Chapter Two - DFAT Travel Advice
Travel advice in the light of Bali
2.1
Of the Bali survivors and
their families who gave evidence to the Committee, all indicated they did not
know Travel Advice existed.[144]
No-one that we know knew to look for anything. We have never
done it for a holiday before and we did not even know where to start to look
for any warnings or anything like that.The travel agent never warned us when
we booked, paid or picked up the tickets or anything like that. We picked our
tickets up a month before we left. We left on 7 October and nothing was
said.No-one that we have spoken to was aware of any sort of travel warning,
web sites or anything like that.[145]
2.2
This, along with other indications of poor
awareness of their existence,[146] has
led to several improvements being made by DFAT.
Travel Advice can now be accessed in Australia
or overseas in a number of ways, including:
-
electronic email subscription;
-
phoning or visiting DFAT or an Australian
mission;
-
using the newly installed touch-screen kiosks in
some Australian international airports.[147]
2.3
More sophisticated systems for dissemination are
still being developed, including alerts via mobile phone SMS. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs (Mr Downer)
also launched a new public information campaign on 7 August 2003: smartraveller.gov.auits
a must see destination.[148]
2.4
In addition, a joint initiative between DFAT and
the travel industry, the Charter for Safe
Travel, is encouraging travel agents, airlines and tour operators to
promote and disseminate DFATs Advice.[149]
2.5
The Committee regards this as an area in which
DFAT should continue to concentrate its efforts. It was particularly clear from
evidence to the Committee by Bali survivors that the
travel agent was regarded as the key source of advice by tourists. It seems that it was simply assumed
by the travellers that their agent would alert them if there were any threats
or risks associated with their destination.
2.6
While the Committee commends the various
initiatives by DFAT and the travel industry to work in partnership to encourage
best practice, the Committee believes that steps could be taken to further
strengthen the quality of advice and service to would-be travellers. Such steps
could be congruent with initiatives being taken with respect to, say, financial
advisers.
Recommendation 2
2.7
The Committee recommends that the government, in
consultation with the travel industry further develop and oversee a code of
practice which would, among other things, make it mandatory for travel
agents/advisers to provide to overseas travellers, at the time a booking is
made, a copy of both DFAT's Travel Advice for the destination concerned and
ASIO's threat assessment for the country itself. Travellers must be advised to consult the
DFAT Travel Advice 24 hours prior to their departure.
2.8
DFAT officials told the Committee that feedback
from market surveys was taken into
account as the Department sought to improve both the development and
dissemination of travel advisories:
We have done quite a bit of market survey work to gauge the
clarity of advice. ... It is very important that the language of the advice and
what it means is as clear as is humanly possible to the reader. We take
professional advice on that but we also gauge the results of market survey
work. The market survey work is actually pretty encouraging. The feedback we
are getting about travel advice is surprisingly positive, in one sense. I have
always judged this area of work as being an area where it is difficult to please
just about anybody, because the judgments are difficult and there are critics
of the travel advice from both ends of the spectrum. But, in fact, I have been
quite heartened by the level of feedback we have received about travel advice
and Australians awareness of and understanding of the issues. It is an ongoing
process. ... [and] we are again looking at some additional things we can do to
make even clearer what our advice means.
In the end, there is one complex issue that needs to be managed
in this dialogue we have with the public about risks, and that is that risks
are difficult to gauge and that the way our society works is that Australians
need, in the end, to make their own judgment about risks and their
applicability to them as individuals on the basis of the best advice that the
government can provide. There can be an expectation on the part of Australians
that we will make decisions for them. That question often arises: You are
saying, Defer non-essential travel. What does that mean? Is my travel
essential? Of course, our response has to be: In the end, you have to make a
judgment about that on the basis of a range of factors. This is what we know.
This is what we are telling you as clearly as we can. You need to think about
whether, in all of that context, you need to travel now. This comes up in our
dialogue with the public from time to time. It is reasonably well understood,
but it is an ongoing process.[150]
General background about travel advisories
2.9
The Consular Branch of DFAT issues travel
advisories for over 200 countries worldwide. Prior to 1997, DFAT produced its
Travel Advice only on an ad hoc
basis to address a significant deterioration in security in an overseas
location. The only dissemination mechanism employed was departmental media
release.[151]
2.10
Since then, the travel advisory systems of Australia
and its consular partners alike have developed considerably. Their rapid
development was driven by a number of factors, including an increasing interest
in travel[152] and the emergence of the
internet which provided a highly effective mechanism for dissemination.[153]
2.11
The greater uncertainty in the international
travel environment caused by the September 11 terrorist attacks resulted in a
greater demand for advice about the risks travellers might face overseas.[154] The number of hits on DFATs website
rose by 60 per cent from June 2001 to June 2002, a demand which continues to
rise.
2.12
In recent times, DFATs Travel Advice has taken
on a different character and a new level of importance to the Australian
travelling public. The public expectations of DFAT concerning the production of
timely, relevant, accurate and credible advice to travellers on safety and
security have increased significantly.
2.13
DFAT has deliberately sought to make a
distinction between travel advisories and travel warnings. While Travel
Advice does contain information about safety and security issues and seeks to
alert Australians to the sorts of risks they may face, Travel Advice is more
than just a warning about possible dangers.[155]
2.14
Rather, it is an advisory addressing a number
of other practical issues that Australians need to be aware of when travelling.
