Chapter Five - Remarks by Government Senators
1. Government Senators' response to
recommendations
1.1 The majority
report makes 4 recommendations. Government Senators support Recommendations 2,
3 and 4.
1.2 We do not
support Recommendation 1. We see little utility in a yet further inquiry, when
the issue has been extensively reviewed not only by this Committee (albeit with
restrictions on access to some sensitive intelligence), but also by the Blick
Inquiry, which enjoyed unlimited access. The integrity and thoroughness of the
Blick Inquiry is not called into question in the majority report. As well, the
Joint Standing Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD has an increasing oversight role
in relation to our intelligence services.
1.3 There are two
other reasons why Government Senators do not support a further inquiry. In the
first place, nowhere does the majority report point to any important gap,
missing piece of evidence, or unpursued line of inquiry, which might suggest
that further examination of the events leading to the Bali
atrocity on October 12, 2002
would yield any new insights. There may be a case to be made for further
inquiry where there is an identified or identifiable gap in existing inquiries.
If there is none, it is difficult to see what benefit there would be in further
canvassing of the same facts and issues.
1.4 The second reason is a compassionate one. Almost two years
have now passed since the Bali bombing. Many of the
survivors and the families of the deceased have spoken of their desire for
"closure". Government Senators understand and respect that wish. Were
there any strong reason to believe that a further inquiry would shed important
new light on the events, it may be that the desire of the survivors and
families for closure should be secondary to the importance of eliciting that
further information. But if there is no particular reason to believe that
further important information would be revealed, Government Senators doubt the
wisdom of continuing to expose the survivors and families to the continued
distress which yet further agitation of the same issues would inevitably bring.
2.
The core
issues
2.1 There
are three core issues considered by the Majority Report. They are:
(a) The nature, development and extent of
Australian intelligence in relation to Islamic extremist movements in southeast
Asia, and specifically Indonesia, in the period leading up to the Bali bombing
on 12 October 2002. This is the central topic of the Chapter One of the
Majority Report. The central question here is whether there was a culpable
failure on the part of any Australian agency or official in failing to
anticipate the Bali bombing. Stripped to its essentials,
the Majority Report answers that question in the negative. Government Senators
agree.
(b) The content and reach of the Travel
Advisories issued by DFAT in the period prior to the Bali
bombing. This is essentially a matter of chronicling the Travel Advisories, and
is the principal topic of Chapter Two. Selective quotation from, paraphrase or
glossing of the Travel Advisories is, in Government Senators' view, of
relatively little value: the documents in each case speak for themselves.
Accordingly, the sequence of relevant Travel Advisories is compiled in Appendix
4.
(c) The issue of
"commensurability"in other words, whether each of the Travel
Advisories were commensurable with the state of intelligence available at the
time they were prepared, in the sense that they sufficiently alerted Australian
travellers to Indonesia, and in particular Bali, to the relevant threat level,
and whether they did so in the appropriate words. This is the topic of Chapter
Three (which compares the threat level as assessed by the agencies with the
relevant Travel Advisory operative at the time) and Chapter Four (which treats
of the specific case of Bali, and whether, because of its supposedly unique
features, it warranted special and different treatment). The Majority Report
concludes that the critical Travel Advisories were not commensurable with the assessed threat level at critical times.
Government Senators disagree.
2.2
The Majority Report is a mixture of fact (both
descriptive and historical), discussion, observation, conjecture and
conclusions. For the purposes of this Inquiry, the most important feature of
the Majority Report is a series of findings which it makes in relation to
(sometimes disputed) facts. Although the "findings" are not
identified or labelled as such, it is reasonably clear what they are. Subject
to our reservations in relation to the matters discussed in section 5, and
without adopting the language of the Majority Report, Government Senators agree
with the critical findings, which we summarize in sections 3 and 4, in relation
to the first two issues, and disagree with what is said in relation to the
third, with which we deal in section 5.
3.
