Executive summary and recommendations

Executive summary and recommendations

In October 2009, the Department of Defence (Defence) elected to re-test the market and commence a new procurement process for air sustainment services to the Middle East Area of Operation (MEAO).

From the start, there were clear indicators that this tender required particular and special attention. Indeed, both past experiences and current circumstances signalled significant probity risks, particularly in respect of conflicts of interest, breaches of confidentiality and proponent grievances about these matters, including:

Although Defence had at least constructive knowledge of these circumstances and the associated probity risks, it failed to implement measures to enable the systematic identification and management of potential probity risks arising from these circumstances—for example, documenting a probity plan, integrating probity issues into the risk assessment framework and appointing a probity advisor.

Confronted by serious allegations of impropriety and before the contract was finalised, Defence initiated four separate reviews of the tender process by the Audit and Fraud Control Division in Defence, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and the Australian Government Solicitor. They identified a raft of serious deficiencies in the process but, overall, concluded that the flaws were not sufficiently material to render the process unsound.

While not fully convinced, the committee agrees with their findings. It could find no compelling evidence of outright fraud; of the use of insider knowledge; of designing the tender to unfairly favour a preferred tenderer; or of the successful tenderer's inability to deliver services as specified under the contract. Finally, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the successful tenderer was not fit and proper for the purposes of contracting with the Commonwealth.    

The committee is strongly of the view, however, that Defence should not take comfort from these findings. This tender was not only valued at over $122 million but provides a critical service to Australian forces serving in the Middle East Area of Operations.[1] Aspects of the tender process were plain sloppy and, in light of the nature of the industry and the behaviour of people in the industry, Defence was notably inattentive when it came to identifying and managing probity risks, especially conflicts of interests. Thus a cloud of uncertainty lingers over the integrity of this tender.

The reviews and the committee also uncovered weaknesses in the procedures for preparing and evaluating the tender. For example, inadequate documentation, poor consultation and lack of certification gave rise to confusion, inconsistency and a failure to correct an error in calculations during the evaluation. Although the Source Evaluation Report was re-validated and confirmed the successful tender as top ranked, the problems identified in the process cannot help but undermine the committee's confidence in the robustness of the decision-making processes.

Undoubtedly, the circumstances which prompted the significant parliamentary and public scrutiny of the 2010 tender process have damaged Defence's image and reputation. It must also have undermined the industry's confidence in the integrity of the process. While the lessons emerging from this incident need not have been learned at such significant cost, the committee welcomes the reforms announced by Defence during the inquiry. These measures may go some way towards addressing the governance and procedural shortcomings evident in the 2010 tender process. The committee has made recommendations for further reforms to enhance those already in train. It has also requested the Auditor-General to conduct a review of the tender process and the reforms announced by Defence, to identify any additional lessons to be learned.

The committee has also highlighted the need for ongoing monitoring of the implementation and effects of these reforms to avoid an 'implementation gap' between documented policy reforms and procurement practice and has recommended that Defence provides the committee with periodic updates on these matters.

The committee's recommendations are listed below.

Recommendation 1                                                                                       paragraph 9.28

The committee recommends that Defence:

(i) proponent grievances and

(ii) the small and highly competitive nature of the commercial air charter market;

Recommendation 2                                                                                       paragraph 10.9

The committee recommends that Defence reviews all Defence Instructions and related documents in respect of Reservists, full or part time, to ensure that real and potential conflicts of interest that might arise as a result of past, current or post separation employment are identified, reported and managed appropriately. In particular:

a) Defence considers whether Defence Instructions DI(G) PERS 25-2 (Employment and voluntary activities of ADF members in off-duty hours) and DI(G) PERS 25-3 (Disclosure of interests of members of the ADF) should be extended to Reservists who are not engaged in continuous full-time service; or

b) if there is no intention to extend the application of DI(G) PERS 25-2 and DI(G) PERS 25-3 to Reservists who are not engaged in continuous full-time service, Defence develops specific policies covering the civilian employment of, and the disclosure of conflicts of interests by, those personnel.

Recommendation 3                                                                                    paragraph 10.21

The committee recommends that, prior to the re-tendering of any future contracts for the provision of air sustainment services to the MEAO, Defence ensures that:

a) all Reserve personnel involved in the procurement complete a conflict of interest declaration; and

b) commanding officers or supervisors in 1JMOVGP:

(i) make a risk-based assessment as to which other Reserve personnel must complete a conflict of interest declaration and which personnel do not;

(ii) in making a risk-based assessment, give consideration to identifying and obtaining conflict of interest declarations from Reservists who have associations with the commercial air charter industry. Such associations may include:

(iii) document their decisions whether or not to require these Reservists to complete a conflict of interest declaration.

Recommendation 4                                                                                    paragraph 10.22

The committee recommends Defence ensures that, in all future procurements of air sustainment services to the MEAO:

Recommendation 5                                                                                    paragraph 11.20

The committee recommends that Defence:

a) continues to include in procurement strategies a requirement that members of the Air Transport Standing Offer Panel are given advance notice of any decisions to re-tender the contract, prior to the release of the RFT; and

b) ensures that such requirements are implemented.

(i) preferred solution for meeting tender requirements, including technical specifications; and

(ii) intention to consider alternative solutions.

Recommendation 6                                                                                    paragraph 12.10

The committee recommends that in all future procurements of air sustainment services to the MEAO, Defence develops and implements tender evaluation processes for assessing respondents' fitness and propriety to contract with the Commonwealth. Such evaluation processes should:

a) identify criteria setting out requirements or indicators for being 'fit and proper' to contract with the Commonwealth;

b) specify searches that may be conducted on tender respondents, their key personnel, proposed subcontractors and any associated companies (for example, parent or subsidiary companies)—including guidance on the scope of the searches;

c) identify the possible implications of the findings of each of the specified searches; and

d) enable the identification and assessment of potential risks arising from issues identified in these searches including:

(i) reputational damage to the Commonwealth, should it proceed to contract with the relevant tenderer; and

(ii) proponent grievances about the relevant tenderer's fitness and propriety to contract with the Commonwealth.

Recommendation 7                                                                                    paragraph 12.16

The committee recommends that Defence includes in all future tender evaluation documentation for the procurement of air sustainment services to the MEAO:

Request to Auditor-General                                                                    paragraph 12.22

The committee requests that the Auditor-General:

Recommendation 8                                                                                    paragraph 12.23

The committee recommends that Defence report back to the committee by 1 May 2012 on the progress being made to implement the reforms it has announced including:

Recommendation 9                                                                                    paragraph 12.25

Although the majority of recommendations apply to the procurement of air sustainment services to the MEAO, the committee recommends that Defence consider incorporating the principles and practices underpinning them as part of Defence wide non-equipment procurement policy.

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