers at Port Dampier, Western Australia.
Committee's visit to Pilbara region
10.33
Between 21 and 24 April 2013, the committee visited the Pilbara region—including
Karratha, Exmouth, Dampier and Port Hedland—and was able to view firsthand the
complex policy issues facing the region. Through conversations with community
and industry representatives, the committee gained a valuable insight into the
grassroots view of the region's future challenges.
10.34
The committee heard from a number of industry and community
representatives that there was a feeling in the area that Defence did not view
the region as a security priority. They felt that there was a need for more
patrols, and an increased visible Defence presence. While they acknowledged
that the risk of a terrorist or other hostile attack was low, they noted that
the consequences would be extreme.[49]
These views were also expressed through the media by the chief executive of the
Pilbara Regional Council, Mr Tony Friday. Mr Friday expressed his concerns to
the ABC: '[t]he reality nowadays is that any threat, either sovereign or
terrorist, is much more likely to come from the north or west, yet a lot of the
defence assets are positioned on the east coast'.[50]
10.35
Comments to the media by Mr Warren Pearce of the Chamber of Minerals and
Energy (CME) reinforced the view regarding threat level. In a statement to the
ABC, Mr Pearce said:
All those companies undertake a risk management process when
they begin their projects. The Western Australian coast is quite low risk
compared to other nations and continents, so there's not really a high risk
profile for the area. That said, they look at the defence presence in the
Pilbara now and think it could certainly be increased and there could be a
greater role for defence organisations.[51]
10.36
As it made site visits in the region and speaking to industry representatives,
the committee found that not all of industry shared the same view of the threat
level. Several resource groups in the region referred to good relationships
with Defence, the AFP and the Western Australian State Police and were
comfortable with the Defence presence in the region. All those to whom the
committee spoke to regarding the Office of Inspector Transport Security's
report on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Security praised the report and agreed
with its approach.
ADF presence and security risks in
the North West
10.37
The committee has before it a number of conflicting points of view on
the security risks and defence presence in the North West. In summary, the main
groups are:
- community representatives (including local government);
- industry;
- state government; and
- federal government departments and agencies (including Defence,
Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Office of Inspector of Transport
Security, Australian Federal Police).
![Mr John Verbeek (Shire of Roebourne), Mr John Lally (Karratha and District Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Senator David Fawcett, Councillor Bill Dziombak (Town of Port Hedland), Senator Helen Kroger, Chair – Senator Alan Eggleston, Mr Tony Friday (Pilbara Regional Council), Senator Mark Bishop, Mr David Parker (Apache Energy Pty Ltd) at Karratha.](c10_2.jpg)
Mr John Verbeek (Shire of Roebourne), Mr John Lally
(Karratha and District Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Senator David
Fawcett, Councillor Bill Dziombak (Town of Port Hedland), Senator Helen Kroger,
Chair – Senator Alan Eggleston, Mr Tony Friday (Pilbara Regional
Council), Senator Mark Bishop, Mr David Parker (Apache Energy Pty Ltd) at
Karratha.
10.38
As noted above, the committee found that industry views varied regarding
the risk level and whether the current defence presence was adequate. Mr Mick
Palmer, former Inspector of Transport Security, spoke of the close cooperation
received from industry in the North West in his inquiry into offshore oil and
gas resource security:
I think the oil and gas industry takes the issue of safety
and security risk extremely seriously. With the Montara and Macondo incidents
in the recent history of the oil and gas industry, obviously from a safety
point of view they are acutely focused on the importance of risk mitigation and
prevention. During the oil and gas security inquiry, they were deeply engaged in
the inquiry process from the start. They supported the process in all its
dimensions, it is fair to say. There was very open contact and communication
between us. They provided one of their senior people, Mr Bill Forbes, who is
now vice-president with Woodside, as the industry representative to assist the
inquiry team. He did not help draft the report, if you like, but he facilitated
all of our inquiries and he travelled with us overseas as well as here. There
is no doubt about the genuine nature of their commitment to identify their own
risks, identify their own areas of vulnerability, move to address them and
further improve the security arrangements to mitigate the chances of anything
serious happening that might affect their business. They are business driven,
obviously, but it is a very serious attitude to security that they bring to the
table.[52]
10.39
Representatives from the Department of State Development, Western
Australian Government, expressed some frustration with regard to inquiries and
reports conducted into infrastructure security in the North West of the state.