Findings
concerning intelligence on terrorism in Indonesia and the region
3.1 Government
Senators agree with the following propositions, which we consider to be the key
findings of the Majority Report concerning the nature, development and extent
of Australian intelligence in relation to Islamic extremism in southeast Asia,
and specifically Indonesia, in the period leading up to the Bali bombing:
(a)
No Australian agency had any foreknowledge of the Bali
bombing.[292]
(b)
To the extent that there was an intelligence "failure", that failure was the failure to pick up specific
intelligence which might have led Australia
to anticipate the bombing. It was not a systemic failure in the way in which
our intelligence agencies operated, nor a failure to analyse the specific
intelligence which they had. As Dr. Hugh
White said, in the quote which introduces
Chapter 1 of the Majority Report, "there was no Pearl
Harbour herethat is, there was no
clear warning which, if identified and acted upon, would have provided an
opportunity to prevent the Bali bombing".[293]
(c)
There was a growing awareness and appreciation within
the Australian intelligence community, in particular from about early 1999, of
the rising significance and militancy within the southeast Asian region of
extremist Islamic groups, of their propensity to engage in terrorism, and of
the potential threat they posed to Westerners (including Australians).[294]
(d)
After the terrorist attacks in the United
States on September 11 2001, Australian agencies redoubled their
intelligencegathering efforts in respect of Islamic militants in southeast Asia.[295]
(e)
On 28 September 2001 ASIO raised its threat assessment
level to Australian interests in Indonesia to "HIGH", reflecting a
benchmark intelligence judgement of "current intent and capability to
attack Australia's interests are established circumstantially, but not
confirmed by reliable intelligence", at which level it stayed at all times
up to and including time time of the Bali bombing.[296]
(f)
In midDecember 2001, following information received in
the investigation of terrorist bombings in Singapore,
Australian agencies for the first time identified Jemaah
Islamiyah ("JI") as a terrorist
organisation.[297]
(g)
There is no evidence for or basis to conclude that
there were links between JI and another militant group, Laskar Jihad, at the
time of the bombing.[298]
(h)
The assessments made by Australian agencies of the
terrorist threat posed by JI were always of a generic character; at no time was
any Australian agency aware of a threat posed by JI specifically in Bali
(or any other particular locality in Indonesia).[299]
(i)
During the first half of 2002, the agencies became more
confident that alQaeda had links in Indonesia,
and during this time were increasingly focussed on assessing the nature and
extent of the threat posed by JI and other militant groups in the region.[300]
(j)
On 18-19 June 2002, at a meeting also attended by
officers of DFAT, ONA briefed the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Downer, on their emerging appreciation of
the threat posed by JI and other militant groups in the region, and of the
presence in the region of alQaeda.[301]
(k)
While all of the officials who attended the meeting
presented the Committee with the best of their recollections, the evidence of Mr.
Bill Patterson,
a DFAT officer who was the only person at the meeting to take contemporaneous
notes of the meeting, must be regarded as the most reliable.[302] Government Senators set out in
Appendix 5 the transcript of Mr Paterson's
evidence and explanation of his contemporaneous notes. Government Senators note
that the Majority Report makes no criticism of Mr.
Downer, either specifically in relation to
the June 2002 meeting, or generally in relation to his handling of the matter.
(l)
In the dispute between witnesses from DFAT and ONA
described at Paragraphgraphs 1.1891.212 as to whether a meeting between
officials from those agencies took place before
or after the meeting with Mr. Downer,
the balance of evidence falls strongly in favour of the DFAT account (i.e.,
that the meeting took place before,
not after the meeting with Mr. Downer), and that the postDowner meeting
alleged by ONA almost certainly did not take place.[303]
(m)
ONA warrants criticism for failing to respond
adequately to DFAT's direct and unambiguous questions about a highly significant
issue for Australians and Australian interests abroadnamely terrorism.[304]
(n)
Nevertheless, DFAT and ONA developed an increasingly
close relationship as the new paradigm of international security, focused on
terrorism, demanded ever greater cooperation between government agencies.[305]
(o)
At the most critical time (in the months immediately
preceding the Bali bombing), the agencies were carrying
out analysis and delivering assessments that were optimal within the bounds of
the information and evidence available to them.[306]
(p)
Prior to the Bali bombing,
neither DFAT nor ONA were possessed of any actionable intelligence that gave
warning of an attack.[307] Government
Senators observe that, as ONA itself conceded, of some 20 reports by ONA
concerning regional terrorism between the time of the Downer meeting and the Bali
