Chapter 2 - Background to and purpose of the bill
2.1
The bill gives effect to initiatives to enhance the security of Defence
bases, facilities, assets and personnel within Australia. This chapter considers
the main security threats to Defence personnel and property in Australia and
the government's legislative response.
The Department of Defence and its estate
2.2
The mission of the Department of Defence (Defence) is to 'defend
Australia and its interests' and:
Defence resources, including equipment and personnel, will be
directed to support this mission as first priority.[1]
2.3
In sustaining its mission, Defence's primary focus is to 'protect and
advance Australia's strategic interests by providing support to the Government
and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for the direct defence of Australia and
its unique strategic interests'.[2]
In this context, the Defence White Paper 2009 recognises Defence bases and
infrastructure as 'enabling functions' which, together with other support
mechanisms, are considered to be the 'backbone' of Defence business.[3]
The facilities and infrastructure of the Defence estate support the activities
of over 90,000 people across the country.[4]
In relation to its estate, Defence noted that it is:
... the largest and most complex land and property holding in
Australia. It provides the facilities which directly enable the generation,
projection and sustainment of operational capability. The Defence estate also
supports our personnel, providing them with a safe place to work and their
families to live.[5]
2.4
There are approximately 88 major Defence bases or Defence premises in
Australia.[6]
The Defence estate which covers 3.4 million hectares of land[7]
comprises approximately 370 owned properties and an additional 350 under lease.[8]
The estate includes 34,000 structures and consists of training areas; command
headquarters; airfields; ship repair and wharfing facilities; accommodation;
depots; warehouses and explosive ordnance storehouses; training, education,
research and testing facilities; and office buildings. The estimated gross
replacement value of the estate is over $64 billion.[9]
Security risks
2.5
Mr Clive Williams from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre noted
that theft by insiders as well as external parties of hard-to-obtain and
valuable items stored at defence facilities was the main security threat to
Defence bases, facilities, assets and personnel in Australia. He commented
that:
Such items can include night vision devices, operational
military equipment, weapons and ammunition, and military ordnance and
explosives. The ongoing concern at some Defence facilities is the potential for
an organised attempt to gain access to weapons and explosives.[10]
2.6
In addition, Defence cited the threat of terrorism as real, persistent
and evolving and that 'Defence personnel and premises are potentially
attractive targets for terrorist groups'. It informed the committee that:
To meet these challenges, Defence maintains a framework of
protective security measures to safeguard its personnel and premises. This
framework consists of a range of physical and personnel security measures,
coupled with intelligence, to provide a layered response to mitigate threats.[11]
2.7
Defence noted, however, that large numbers of people regularly flow in
and out of Defence premises on a daily basis. Moreover, under the current
regime, a Defence Force member or Australian Public Service (APS) employee
cannot be denied access to Defence premises because of a refusal to consent to
a search or detained on exit unless there is a reasonable suspicion that the
individual had committed an offence.[12]
It identified a number of other restrictions in relation to security functions
on Defence premises. For example, whilst access by contractors can be made
conditional, at present the ability to conduct a search in relation to a
contractor is dependent on the terms of their contract. Further, even though
visitors may be subject to a consensual search on entry, any attempt to conduct
a search on exit is dependent on consent being given to that action, unless
there is reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed an offence. In
relation to these restrictions, Defence stated:
The present lack of explicit search, seizure and related
powers significantly impedes Defence's ability to reduce the risk of
unauthorised items being brought onto Defence premises and dangerous,
restricted or classified items and information being improperly removed.[13]
Response to new challenges
2.8
Two high profile incidents highlighted the need for Defence to review
its security arrangements. In 2008, a former army captain was convicted and
imprisoned in relation to 21 offences over the theft and illicit sale of ten
rocket launchers between 2001 and 2003 to a convicted criminal with terrorist
links.[14]
The case illustrated the 'risk of improper removal of dangerous, restricted or
classified items from defence bases'.[15]
Similarly, in 2007 seven M72 shoulder-fired launchers were stolen from an ADF depot
at Orange Hills.[16]
2.9
The second major public incident happened on 4 August 2009 when five individuals
were arrested on allegations of planning an armed attack on the Holsworthy Army
Base.[17]
The alleged plan involved storming the barracks with automatic weapons and
shooting army personnel or others until they had used up their ammunition, were
