Footnotes

[1] See for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May 2004, p. 17, 3 May 2004, p. 8; The Australian, 3 May 2004, p. 11, the New Yorker, 4 May 2004, p. 1A and 10 May 2004.

[2] See for example, Amnesty International Australia, Media release, 7–8 May 2004; CQ Weekly, 8 May 2004, pp. 1060–1066; the New Yorker, 4 May and 9 May 2004.

[3] Amnesty International Australia, Media Release, 7–8 May 2004.

[4] Courier Mail, 11 May 2004, p. 1; Transcript, AM, 11 May 2004.

[5] Questions without notice, Senate Hansard, 11 May 2004, p. 22767.

[6] See for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 May 2004, pp. 1 and 7; Transcript, 7:30 report, 27 May 2004 and Transcript, Lateline, 27 May 2004; Transcript, PM, 27 May 2004.

[7] Question without notice (speech): Iraq: treatment of Prisoners, Senate Hansard, 16 June 2004, p. 23939.

[8] Defence Intelligence Organisation, OP Falconer—Concept of Operations for Australian Defence Force Participation in the Iraq Survey Group, para. 4, attachment to answers to questions on notice, Question no. 1, 2004–05 Additional Estimates, 16 and 18 February 2005.

[9] Defence Intelligence Organisation, OP Falconer—Concept of Operations for Australian Defence Force Participation in the Iraq Survey Group, para. 14, attachment to answers to questions on notice, Question no. 1, 2004–05 Additional Estimates, 16 and 18 February 2005.

[10] Testimony to the US Congress by Mr Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs, 30 March 2004. http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_testimony_03302004.html (1 July 2005).

[11] Testimony to the US Congress by Mr Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs, 30 March 2004. http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_testimony_03302004.html (1 July 2005).

[12] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 62.

[13] Defence Intelligence Organisation, OP Falconer—Concept of Operations for Australian Defence Force Participation in the Iraq Survey Group, para. 2, attachment to answers to questions on notice, Question no. 1, 2004–05 Additional Estimates, 16 and 18 February 2005. Other stipulations included that the commitment was for 'a period of approximately six to eight months but that this could be extended' and that the Australian contingent should not operate without ISG force protection measures being implemented. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 62.

[14] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 62.

[15] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 63.

[16] He elaborated on this process: 'The standard process seemed to be that three different lieutenant colonels adopted slightly varying command procedures, but they seemed to all cluster in a room at the start of the deployment during what the military would call their force preparation time. They seemed to have a collective discussion about it with very clear enunciation either through PowerPoint slides or the reading out of orders in the commander’s notebook'. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 64. Vice Admiral Shalders added: 'The concept of operations remained in force. The contingent commanders took that concept and applied it in slightly different and expanded ways. You heard in evidence this morning that the third rotation, for example, had slightly different words around the way they were told to do their job but the concept, the governing—...The concept remained the same'. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 108.

See also Brigadier Meekin who explained that 'The first contingent certainly saw the concept of operations. It was briefed to them in PowerPoint, and I recall a PowerPoint slide that in fact stated the restrictions on interrogation. It might be that subsequent contingents were briefed in the same manner, or were briefed without the benefit of having the words in front of them on a screen'. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 107.

[17] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 62.

[18] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 62.

[19] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 64.

[20] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 64.

[21] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 53.

[22] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 53–54.

[23] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 107.

[24] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 58–59.

[25] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 30. The Minister stated further that 'Australians working there, whether they be military or official, had to operate within our rules. These rules were clear, they were briefed to these individuals and I assume the individuals followed their instructions'. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 112.

[26] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 114.

[27] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 5 and 21.

[28] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 20–21.

[29] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 5–6, 8, 20 and 34.

[30] For example see Transcript, Senator the Hon Robert Hill. Interview with ABC PM Program, 15 February 20005. The Minister stated that 'Right from day one when we sent the ISG to Iraq, they went under written orders that they were not permitted they participate in interrogation. Those orders were translated by the Lieutenant Colonels who were in charge of each of our three rotations and they reported back that Australians did not interrogate'.

[31] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 106.

[32] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 106.

[33] Transcript, 'Minister confirms his earlier claim that no Australian members of the ISG were involved in interrogating Iraqi prisoners', AM, 16 February 2005.

[34] Answer to question without notice, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 February 2005, p. 82.

[35] Transcript, Four Corners, 14 February 2005, p. [11].

[36] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 20–21.

[37] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 24, 29.

[38] Transcript, 'Prime Minister defends Minster over interrogation issues raised by former Iraqi weapons inspector', PM, Thursday, 17 February 2005. See also comment by Mr Alan Behm, Transcript, AM, 16 February 2005.