They noted that while the Western Australian Government had provided much input
about security and infrastructure issues, it had received no response to its
concerns from the federal departments conducting reviews and inquiries:
We are consulted frequently on infrastructure. We continue to
make numerous submissions around the types of infrastructure that are important
for the state. So the short answer to that is, yes, we were consulted. From those
government departments that we make submissions to, feedback and response is
very limited in return. [53]
10.40
The committee believes that there is a concern in the communities of the
North West that Defence is not a visible presence and encourages Defence to
take note of such concerns and increase community engagement in the area.
Australian Federal Police
10.41
The AFP were asked if they had made any studies similar to that of the
Office of Inspector of Transport Security on the offshore oil and gas resource
security risks.[54]
The AFP has not done so—it stated that it relies on the work done by the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Office of Transport Security and
the Attorney-General's department.[55]
10.42
The AFP's annual report lists the principal locations of the AFP in the
west and north as being in Perth and Darwin.[56]
The committee heard from community representatives in the Pilbara that there
was little to no AFP presence in the area (although the committee notes that
the AFP are co-located with Defence at the Harold E. Holt facility near
Exmouth). The committee heard from the Pilbara Regiment Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Saad Omari, that Defence in the Pilbara works with the AFP and the WA
Police in regards to gathering intelligence in the area.[57]
Australian Defence Force
10.43
As noted above, the Inspector of Transport Security was of the view that
there was a need for increased visibility of Defence in the North West. Most
community and industry representatives to whom the committee spoke during its
visit to the Pilbara were supportive of a greater Defence presence in the area.[58]
10.44
It should be noted that Defence has a regiment stationed in the North
West with its headquarters based in Karratha. The Pilbara Regiment is an
infantry unit and one of the three Regional Force Surveillance Units in the
northern area of Australia. According to Defence it is responsible for 'an area
of 1.3 million square kilometres from Port Hedland to Carnarvon in Western
Australia, and from the coast to the border with the Northern Territory; being
approximately one-sixth of the total Australia mass.'[59]
10.45
The Pilbara Regiment Commanding Officer informed the committee that the
regiment's role is primarily surveillance, reconnaissance, and community
engagement. He explained that a key challenge for the regiment was the recruitment
of reserve personnel—a task made difficult by the small population, 12 hour
shifts worked in industry, and problems with release of staff from work for
reserve exercises and training. While the Regiment works closely with industry,
the conduct of the Regiment's exercises can be restricted as companies can be
reluctant to release staff.[60]
10.46
The committee also visited RAAF Base Learmonth, a bare base close to the
Learmonth Airport, the main airport for Exmouth. The committee toured the
facility and received evidence regarding the condition of some parts of the
base.
10.47
The committee is pleased to note the government's response to the
Defence Force Posture Review in the Defence White Paper 2013, in particular the
undertaking to:
- prioritise resources to upgrade Royal Australian Air Force bases
Tindal and Learmonth to enhance KC-30 air-to-air refuelling tanker operations
and Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield facilities to support maritime
surveillance aircraft; [and]
- proceed with programmed airfield upgrades to support Joint Strike
Fighter operations at Royal Australian Air Force bases Darwin, Tindal,
Williamtown, Amberley, Edinburgh, Townsville, Learmonth, Curtin and Scherger.[61]
![Committee Chair – Senator Alan Eggleston and Senator David Fawcett with (from left) LTCOL Saad Omari (Commanding Officer Pilbara Regiment), and officers from the Pilbara Regiment.](c10_3.jpg)
Committee Chair – Senator Alan Eggleston and Senator David
Fawcett with (from left) LTCOL Saad Omari (Commanding Officer Pilbara Regiment),
and officers from the Pilbara Regiment.
