Appendix 2 - Supplementary
submission—Department of Defence
SUPPLEMENTARY
DEPARTMENTAL SUBMISSION TO THE SENATE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE LEGISLATION COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENCE LEGISLATION
AMENDMENT (SECURITY OF DEFENCE PREMISES) BILL 2010
Department of Defence
January 2011
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page |
Section 1: Response to the House debate, 25 October 2010 and
the Bills Digest No 29 of 2010-11, dated 29 October 2010 |
1 |
Section 2: Response to the Senate Standing Committee for the
Scrutiny of Bills, regarding issues in Alert Digest 8/10 of 27 October 2010 |
3 |
Section 3: Response to other submissions lodged with the Senate
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee |
8 |
Section 1: Response to the House debate, 25 October
2010 and the Bills Digest No. 29 of 2010-11, dated 29 October 2010
Issue - In what
circumstances and manner may Australian Defence Force members use lethal force
under the provisions contained in this Bill.
1.1 Detailed information on the Department’s protective security
arrangements, including the proposed rules of engagement for authorised
Australian Defence Force (ADF) members using reasonable and necessary force in
the event of an attack on a Defence base, are not publicly released for
security reasons. However, in accordance with this legislation, potentially
lethal force will only be used by authorised ADF members to protect people on a
base from death or serious injury in the event of an attack that is imminent or
occurring. Authorised ADF members will only draw weapons and ammunition on the
order of the senior ADF officer on base, or in accordance with the base
response plan. Provision will be made, as appropriate, for suitably trained
and authorised ADF members to have ready but controlled access to weapons and
ammunition to allow them to protect life in the event of an attack. The use of
force in this context will be supported by training and rehearsals.
1.2 The purpose of the provisions addressing the use of lethal
force is to protect people. That said, the protection of people would, of
course, extend to people working on, or securing assets located on Defence
premises, therefore indirectly protecting those assets.
Issue - Use of contracted
security guards rather than Australian Defence Force members to provide
security at the entrances and perimeters to Defence bases.
1.3 The
use of ADF members to undertake routine 'static' guarding duties at low threat
levels across all Defence sites is not a cost effective use of this highly
trained resource. Moreover, noting the significant personnel numbers that
would be involved, this would also have an adverse impact on ADF training and
operational availability.
1.4 At
lower threat levels, security at Defence bases will involve a combination of
contracted security guards, civil police and, at some sites, Australian Federal
Police (AFP) Protective Service Officers. At higher threat levels, ADF members
would likely takeover the guarding function at Defence bases given their
increased range of powers under the Bill, vis-a-vis contracted security guards,
including the power to require identification, conduct non-consensual searches,
seize items and, if necessary, take action to make a seized item safe.
1.5 All
bases will have well-rehearsed arrangements in place to deal with a no-warning
attack.
Issue - Costs associated
with the implementation of the Bill’s measures.
1.6 Funding
for implementation of the Bill's measures will be met from internal Defence
resources that have been allocated to the Base Security Improvement Program. As
is the case for the rest of Base Security Improvement Program, the extent of
the implementation of the Bill's measures at each site will be informed by
security risk assessments, with measures appropriately tailored to each site
and the available budget allocation. This will ensure that the cost of
implementing measures is proportionate to the anticipated risk reduction that
can be achieved at each site and that Defence remains within its approved
budget.
Comments in Bills Digest No. 29 of
2010-11
1.7 It is noted
that the Law and Bills Digest Section of the Parliamentary Library have
reported on the Bill. The Bill notes two issues.
1.8 The first
issue identified in the Digest notes that the Bill does not define the term
‘attack’. The term is used in the Bill in relation to the power of an
authorised ADF member to use potentially lethal force if there is a threat of
death or injury to a person caused by an attack on defence premises, or people
on those premises, that is occurring or imminent. In this respect, any attempt
to define terms relating to this provision risks limiting the broad protection
that this provision currently affords authorised ADF members in protecting
people on Defence premises.
1.9 The second
issue noted by the Bills Digest is that the Bill does not provide protection to
an ADF member who exercises greater force than is authorised. In the same
context, the Digest notes that the Bill does not contain a provision
corresponding to section 51WB in Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903; a
part that primarily deals with the utilisation of the Defence Force in
situations of domestic violence, such as terrorist attacks. Section 51WB
provides a defence to a charge if an ADF member has done a criminal act under
an order of a superior, provided certain criteria can be made out. The section
was inserted into Part IIIAAA as part of a package of measures that allowed
action to be taken against aircraft (including passenger aircraft) or ships,
which may have been taken over as part of a terrorist action for use against
other sites. In these circumstances, such a provision was considered
appropriate given the potential for mass innocent casualties flowing from
Defence Force action.