bombing, not one mentioned Bali as a possible terrorist
target.[308]
(q)
There is no basis for any suggestion that the
Australian agencies were not as assiduous as, nor that they lacked the sense of
urgency, of their American counterparts in assessing the terrorist threat in Indonesia.[309]
4. Findings concerning Travel Advisories
4.1 Government
Senators agree with the following key findings in relation to Travel
Advisories
prepared by DFAT:
(a) DFAT did not in this particular instance,
and does not as a matter of practice, temper Travel Advice according to
diplomatic considerations.[310]
(b) Travel
Advisories issued by DFAT during the period from September 11 2001 until the Bali
bombing reflected an increasing concern with the risks posed by the rise of
militant Islamists.[311]
(c) The
travel advice for Indonesia
was changed on 12 July 2002
in a way which noticeably strengthened it, to warn travellers of the need to "maintain a high level of personal security awareness", and to warn
that bomb had been exploded "including in areas frequented by
tourists" and that "further explosions may be attempted".[312]
(d) The travel advice was strengthened again on 10 September 2002, by the inclusion
in the headline boxed summary of the words "In view of the ongoing risk of
terrorist activity in the region, Australian in Indonesia
should maintain a high level of personal security awareness".[313]
(e)
The travel advice which was in force at the time of the
Bali attack, i.e. that issued on 20 September 2002, contained the words "Bombs have been exploding periodically in Jakarta
and elsewhere in the past, including areas frequented by tourists. Further
explosions may be attempted. In view of the ongoing risk of terrorist activity,
Australians should maintain a high level of personal security awareness at all
times".[314]
(f)
In its travel advisories DFAT employed the relevant
level of warning and language that corresponded to the threat being conveyed by
the intelligence agencies.[315]
5. The issue of
"commensurability"
5.1
The principal point of difference between Government
Senators and the Majority Report is on the related issues of the sufficiency of
the DFAT travel advisories in conveying to the traveller a level of caution
commensurate with the agencies' (and particularly ASIO's) threat assessments at
the relevant time; and whethereven assuming the level of caution to have been
generally appropriatewhether sufficient was contained to convey to intended
travellers to Bali the message that Bali was no safer than anywhere else in
Indonesia (and indeed, as a socalled "soft target" known to be
frequented by Westerners, was arguably for that reason more at risk than
elsewhere).
5.2
In the view of Government Senators, the ultimate test
of the sufficiency of the Travel Advisories is whether they were accurate. The
central point here is that at no time
was there any intelligence suggesting a particular threat to Bali
as distinct from other tourist destinations. The generic nature of the Travel
Advisories at all times reflected the generic nature of the threat assessments.
There was, in Government Senators' view of the evidence, simply no proper basis
known to the Australian authorities upon which to assert that Bali
was any more dangerous than any other
tourist destination. In such circumstances, pitching the Travel Advisories at
the level of generic risk of bombings, but specifying likely targets by type but not locality, was not only
correct; there was no basis to localize the advisories in the absence of any
assessed threat to any particular locality. How can a Travel Advisory which
warns of the risk of terrorist bombing of tourist facilities in generic terms
not be commensurate with the threat assessment, when the threat assessment was
itself generic? How can a locality be identified in the Advisory which was not
identified in the threat assessment?
5.3
Criticism is also made of the fact that the Travel
Advisories contained a statement that Bali was
"calm" and "tourist services were operating normally". That
was objectively true. The statement, as DFAT witnesses explained, was included
merely because of the high frequency of inquiries concerning Bali
from Australian travellers; not to suggest that, for any other reason, Bali
was a special case. There is no inconsistency between that observation, which
was descriptive and accurate, and the warning that tourist facilities (which
necessarily included Bali) were at risk of terrorist
bombings. Would an Australian traveller to Bali, reading
that warning, think that Bali was not at risk, given that it was the very destination in which he or
she was interested, and the purpose of the travel was tourism? We think not.
5.4
We proceed to deal with the sequence of Travel
Advisories in detail. We also draw to the attention of readers the sequence of
actual Advisories, in the format they were issuedas they "strike the
eye"in Appendix 4.
5.5 Chapter 3 of this Report
opens with a quotation from the parent of a young man who was killed in Bali.
My son, Scott, was killed in that tragedy. I would like
you to know that neither I nor any member of my family consider that the
Governments travel warnings were in any way inadequate. We do not feel there
was any lack of advice that contributed to Scotts death.