10.48
The practical difficulties for Defence engagement in the North West were
also highlighted, for example, at Supplementary Budget Estimates 2012-13. In
response to a question regarding whether he had had taken a group of senior
officers to the North West as intended, General Hurley stated:
We were planning to take the chiefs of staff committee up to
the Pilbara area next month, about 12 November. I have decided to take them
down to Perth as a whole. The vice chief will continue up to the Pilbara region
to engage up there but in Perth we will engage with industry business
leadership that is involved in the Pilbara region and that then links in with
the AUSMIN, the Australia-US Ministerial Consultations meeting, which is on the
next day. Firstly, for one reason it was getting particularly practically
difficult to get me and others in the right place to do both activities. Secondly,
there was some cost involved with going to the Pilbara that, frankly, I did not
want to pay to use service aircraft to access airfields and so forth, so I have
split the task and got the vice chief to go up there. We will relook at it but
it really conflicted with a number of activities that came up that week.[62]
10.49
The committee was also interested in Defence's interaction with local
industries and those concerned with national security. Asked about Defence's partnership
with industry in the North West and the coordination with other security
agencies, Mr Shoebridge advised the committee that while Defence works with
industry, Defence (at least in Canberra) see security as primarily a company's
obligation:
...from a Defence perspective it certainly is the case that
companies have obligations for the safe operation of their own facilities. That
includes things like evacuation planning, shutdown procedures, and thinking
about how they can move people on and off those installations as they need to.
We know the companies undertake that planning. We have expanded our Australian
Maritime Defence Council to include representation from the Australian
Petroleum Production and Exploration Association to make that closer
connection. We are also in discussions with Attorney-General's and, as a result
of Mick Palmer's review, with major companies about their plans for their own
safety and the security of that offshore infrastructure. Our [counter
terrorism] exercising and training on various rigs involves that kind of
discussion and collaboration.[63]
10.50
Mr Shoebridge also provided advice to the committee about the Defence
presence in the North West. He observed that the Defence Force Posture Review
had made the point that there was a considerable Defence presence in the North
West as a result of Operation Resolute—Defence's contribution to border
security and offshore surveillance.[64]
However Mr Shoebridge did concede that the Review had concluded that although there
was 'a lot of presence...it has not been made terribly visible to the population
or the installation operators'.[65]
10.51
In answers to questions taken on notice, Defence particularly emphasised
Exercise PYTHON which was conducted in April 2013 out of Perth as being a
key exercise to increase awareness of the security challenges of the North West.
Exercise PYTHON was a desk top activity with industry executives and federal
and state government involvement.[66]
During Budget Estimates in June[67],
Air Marshal Mark Binskin provided more detail regarding Exercise PYTHON. The
Exercise was whole-of-government and included Defence, the AFP, Border
Protection Command, and the Attorney-General's Department. Representatives from
the state police and Western Australian Government attended; as did
representatives from between 10 to 12 resource companies. In the course of the
day-long table top exercise, or command post exercise, participants ran through
a number of scenarios which involved vignettes of potential threats. Air
Marshal Binskin explained:
We went right through the command and control that would be
involved in response to any of those scenarios. I think it demonstrated to the
companies that it is a complex environment in that respect. But it did go
through and demonstrate to them that we know who has the responsibility at
various stages of any operation or who has jurisdiction at any stage through
that.[68]
10.52
Defence also informed the committee that it planned and conducted
liaison, exercise and engagement activities throughout the year in the region.