1.10 That said,
section 51WB is not limited on its face to this type of action and applies to
any action covered by Part IIIAAA. Consequently, as implied by the Bills
Digest, a corresponding provision could be inserted into the base security
regime proposed in the Bill. This is not seen as desirable as the base security
amendments are more limited and are intended to provide an immediate response
to an attack on a base, rather than involving more complex use of force issues
that arise in responding to a Part IIIAAA event, such as the need to consider
shooting down a passenger aircraft over a major city.
Section 2: Response to the Senate Standing Committee
for the Scrutiny of Bills, regarding issues in Alert Digest 8/10 of 27 October
2010
Issue: Whether the
definition of defence premises includes land which may have a Defence purpose,
but which is also being used for another purpose (such as an immigration
facility) and generally whether it is appropriate for the amendments to apply
to all defence premises.
2.1 Land or
buildings that may have a Defence purpose, but which are not currently used by
the Defence Force or the Department of Defence do not meet the definition of
defence premises included in the Bill. So, for example, the provisions in the
Bill would not apply to an immigration facility that is located on a former
Defence base that is not currently used by the Defence Force or the
Department. Similarly, if a portion of an operational base was set aside for a
use that is unrelated to the Defence Force or the Department, the provisions of
the Bill would not apply to that portion of the base. The Department will
amend the Explanatory Memorandum to include a statement to this affect.
2.2 Defence
facilities, assets and personnel are potentially attractive targets for
terrorist groups. In addition, many Defence facilities house dangerous,
restricted or classified items. To ensure that the Department can
appropriately safeguard Defence facilities, assets and personnel and prevent
the unlawful removal of dangerous or classified items, Defence requires the
ability to exercise the powers contained in the Bill at all of its premises.
In practice, the exercise of the powers contained in the Bill and the proposed
use of the various classes of Defence security officials will be dependent on
the nature of the site and the assessed level of the security threat, typically
determined on the basis of intelligence.
Issue: Whether
consideration has been given to adequately warning persons entering Defence
premises that they may be subject to non-consensual searches.
2.3 The
Department intends to implement a number of administrative measures to ensure
that people entering Defence premises are aware of the requirements,
obligations and consequences arising from the search regime in the Bill. Given
the diverse nature and composition of Defence premises, the definition of which
includes movable assets such as aircraft, vessels and vehicles, the selection
and implementation of these measures will be tailored to the particular
circumstances of each Defence premise. Measures will include:
(a) prominently displaying signs at the
entrance to Defence bases or facilities notifying people that they, their
carried items and vehicles may be subject to consensual and non-consensual
searches;
(b) conducting a comprehensive awareness
campaign, prior to the introduction of the Bill’s measures, to ensure all
Defence personnel and contractors are aware of the Bill’s provisions and their
rights and responsibilities in relation to consensual and non-consensual
searches;
(c) incorporating appropriate advice on the
Bill’s provisions in recruitment material for all advertised Defence vacancies
and tenders to ensure prospective employees and contractors are aware of
Defence’s expectations and security requirements;
(d) addressing the Bill’s provisions
during staff and contractor induction training and in regular, mandatory
security awareness training; and
(e) requiring Defence Force members and
public servants who are hosting or escorting visitors on Defence premises to
notify visitors of search requirements.
2.4 Further, Defence would
highlight that section 72B of the amendments require Defence security officials
to notify people, before making a request or requirement under the Bill’s
provisions, of the affect of refusing or hindering the request or requirement.
Issue: Concerns about the
adequacy of the training of Defence security officials to ensure the restrain
and detain powers are exercised safely and appropriately, and whether
appropriate parameters for training requirements can be included in the Bill.
2.5 The
Bill makes provision for Defence security officials to restrain and detain a
person for the purposes of placing them in the custody of police or a
protective security officer at the earliest practicable time. This power can
only be exercised if the person is located on Defence premises and either
refuses or fails to comply with an identification or search requirement or, as
a result of complying, the Defence security official reasonably believes the
person is not authorised to be on the premises, constitutes a threat to safety
or has (or may) commit a criminal offence.