DFAT seeks to encourage Australians to see Travel Advice as a source that
should be consulted even when travelling to a country that is not considered
dangerous.[156]
2.15
DFAT insists that their Travel Advice is only
guidance. DFAT does not, and cannot, make decisions for Australians about when,
where and whether or not to travel. DFATs responsibility goes only so far as
to assist Australians in making their own informed decisions, regardless of
whether they are first-time holiday makers, seasoned business travellers,
expatriate Australians, or government officials.[157]
2.16
A typical DFAT Travel Advice runs for two to
three pages. It states when it was last updated, and briefly how the Advice has
changed.[158] It then contains a
summary of the Advice (in bold text and contained within a box) which details
the main safety and security issues, and the overall warning level. The body of
the Advice is divided into sections, which may include Safety and Security,
General, Health Issues, Insurance, Local Laws and Customs, and Consular
Assistance and Registration.
2.17
DFAT follows the same methodology employed by
its consular partners (the US,
UK, Canada
and NZ) in drawing on a range of sources to prepare Travel Advice.[159]
The department's travel advice is a composite judgement based on
the following factors:
-
Input from our overseas posts on security
conditions.
-
Our experience, in the consular field, of the difficulties
experienced by Australians overseas and issues of concern to them as reflected
in the questions we are asked, on our free call lines, by the general public.
-
Intelligence, with particular weight given to
ASIO threat assessments. Unless the raw intelligence suggests a specific and
imminent threat that requires immediate action, we will test the credibility of
the information by seeking an assessment from ASIO.
-
The consular settings of marker governmentsthe
United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealandare also useful to our
considerations. It is important to note that, for the large part, marker
governments are dealing with a broadly similar information base for
intelligence. Nevertheless, our travel advice settings canand dovary.[160]
2.18
The Department gives particular weight to ASIOs
Threat Assessments. Where ASIO assesses the threat of politically motivated
violence against Australian interests to be HIGH, this will
As a matter of course lead to a clear and prominent reference to
the risk of terrorism in the travel advisory, and a recommendation (at a
minimum) that Australians exercise a high degree of caution. Our concern about
the risk of terrorism will be reflected both in the summary section as well as
the body of the advisory.[161]
2.19
DFAT will not advise against travel to a country
on the basis of an ASIO Threat Assessment of HIGH alone.[162] There must be a clear, specific and
credible threat to Australians before advice to defer travel is given.[163]
2.20
There have been allegations that Travel Advice might
be tempered by DFAT according to diplomatic requirements that might be in play
between Australia
and the country concerned. This was articulated by one witnessa former ONA
analystas follows:
[B]ased on my experience I think that the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade did have a tendency to perhapsapply the precautionary
principleparticularly when dealing with Indonesia because of the sensitivity
of the diplomatic relationship. Once again, I emphasise that I had been out of
the loop for more than six months by the time the Bali bombings occurred, so
whether there had been a change in that environment over that time I cannot
say.[164]
Up until early 2002 the information that was coming through was
certainly at odds with established orthodoxies on the nature of Islam and the
nature of militant Islamic groups in south-east Asia. A
debate ensued between those who were saying we need to revise the way we are
thinking about militant Islam and potential terrorist groups in the region and
those who are saying, No, the old model still applies. The ambiguity
generated by that debate perhaps created a window of opportunity for some
within DFAT to continue a line that was perhaps sensitive to Indonesian
concerns. By the same token, I do not believe that DFAT, had there been
absolute information, would have downplayed the threat to protect that
relationship. I believe that, had the information been more absolute and had
the debates amongst the analysts been closer to resolution, then perhaps the
warnings would have been a little more rigid.[165]
2.21
DFAT emphasised to the Committee that it will
not consider the impact negative Travel Advice has on the tourist industry and
will not temper its Advice to accommodate diplomatic niceties.
Our travel advisories are not influenced by bilateral
sensitivities, or the often strong representations we receive from foreign
governments. In the face of pressure over the years from many governments,
including in the Southeast Asian region, Ministers have taken a firm position
that the safety of Australians overseas is of paramount importance.[166]
2.22
The Committee accepts DFAT's evidence on this
point and is satisfied that DFAT did not in this particular instance, nor
generally, engage in the practice of tempering Travel Advice according to diplomatic
considerations.
2.23
Nor does DFAT feel bound to ensure that its
Travel Advices necessarily always align with those of its consular partners.
We are fully prepared to vary from our consular partner
governments in the nature of the advice we provide, and do so from time to
time. All governments make their own assessments on the basis of their own
circumstances. But given that all governments are working off a broadly similar
information base, we will naturally want to check the situation very carefully
if a wide gap begins to develop between our travel advisory setting and those
of other governments.[167]
2.24
DFAT has made a conscious decision not to use a
strict rating system involving the colour-coding or ranking of threat. The
basis for this decision is that DFAT wishes to encourage the public to read the
content of the Travel Advice and make an individual informed decision on
whether to travel.[168]
2.25
A rating system would firstly mean that DFAT
would be making that decision, regardless of the circumstances of the individual
person. In addition, the public would be less likely to read the remainder of
the document and therefore would not gain a true understanding of the threat.
This general approach is also taken by Australias
consular partners.[169]
2.26
DFAT does, however, have an informal rating
system using language. Travel Advice may fall into one of seven broad
categories, each of which is represented by a particular phrase. That phrase
will appear in the summary and content of the Advice to give an indication of
the overall assessment of the security situation. Generally, the categories
will be applied in the following ways:
(a)
Where DFAT has compelling information suggesting it
is not safe to travel to a country or area, DFAT will advise Australians to defer all travel.
(b)
Where the threat is lower, or the information less
specific, the Travel Advice may only advise Australians to defer non-essential
travel. Whether travel is essential or not is a matter for personal judgement.
DFAT maintains that it cannot weigh those factors for the individual.