Defence believed that these activities demonstrated that there was an active
defence presence in the area. It noted further that:
Specific planning is under way to develop a joint activity in
the 2014 training year to build on current single Service activities. This
exercise will incorporate platforms and force elements from all three Services
and the US Marine Rotational Force-Darwin.[69]
10.53
In addition, Defence noted that Defence and Border Protection Command
representatives attend bi-annual meetings of the Oil and Gas Security Forum
(led by the Department of Infrastructure and Transport).[70]
Defence indicated that it was seeking to expand membership of the Australian Maritime
Defence Council, a body established in 1982 whose expanded remit creates a
forum for cooperation between government, industry and Defence on maritime and
shipping issues.[71]
Department of Infrastructure and
Transport, Office of Inspector of Transport Security
10.54
In evidence to the committee on 21 March 2013, Mr Mick Palmer advised
the committee that while he had met with the Defence Force Posture Review
members, and raised issues identified in his report with CDF, the Defence Force
Posture Review group had independently come to similar conclusions to the OITS
report.[72]
The committee notes the Defence has advised that it has been consulted on the
government response to the OITS report and that it will factor issues raised in
the report, as well as those in the Defence Force Posture Review, in the 2013
Defence White Paper.[73]
10.55
The committee notes in particular that the OITS Report raised the issue of
coordination between agencies in the event of a security incident. It put the
concerns of the WA Government to Mr Palmer regarding the lack of feedback on
their submissions regarding security and infrastructure matters (see paragraph
10.40). He noted that sometimes there was tension between state and federal
governments—competing priorities and concerns—and that this had been evident in
the preparation of the OITS Report. In Mr Palmer opinion, it was fair to say that
sometimes agencies were unclear about exactly who would be in charge and
immediately responsible for given issues.'[74]
Mr Palmer advised that while oil and gas companies were often in daily contact
with local police and had security preparations in hand:
Some uncertainty exists between the state and federal
agencies as to exactly who would call the shots if the situation changed and
federal support was needed and who would pay the bill for such federal
assistance that might be given. It was those sorts of issues that we identified
going through which are challenging for everybody.[75]
10.56
In Budget Estimates in June 2013, Air Marshal Mark Binskin maintained
that Exercise PYTHON had helped to raise awareness of the jurisdictions
involved in managing response to a security incident and the coordination
between those jurisdictions. He explained:
But it is complex. It gets to a point where you might have a
ship that is out there. It is a ship until the time it attaches itself to the
seabed inside the Continental Shelf, and now it is considered a fixed facility,
so it is a different jurisdiction. If a terrorist were to take that boat, for
example, while it was a ship, it would be under one jurisdiction. The minute it
attaches itself to the Continental Shelf, it is against another jurisdiction.
So it is quite complex, but we are across that complexity, and it is exercised.[76]
10.57
Air Marshal Binskin assured the committee that participants in the table
top Exercise PYTHON understood their first points of contact in the event of a
security incident.[77]
Although he did note that one product of the discussions during Exercise PYTHON
was that more communication was needed.[78]
10.58
The remoteness and isolation of the region is a further security issue
for the oil and gas installations in the North West. On its visit to the
Pilbara, the committee was able to get a sense of community concerns about
being cut off from the rest of mainstream Australia. Mr Palmer advised the
committee that this area was not a place where many government agencies reside
and that both police and defence personnel numbers are small.[79]
![Aerial view of the Pilbara region and development area against an empty landscape](c10_4.jpg)
The committee was able to see, from a charter flight, the
scale of resource activity in the Pilbara region and the isolation of many
industry projects.
10.59
Mr Paul Retter, Executive Director of the Office of Transport Security,
Department of Infrastructure and Transport, noted that this issue of
responsibility and coordination of agencies was a matter currently before
government to consider in its response to the OITS report. Mr Retter believed
that while there will always be concern from industry about the presence of
security in the region, the size of the area makes it certain that there would
be reasonable delays in responding to an incident. Mr Retter noted that:
...there are well laid-out procedures in terms of the
Commonwealth assets that would respond, but there are also issues around where
the state has responsibility for response within their boundaries. There are
also procedures that they can follow should they believe that it is beyond
their capacity to deal with.[80]
Conclusion
10.60
The evidence to this inquiry has clearly demonstrated that the Indian
Ocean rim is significant for Australia's defence policy and hence the committee
is encouraged by the priority given to the Indian Ocean rim in the Defence
White Paper. 2013. However the committee is concerned about the security issues
in the North West of Australia, particularly after the committee was able to
view for itself some of the industry installations in the area. It notes in
particular Mr Palmer's comments regarding the uncertainty around agencies
coordinating in the event of a security incident and believes that finding a
solution to this issue should be a priority in the government response to the
OITS report.
10.61
The committee is concerned that while the Pilbara Regiment is working to
increase community awareness and encourage recruitment, Defence as an organisation
does not view the North West region as a priority. The committee understands
the resourcing implications, and appreciates that Defence is participating in
whole-of-government work to ensure that security is adequate for the natural
resource-rich region. Nonetheless, the committee is disappointed that the
evidence provided by Defence to the inquiry placed a heavy reliance on a desk
top exercise. The committee is encouraged to hear, from evidence during Budget
Estimates in June 2013 that Defence work is being undertaken planning a larger,
more visible exercise in the North West itself in 2014.
