Chapter 5
Seeking answers
5.1
Since 9 May 2009, the senior sailors had been left completely in the
dark about the reasons they were removed from Success. Even after the
distress caused by media reports of their involvement in a so-called sex
scandal, they still could not obtain information on why they were landed and
returned to Sydney. In this chapter, the committee considers their continued
attempts to obtain a statement of reasons for their landing and the unfolding
of events which increased their fervour to gain access to information relevant
to the circumstances in which they found themselves.
15 July—request for statement of reasons
5.2
On 15 July, LCDR Bainbridge wrote to CMDR Bowers stating that he
appeared to be 'going around the buoy for the umpteenth time' seeking
information on the removal of the senior sailors.[1]
He noted that after almost three months they had still not been notified as to
the reason they were landed. He continued:
Advice from you was that the generic issues (which I am told
should be contained somewhere within the current inquiry) were the reasons,
however, there is no particularisation of what the issue was at the time...
What I find troubling is that our own Navy website directly
contradicts the advice I have received to date that the three senior sailors
were removed for matters contained within the administrative inquiry:
'Once these allegations were made
known, Navy acted immediately by removing those sailors allegedly involved in
the matter from the ship and referring the matter to the independent Australian
Defence Force Investigative Service for action,' VADM Crane said...
Sir, with respect, my boys have
been more than patient with this whole process. This is particularly so
considering the way they were cast aside by their chain of command and later
identified by the media.[2]
5.3
In turn, CMDR Bowers emailed CMDR Rayner, the new CO Success, explaining
that the legal officer representing the three sailors had asked for information
on the reasons for the sailors' landing. CMDR Bowers explained further that he
had obtained advice, dated 15 July, from a Barrister of the Sydney legal panel,
LEUT Brad Jones, about providing reasons in these circumstances.
Refusal to disclose reasons
5.4
It should be noted that the advice sought from LEUT Jones was narrowly
defined asking only for the grounds for withholding information. LEUT Jones
made this intention clear when he stated that he had been instructed to advise
whether there was 'legal foundation for declining to provide those particulars'
of the reasons for landing'.[3]
Mr Giles observed that the framing of this question was significant—LEUT Jones
was 'not asked whether there was a proper basis for providing particulars'.[4]
5.5
The committee agrees that the wording of the request for legal advice
was noteworthy. In effect, it was slanted toward producing an argument that
would support the continuing non-disclosure of information to the senior
sailors.
5.6
In his advice, LEUT Jones stated that 'in certain circumstances
procedural fairness requires that persons adversely affected by a decision be
given reasons for that decision'.[5]
The advice continued:
In my opinion, in the present circumstances there are two
strong grounds why particulars of the allegations underlying CMDR Brown's
decision to land the sailors ought not be given, quite apart from the absence
of a legal obligation to do so.
First, there is currently an administrative inquiry underway
which is investigating the allegations. In my opinion the giving of particulars
of the allegations could undermine the integrity of the inquiry process. I
understand each of the sailors have been given a notice of possible adverse
findings. Consequently, should the report contain adverse findings in respect
of these allegations the sailors will have an opportunity to respond before any
adverse findings are made in respect of them. If the Inquiry Officer considers
that the particular allegations are made without foundation (and have not
therefore given the sailors notices in that regard) then revealing the
particulars of the allegations to the sailors could be seen as undermining the
outcome of the inquiry.
Second, the decision to land the sailors was made in the interests
of the safety and welfare of the ship's company. In particular I understand
that there were concerns that members had been intimidated and physically
threatened by one or more of the sailors about reporting their behaviour. If
this allegation is true then by revealing particulars of the allegations
certain members may therefore be at risk from one or more of the sailors. If
this were to occur it could conceivably affect not only the safety of
particular individuals but also the morale and safe operation of Success.
I therefore recommend that consideration be given to making a
circumspect response to LCDR Bainbridge in the form of Annex A.[6]
5.7
The draft proposed response to LCDR Bainbridge which was Annex A to LEUT
Jones' legal opinion follows:
On 9 May 2009 the former CO Success CMDR S T Brown RAN
wrote to each of the sailors to inform them that they were being temporarily
landed from Success as certain allegations had come to his attention
that were of great concern to him regarding the operations of Success.