(c)
The lowest category, exercise good personal
security awareness involves people doing what they would normally do in Australia.[170]
2.27
Travel Advices are updated promptly in response
to developments reported to their overseas missions and Consular Emergency
Centre, which are open 24 hours a day, all year round.[171]
2.28
When new information emerges, for example an
ASIO Threat Assessment, DFAT will consult with the relevant overseas mission
and consider the settings of consular partners in order to determine how to
interpret and translate that new information into a format that can be used in
Travel Advice.[172] As a general rule,
even where no new information has become available which necessitates an
update, Travel Advice is reviewed on a quarterly basis and revised where
appropriate.[173]
2.29
DFAT stated that it operates on a strict
principle of no double standards and therefore produces only one form of travel
advisory: Travel Advice. This is the Advice provided to DFATs own staff, other
Government agencies and the private sector.[174]
2.30
DFAT officials described to the Committee how
Travel Advice was formulated in the period before the Bali
attacks. Since Bali, ASIO has been more formally
integrated into the process outlined hereunder.
Within the department, there is a triangle, if you like, that is
involved in preparing the travel advice prior to it going to the minister for
clearance. The first point of the triangle is the Consular Branch, which is the
part of the department that in the end physically passes the draft advisory to
the minister for clearance. As the manager of the process of travel advice, it
ensures consistency of format across travel advisories. Clearly the consular
area can value add to the process, because the consular area has direct experience
of the kinds of real difficulties that Australians experience on a daily basis
across the worldbecause we are also managing and supporting people who are
involved in those difficulties.
The second point of the triangle is the geographic division. In
this case, that was the South and South-East Asia Division. In the way we
structure these things in the department, we do rest to some considerable
extent on the expertise and specialisation that a geographic division has in
its own area of responsibility. So the responsibility for tracking
developments, watching threat information and making suggestions about travel
advice is shared with that area. The opportunity is certainly availablewithin
the south and south-east Asia division in this caseto
suggest a change in a travel advisory. They along with others are monitoring
threat information. The third part of the triangle is the relevant embassy, in
this case the embassy in Jakarta.
Of course, the consul-general in Bali is also involved
in these processes over time.
We need to be very clear that every time a draft travel advisory
goes to the minister it has passed a clearance process involving all three
elements of that triangle. The practice will vary a little from place to place
but often the wording is suggested by the relevant embassy. The consular area
will look at that, review it, consider its consistency and conduct a quick
liaison. That liaison is usually conducted quite quickly, but 24 hours or so
would be normal unless there was some very urgent development that required
immediate action. [175]
2.31
Although there is only one form of Travel
Advice, DFAT does provide other forms of information:
(a)
General
Advice to Australian Travellers provides general advice, wherever one may be
travelling, on how to avoid difficulties. The General Advice currently includes
warnings about terrorism.
(b)
Travel
Bulletins are used to address
specific issues in a particular country to supplement a Travel Advice. For
instance, these were issued after the Bali bombing.
(c)
Embassy
Bulletins are issued by Australian missions overseas for expatriate
Australians. They may adopt a slightly different emphasis and provide more
detail to Travel Advice, but their overall content and warning level must be
wholly consistent with that Advice.[176]
Travel advice by Australia
and its consular partners
2.32
The Committee sets out hereunder the sequence of
Travel Advices in the 18 months leading up to the Bali
bombings. Given the relevance to the discussion of the consular settings and
advice prepared by Australia's
consular partners, the Committee refers to these where appropriate. Some
contextual remarks are also provided in order to locate those advices within
the sequence of notable events of the period.
2.33
In its submission to the Committee, DFAT stated
that:
Our travel advisories for the Philippines
and Indonesia
had given clear focus to the risk of terrorism well before the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United
States. Australias
travel advice for Indonesia
has referred to the risk of bomb attacks since July 2001. Our consular partners
maintained very similar travel advice settings.[177]
2.34
DFATs Travel Advice for Indonesia
was already referring to the risk of bomb attacks prior to 11 September 2001. The Safety and Security
section of the Travel Advice of 27
August 2001 contained the following warning, which was repeated in
similar form in the body of all but one of the subsequent travel advisories:
A number of explosive devices have been detonated recently in Jakarta
and elsewhere. Australians are advised to take seriously any bomb threats that
may be made against them or premises they occupy.
2.35
That Travel Advice also informed the public
that:
The American and British governments have issued warnings to
their citizens of a heightened terrorist threat to US and UK
interests in Indonesia.
While we are not aware of any specific threat to Australian interests,
Australians should nevertheless exercise sensible precautions.
2.36
The bolded and boxed headline advice was that Australians should monitor carefully
developments that might affect their security and to defer travel to West
Timor and Aceh. The body of the Advice also contained references
to the risk of public disturbances and Australian travellers were warned to
avoid large public gatherings and areas where demonstrations might occur.
2.37
In relation to Bali in
particular, the following statements appeared in the General section of the
August 2001 Travel Advice:
Tourist services are operating normally on Bali
and Lombok. Travellers to other regions in Indonesia,
as well as resident Australians, are advised to keep themselves well informed
of developments that might affect their safety and to maintain a high level of
personal security awareness.
2.38
DFAT told the Committee that the reference to Bali
was included as a response to the numerous phone calls that DFAT was receiving
from the public about the tourist situation in Bali.
DFAT told the Committee it was a statement of fact.[178]
The Australian Jakarta Embassy's Bulletin to Australia Citizens Living in Indonesia, issued a couple
of weeks earlier on 15 August 2001, contained
a similar statementthat 'Bali is calm and tourist services are operating
normally' and added the following sentence by way of extra advice. Australian
tourists on Bali should observe the same prudence as
tourists in other parts of the country.