captured or killed.[18]
On 23 December 2010, three of the men were found guilty of conspiring to
prepare for or plan a terrorist act. The two other men were acquitted.[19]
2.10
Exposure of the planned attack raised concerns regarding the security of
Defence bases. Mr Clive Williams, for example, argued that terrorism, and
particularly Australian home grown extremism, was one of the main security
threats to defence facilities. He noted, moreover, that at least three of the
Islamic extremist terrorism cases in Australia since 9/11 have involved plans
to attack defence facilities using explosives or firearms.[20]
2.11
Following the arrests in relation to the planned attack on the Holsworthy
base, then Prime Minister the Hon Kevin Rudd MP convened a meeting of the
National Security Committee of Federal Cabinet the same day. Whilst noting the
advice from the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) Air Chief Marshal Angus
Houston that security arrangements were 'adequate', Mr Rudd requested that the
CDF and Defence undertake an 'immediate and comprehensive review of adequacy,
given these new developments'.[21]
2.12
Reports suggested that within hours of Mr Rudd's order for an inquiry
into security arrangements, two employees of the Daily Telegraph
newspaper were caught by Defence personnel taking photographs inside the
Holsworthy base for which they were charged.[22]
The incident prompted fresh calls for unarmed private security guards who
provide frontline security at defence bases to be replaced with armed soldiers.[23]
2.13
The Review of Defence Protective Security Arrangements (the review)
produced a number of recommendations concerning both policy and physical
security measures. The need to clarify legal issues surrounding Australian
Defence Force (ADF) members acting in self defence in the event of a no-warning
attack was one such recommendation.[24]
2.14
On 22 October 2009, the Secretary of Defence, Dr Ian Watt, stated that
the department was in the process of implementing a range of measures in
accordance with the findings and recommendations of the review. He stated in
this regard that:
These initiatives include strengthening Defence's protective
security alert system and other policy underpinning security arrangements,
additional patrolling presence by the Australian Federal Police and contracted
security guards, and a range of physical security measures.[25]
2.15
The same Defence media release also noted that no further details about
the security review, its recommendations and enhanced security measures would
be released.[26]
2.16
In its submission, Defence noted that the review led to the introduction
of a number of policy and security initiatives to complement pre-existing
arrangements at Defence premises. It noted:
These initiatives include strengthening security policy and
arrangements relating to access control, incident response and contractor
guarding, together with physical measures such as improvements in perimeter
fencing, security lighting, alarm systems and increased security patrols.[27]
2.17
In the second reading speech in relation to the bill, the Defence
Minister, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, stated that one of the recommendations of
the review was to 'bring forward' a number of legislative amendments. These
proposals are incorporated in the bill. To this extent, therefore, the bill
seeks to implement recommendations of the review pertaining to legislative
reform.[28]
2.18
Defence argued that the implementation of provisions contained in the
bill are required to continue to meet the challenges created by the 'changeable
nature of security threats, to ensure the continued security and safety of
Defence premises, personnel and assets within Australia'. According to Defence,
the bill 'represents the first phase of legislative amendments and provides
provisions of common application across Defence to deal effectively with the
security of Defence premises, assets and personnel'.[29]
A second phase will consider the requirement to implement proposals that raise
more complex legal and practical issues including powers for the protection of
naval vessels.
Objectives and scope of the bill
2.19
According to the Minister, the bill reflects 'the importance the
government places on the security and safety of ADF members, defence employees
and the Australian public'.[30]
The bill will insert a new Part (Part VIA) into the Defence Act 1903 to
give effect to initiatives directed at enhancing the security of Defence bases,
facilities, assets and personnel within Australia. In broad terms, the bill
introduces measures in three key areas designed to:
-
strengthen the legal regime for Defence Force members who may be
required to use force involving death or grievous bodily harm;
-
establish a statutory regime of search and seizure powers; and
-
update the existing trespass offence and associated arrest power
in the Defence Act 1903.
2.20
The powers introduced in the new Part confer security functions,
including identity and authorisation checks, search and seizure powers, on
three classes of officials, otherwise termed 'defence security officials'
including:
(a)
defence contracted security guards;
(b)
security authorised members of the Defence Force; and
(c)
defence security screening employees who are Australian Public Service
employees of the Department of Defence.