In particular, I understand those allegations included matters that were
considered to be of sufficient gravity that they could affect the safety and
welfare of personnel on board and the effective operation of the ship. I
understand that it was CMDR Brown's belief that the temporary landing was
necessary for both the welfare of the ship and her company and to allow a
thorough and expeditious inquiry to be conducted.
As you are aware, an Inquiry Officer's Inquiry is currently
being conducted by CMDR Work RAN. That inquiry will, among other things,
examine those allegations. As I do not wish to prejudice the integrity of the
Inquiry process (including its outcome) or the sailors' right to address any
findings that may affect them, it would be inappropriate for me to provide any
further particulars of the allegations. However, I understand that the sailors
have seen the terms of reference for the IO's inquiry and have been advised of
matters relating to them in 'notices of possible adverse finding'. The sailors
will therefore have an opportunity to respond to those matters before any
Command decisions are made that adversely affect them.[7]
5.8
At that time, CMDR Bowers' explanation for maintaining the position of
not providing reasons for the temporary landing was:
...to let the administrative inquiry take its course with its
own timeframe and parameters given the matters in common between the reasons
for landing and the matters which were subject of the administrative inquiry.[8]
5.9
CMDR Bowers told the Commission that they were dealing constantly with
the issue of reasons or the issue of whether or not to provide reasons to the
sailors. He then explained:
I received advice that reasons might not be given and in fact
ought not to be given, given the inquiry process, while the inquiry was
underway, but then later when the inquiry was concluded that changed
everything.[9]
5.10
LEUT Jones and CMDR Bowers' opinion on refusing to disclose the reasons
for landing the senior sailors was based on their understanding that the
Inquiry Officer's Inquiry was investigating the circumstances of the sailors'
removal. In this regard, CMDR Bowers indicated that based on LEUT Jones' legal
advice and his own thoughts:
...the inquiry ought to get on and conduct the inquiry without
interference or any sort of insertion of the command structure...so to my mind
the matters which were the subject of the landing were also the subject of the
inquiry. And I didn’t know what happened until the inquiry had concluded.[10]
5.11
CMDR Bowers requested CMDR Rayners to consider the advice and the
attached draft response, suggesting that 'in the interests of providing a way
ahead, you might consider the attachments'.[11]
5.12
Having considered LEUT Jones' legal advice, CMDR Rayners was of the view
that it gave two good reasons for not providing additional clarification for
landing the sailors. Even so, he informed CMDR Bowers on 15 July 2009 that he
could sympathise with the sailors' claims that they have not been told
specifically as to why they have been landed. He stated:
I do not think the proposed draft response will particularly
relieve their consternation in respect to this matter. I actually think it will
only cause more frustration as it does not really tell them any more than they
already know and it will probably be seen as disingenuous. The advice indicates
any further amplification beyond that recommendation would be inappropriate.[12]
5.13
CMDR Rayners explained further that he was not the CO at the time of the
sailors' removal and had very little knowledge of what the commanding officer's
specific deliberations were in coming to his decision. Consequently, he noted
that he was not in a position 'to validate or question the veracity of this
decision'. He also pointed out that he had not been provided with any reason
why he needed to review or change the decision that had been taken.[13]
In his view, the present circumstances should remain unchanged until the
inquiry was completed and then decisions could be made 'based on the findings
with a degree of knowledge available to all'.[14]
5.14
Clearly, CMDR Rayner could not offer a solution that would resolve the
current dilemma satisfactorily. He told CMDR Bowers that he could not see how
they could improve the sailors' understanding nor discern any benefit to the
Navy by responding as outlined in the attachment. He then stated:
I think the issue here is the frustration being generated by
an inability to repudiate a decision when the reasons for that decision have
not been clearly articulated. I do not think that this situation can change
until the inquiry findings are known...I think any opportunity for clarifying the
decision on 9 May has passed.[15]
5.15
The next day, following a conversation with CMDR Bowers, CMDR Rayner
wrote to him acknowledging that a response to LCDR Bainbridge's inquiry was
required and that he had prepared a written response based on the previously
provided legal opinion. By minute dated 17 July, CMDR Rayner wrote to LCDR
Bainbridge along the exact lines of LEUT Jones' drafted response cited above
(paragraph 5.22)[16]
CMDR Rayner told the Commission:
Every request I received from those sailors was through their