2.39
The Committee considers that there is a risk
that the 27 August 2001 DFAT Travel
Advice could be read as making a distinction between the situation in 'Bali and
Lombok' on the one hand and the situation in those 'other
regions in Indonesia'
where travellers are encouraged to 'maintain a high level of personal security
awareness'. The point made in the 15 August Embassy Bulletinnamely that 'Australian tourists on Bali
should observe the same prudence as tourists in other parts of the
country'mitigates that risk
2.40
In the Committee's view, the embassy's warning
that tourists in Bali should maintain the same prudence as tourists elsewhere
was appropriate, and indicated that there was an appreciation amongst Embassy
staff that most Australian tourists thoughtinnocently or misguidedlythat Bali
was a distinctively safe and hospitable place set apart from the rest of
Indonesia.
2.41
The Committee notes that this additional point
that 'Australian tourists on Bali should observe the
same prudence as tourists in other parts of the country' was contained in
virtually every Australian Embassy Bulletin issued from August 2001 through to
October 2002. The Committee questioned DFAT about the noninclusion of this
reminder in the 27 August advisory and subsequent Travel Advices, especially
given that DFAT had told the Committee that it relied heavily on the Australian
embassy for accurate and uptodate advice about the security situation 'on the
ground'.
DFAT Consular Branch did not omit the text. Draft travel advice is prepared with the
Embassy and cleared with the Embassy.
The role of Consular Branch is to manage a process involving direct
input from the embassy and geographic division.
The Embassy did not recommend that this particular reference should be
included in this case. [179]
We [Consular Branch] also had many exchanges across the year
with our embassy in Jakarta about
advisories. At no point was their advice ignored.[180]
2.42
As noted earlier, DFAT informed the Committee
that Australias
consular partners had maintained similar advice settings.[181]
2.43
While the Australian, New
Zealand, Canadian and UK
advisories were similar in tone and content at this time, the US Travel Warning
of 10 August 2001 conveyed
a stronger sense of threat. The US
warning opened with the statement:
The Department of State urges American citizens to defer
nonessential travel to Indonesia.Those
who must travel to Indonesia,
or who are resident there, should exercise extreme caution.
The US Embassy in Jakarta
has received information that indicates extremist elements may be planning to
target US interests in Indonesia,
particularly US Government facilities, and could also extend to US tourists and
tour groups.
2.44
The US
warning stressed that all Americans, 'including tourists and hotel guests',
should take precautions to 'ensure their safetyand reduce their
vulnerability.' It mentioned the locations of recent bombings, and noted that
on past occasions of 'intimidation and violenceIndonesian security officials
have sometimes been unwilling or unable to respond.' There was no specific
reference to Bali in this 10 August 2001 US
Travel Warning.
2.45
The Committee accepts that in these (August
2001) advices of consular partners there may have been perfectly good grounds
to distinguish the risk to Americans and US interests in Indonesia
from the risk to Australians and Australian interests.
The Canadian advice of 16
August 2001 was very similar to the Australian advice. In addition
to their comments about Bali being calm and with tourist
services operating normally the Canadians added the phrase that had been
included in the 10 August Australian Embassy bulletin. Nevertheless, the
same prudence should be observed as in other parts of the country.
2.46
The UK
advice a couple of weeks later was similar in tone and content to, and possibly
even softer than, the Australian Travel
Advice. It included mention of attacks by extremists on Jakarta nightclubs with
expatriates sometimes being the targets, advising British nationals 'visiting
clubs and bars[to] remain alert and be ready leave at the first sign of
trouble.' The Committee understands that this warning related to harassment,
sweeping or physical violence.
Travel advice after September 11 and before the Afghanistan
action
2.47
The first DFAT Travel Advice after the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Centre was issued on 20 September 2001. It stated that the Advice 'contains new
information or advice but the overall warning level has not changed'.
2.48
The headline advice remained identical to that
of 27 August, and the body of the advice was almost soincluding the reference
to 'explosive devices...detonated recently in Jakarta
[so] take seriously any bomb threats'. To the body of the advice was added the
sentence:
In view of the heightened tension associated with the recent
terrorist attacks in the United States of
America, Australian travellers are advised
to be especially alert to their own security at this time.
2.49
The general advice about Bali
was repeated:
Tourist services are operating normally on Bali
and Lombok.
Travellers to other regionsare advised tomaintain a high level
of personal security awareness.
2.50
UK
and Canadian advices in September 2001 were similar in content to the
Australian adviceincluding with respect to Bali. When
referring to the September 11 attacks, their nationals were warned to 'keep a
low profile [and] maintain a high level of vigilance' (UK)
and to be 'especially vigilant' (Canada)
because of the 'possibility of increased dangers for Canadians abroad'.
2.51
The Committee regards the language of these
warnings'keep a low profile', 'maintain a high level of vigilance', etcto be
direct and succinct. Prof. Ross
Babbage told the Committee that, when it
comes to travel advice:
I do not think it needs to be in a particular vernacular; I
think it just needs to be very plain English. I think the Australian public is
well enough educated to follow [travel advisories] ifthe language is simple.[182]
2.52
The phrase 'Australians are advised to be
especially alert to their own security' corresponds to level two of DFAT's
seven graded advisory settings. The phrase 'exercise caution and monitor
developments' is a level three advice.[183]
2.53
The US Travel Warning of 20 September 2001 is stronger than the
Australian, UK,
NZ or Canadian advices. Its language corresponded to a DFAT level five
advisory, with the US State Department warning its nationals to 'defer
nonessential travel to Indonesia'.
The US warning
added:
Those who must travel to Indonesia,
or who are resident there, should exercise extreme caution.