[39] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 33.

[40] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 33.

[41] Transcript, 'Update on the Australian Defence Force's Contributions to Global Operations', 21 March 2003, interviewee Brigadier Mike Hannan.

[42] See for example, Transcript, 'Media Briefing Australia's contribution to Operation Falcon', 9 April 2003. On 2 May 2003, he explained in greater detail Australia's stand on the treatment of prisoners. He noted that right from the earliest planning for this operation, prisoners of war were 'an important consideration'. He stated:

'Because the Coalition essentially of the US, the UK and Australia had differing legal obligations in terms of the conventions that they'd signed, this was a matter of negotiation between the three countries an agreement was reached between the three countries that the handling of PWs would be in accordance with the obligations of the countries with the strictest responsibilities, and that was of course the UK and Australia.'

So when the operation was put together, specialist troops were designated for the purpose of managing PWs, and those troops were properly prepared and trained to deal with the PWs in accordance with the regulations.

For Australia's part, of course, we handle and treat all prisoners of war and all detainees in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, and we have every expectation that in accordance with the agreements we've made the other coalition partners would also abide by those regulations rigidly'.

See also Transcript Australian Media Briefing: Operation Falconer, Brigadier Mike Hannan, 2 May 2003.

[43] Committee Hansard, 17 June 2004, p. 10.

[44] Committee Hansard, 17 June 2004, p. 12.

[45] Committee Hansard, 17 June 2004, p. 12.

[46] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 78.

[47] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, pp. 52–53, 61 and 73–74.

[48] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 120.

[49] The ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger, Press Release, 04/35, Report by the ICRC on the coalition forces' treatment of persons in Iraq, 7 May 2004.

[50] The ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger, Press Release, 04/35, Report by the ICRC on the coalition forces' treatment of persons in Iraq, 7 May 2004.

[51] ICRC, Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions during Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, pp. [13, 17–18].

[52] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 121.

[53] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 76. In February 2005, Mr Chester, reminded the Committee, that Mr Quinn gave testimony during the June 2004 Estimates that, 'when we became aware of Abu Ghraib, he, as head of the Iraq Task Force, had made inquiries of any possible Australian involvement and Australian knowledge of abuse. His testimony...was in relation to him doing a broad trawl of Australians that were in Iraq. He said that, just so he had a complete knowledge, he sought advice from those Australians who were working with the Iraq Survey Group about whether there were any issues that he needed to be aware of in relation to the prisoner abuse allegation'. Committee Hansard, 17 February 2005, p. 37.

[54] The legal watch group was a sub group of the Iraq Task Force comprising lawyers from Defence, Attorney–General's and DFAT, the task force and at times other colleagues from Defence on the operations or international policy side.

[55] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 59.

[56] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 62. Mr Quinn stated: I guess our understanding and our assumption was that the ICRC was doing its job. From the tenor of the reporting to that point, there had been close cooperation from the detaining authorities. We had no reason to suspect there was any major difficulty there. Our officers were there to facilitate and overcome problems. From my seat I did not see any particular issues and I can only assume my other colleagues who saw the sit reps took the same judgment.

[57] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 74.

[58] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 7.

[59] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 7.

[60] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 3.

[61] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 4.

[62] Committee Hansard, 18 February 2005, p. 30.

[63] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 3.

[64] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 3.

[65] Transcript, Four Corners, 14 February 2005, p. [9] and Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 3.

[66] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 84.

[67] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, pp. 37–39.

[68] Answer to question on notice, no. 2, Budget Estimates 2004–2005.

[69] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 42.

[70] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 42.

[71] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 50.

[72] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, pp. 53–54. see also pp. 43–4.

[73] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 65, 116.

[74] Information available on Four Corners web site, 15 February 2005, Questionnaire from the Department of Defence http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/20050214_rodbarton/proforma.htm.

[75] Information available on Four Corners web site, 15 February 2005, Questionnaire from the Department of Defence http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/20050214_rodbarton/proforma.htm.

[76] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 28.

[77] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, pp. 85–86.

[78] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 85.

[79] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 86.

[80] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 104.

[81] Committee Hansard, 2 June 2004, p. 113.

[82] Defence Media Release, 28 May 2004 MSPA, 91.04.

[83] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 25.

[84] Committee Hansard, 31 May 2004, p. 47.

[85] Committee Hansard, 1 June 2004, pp. 54–55.

[86] RC Smith and PJ Cosgrove to Mr M Pezzullo, 2 June 2004, Tabled documents, 17 June 2004. Mr Pezzullo was directed: to draw attention immediately to any matter which suggests that incorrect advice may have been provided to Government; to advise immediately in the event that he had concerns that any ADO personnel may have been involved in the mistreatment of detainees in Iraq; and to provide a full report as soon as possible to enable the minister to be briefed by 11 June 2004.