lawyer and I, on every occasion, approached Fleet Legal to assist because I
had...no information myself. I had no capacity or access to the Wark Inquiry even
when it was complete. So...I was in no position to answer those questions. So I
sought the guidance and support from Fleet Legal to try and get an answer out
of COMASSURFOR [CDRE Middleton] to provide that response.[17]
5.16
Consistent with the views he expressed to CMDR Bowers, he told the
Commission that he had great sympathy for the senior sailors' situation, and
'empathy for the problems' that they were facing. According to CMDR Rayner, he
was trying 'very hard' to get some answers for the senior sailors and to
support them as best he could but the information was not available to him.[18]
5.17
Having received CMDR Rayner's response to his application for
information, LCDR Bainbridge then made a number of subsequent requests. By
minute dated 28 July, he asked the CO Kuttabul to provide a copy of the
document from the CO Success that contained the reasons for the landing
of the senior sailors. He wrote that they were yet to be informed of the
reasons for their removal from Success, other than a vague reference by
the CO Success to some 'serious allegations' yet to be disclosed. He
stated further:
As the legal representative of the three members, I have made
several attempts to obtain a statement of reasons for the removal from Success
(through the Fleet Legal Officer), however, I am yet to receive any information
other than vague, non-specific, inferences to the matters which have featured
in the media and/or matters which are subject to inquiry.[19]
5.18
LCDR Bainbridge enclosed the LAM Signal raised at the time the sailors
were returned to Australia. He observed that the CO Success 'did, or did
intend to, send a statement of reasons' for the sailors' removal from HMAS Success
to CO Kuttabul and requested a copy of that document containing the
reasons.[20]
The next day, CMDR Clarke informed LCDR Bainbridge that she had not received
such a statement and was unable to pass on any information.
5.19
In response to an earlier request for a statement of reasons, CMDR
Clarke received correspondence from CMDR Bowers on 10 August. It enclosed the
minute of 17 July 2009 from CO Success which, as noted above, indicated
that it was 'inappropriate to provide further particulars to allegations as the
Commanding Officer did not wish to prejudice the integrity of the inquiry
process'.[21]
Importance of providing reasons
5.20
The committee does not accept the argument that withholding a statement
of reasons from the senior sailors had the potential to jeopardise the Inquiry
Officer Inquiry. The legal advice at that time for non-disclosure provides no
indication of how the senior sailors' knowledge of the reasons for their
landing would 'undermine the outcome of the inquiry'. In the committee's view
this argument is muddled. In respect of posing a threat to crew members, the committee
notes that the sailors had effectively been quarantined from any contact with
crew members and they were in no position to influence witnesses to the Inquiry
Officer Inquiry.
5.21
In the committee's view, the refusal to explain to the senior sailors
why they were removed from Success goes against all practical reasoning.
The Administrative Review Council takes the sensible approach that 'even if
there is a prima facie exemption from a statutory obligation to give reasons,
it is good administrative practice to provide reasons unless there are good
grounds for not doing so.[22]
The Council recently produced a consultation paper which highlighted the
significance of providing reasons for making a decision that will adversely
affect another:
Informing people about their rights and responsibilities can
prevent disputes from occurring and escalating. The earlier a dispute is
resolved, the less risk of adverse impact on the applicant and the less cost to
the taxpayer is likely to occur.[23]
5.22
Defence's Decision-Makers' Handbook similarly recognises the importance
of applying procedural fairness to decision-making, including the right to know
and be heard. It advises that a person subject to a decision must have full
access to the rule and any criteria on which the decision is to be made, so
that they can make their case and respond to any problems. In addition, they
have 'the right to be heard before their application is refused'. It directs
the decision maker:
You must not shut your ears to the applicant during the process
of deciding the matter.
5.23
The CO Success at the time of their landing not only closed his
ears to the sailors request for reasons but for months after no one thought to
consider seriously the arguments for disclosing information to the senior
sailors. The focus was on maintaining the wall of silence and finding
justification for doing so.
Freedom of Information
5.24
As a means to gain access to information on the reasons for their
landing, the sailors decided to exercise another option and lodge Freedom of Information
(FOI) requests. On 4 August 2009, one of the senior sailors submitted such a
request which it would seem included obtaining a copy of the E&D report.