2.21
The role of (a) defence contracted security guards is principally
restricted to performing the consensual security functions. The non-consensual
powers are largely reserved for (b) security authorised members of the Defence
Force and (c) defence security screening employees. Whilst all three classes of
official are empowered to use force in restricted circumstances including that
to restrain and detain a person, the principle that underlies such action is
that such force shall be 'necessary and reasonable'. The power to use force
likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm is restricted to security
authorised members of the Defence Force only in the context of a current or
imminent attack on defence premises which is likely to cause death or serious
injury to persons on defence premises. Other defence security officials are not
so authorised.
2.22
In terms of the scope of application, the bill distinguishes
between three locations: defence access control points, defence premises, and
locations external to defence premises. The concept of a 'defence access
control point' is introduced in the bill and defined in section 71A as:
...a point of entry to, or exit from, defence premises or a
part of defence premises, where entry or exit is controlled or limited by any
means, including but not limited to control by means of:
(a)
guarding by defence security
officials; or
(b)
physical barriers such as security
screens, locked doors or gates.
2.23
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the purpose of the definition
is to create identified points on defence premises where defence security
officials are 'expressly authorised to exercise the identification, search and
related enforcement powers proposed in the new Part' and that:
The mere presence, on Defence premises, of a sign or boundary
marker, for example a fence or a painted line on a road or airport tarmac, does
not of itself constitute a defence access control point for the purposes of
this Part. A defence access control point will use one or more measures to
limit or control access to defence premises, or a part thereof, either by
identifying the person or confirming their authority to access the premises, or
a part thereof. These measures may include, but are not limited to, the use of
one or more of the following: the presence of defence security officials, the
requirement to present access cards or other identification for inspection,
electronic security barriers fitted with access card readers, electronic
handheld access card readers, retinal scanners, hand scanners and comparable
devices. These measures may be used in conjunction with, but not limited to,
any of the following physical security controls: gates, boom gates, security
bollards, locked or electronically controlled doors, and entry points to
vehicles, vessels or aircrafts including gangways and stairs. In relation to
the latter, a defence access control point may be established at the base of
the gangway to a vessel, the stairs leading up to an aircraft or a ramp
providing access to a vehicle.[31]
2.24
Defence premises is also defined in the bill to be in Australia, owned
or occupied by the Commonwealth for use by the Defence Force or the Department
and:
(a)
an area of land or any other place (whether or not it is enclosed or
built on);
(b)
a building or other structure;
(c)
a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including any fixed or moveable ramp,
stairs or other means of access to, or exit from, the vehicle, vessel or
aircraft;
(d)
a prohibited area, within the meaning of the Defence (Special
Undertakings) Act 1952.[32]
Views on the bill
2.25
Overall, submitters recognised the importance of this legislation and in
general supported the objectives. For example, the Chief Minister, Minister for
Police, Fire and Emergency Services of the Northern Territory stated:
It is quite clear that these amendments are needed and will
certainly enhance the security of Defence bases, facilities, assets and
personnel, which is especially relevant given the current security environment.[33]
2.26
The ACT's Attorney-General and Minister for Police and Emergency
Services had no concerns about the bill and emphasised that the AFP had
'substantial involvement in drafting the amendments'.[34]
The New South Wales Department of Premier and Cabinet advised that the New South
Wales Police Force also had no major concerns in relation to the bill.[35]
The South Australia Police, the Victoria Police and Police Federation of
Australia offered general support for the bill while Tasmania Police supported
the proposed amendments on the basis that training and accountability
provisions are put in place.[36]
Mr Clive Williams supported an extension of the powers conferred under the
bill.[37]
2.27
Although in favour of the bill, a number of submitters raised a few concerns
such as the need for delineation between the role and powers of defence security
officials in relation to those of the police. They also drew attention to
issues with the implementation of the provisions especially the importance of
training. The Standing Committee on the Scrutiny of Bills, however, registered
a number of concerns relating to undue trespass on personal rights and
liberties and strict liability provisions.
2.28
In the following chapters, the committee examines the provisions of the
bill and key issues.
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