4.1
A range of explanations for the collapse of the Afghan government and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were received by the committee and are explored in this chapter. The evidence indicated that there were issues with the long-term viability of the Afghan government and the ANDSF to sustain themselves without the ongoing support of allied forces. Others proposed that the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (commonly referred to as the Doha agreement), which was an agreement signed between the United States (US) and the Taliban, was the catalyst that delegitimised the Afghan government and led to the strengthening of the Taliban. The role of Pakistan was also an important factor raised in understanding the Taliban’s resurgence.
4.2
This chapter also explores a range of views on the speed of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan which was described by some as surprising. Perspectives on the capability of the Taliban to form government and govern effectively are also considered, as well as the ongoing presence and persistence of resistance within Afghanistan.
Fragility of the Afghan government and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
The collapse of the Afghan government
4.3
The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) explained that the ‘Taliban commenced major offensives against Afghan military forces in May 2021’ and:
On 2 July 2021, US military forces withdrew from their primary military base outside of Kabul and by the end of July 2021, the US confirmed that the Taliban had taken control of approximately half of the country’s districts. In the interim, the Taliban had indicated a forthcoming peace proposal to secure their position as the governing power in Afghanistan. They entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, claiming victory over Afghanistan and established an interim government, as President Ashraf Ghani and other government officials were evacuated from the country.
4.4
Professor Theo Farrell, an academic at the University of Wollongong, noted:
In just a few days, over 6 to 15 August 2021, the Taliban swept across Afghanistan, seizing all of its provincial capitals and major cities, including Kabul.
4.5
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) stated that the ‘reasons for the failure of the Afghan government and the ANDSF to defend against a Taliban takeover are open for debate, and it is too early to attribute the root causes without detailed analysis’.
Problems within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
4.6
Evidence received by the committee indicated a number of issues within the ANDSF that contributed to the Taliban’s victory in taking over Afghanistan.
4.7
Professor Farrell provided the committee with an article written by
Dr Jonathan Schroden, titled ‘Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces’, which identified six key factors which led to the collapse of the ANDSF:
the ANDSF collapse was months—if not years—in the making;
the United States did not give the ANDSF everything they needed to be independently successful;
the ANDSF did put up a fierce fight in many areas;
the ANDSF were poorly served by Afghan political leaders;
the ANDSF were poorly served by their own commanders; and
the Taliban strategy overwhelmed and demoralized the ANDSF.
4.8
Professor Farrell agreed with Dr Schroden’s conclusion that ‘[t]he speed of the Taliban advance belies an insurgent victory that unfolded over years’.
4.9
Mr Scott May, who served in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009, reported ‘[a]s an enlisted soldier I could see that the Afghan Army were not an efficient or effective fighting force…it is not at all surprising how quickly they capitulated’.
4.10
Another veteran who served in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) from 2006 to 2014 described his experience with the Afghan army:
One of the main jobs my platoon had was supporting the ANA [Afghan National Army] patrols either by doing our own patrol near where they were or with them as a part of the OMLT [Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team] when they wanted to be backed up.
There is less than a hand full of ANA soldiers that I personally saw that were at a standard that made you think, [oh] he knows what’s going on[,] he knows his job…
There was no way in hell the ANA could have done [their] job without us holding [their] hands.
4.11
Mr Hugh Poate, whose son was killed while serving in Afghanistan, submitted that the Afghan army lacked the drive to hold back the Taliban:
There was no shortage of Taliban fighters to fill dead men's shoes. We had no chance at all of beating them. The Afghan National Army was probably 10 times greater than the numbers of the Taliban, but it didn't have the same drive to fight. Most of the Afghan National Army soldiers were there because it was a paid job. They gave up, though, towards the end because they could see the Taliban was going to win and their pay had stopped coming through because most of the money being given to the government of Afghanistan was being squandered by the corrupt government of that time—in fact, under both presidents, Karzai and Ghani.
…they thought that they were going to be supported by the Western forces, but the Western forces announced that they were leaving. That, of course, emboldened the Taliban even further, and the Afghan National Army, who had relied heavily on Western forces for support, suddenly realised: “Well, we're going to be left to our own devices. We can't possibly win”. And when the president flew out of the country, that was the end of it.
4.12
DFAT compared the lack of morale within the ANDSF with some of the tactics of the Taliban which led to the downfall of the Afghan government:
On the Taliban’s part, its brutality and mercilessness, and its murder of surrendering ANDSF soldiers, broadcast over the internet, was designed to generate fear. It did not abide by its undertakings under the Doha Agreement of February 2020 and that gave it an advantage that was difficult to counter.
For its part, the ANDSF was not able to maintain command and control nor morale within its ranks. Fragile ideological cohesion and a lack of national unity within the ANDSF contrasted against the Taliban’s ruthless dedication to its cause and its use of propaganda to degrade the ANDSF’s will to fight. The Taliban’s military strategy of taking control of main highways and besieging the major cities crippled Kabul’s ability to send reinforcements and supplies.