Yet again, their attempts were frustrated. On 11 September, the sailor was told
that due to an administrative oversight his request had passed the statutory
deadline of thirty days and was 'currently overdue'. He was further informed
that the relevant people would endeavour to provide the sailor 'with an outcome
as soon as it is available'. On 4 November, the sailor put in writing his
disappointment at the delay in his FOI request:
It has been 3 months since our request was considered valid
and my patience has been well and truly tested. I also informed you that the
Inquiry has completed (final report completed 20th August and 2
months has elapsed and therefore the Inquiry cannot be re-opened) and that any
request denied on the grounds of 'an on going inquiry' should be queried by
FOI.[24]
5.25
One of the sailors indicated that through an FOI request, he received a
copy of the E&D report, six months after it was written.[25]
Another explained that he eventually received a copy through an FOI request in
November 2009 which took 'some 120 days from the application'.[26]
The Gyles Report noted that on 16 November the three senior sailors were given
interim decisions in relation to their FOI requests which included the
provision of some documents.[27]
5.26
While the senior sailors were struggling to obtain information on why
they were landed, the Wark inquiry had been interviewing crew members from Success.
The Wark inquiry—progress
5.27
On 15 May 2009, soon after the landing of the senior sailors, CDRE
Bates, as Chief of Combat Support Group, appointed CMDR Niel Wark as an Inquiry
Officer to inquire into the facts and circumstances of allegations of equity
and diversity issues in HMAS Success. CDRE Bates directed CMDR Wark to
submit a report no later than 26 June 2009, after being satisfied that all
information relevant to the inquiry had practicably been obtained. CDRE
Middleton, who assumed responsibility for Success, amended the
instrument of appointment on 17 July, which then superseded the earlier one.[28]
It directed the report be submitted no later than 31 July 2009. If the inquiry
were not completed by that date, CMDR Wark was to present an interim report by
31 July setting out the circumstances. Both instruments directed CMDR Wark to
ensure that a notice of adverse findings was issued in the event that such
findings were contemplated. This instrument was superseded by another issued on
10 August 2009.[29]
5.28
After two months of inquiry, CMDR Wark was ready to issue notices of possible
adverse findings. In this chapter, the committee considers the events that
flowed from this action.
Notification of potential adverse
findings
5.29
On 10 and 13 July 2009, CMDR Wark gave notification of proposed inquiry
findings to 11 people, including the three senior sailors. In part the notice stated:
I have gathered information relevant to the inquiry and have
commenced analysing that information with a view to making findings as required
by the Terms of Reference. The purpose of this Minute is to inform you that, based
on the information available, I am inclined to make findings and
recommendations which you may regard as adverse to your interests. Attached at
enclosure 2, is a list of those proposed findings.
In order to provide you with procedural fairness, you are
invited to make any statement and/or provide material in relation to the
proposed findings contained in Enclosure 2. Such statement and/or further
material will be considered when I make my final report.[30]
5.30
According to CMDR Rayner the notices were initially emailed directly to
some sailors from the Wark inquiry. He intervened in this process and had the
notices forwarded to him, which he then issued on behalf of CMDR Wark. He
explained:
All of these notices required the recipients to respond to
evidence and this was part of the due process of the inquiry. When I issued the
notices I offered each of the recipients legal assistance should they require
it.[31]
5.31
This action was consistent with the Defence Administrative Inquiries
Manual, which directs that an Inquiry Officer is to put possible findings
to a person who will be potentially adversely affected by the findings of the
inquiry. Importantly, the Manual also requires the Inquiry Officer to provide
that person with opportunity to respond to those potential findings and the
evidence on which those findings are proposed to be made.[32]
Access to evidence
5.32
On 15 July 2009, LCDR Bainbridge wrote to CMDR Wark expressing concern
that the notifications served on the senior sailors did not, in a majority of
cases, contain the full transcript of interviews. Among other things, he noted that
some of the extracts began with a reference to previously undisclosed material
and several transcripts contained references to other documents that had not
been disclosed. He gave an example. To save time and effort in identifying
deficiencies in the extracts, he sought to obtain the full transcripts. If this
request were not acceptable, he indicated that he could provide reasons for
each transcript as required. LCDR Bainbridge also noted that transcripts from
several 'key personnel onboard Success had not been provided and
references to other documents mentioned in the transcripts had not been
disclosed'. He therefore also requested to be provided with all the remaining
transcripts in full and copies of all supplementary evidence gathered during
the inquiry.[33]
5.33
LCDR Bainbridge wrote again on 18 July, providing justification for
seeking to obtain the additional material and identifying numerous specific examples
of, what he held to be, incomplete evidence. He submitted that the obligation
to disclose evidence should not be limited to that evidence which may be
considered adverse but 'exculpatory evidence which may tend to contextualise,
disprove or discredit the adverse evidence should also be disclosed.'[34]
5.34
Six weeks later, LCDR Bainbridge wrote to CDRE Middleton, as the Appointing
Authority, about potentially affected persons being entitled to know the
substance of the case against them and to receive the evidence relied on in
contemplating any action or decision that may adversely affect them. He maintained:
Although some evidentiary material was disclosed to my
clients as enclosures to their respective notices of potential adverse
findings, there was a substantial amount of evidence that was not provided.