10.62
The committee commends the work done by the Office of Inspector of
Transport Security (OITS) on the report into Offshore Oil and Gas Resource
Security Inquiry. It is a comprehensive report and the committee looks forward
to seeing a similarly comprehensive response from government in the near
future, particularly in regards to the issues identified in the report about
coordination between agencies, state and federal, in the event of an incident
at a facility in the North West.
10.63
In this regard, the committee is encouraged by the reference to a
renewed focus on the North West in the Defence White Paper 2013, especially the
planned joint activity in 2014 which is to incorporate platforms and force
elements from the three Services.[81]
10.64
The committee will be interested to follow the progress Defence makes in
the conduct of exercises in the North West and in promoting a visible Defence
presence in the area.
Recommendation 7
The committee recommends that the AFP consider greater
community engagement in the North West region to increase the understanding of
its role and reassure the community that the security of the region is a
priority.
Recommendation 8
The committee recommends that Defence make it an urgent
priority to focus on the defence of the North West. The committee encourages
Defence to increase its cooperation with industry in order to find creative
solutions to the challenges which currently prevent larger exercises and affect
reserve recruitment.
Recommendation 9
The committee recommends that Defence examine the
possibility of making the 2014 planned Defence exercise in the North West a
larger, more visible exercise in the region—as a means of providing reassurance
to industry and actively engaging the community. In particular, the committee
encourages the RAN to examine ways in which it can increase visibility in the
area and raise community and business awareness of its activities in the North West
of Australia.
Recommendation 10
The committee recommends that in its work on the government
response to the OITS Report, the Department of Infrastructure and Transport
consider including strategies for community engagement. The committee strongly
believes that local government and relevant state agencies have a role to play
in educating community and industry about the role of various security agencies
and can help to provide reassurance to the community that security of the North
West is a priority for government.
![Ships line the horizon, Port Hedland port.](c10_5.jpg)
Ships line the horizon, Port Hedland port.
Piracy
10.65
Countries both within and outside the Indian Ocean rim are deeply
concerned about piracy particularly off the coast of Somalia, which threatens
not only the peace and stability of that country, but 'regional and
international security as well'. A report to the Security Council described
Somali maritime piracy as 'a form of money-driven, clan-based, transnational
organized crime' which posed a threat to global shipping but was also a
humanitarian tragedy for hijacked seafarers and kidnapped hostages, their
families and employers.[82]
In the following section, the committee considers the international and
regional response to piracy in the Indian Ocean, the implications that piracy
has for Australia and its contribution to combating such activity.
Prevalence of piracy in the Indian
Ocean
10.66
As mentioned earlier in this the committee's report,[83]
piracy is a significant problem in the Indian Ocean rim and has been raised at
discussions in IOR-ARC with a view to encouraging collaboration and sharing of
lessons learnt amongst member countries. DFAT noted in its submission that the
issue of piracy was also raised at IONS in 2008.[84]
10.67
The Office of Inspector Transport Security also conducted an inquiry
into international piracy and robbery at sea. The report defined piracy as:
Piracy in accordance with Article 101 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is defined as:
(1) Any illegal acts of
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by
the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed:
a. On
the high seas, against another ship or persons or property on board such ship.
b. Against
a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
(2) Any act of voluntary
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft, and
(3) Any act of inciting or
of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).[85]
Effect of piracy
10.68
Dr Sam Bateman noted that the prime causes of piracy around the world were
the same as the common causes of criminal activity generally—lack of economic
opportunity, employment, and effective policing. A further factor, linked to
contemporary piracy off the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asia, has been the
decline in fish stocks and overfishing, particularly by commercial interests.[86]
DFAT identified Somalia as 'Africa's most pressing peace, security and
humanitarian issue' and noted that '[t]he crisis in Somalia has consequences
beyond its borders, including as the primary source of piracy in the Indian
Ocean'.[87]
Global piracy—actual
and attempted attacks 2006 to June 2012[88]
Location
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
Jan-Jun 2012
|
Southeast Asia
|
87
|
78
|
65
|
68
|
113
|
101
|
48
|
Indian subcontinent
|
53
|
30
|
23
|
30
|
28
|
16
|
10
|
Americas
|
29
|
21
|
14
|
37
|
40
|
25
|
9
|
Horn of Africa
|
20
|
44
|
111
|
218
|
219
|
237
|
69
|
West Africa/ Gulf of Guinea
|
25
|
49
|
56
|
47
|
38
|
52
|
32
|
Other Africa
|
16
|
27
|
22
|
7
|
4
|
5
|
9
|
Rest of World
|
9
|
14
|
2
|
3
|
3
|
3
|
0
|
Total
|
239
|
263
|
293
|
410
|
445
|
439
|
177
|
Source: International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy
Reports
Notes: 1. Horn of Africa includes attacks in the Gulf
of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean and off Oman and Somalia—those
carried out by Somali pirates.