5.6
The rest of the
Chapter provides a detailed account of the travel advisories produced by DFAT,
and the intelligence reports and threat assessments that underpinned them. On
the basis of this evidence, which is elaborated with considerable attention to
detail, it is abundantly clear that DFAT's Travel Advice in the months leading
up to Baliand especially from September 2002was wholly commensurate with the
level of threat being conveyed by the intelligence agencies.
5.7 The Government Senators
simply cannot fathom how, given the extensive evidence canvassed in the Report,
it can be asserted that the DFAT Travel Advice was somehow inadequate.
5.8
During
the first half of 2002, while intelligence agencies were trying to come to
grips with the security and threat implications for Australia of the discovery of JI as a terrorist group,
DFAT's Travel Advice was conveying information about the dangers from
extremists in Indonesia. The advisories had been doing so even
earlier than that.
5.9
DFAT's
Travel Advice by mid-2001 was employing the language of a level 3 Advice.
(There are 7 levels or categories of advice, each of which tends to use certain
key phrases and terminology.) Level 3 advices often have some reference to the
risk of terrorism.
5.10
The
'headline' summary of DFAT's 27 August 2001 Advice used fairly standard level 3
phraseology. The Safety and Security section drew attention to US and UK warnings about heightened terrorist threats,
referred to explosions in Jakarta, and warned Australians to take bomb threats seriously.
5.11
The
first DFAT Travel Advice after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Centre was issued on 20 September 2001. The headline advice remained identical to
that of 27 August, and the body of the advice was almost soincluding the
reference to 'explosive devices...detonated recently in Jakarta [so] take seriously any bomb threats'. To
the body of the advice was added the sentence:
In view of the heightened tension associated with the
recent terrorist attacks in the United States of America, Australian travellers are advised to be
especially alert to their own security at this time.
5.12
The next
advisory, six days late on 26 September further upgraded the warning level from
previous advices. The boxed, 'headline' summary introduced the additional
phrase 'and exercise great caution at this time'. This is typical of
level 4 terminology. Level 4 terminology in a Travel Advice is DFAT's
standard setting if ASIO's threat assessment for politically motivated violence
(PMV) against Australians is HIGH.
5.13
The Safety and Security section advised about explosive devices
being detonated in Jakarta, and telling Australians to take any bomb threats seriously. This
advice, or warnings very similar, appeared in the body of all later Travel
Advices.
5.14
The next
event of significance was the commencement of USled military activity in Afghanistan on 8 October, prompting new DFAT Travel
Advice headlined:
Australians
should consider deferring all holiday and normal business travel to Indonesia, excluding Bali. Australians in Indonesia are advised to monitor carefully developments
that might affect their security and exercise great caution at this time.
5.15
The 8
October DFAT Advice also said 'It is highly likely that there will be further
demonstrations in a number of cities in Indonesia which could have antiWestern
overtones' and that Australians were advised to take 'special care' and
'exercise sensible precautions'.
5.16
The Bali exclusion was made on the basis that the
concerns were related to violence associated with protests, and Bali did not pose that risk. As DFAT explained:
The
key focus in the period you are talking aboutand actually it is the key focus
for the ASIO threat assessment as wellwas the possibility of protest action,
civil disorder and in particular protests outside our embassy in Jakarta in the
context of the coalition attacks in Afghanistan. That is what the advice was
about. The situation in Bali was calm. That was the fact of the matter[316]
5.17
DFAT's
travel advice of 7 December 2001 for Indonesia urged heightened vigilance and personal
security awareness, relating this advice to the possibility of further protest
activity against the War on Terror and civil unrest, and a range of serious
threats across Indonesia.
5.18
The
first DFAT Travel Advice of 2002, issued on 8 March, was virtually identical to
the December 2001 Advice. The Travel Advice of 28 March 2002 was a substantially re-written advisory, and
drew attention to the fact that the advice had been 'reviewed [and] contains
new information or advice'.
5.19
Its
headline opened with advice to Australian's travelling to, or resident in, Indonesia to register with the Jakarta Embassy or Bali
Consulate, and concluded with advice against travel to certain regions, and a
caution about travel in Irian Jaya and North
Sulawesi.
5.20
The body
of the advice elaborated on the hot spots of ethnic and separatist violence,
and discussed the risks to foreigners in the light of kidnappings conducted by
the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in locations near Indonesia.