Despite making formal objections to the Inquiry Officer and requesting access
to the evidence, a considerable amount of material remains hidden from my
clients.[35]
5.35
He then identified a number of documents and requested that they be
provided to him, including the E&D report and the missing evidence
identified in his earlier request for documentation dated 15 July and 18 July.
He explained:
As a result of my restricted access to the evidence that was
relied upon by the Inquiry Officer, I have been unable to offer my clients the
requisite standard of legal support.[36]
5.36
LCDR Bainbridge persisted with such requests including seeking
permission from CO Success to come aboard the ship for the
purpose of speaking to witnesses who may have given evidence under duress or
eyewitnesses who were not interviewed.[37]
He also requested the Inquiry Officer's Report in its entirety and all
enclosures, annexes, appendices and other related material attached or included
in the report. In all, after 18 July 2009, LCDR Bainbridge made seven separate,
yet unsuccessful, requests to CDRE Middleton in an attempt to obtain access to
what he termed 'the hidden evidence'.
15 July—joint complaint
5.37
While, the senior sailors' legal representative was actively seeking
access to material that would assist them to respond to their notifications of potential
adverse findings, they were pursuing a grievance about their treatment. On 15
July 2009, they lodged a joint formal complaint with CO Kuttabul, CMDR
Clarke, in which they argued that the initial E&D health check was
conducted under the 'deceptive guise of 'multicultural awareness training'. In
addition, the senior sailors claimed that:
-
they were shocked and humiliated by the way the CO of Success
had treated them from the time they were summoned to his cabin until their
landing;
-
they had not been interviewed, either formally or informally,
about the allegations against them; and
-
had not been informed about the allegations or given the
opportunity to make representation against them.
5.38
By this time, the sailors had also become aware that, shortly after their
landing, the CO of Success had made statements to the Heads of
Departments, Wardroom, CPOs and POs to effect that a rotten core had been
removed from the ship. Furthermore, they had been told that the Supply Officer
used this statement when briefing the supply department on the removal of
personnel. The senior sailors included this reference to them as a rotten core in
their complaint, arguing that:
The use of this statement gave the entire ship the presumption
of guilt before we have even been given a chance to defend ourselves or even
been made aware of the allegations. These personnel who were briefed in this
way were later to become the witnesses to the inquiry. This abuse of power can
only lead to bias when the inquiry conducted interviews with the ship's
company.[38]
5.39
Overall, their complaint covered: the conduct of the E&D health
check; the way the CO informed them of his decision to remove them; and the manner
in which they were removed from the ship including the CO's reference to a
rotten core, which, in their view, could jeopardise the Inquiry Officer Inquiry.
Their complaint also referred to the lack of support on their arrival in Sydney
and during the media reports. The senior sailors concluded their joint
complaint by stating:
Our treatment by the Commanding Officer of HMAS Success
and other senior members has been biased and unfair during the removal from the
ship and the subsequent inquiry. We feel the Navy has a duty of care in
protecting our reputation within Navy and from the Media. We have received no
such protection and feel let down by an organisation that we have been proud to
serve in.[39]
5.40
On receipt of the joint complaint, CMDR Clarke directed LEUT Pymble, a
legal officer attached to Kuttabul to carry out a quick assessment of
the matter. In this assessment, LEUT Pymble noted that the sailors had made
serious and numerous complaints regarding their treatment on Success,
and to a lesser degree their treatment by the RAN more generally. It went on to
state:
The allegations made against CO Success and members of
Command onboard Success are particularly concerning and warrant thorough
and careful investigation as they allege a concerted and deliberate use of
Command influence which may potentially compromise the ongoing IOI into the
'sex scandal' matter. These sailors also raise significant allegations over
whether or not they have been treated in line with the concept of natural
justice and whether procedural fairness has been afforded to them.[40]
5.41
LEUT Pymble formed the view that:
...it is prima facie appropriate that consideration be given to
appointing an Inquiry Officer's Inquiry into the matter. It is important to
note that the relevant Appointing Authority should be independent and removed
from the matter so as to avoid any allegation of real or perceived bias in
directing the inquiry. In the first instance the matter should be referred by CO
Kuttabul to the Fleet Commander for consideration of appropriate action.[41]
5.42
On 17 July, CMDR Clarke forwarded LEUT Pymble's quick assessment report
and the joint complaint to CDRE Middleton, Commander Australian Surface Forces.