2.54
On 26
September 2001 DFAT issued a new Travel Advice containing 'new
information or advice but the overall warning level has not changed'. However,
the headline advice was strengthened by the addition that Australians should
'exercise great caution at this time'. (This is a level 4 advice and is the
standard setting when ASIO advises a high threat assessment.)
2.55
The body of the Advice also mentioned the US
government's warning to its citizens of a heightened terrorist threat and for
US citizens to defer nonessential travel. The Australian advice went on to
say:
In this environment Australians should
exercise sensible precautions and monitor carefully developments that might
affect their safety.
2.56
Australians were also 'urged to avoid large
public gatherings and areas where demonstrations might occur'. The remainder of
the advice repeated the paragraphs that had been present since the 27 August 2001 advice, including the
reference to explosive devices in Jakarta,
and to take bomb threats seriously.
2.57
In its submission to the Committee, DFAT drew
attention to the way Travel Advice is formulated whenever ASIO produces a high
threat assessment:
An ASIO assessment of a high threat of
politicallymotivated violence against Australian interests will as a matter of
course lead to a clear and prominent reference to the risk of terrorism in the
travel advisory, and a recommendation (at a minimum) that Australians exercise
a high degree of caution. Our concern about the risk of terrorism will be
reflected both in the summary section as well as the body of the advisory.
Where circumstances warrant, travel advisories will on occasions move to higher
warning levels (defer non-essential travel/consider leaving; defer all
travel/leave) because of terrorist threats, civil disorder or war.[184]
2.58
The US
Travel Warning of 24 September 2001
added Central Java and Yogyakarta
to its 'defer all travel' list, but on 26 September the State Department issued
another warning which raised the warning from 'defer nonessential travel to Indonesia'
to 'defer travel to Indonesia'.
2.59
The 26
September 2001 US
warning also urged 'all American citizensto take those measures they deem
appropriateincluding consideration of departure from the country'. The warning
was expressly issued 'to alert Americans to increased security concerns in Indonesia,
and it supplements the Travel Warningof September 24'.
2.60
The UK Travel Advice of 25 September 2001 remained largely as it had been
a week earlier, but the Canadian advice was significantly strengthened. On
27 September the Canadian advice read:
Canadians should not travel to Indonesia
and those in the country should consider leaving while commercial means are
still available. Those who choose to remain in Indonesia
are advised to be especially vigilant and avoid situations where political
violence and demonstrations may occur. The recent events in the United
States have raised the possibility of
increased dangers for Canadians.
2.61
The NZ advice of 27 September 2001 spoke of 'increased risk to foreigners'
and that situations 'could change rapidly'. New Zealanders were 'urged to take
extreme care' and it was recommended that 'New Zealanders consider carefully
their need to travel to Indonesia'.
2.62
By this time, it was apparent that USled
military activity against Afghanistan
was in the offing. Canada
reissued on 28 September its 'do not travel and consider leaving' advice, and
did so again on 4 October 2001.
However, Canada
modified its comments on Bali in its 4 October advice,
saying:
The security situation in Bali
and Lombok is calm, and tourist services are operating
normally, however, this could change and we are advising Canadians not to
travel there.
2.63
The UK Travel Advice of 2 October remained
largely unchanged, but with two variations worth mentioning. References were made
to reports of attacks on Jakarta
nightclubs, which were 'quite likely to recur' with the approach of Ramadan and
the generally heightened level of tension. As well, the paragraph that 'there
is no strong antiforeign sentiment at present' was removed after having been
present in all previous advices. Reference to bomb attacks in Jakarta
and violence and explosions in several Indonesian provinces was common to all
consular partners' advisories.
2.64
In summary, during the time after the September
11 terrorist attacks in the US and before the USled invasion of Afghanistan,
Australia and its consular partners had all strengthened their Indonesian
travel warnings, but to varying degrees.
2.65
America
and Canada had
gone as far as to warn their citizens to defer travel (or nonessential travel)
to Indonesia
and to consider leaving the country. During the period under consideration
(after 9/11, before Afghanistan)
the US had so
warned consistently, and Canada
had so warned from 27 September 2001.
Between 9/11 and the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan,
neither Australia
nor the UK had
so advised their nationals. New Zealand
had recommended that its nationals 'consider carefully their need to travel to Indonesia'.
2.66
Australia's
Travel Advices had stated consistentlyin response to consistent inquiries to
DFAT from travellersthat 'Tourist services are operating normally on Bali'.
The UK
elaborated that Bali had low crime but residents and
tourists should take precautions. Canada
added that, while Bali was calm and tourist services
normal: 'Nevertheless, the same prudence should be observed as in other parts
of the country'.
2.67
Advice about Bali being
'calm' and with 'tourist services operating normally' had been given
consistently by Australia,
Canada and the UK.
But Canada was
the only one during this period9/11 to Afghanistan
- to advise (in its October 4 Advice) specifically against travel to Bali.
2.68
US Travel Warnings never mentioned Balithe
general tenor of the US
advice was: 'Avoid going to Indonesia,
and if you're there, leave.'
2.69
DFAT officials reminded the Committee on a
number of occasions that the explicit advice about Bali
being 'calm' with tourist services 'normal' was:
A simple statement of fact. It was
included against the backdrop of widespread civil unrest in other parts of Indonesia
over previous months. .The travelling Australian public was naturally
interested in whether such unrest would spread to tourist locations such as Bali.