5.21
The
advice also repeated the warning to 'maintain a high level of personal security
awareness'. This advice remained extant until 12 July 2002.
5.22
The DFAT
Travel Advice of 12 July 2002 was noticeably strengthened, opening its
headline summary with the warning that :
Australians
in Indonesia should monitor carefully developments that might
affect their safety and should maintain a high level of personal security
awareness.
5.23
This
message was repeated in the first paragraph of the main body of the advice.
5.24
DFAT
issued a further Travel Advice on 13 August. The bolded and boxed summary or 'headline'
section opened with the warning that Australians in Indonesia should 'monitor carefully developments that
might affect their safety' and that they should 'maintain a high level of
personal security awareness'. It concluded with the statement: 'Tourist
services elsewhere in Indonesia are operating normally, including Bali.'
5.25
This
statement was repeated in the Safety and Security section of the Travel Advice. The Safety and Security section retained the July warning that bombs
had exploded, including in areas frequented by tourists, and that further
explosions may be attempted.
5.26
The next
Travel Advice, issued on 10 September 2002, was noticeably strengthened, even though it
was still prefaced by the statement that 'the overall level of advice has not been
changed' and to that extent was again misleading. The headline boxed summary
now opened with the statement: 'In view of the ongoing risk of terrorist
activity in the region, Australians in Indonesia should maintain a high level of personal
security awareness.'
5.27
The
advisories of 13 and 20 September were essentially the same as the
10 September Travel Advice, also retaining, in the Safety and Security section, the reference to bombs exploding
'periodically in Jakarta and elsewhere in the past, including areas frequented by tourists.
Further explosions may be attempted'.
5.28
The
Travel Advice of 20 September was the advisory extant at the time of the Bali attacks. That Advice, as discussed above,
opened its headline summary statement with the sentence 'In view of the ongoing
risk of terrorist activity in the region, Australians in Indonesia should maintain a high level of personal
security awareness'.
5.29
The Safety and Security section in the body of the advisory also
contained the paragraph:
Bombs
have been exploded periodically in Jakarta and elsewhere in the past, including areas
frequented by tourists. Further explosions may be attempted. In view of the
ongoing risk of terrorist activity, Australians should maintain a high level of
personal security awareness at all times.
5.30
In the
view of the Government Senators, any fair-minded reading of these travel
advisories could leave no one reading them in any doubt that they should be on
high alert regarding risks of terrorism, and that this could well involve
bombs, as had already happened in areas frequented by tourists and might be
attempted again.
5.31
Given
that Bali was a premier tourist destination, it is
important to note that the Travel Advice was quite explicitand had been so
since July 2002that bombs had exploded in areas frequented by tourists.
6. A concluding observation
6.1
We must
never lose sight of the fact that the Bali
atrocity was Australia's greatest peacetime disaster. It was a time
of almost unparalleled grief and anguish, in which the whole nation vicariously
participated, and was felt, in some measure, by every Australian.
6.2
Those at
the very front line in dealing with the tragedy were DFAT consular officers.
The overwhelming evidence of the survivors and the families of victims was one
of appreciation for the extraordinary efforts of those men and women. As Mr. Ian Kemish, the DFAT officer with overall responsibility for consular support,
summarized the response:
I am pleased to say that quite deep personal bonds have developed
between some of those who lost their families in Bali and some of our officers. It is an
extraordinary thing and I find it amazing every time I see it. Certainly, there
is ongoing support. You will, of course, recall the very high level of support
that consular officers were involved in immediately after the bombingincluding
undertaking activities which, frankly, no public servant should be asked to
undertake, such as the management of remains and work in the morgue in Bali. It also included very active work in
ensuring that they had answers to questions about disaster victim
identification and so on. We moved beyond that. We had a very strong role in
organising the Bali commemorating last October and were in very
strong contact with many of the family members after that. If I may, Chair, on
previous occasions in response to questions I have asked leave to table
correspondence from families. I know it is not core to the focus of the
Committee, but it does go to the professionalism of the department and our
relationship with families.[317]
The understandable,
very human desire of some to seek to point the finger of blame must never
diminish our appreciation of the real valour of those officers who confronted
this terrible tragedy, and rose to the occasion in a magnificent spirit of public
service.
Senator Sandy Macdonald
Deputy Chair
Senator David Johnston