[87] They reviewed Hansard material, re–examined the sources of the briefing behind the Senate Legislation Committee (SLC) packs and the survey data. The ministerial services people conducted a sweep through the Strategic Operations Division of ministerial submissions. A sweeper email was sent requesting information on the broad matter of detainee. Some people came forward and amplified some of their statements. Committee Hansard, 17 June 2004, pp. 43–44.

[88] Committee Hansard, 17 June 2004, p. 51.

[89] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 74, 84 and 29 March 2005, pp. 12, 14–15.

[90] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 77.

[91] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 38.

[92] Committee Hansard, 17 June 2004, p. 72.

[93] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 145.

[94] Question without notice (speech): Iraq: treatment of Prisoners, Senate Hansard, 16 June 2004, p. 23939.

[95] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 116, 130, 143–144.

[96] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 14.

[97] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 14 and 15.

[98] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 12–13, 23–26. Mr Barton told the Committee that there were to be two versions of the record: that he recalled Mr Pezzullo saying that there were going to be two versions of this. 'One version he wanted to pass to the US so that they could follow up and the other one was for internal use. It would be inappropriate, he said, for the external version to have what I reported to the defence department internally and to whom'. Mr Barton annotated and signed the one copy with amendments on 18 June. According to Mr Pezzullo, Mr Barton 'did not think that it recorded properly the fact that he had put certain information to me about his contact with the Australian officials in March'. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 74.

[99] On 21 June 2004, Mr Pezzullo informed Mr Barton that his record of interview would be followed up with the US. [Conflicting dates given by Mr Perzullo: 21 and 22 June, Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 151; and, Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 15]. He also sought Mr Barton's 'explicit permission about his cooperation... with any US investigative process that one would assume the US might be minded to take'. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 151.
On 1 July, Mr Barton received confirmation that a letter had been written to the US Ambassador. On 23 June 2004, a submission was sent to the minister regarding the course of action to be taken in conveying information to the Americans. A formal response from the minister was sent on 25 June 2004. Toward the end of June, Mr Smith wrote to the US Ambassador, Mr Schieffer, after having read the record of Mr Barton's 9 June interview. Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 84–85 and Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 3, 15–16.

[100] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 129.

[101] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 84.

[102] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 152–153. On 12 November 2004, Mr Barton called Mr Bonighton and asked whether anything further had been heard as a result of his interview with the US investigator.

[103] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 153–154.

[104] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, pp. 89–92.

[105] See paragraph 3.16. It explains that the situation reports from Major O'Kane and Lieutenant Colonel Muggleton that contained references to either the ICRC working papers or the February report were provided to a number of addressees in Canberra, to Headquarters Joint Task Force 633 and to the Australian Representative Office (ARO) in Baghdad. According to Air Commodore Harvey, they were also 'onforwarded to other government departments, including Attorney–General's and DFAT, because they were obviously interested in monitoring what was happening within the Coalition Provisional Authority'.

[106] Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, 30 September 2004.

[107] Testimony to the US Congress by Mr Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Matters Destruction (WMD) Programs, 30 March 2004.

[108] Acknowledgements, Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, 30 September 2004.

[109] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 47–48.

[110] Transcript, Four Corners, 14 February 2005.

[111] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 3–4.

[112] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 4.

[113] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 47–48.

[114] Committee Hansard, 16 February 2005, p. 77.

[115] Rod Barton, letter of resignation, 29 March 2004, http://www.abc.ney.au/4corners/content/2005/20050214_rod barton/img/resignation1.gif (27 March 2005).

[116] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 11, 39–40, 44.

[117] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 11.

[118] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, p. 42.

[119] Committee Hansard, 29 March 2005, pp. 43–44.

[120] The Australian, 30 March 2005, p. 4 and 31 March p. 4; Sydney Morning Herald, 31 March 2005, p. 5 and the Age, 31 March 2005, p. 6.

[121] See para. 3.24 in chapter 3.

[122] Proof Committee Hansard, 1 June 2005, p. 68.

[123] Proof Committee Hansard, 1 June 2005, pp. 69 and 70.

[124] Proof Committee Hansard, 1 June 2005, p. 71.

[125] Proof Committee Hansard, 1 June 2005, p. 68

[126] Proof Committee Hansard, 1 June 2005, p. 70.

[127] Correspondence from Dr Gee to the committee, 4 May 2005.

[128] Mr Varghese gave these assurances before the Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee on 24 May 2005.