It was a very common questionWe were responding to that question with a statement
of fact through the travel advisory.[185]
2.70
DFAT also pointed out, by way of illustrating
its congruence with its consular partners that:
The governments of the United
Kingdom and Canada
also stated this fact. The government of the United
Kingdom said for a period that Bali
was safe.[186]
2.71
The Canadians reminded their nationals that
while Bali was 'calm' and 'normal', the 'same prudence should be observed as
elsewhere' and that 'however, this [the security situation] could change'. Such
caveats were not linked as directly and immediately to the Bali
advice in any of the Australian versions.
2.72
The settings of consular partners can, and do,
vary[187] because:
(a)
Governments may come to different conclusions based
on the same information; and
(b)
Assessments are specific to a countrys own
circumstances and the risks that may confront its citizens.[188]
2.73
It is standard practice that each individual
country articulates its advice in a way which highlights those aspects that the
relevant authorities think are of most use or significance to its citizens.
2.74
But given the 'consular partner' nature of the
relationship between the countries considered above, and given the 'very
intimate intelligence sharing between the United States, Australia and the
United Kingdom in particular',[189] it
is to be expected that there would be considerable similarity in the travel
advisories of Australia and its consular partners. And there was. This is
supported by the fact that DFAT itself has stressed its constant engagement
with its consular partners on these matters, including as part of DFAT's
efforts to ensure that it was operating at world's best practice.
2.75
The bulk of the Committee's examination,
however, must remain focused closer to home, on the relationship between the
intelligence and threat assessments provided by ASIO, (and other reports from
ONA and DIO) and the Travel Advices produced by DFAT which presumably relied
significantly, although not exclusively, on those assessments.
2.76
This task is undertaken in the last section of
this chapter, once the Committee has completed its consideration of all the
Travel Advices leading up to 12
October 2002.
Travel advice from 8 October 2001
2.77
The commencement of the US-led action against
the Taliban in Afghanistan
prompted the issuing of fresh travel advisories by Australia
and its consular partners. The DFAT advice included in its headlined section:
Australians should consider deferring all holiday and normal
business travel to Indonesia,
excluding Bali. Australians in Indonesia
are advised to monitor carefully developments that might affect their security
and exercise great caution at this time.
2.78
The advice specifically excluded Bali from the warning to defer
travel. (The body of the advice included the standard statement that 'Tourist
services are operating normally on Bali'.) The exclusion
was made on the basis that the concern about violence to foreigners related to
protests and demonstrations in Jakarta
and big cities. This, in DFAT's judgement, did not apply in Bali,
which was calm.
2.79
The Committee explores this exclusion more
thoroughly later in this chapter with reference to the Australian intelligence
and threat assessments available at the time, and to DFAT's use of these in
formulating travel advisories.
2.80
The 8
October DFAT Advice went on to refer to the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan,
saying 'It is highly likely that there will be further demonstrations in a
number of cities in Indonesia
which could have antiWestern overtones'. Australians were also advised to take
'special care' and 'exercise sensible precautions'. The reference to explosive
devices and bomb threats was again included.
2.81
The UK's
8 October Advice was only marginally different from Australia's.
It advised 'against all holiday and other non-essential travel to Indonesia,
except for Bali'. It expanded upon the Bali
situation in the following terms:
Bali remains
safe. At present we are not advising tourists there to leave. Nor, at the
moment, are we advising those who have planned to holiday in Bali
to defer their travel.
2.82
The New
Zealand advice, while overall very similar to Australia's, expanded its
Balispecific advice in the same manner as the UK, and reminded its nationals
that, with respect to Bali, they 'should monitor developments closely'.
2.83
The Canadian 8 October Advice retained its
warning not to travel to, and to leave, Indonesia.
This advice removed completely its previous references to Bali.
(Recall that Canada's
4 October Advice said that the 'calm' and 'normal' situation in Bali
'could change' and advised Canadians 'not to travel there'.)
2.84
The DFAT Travel Advice of 15 October 2001 repeated in its headline summary
the 'defer holiday and business travel' advice of 8 October, but as well as
excluding Bali from the warning, now also excluded
Bintan and Batam. The body of the advice remained largely unchanged.
2.85
The UK Advices of 12 and 17 October persisted
with warning 'against holiday and nonessential travel, except for Bali'the
same exception as contained in the DFAT Advice. The UK Advices also reiterated
that 'Bali remains trouble free' and retained the
earlier "watch this space" advice.
2.86
Canada's
22 & 23 October 2001
Travel Reports continued to 'defer tourist travel to Indonesia
until further notice' but now excluded Bali from that
recommendation. It also reinstated its standard paragraph about Bali
(calm/services normal/nevertheless observe same prudence as elsewhere.)
2.87
On 23
October 2001 DFAT issued a Travel Advice that removed the 'defer
travel' warning, but advised tourists to 'consider their destinations
carefully'. The headline summary advised:
The Government no longer judges it necessary to advise
Australians to consider deferring normal business or holiday travel to most
parts of Indonesia,
although continued vigilance is recommended.
2.88
The DFAT Advice also reported 'the attempted
placement of a small bomb in an Australian company office'. This was the first
time during this period that a DFAT Travel Advice had referred specifically to
a threat directed at an Australian interest. The body of the advice retained
the usual warnings about explosive devices in Jakarta
and elsewhere.
2.89
On 24 October, the UK Travel Adviceand the NZ
advisoryno longer warned 'against holiday and nonessential travel', but in
the light of Afghanistanrelated protest activity urged care, and retained references
to the forthcoming Ramadan, and the associated risks of attacks on bars and
nightclubs.
2.90
Throughout this period the American State
Department had retained its warning to its citizens to 'defer travel to Indonesia'.
Eventually, on 23 November 2001,
this was softened slightly to 'defer non-essential travel'. This was the travel
warning that remained throughout 2002, until the Bali
bombing.