Ten days later, CDRE Middleton wrote to RADM Gilmore advising him of the joint
complaint and, to ensure impartiality and independence, asking him to take
responsibility for investigating the complaint, if deemed necessary.[42]
5.43
RADM Gilmore did not reply until 25 August when he wrote back to CDRE
Middleton stating that, having read the quick assessment and the complaints,
the matter appeared to 'be quite constrained and well within the power of Fleet
Command to address'. He felt obliged to refer the matter back to CDRE Middleton
so that he could refer it to another of the Force Commanders to initiate an
inquiry.[43]
5.44
For almost a month the matter simply gathered dust. On 21 September, LCDR
Bainbridge wrote to CO Kuttabul seeking an update on the joint
complaint. Clearly frustrated by the delay, he stated:
On the one hand, my three clients were removed from their
ship on the basis of unsubstantiated rumours and without procedural fairness. This
action took place immediately and command spared no expense in setting up
disciplinary and administrative inquiries in short time. On the other hand,
when it comes to investigating the matters raised by my three clients, it
appears that there is a substantial lack of urgency in investigating the
complaint.[44]
5.45
Promptly, CMDR Clarke wrote to CDRE Middleton 'respectfully requesting' a
progress report on the status of the complaint. She was informed that a Routine
Inquiry was due to start.
The Routine Inquiry—Houston inquiry
5.46
On 25 September 2009, Commodore Support, CDRE van Balen, appointed CMDR
Houston to conduct a routine inquiry based on the complaints raised by the
senior sailors. Five days later, on 30 September, CMDR Clarke wrote to LCDR
Bainbridge acknowledging that the issues raised in the complaint were of a
serious nature and informing him that a Routine Inquiry had commenced on 28
September.[45]
She again indicated that the senior sailors were 'to receive the full
divisional support of Kuttabul.[46]
5.47
The senior sailors would not learn of the results of the Routine Inquiry
until November.[47]
The committee considers this inquiry in the following chapter.
Request to rescind order not to contact members of the ship's crew
5.48
When the three sailors sought to rejoin Success on 27 July 2009,
which was the first working day after the ship came alongside in Sydney,
they were directed not to approach the ship or associate with any Success
personnel.[48]
5.49
On the same day, LCDR Bainbridge wrote to the CO Success
requesting that he rescind the order banning the sailors from contacting by any
means members of the ship's company.[49]
In his view, this order was 'oppressive'.[50]
For their information, the CO of Kuttabul
and the Fleet Legal Officer were included in the correspondence. LCDR
Bainbridge argued that the direction prevented the landed sailors, and even him
on their behalf, contacting the CO of Success, and they risked
imprisonment if they were to do so. He stated:
The order preventing the three sailors from contacting
members of the ships' company, which even prevents the members writing to you
via formal correspondence, is oppressive. The order is preventing the members
from exercising their statutory rights and other rights conferred by Defence
Instruction and/or other ADF policy documents.[51]
5.50
On the following day, 28 July, CMDR Bowers informed CMDR Rayner that
LCDR Bainbridge had indicated to him that he had a signal from Success dated
in May directing the senior sailors to return to Success on 22 June. As
a result, the sailors had turned up to the ship's gangway yesterday and were
turned away. CMDR Bowers stated further that:
LCDR Bainbridge asked what the status of the personnel was
and I stated that they continued to be temporarily landed from Success.