2.6 The
ability to restrain and detain people is a fundamental component of the
proposed search regime detailed in the Bill. Without the ability to restrain
and detain people for the purposes of placing them in police custody, Defence
will be unable to mitigate the risk of dangerous or classified items being
improperly removed from Defence premises.
2.7 Under
the Bill, all Defence security officials must satisfy training and
qualification requirements before they can exercise any of the powers contained
in the Bill, including the power to restrain and detain people. These training
and qualification requirements, which will be specified in a legislative
instrument, must be determined by the Minister for Defence or his delegate and
will be stringent.
2.8 Defence
is currently consulting with other Federal agencies, such as the Australian
Federal Police and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, to
assist in identifying the appropriate training and qualification requirements
for Defence security officials.
2.9 The
training requirement for contracted security guards under this Bill, and as
determined by the Minister for Defence, will build upon and enhance the
existing training regime as mandated in Defence security policy. Current
Defence policy demands that contracted security guards meet a number of
requirements that includes the successful completion of a Certificate II in
Security Operations and the provision of services in accordance with relevant
legislation, including general criminal legislation which controls the use of
force. Additional mandatory requirements state that Defence contracted
security guards:
(a) must be licensed to carry out the
required security function by the relevant State or Territory in which the
Defence facility is located;
(b) must hold a minimum security clearance
of CONFIDENTIAL;
(c) must provide services in accordance
with any relevant enactment or direction by the regulatory authority in each
State and Territory and Australian Standard (AS) 4421 Guards and Patrols; and
(d) must possess a current drivers licence
and a first aid qualification or competency.
2.10 In
addition, contracted security guards must complete a Defence-endorsed training
package covering the following topics:
(a) Defence security policy and relevant
laws;
(b) Defence protocols such as rank
structure and customer service;
(c) Defence security environment and
awareness;
(d) Defence policing; and
(e) the Defence security alert system.
2.11 Australian
Public Service employees who are to be appointed as Defence security screening
employees and security authorised Defence Force members will be required to
undergo comparable training to contracted security guards, appropriately
augmented to address the additional powers available to these two categories of
Defence security officials.
2.12 The
Department’s position is that it is appropriate from a legal policy perspective
that the training and qualification requirements for Defence security
officials, including training requirements for the restrain and detain powers,
be specified in a legislative instrument. As a legislative instrument is
subject to tabling and potential disallowance in both Houses of Parliament, the
use of this mechanism affords significant protection. It ensures that the
Parliament, at all times, has control over the nature and level of training and
qualification requirements that will be imposed on people who will be
authorised to exercise powers under this Bill. This affords a far greater level
of protection than having the training and qualification requirement set out in
departmental administrative guidance.
2.13 The use of a
legislative instrument also enables the training and qualification requirements
to be updated rapidly, for example in response to the availability of new
technologies and equipment, without incurring the delays that would arise if
these requirements were stipulated within the Bill itself.
Issue: Justification for the
provisions allowing and limiting the use of deadly force, together with
concerns about of the adequacy of the training and qualification requirements
and whether parameters for these can be included within the primary
legislation.
2.14 A key rationale
behind the development of the Bill is the requirement to clarify the legal
issues surrounding Defence Force members acting in self defence in the event of
a no-warning attack on Defence premises.
2.15 Australian law
recognises the right to protect yourself or others who are threatened. This
currently provides a legal basis for Defence Force members to use reasonable
and necessary force to protect themselves, or others, in the event of an attack
on Defence premises. This Bill, however, will provide certainty as to the
scope of actions that authorised and appropriately trained Defence Force
members could take, rather than having to refer to the various Commonwealth,
State and Territory legislative provisions that provide a defence of
self-defence.
2.16 The
Department’s position is that it is appropriate from a legal policy perspective
that the training and qualification requirements for Defence security
officials, including training requirements for appropriately authorised Defence
Force members who may be required to exercise potentially lethal force in the
context of base security, be specified in a legislative instrument. As a
legislative instrument is subject to tabling and potential disallowance in both
Houses of Parliament, the use of this mechanism affords significant
protection. It ensures that the Parliament, at all times, has control over the
nature and level of training and qualification requirements that will be
imposed on people who will be authorised to exercise powers under this Bill.
This affords a far greater level of protection than having the training and
qualification requirement set out in departmental administrative guidance.