2. Gulf of Guinea includes Cameroon, Congo, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and
Togo.
10.69
DFAT outlined in its submission the effect of piracy on trade, stating
that in 2011 the estimated economic cost of piracy was between US$6.6 and 6.9
billion. This cost includes ransoms, insurance, security equipment, guards,
re-routing, prosecutions and military operations.[89]
DRET noted that in relation to commodity trade on routes through the Indian
Ocean, Australian suppliers have low-level concerns, however:
...in the future with the steady increase in Australian foreign
direct investment (FDI) into lOR resources provinces, particularly in eastern
Africa and South East Asia. Investments in production in Africa and South East
Asia is likely to be intended to service Australia's traditional markets in
Asia, which will then require transport across the Indian Ocean. Dependent on
the value of these cargoes, they could become a lucrative target for piracy,
similar to current LNG shipments from Nigeria.[90]
10.70
The Consulate-General of the Sultanate of Oman also drew the committee's
attention to its concerns about security in the Indian Ocean, stating that the
increase in piracy and terrorism, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, had
significantly affected the traffic of ships in the region.[91]
This in turn has had a detrimental economic impact on the economies of
countries whose main industries are maritime industries. It should also be
noted that piracy not only poses a threat to the safety of ships transiting the
Ocean but to many other activities. For example, only one of the four highly
ranked Indian Ocean scientific sea drilling proposals under the Indian Ocean Drilling
Program is feasible because of piracy.[92]
Combating piracy in the Indian Ocean
10.71
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Report provides
some encouragement, noting that with international attention and sustained
resource contribution by more than 30 states since 2008, piracy has begun to
decline:
The frequency of attacks has dropped considerably, with a 54-per-cent
reduction in incidents in the first half of 2012 compared with the previous
year, and there was only one attack in the third quarter of 2012, the lowest level
for the third quarter of the year recorded since 2008. Somalia has elected its first
permanent central Government since the start of the civil war, which is a hopeful
sign for improved stability and prospects for development across the country.[93]
10.72
Indeed, the international community has dedicated substantial resources,
political, military, intelligence and financial, to combating piracy. Three
large international forces—NATO, European Union Naval Force and the Combined
Maritime Forces/Task Force 151—and numerous independent, national missions have
been engaged in maritime counter piracy off Somalia.[94]
However the UNODC report noted that these achievements were fragile and
sustained support was needed if the region was to build on them. [95]
Australia's contribution
counter-piracy measures
10.73
Australia has a key role in anti-piracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean,
hosting an international counter-piracy conference in Perth in 2012,[96]
participating in a multi-national taskforce,[97]
and providing aid funding of $2.3 million to assist counter-piracy efforts and
support for the UNODC Counter-Piracy Programme.[98]
10.74
In a paper on the importance of the Indian Ocean, the Defence Minister,
the Hon Stephen Smith MP commented:
The Australian maritime contribution is deployed to the
US-led Combined Maritime Forces, which patrols more than 2.5 million square
miles of international waters to counter terrorism, prevent piracy and reduce
the illegal trafficking of people and drugs. That contribution, along with our
maritime partners will be responsible for conducting maritime security
operations in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the
Indian Ocean. These operations help develop and maintain maritime security and promote
stability and prosperity.[99]
10.75
The Defence Minister also noted that Australia hosted a Forum on Indian
Ocean Piracy in the margins of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
October 2011. Following from this event, a Counter-Piracy Conference (an
Australian Strategic Policy Institute event) was held in Perth in July 2012.[100]
10.76
During this conference, the Hon Warren Snowdon MP, Minister for
Veterans' Affairs (on behalf of the Minister for Defence), outlined Australia's
contribution to counter both the symptoms and the causes of piracy in the
region:
- the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) contributes a frigate to the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which is flexibly cross-tasked between the
counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and Gulf maritime security task forces which
form the CMF;
- as a member of the United Nations Contact Group working off
Somalia, Australia contributes to the legal and operation working groups, and