In light of the signal however, he asked for further direction as to where they
should report for duty.[52]
5.51
In responding to CMDR Bowers, CMDR Rayner indicated that he was unaware
of the LAM signal or the direction for the sailors to return to the ship and
that he would investigate and advise accordingly. Each of the relevant 3
signals stated 'request [named sailor] be administered by Roberts Division HMAS
Kuttabul until Success returns 22 June 2009'.
5.52
Correspondence continued throughout the following weeks.[53]
On 19 August, LCDR Bainbridge wrote to CO Kuttabul noting his previous
request to have the order preventing the senior sailors from contacting members
of the ship's company revoked. He enclosed separate requests from each of the
three senior sailors seeking a written statement of reason for the decision to
remove the sailor from the ship and preventing him from rejoining Success
as instructed.
5.53
That same day, LCDR Bainbridge also informed CMDR Bowers that he had
previously asked CMDR Rayner to revoke the order preventing the senior sailors
from contacting the ship's company and was yet to receive a response.
5.54
CMDR Rayner understood that the senior sailors had been directed 'not to
access the ship or talk with members of the ship's company'. He believed that
the directive was given 'to prevent collusion of witnesses to the Wark inquiry'.
CMDR Rayner told the Commission that he sought legal opinion from CMDR Bowers,
who informed him that once the Wark inquiry had completed evidence, then this
requirement would no longer apply.[54]
5.55
By minute dated 31 August 2009, CMDR Rayner wrote to LCDR Bainbridge with
regard to, among other things, the landed sailors' access to the ship. The
minute stated that the divisional support for the sailors' LAM posted to Kuttabul
remained extant but the senior sailors were:
-
not to speak to anyone about any matters under investigation/administrative
inquiry; and
-
not to proceed onboard HMAS Success except where they have
a work purpose to do so.[55]
5.56
With regard to the senior sailors, CMDR Rayner explained further:
It should be noted that the Engineer, CMDR Kemp, provided
this clarification to the members via Telecon, and for three of them in person
later when they came onboard the ship. This advice was reiterated and Legal
counselling and Divisional support provided again while the ship was alongside.
I believe that in my command...all members have had access at all times to
Divisional support and as advised, access to the ship, when requested or
needed.
To date, every known request has been dealt with promptly, no
member has requested access to, or an audience with, the Commanding Officer. There
have been several requests and communication made by the members with other
members of ship's company, and those requiring action have been passed through
the divisional chain for action. I am not aware of any requests where a
response has not been afforded.
The ship will continue to provide support to the members
within the constraints imposed by distance and subsequent communications
challenges brought about from being deployed overseas.[56]
5.57
LCDR Bainbridge persisted with the request to have the order prohibiting
the senior sailors from contacting members of the ship's company lifted. On 2
October, he wrote again to CMDR Rayner seeking an update in relation to his
request to rescind the order.[57]
5.58
Although, the CMDR Wark finished his report on 19 August, it would
appear that the order remained in force.[58]
Conclusion
5.59
By mid August 2009, the senior sailors and/or their legal representative
had with great persistence:
-
continued their efforts to receive a statement of reasons for
their landing, including submitting an FOI request;
-
endeavoured to obtain evidence that they believed was central to
the Inquiry Officer's findings and necessary for them to mount a response to their
respective notifications of possible adverse findings;
-
pursued their grievance concerning the manner in which they were
removed from Success and returned to Sydney culminating in a formal
joint complaint; and
-
requested the revocation of an order preventing them for
contacting crew members of Success.
5.60
Even after repeated attempts, their position and entitlement to know the
reasons for their return to Australia had changed little from the day they were
removed from the ship on 9 May. They were still denied access to the ship and
the ship's crew and were under the impression that crucial evidence related to
their notifications of proposed adverse findings was being withheld. Their
thwarted efforts to obtain information and to have restrictions lifted coupled
with the uncorrected media reports deepened their frustration and suspicions. As
noted by Mr Gyles their circumstances at this time 'ensured that the sailors
would harbour a serious sense of grievance and a determination to pursue their
rights'.[59]
5.61
The completion of the Routine Inquiry that was addressing their formal
complaint and the Wark inquiry appeared to offer the only solution whereby the
senior sailors would finally obtain details on the reasons for their landing.
Hopefully for the senior sailors, the inquiries would also allow the order
preventing them from contacting crew members to be rescinded. In the following
chapter, the committee considers the Wark inquiry which reported on 20 August
and the Routine Inquiry which reported on 25 September 2009.
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