2.17 The use of a
legislative instrument also enables the training and qualification requirements
to be updated rapidly, for example in response to the availability of new
technologies and equipment, without incurring the delays that would arise if
these requirements were stipulated within the Bill itself.
Issue: Whether, and if so why, it is
intended that the proposed offence @71W of hindering or obstructing a search be
regarded as a strict liability offence.
2.18 The Explanatory
Memorandum incorrectly states this is a strict liability offence. It will be
amended to correct this error.
Issue: Justification of the use of
dogs for functions other than to detect explosives or other hazardous
materials.
2.19 The primary use of dogs is for
the protection of people and assets. Apart from their role in the detection of
explosives or other hazardous material, dogs may be used by security authorised
Defence Force members to deter, detect and, if required, apprehend trespassers
for the purposes of placing them in the custody of the police or a protective
service officer at the earliest practicable time (ie restrain and detain).
2.20 Military working dogs are
presently employed at a number of Defence sites, in particular around Air Force
bases. They are used to assist with the protection of people and assets over
an extended area, which can often be difficult to protect effectively through
other means. The presence of military working dogs can also be a very
effective deterrent to trespassers and assist in avoiding a situation
escalating to a point where injury to personnel or damage to assets may occur.
2.21 Defence maintains stringent
policies and procedures around the training and use of military working dogs
and the training of dog handlers. At all times, military working dog handlers
are required to only use such force as is reasonable and necessary and direct
their dogs in such a manner as to prevent unreasonable injury to persons or
damage to property.
2.22 The use of dogs to assist with
the conduct of searches or other functions or powers under this Bill is limited
to security authorised Defence Force members who are also fully qualified dog
handlers.
Section 3: Response to other submissions lodged with
the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee
3.1 While
submissions to the Committee from other organisations were generally
supportive, there were some instances when the submissions reflected a
misunderstanding of some aspects of the Bill or its intended implementation.
The following information is provided to clarify these matters.
Victoria Police – consideration should be given to legislate for
Federal and State Police to have the same security powers as Defence Security
Officials.
3.2 This is a
matter for State and/or Federal government consideration and Defence has no
position on this matter.
Police Federation of Australia – concerns with
Police-style powers being granted to individuals who are not fully trained,
sworn officers.
3.3 The Bill does
not alter the primacy of civil law enforcement authorities in responding to
security incidents at Defence premises. The proposed statutory regime
incorporates safeguards that ensure that personnel exercising powers under the
Bill have been authorised by the Minister for Defence and have satisfied a
minimum level of training and qualification requirements as determined by the
Minister or his delegate. For further information on training of Defence
security officials, please refer to our response to the Senate Standing
Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills.
Police Federation of Australia – assurance as to the
scope of work of contracted Defence security guards.
3.4 Contracted security
guards currently perform a range of protective security functions at Defence
bases. The powers available to contracted security guards under this Bill have
been deliberately limited. Contracted security guards will only be authorised
to request evidence of a person’s identification, conduct consensual searches
and, in defined circumstances, restrain and detain a person for the purposes of
placing them in the custody of a law enforcement officer.
3.5 In addition,
under the Bill contractors, subcontractors or their employees who provide
security services at Defence premises must be authorised by the Minister by
written instrument to be Defence contracted security guards. The Minister will
only be able to authorise as contracted security guards, persons who have met a
standard of security training as determined by the Minister by legislative
instrument.
Police Federation of Australia – assurance that Defence
security guards’ functions will be strictly confined to Defence bases and
premises and the immediate surrounds of those establishments.
3.6 The powers
contained in the Bill for all categories of Defence security officials are only
exercisable on Defence premises. This is defined as any area of land or other
place, a building or other structure, a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or a
prohibited area within the meaning of the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act
1952, which is located in Australia and is owned or occupied by the
Commonwealth for use by the Defence Force or the Department.
Government of Western Australia, Department of Premier
and Cabinet, Office of the Director General – in regard to State or Federal
police responding to incidents at Defence facilities, consideration could be
given to a waiver of the screening of attending police to facilitate a timely
response to an incident.
3.7 The powers
contained in the Bill are discretionary and in practice the exercise of these
powers by Defence security officials will be dependent on the nature of the
site and the assessed level of security threat. In the event of a security
incident requiring a police response, these arrangements will be altered
accordingly if required.
3.8 Local
emergency services are involved in the preparation of base security response
plans to confirm response arrangements and assistance required in the event of
a security incident. This would include procedures addressing the issue
outlined above.
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