2.91
In December 2001 Australia,
NZ and the UK
maintained their Travel Advice at the lower levels of lateOctober advisories. Canada
removed it's 'defer tourist travel' warning.
Travel advice in 2002 leading up to the Bali attacks
on 12 October
2.92
DFAT's 7
December 2001 Travel Advice was reissued unchanged on 8 March 2002 but on 28
March 2002, the DFAT Travel Advice contained 'new information or advice',
including that Australian travellers should register with the Australian
embassy in Jakarta or ConsulateGeneral in Bali. The advice specifically warned
of dangers in Aceh, Ambon and Irian
Jaya and the risk of kidnapping in North
Sulawesi. These warnings were based on specific intelligence.
2.93
The standard reference to Bali
in the body of the advisory changed its form of words for the first time. It
now read: 'Tourist services elsewhere in Indonesia
are operating normally, including Bali'. This was
included in all subsequent advisories.. The reference to explosions in Jakarta
and elsewhere was omitted from this particular advice. It reappeared in
subsequent advisories with the addition that such explosions had been detonated
at sites 'including areas frequented by tourists'.
2.94
Throughout 2002, UK,
NZ and Canadian travel advisories remained essentially unchanged from the close
of 2001. There was no significant reference to Bali in
these advisories.
2.95
DFAT told
the Committee that there were two issues that were of principal concern leading
into 2002the 'risk of civil unrest, demonstrations and harassment directed at
Westerners' and 'a non-specific risk of terrorism in the region'.[190]
2.96
According to DFAT, the focus of the advisories
on terrorism:
Sharpened further at different periods
since then up to 12 October 2002in
particular, from the middle of 2002 as intelligence agencies came to understand
this phenomenon better. In particular, ASIO threat assessments and our
advisories gave a much stronger focus to terrorist threats generally from
mid2002 onwards. That is a matter of public record, and it was at the time a
matter of very considerable media coverage.[191]
2.97
The
Committee has examined those advisories from the middle of 2002. DFAT issued
Travel Advices on 12 July, 13 August and 10, 13 and 20 September. While there
was sometimes new information added, DFAT had written at the head of every
advisory that the 'overall level of advice [was] not changed'. Closer
examination, however, reveals that the content of the advisories had changed
and that actually the warnings in the mid-2002 advisories had been strengthened
from what they were earlier in the year.
2.98
The bolded and boxed summary or 'headline'
section in the 2002 July and August Travel Advices opened with the statement
that Australians in Indonesia
should 'monitor carefully developments that might affect their safety' and that
they should 'maintain a high level of personal security awareness'. (These are
the key phrases used by DFAT at advisory levels 3-4.)
2.99
The body of these two advices, in the Safety and Security section, included
the advice:
Bombs have been exploded periodically
in Jakarta and elsewhere in the
past, including areas frequented by tourists. Further explosions may be attempted.
2.100
This was the first reference to bombs exploding
'in areas frequented by tourists' and warning of the risk of future bombings in
tourist areas.
2.101
The summaries in the September 2002 advisories
were further strengthened by the explicit reference to the 'risk of terrorist
activity in the region', and these risks were repeated in the Safety and Security section, which also
contained the above reference to explosions etc.
2.102
Reference to 'bombs' and 'violence' had been
contained in the Safety and Security
section of all DFAT's 2002 Travel Advices, and the summary 'headline' of all
Travel Advices of this period finished with the statement: 'Tourist services
elsewhere in Indonesia are operating normally, including Bali'. This statement
was repeated in the Safety and Security
section of each Travel Advice.
2.103
The Committee appreciates the distinction
between the description of a existing situation and the conveying of warnings
of possible risks. The statement 'tourist services operating normally' was
objectively true, and was in no way inconsistent with the warning of the risk
of bombings in areas frequented by tourists.
2.104
By the same token, the Committee has argued
elsewhere that this 'objectively true' statement was reassuring to Bali
travellers at a time when risks to them were unprecedentedly high.
2.105
The Committee notes that, in addition to the
Travel Advice, DFAT also issued a Travel Bulletin around the time of the
September 11 anniversary. It was headlined: 'Possible terrorist activity in Southeast
Asia' It highlighted a generic threat to Australian and UN
interests in East Timor, then went on to say:
Australians in Southeast Asia should note the ongoing threat of
terrorism in the region and maintain a high level of personal security
awareness at all times, both during the anniversary of the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks and afterwards.
The US Government has also reminded its citizens to be extremely
cautious during the coming days and to maintain a high level of vigilance, a
low profile, and avoid facilities associated with the US Embassy.
2.106
The Travel Advice of 20 September was the
advisory extant at the time of the Bali attacks. That
Advice, as discussed above, opened its headline summary statement with the
sentence 'In view of the ongoing risk of terrorist activity in the region,
Australians in Indonesia should maintain a high level of personal security
awareness' and concluded with the sentence 'Tourist services elsewhere in
Indonesia are operating normally, including Bali'.
2.107
The Safety
and Security section in the body of the advisory also contained the
paragraph:
Bombs have been exploded periodically
in Jakarta and elsewhere in the
past, including areas frequented by tourists. Further explosions may be
attempted. In view of the ongoing risk of terrorist activity, Australians
should maintain a high level of personal security awareness at all times.
Later in the section the advice was repeated about
tourist services 'elsewhere in Indonesia...operating
normally, including Bali.'
2.108
While the 20 September 2002 Travel Advice was
the one extant at the time of the Bali bombings, the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta had, on 3 October 2002, issued a Bulletin
to Australian Citizens Living in Indonesia. It contained much of the advice
and warnings that it had issued in
previous Bulletins, but in the second
paragraph of the 3 October 2002
issue there was a warning that made reference to clubs and bars:
As in the past around religious holidays, militant groups may
conduct intimidatory activity against night clubs, bars and other places where
expatriates are known to gather. Australians are advised to take particular
care in this period prior to religious holidays, and during Ramadan.