the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction group which assists in coordinating the
CMF, NATO and EU counter-piracy efforts;
- the ADF has had a member seconded to the UN Office for West
Africa to contribute to maritime security and counter-piracy capacity building
work; and
- the RAN seconds officers to the UK-led Maritime Trade Operations
cell in Dubai, providing liaison and coordination for ships travelling in that
region.[101]
10.77
The CMF is a naval partnership of 27 countries which promotes security
and stability in the Indian Ocean which encompasses some of the world's key
shipping lanes.[102]
The CMF is led by the US and consists of three principle taskforces: CTF-150
(maritime security and counter-terrorism); CTF-151 (counter piracy); and
CTF-152 (Arabian Gulf security and cooperation).[103]
10.78
Ms Watt, DFAT, noted that the shipping industry was also focusing on
reducing the number of hijackings and taking more responsibility for security
on vessels. She explained that there was a lot more recognition and analysis of
the types of factors that put ships at risk—older, run-down vessels which are
easier targets for pirates—and the need for shipping companies to take more
action to keep those slower, more vulnerable vessels out of high-risk areas.[104]
Building local capacity
10.79
While the adoption of best management practices by the shipping industry
and more effective international counter-piracy naval operations have lowered
the number of successful hijackings, major obstacles in the judicial and legal
areas undermine this success. In November 2012, the Security Council noted the
limited capacity and the deficiencies in domestic legislation 'to facilitate
custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture'. It reported
that this situation had 'hindered more robust international action against the
pirates off the coast of Somalia' and too often 'led to pirates being released
without facing justice'. The Security Council underlined the importance of
continuing to enhance the 'collection, preservation and transmission to
competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia'.[105]
10.80
In this regard, Australia is contributing to longer term projects on
land designed to reduce piracy in the Indian Ocean—the building of better
governance and policing, investigative capacity and prosecutorial capacity.[106]
Mr Rauter, AusAID, informed the committee that Australian assistance to combat
piracy in the Indian Ocean to date equated to approximately $4.3 million with
an additional $2 million committed earlier in 2012. He explained that the
payments have gone mostly to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which works with
governments in Somalia, Seychelles, Mauritius, Kenya and Tanzania to:
- increase the capacity of those governments to prosecute pirates;
- have a prison system to be able to safely and securely house
people who are prosecuted; and
- improve their ability to undertake maritime surveillance to
detect piracy. [107]
10.81
The AFP provides personnel to the UN counter-piracy efforts through the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in accordance with the AFP's international
engagement priorities and in support of regional capacity building. UNODC has a
Programme on Countering Maritime Piracy in the Horn of Africa—AFP personnel
contribute to the planning, development, organisation and coordination of the
Programme and related UNODC activities.[108]
10.82
The committee has referred to the third prong in the multinational
efforts to combat terrorism by providing aid to Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania in
the areas of food security and agricultural production so that people have job
opportunities and do not see 'piracy as their only job option'.[109]
Conclusion
10.83
Many countries rely on the Indian Ocean as a maritime route for trade,
energy and resource security. The evidence presented to the committee
demonstrates the detrimental effect piracy has on stability and security in the
Indian Ocean rim, and on the maritime transport hub that the ocean provides.
Piracy not only affects maritime security—it can also be a deterrent for
investment in offshore infrastructure, and disrupt activity such as important
scientific research.
10.84
However, some encouragement can be drawn from the fact that the
cooperation of the Indian Ocean rim countries on combating piracy has had some
effect—the number of piracy attacks in the region has dropped. As described in
this chapter, the substantial resources and coordinated operations conducted by
countries in the Indian Ocean rim, including Australia, have started to improve
the situation in countries from which piracy emanates. But as the UNODC notes,
the improvement is fragile and requires continued efforts to be sustainable
over time.
10.85
The committee notes the effect piracy has on the stability and security
of the India Ocean region and commends the efforts being made by Australia to
counter piracy.
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