2.109
The Committee mentions this Embassy Bulletin, as
there was some speculation in the press and elsewhere that warnings about clubs
and bars at this time related to information about terrorist attacks. The above
makes it clear that the warnings related to harassment and sweeping associated
with religious holidays.
2.110
The Committee also notes that on the day before
the Bali attacks, DFAT issued a worldwide Travel
Bulletin in which it set out the details of an FBI release warning of potential
terrorist attacks against US economic interests. This was a universal alert,
and not specific to Indonesia.
The release said that 'US authorities are unable to provide further information
on specific targets, timing or method of attack'. The DFAT Travel Bulletin
closed with the lines:
In light of the warnings by the United States Government,
Australian travellers and residents overseas are advised to remain alert to
their own security. They should monitor local developments and news broadcasts
carefully and follow the advice of local authorities.
2.111
In this context, DFAT officials expressed to the
Committee their frustration at claims that the US
had provided some kind of special warning just prior to the Bali
attacks that had not been matched by Australia.
Finally, we have noted in the mediaand I would really like to
make this clearsuggestions that the United States came up with some kind of
statement immediately prior to the Bali bombings and that this was not matched
by Australia. This frustrates those of us who actually know the truth of the
matter and recall quite clearly the public attention that was given to the
matter. In fact, the Australian and United
States governments issued statements about
these issues at the same time. These were global warnings and they were not
informed by knowledge about Bali and about bars. These
statements, issued at almost exactly the same time, advised our respective
travellers overseas generally to remain alert to their own security. We took
the additional caution on 11 October
2002 to relay to Australiansin the form of a bulletinthe full
text of a statement issued by the United States
government.[192]
Concluding remarks
2.112
At the time of this Report going to print in
August 2004, the official ASIO threat assessment for Indonesia
remained at high, and the official DFAT Travel Advice was that Australians
should defer nonessential travel to Indonesia
as a whole, including Bali. Despite this persistent
advice, Australians have continued to flock to Bali in
their thousandsaround 15,000 per month since mid2003.
2.113
The Committee makes this observation by way of
affirming that official advice can only ever be that; Australians will continue
to make their own decisions about how that advice impacts upon their personal
choices and circumstances. This does not, of course, diminish the absolute
requirement that our intelligence agencies and DFAT must always ensure that the
advice they give is as accurate, meaningful, relevant, accessible and
intelligible as possible.
2.114
During the year before the Bali
bombings, DFAT Travel Advice contained generic threat advice, with particular
attention being paid to those areas of Indonesia
where domestic ethnic and religious political violence posed serious risks to
travellers. They included reference to explosions and bomb threats in Jakarta
and elsewhere, and (from July 2002) including areas frequented by tourists.
2.115
For the first half of 2002 there was no notable
warning about the deliberately antiWestern terrorist threat of the kind being
discerned by the intelligence agencies during that period. The advisories
tended to highlight the risks to foreigners arising from demonstrations and
protests, and from harassment and opportunistic physical assault by militants.
They did, however, warn that Australians should take seriously any bomb threats
made against them or the premises they occupied. The advisories also stated, in
response to persistent questions from travellers, that Bali
was 'calm' and that tourist services were 'normal'.
2.116
In July 2002, however, the Travel Advices were
changed to convey to travellers the need to 'monitor carefully developments'
and to 'maintain a high level of personal security awareness'. The Advice also
now warned that bombs had been exploded 'including in areas frequented by
tourists' and that 'further explosions may be attempted'.
2.117
From 10
September 2002, each Travel Advice headline summary began with the
words: 'In view of the ongoing risk of terrorist activity in the region ' and
concluded with the words: 'Tourism services elsewhere in Indonesia
are operating normally, including Bali.'
2.118
In the Committee's view, the information and
warnings contained in the travel advisories for Indonesia during the month or
so before the Bali attacks, while warning of an increased generic terrorist
risk, nonetheless did not adequately reflect the content of the threat
assessments that were available by that time that specifically warned that
Australians in their own right were now seen as terrorist targets in Indonesia.
ASIO's threat assessments had made plain that Australians were potential
terrorist targets not just because they were 'westerners', but because Australia
itself had become a focus of al-Qa'ida / Jemaah
Islamiah terrorist attention. In the
Committee's view it would have been better for this additional piece of
information to have been provided through DFAT's travel advisories so that
potential Australian travellers would have been aware that Australians in their
own right were now the objects of specific terrorist interest in Indonesia.
2.119
Furthermore, while DFAT's travel advisories
warned of a generic terrorist threat 'in the region', the ASIO threat
assessments had referred to Australians becoming potential terrorist targets
specifically within Indonesia
(as well as elsewhere in the region). Again, it is the Committee's view that it
would have been better to tell the Australian travelling public that
Australians in Indonesia
(rather than simply westerners within the region) were of potential interest to
al-Qa'ida / JI terrorist organisations.
2.120
It would be reasonable, however, to assume that
anyone reading the Travel Advice for Indonesia
even just the headline summary and Safety
and Security section - would understand that there was a generic terrorist
risk, that bombs had exploded in the past, including where tourists gathered,
and that further explosions may be attempted.
2.121
What the Travel Advice reader may not have appreciated, however, was that Bali
was no safer than any other part of Indonesia
in terms of the terrorist risk or the likelihood of a bomb going off. The
Committee explores this key issue in detail in a separate chapter of this
Report.