Problems within the Afghan government
4.13
Additionally, evidence received by the committee indicated that issues within the Afghan government not only contributed to the flaws identified above within the ANDSF but also, ultimately, to the victory of the Taliban.
4.14
Professor Farrell provided the committee with an article written by Professor Michael Semple, a world-leading authority on the Taliban, which raised a number of issues with the ministerial leadership of the Afghan government:
…there was a critical failure of Afghan leadership of the security forces. Incredibly, Afghanistan operated for most of the past two years with a defence minister who was off sick. A chief of army staff had to stand in for him before being replaced by someone even less competent during the offensive.
The national security adviser was relatively inexperienced but passed on the president’s micro-managing instructions to the armed forces. To cap it all, the head of the administrative affairs division which makes all appointments, was deeply corrupt and, despite the crisis, continued to demand bribes for command appointments, which disastrously weakened the officer corps. Competent officers were simply excluded from some of the most important posts and many units were under-manned, to enable the commanders to divert salary and ration payments.
With such chaos in the top leadership of the Afghan security forces, it is hardly surprising that Afghanistan did not have an effective strategy to combat the Taliban offensive.
4.15
DFAT also noted that the ‘[b]attlefield performance of the ANDSF was… affected by the Afghan government’s reshuffling of office holders, including interior and defence ministers, governors, and police chiefs’.
4.16
Adjunct Professor Mahmoud Saikal, former Ambassador of Afghanistan to Australia, added that there were issues with corruption within the Afghan government:
At national level the weakness of the rule of law in Afghanistan played a key role, and partially our leaders ignored strengthening the rule of law. That of course paved the ground for high corruption. It also paved the ground for power struggle, and, in order to do that, certain elements used ethnic politics. I think these were the key factors in terms of weakening the state inside Afghanistan.
The Doha agreement
4.17
The Doha agreement was discussed at length in the evidence received by the committee. Many submitters saw that the signing of the agreement played a role in delegitimising the Afghan government, lowering the morale of the ANDSF, and strengthening the position of the Taliban.
4.18
The Doha agreement was signed on 29 February 2020. Home Affairs explained:
Following nearly two decades of US-led Coalition occupation in Afghanistan and nine rounds of negotiations over two years, the Agreement sought to be a comprehensive and sustainable agreement to end the war in Afghanistan for the benefit of all Afghans and contribute to regional stability and global security.
4.19
The Doha agreement contained a number of commitments made by each party, as outlined by Home Affairs:
A key provision in the Agreement was the US commitment to withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of the US, its allies, and Coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel within
14 months. Both parties agreed to a staged withdrawal, with the initial withdrawal reducing the number of US personnel in Afghanistan to 8,600 and the US and Coalition withdrawal of forces from five military bases within the first 135 days of the agreement. This would be followed by a full NATO withdrawal if the Taliban met its own commitments.
The Taliban committed to prevent the use of Afghanistan territory to threaten the security of the US and its allies by any of its members, other individuals, or groups (including al-Qaeda). This was to be ensured by the Taliban directing members not to cooperate with such individuals or groups, and preventing the same from recruiting, training or fundraising. They committed not to provide visas, passports, travel permits and other legal documents to such individuals/groups. The agreement also outlined that measures should be taken to assure that those seeking asylum or residence in Afghanistan do not pose a threat to the security of the US and its allies.
In addition, the US further committed to the release of up to 6,000 combat and political prisoners, to initiate an administrative review of current US sanctions and rewards list against members of the Taliban, and to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or interfere in its domestic affairs.
4.20
Emeritus Professor William Maley, Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Dr Nishank Motwani and Dr Srinjoy Bose, academic specialising in the study of Afghanistan, submitted that the ‘fuse for disaster in Afghanistan was lit by the Doha Agreement’, describing it as ‘one of the most ill-conceived and poorly-implemented exercises in diplomacy since the Munich agreement of September 1938’. Additionally, the way in which the agreement undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government and lifted the Taliban, ‘was one of the most utterly predictable developments that one might have expected if one had much knowledge of Afghan history’.
4.21
Emeritus Professor William Maley, an academic at the Australian National University, further explained the comparison of the Doha agreement with the Munich agreement:
The Doha agreement was defective in multiple respects. Firstly, it was concluded and signed in the absence of the government of Afghanistan, but that did not prevent the United States, in signing the agreement, from committing that the government of Afghanistan would release up to 5,000 combat and political prisoners held by the Afghan government, even though it was not a party to the agreement. That was a first parallel with the 1938 Munich Agreement, which was conducted in the absence of the government of Czechoslovakia.
4.22
Secondly, the Doha agreement:
…involved commitments not just on behalf of the United States, but on behalf of Allied powers such as Australia and the United Kingdom that their forces and contractors would be withdrawn as well. The US official who actually signed the Doha agreement was not even a permanent official of the US government, but was a contractor. It's not clear to me that he was authorised in advance by Allied states to make such a commitment.
4.23
Dr Nematullah Bizhan, also an academic at the Australian National University, agreed that the absence of the Afghan government within negotiations was a fundamental problem as:
… it undermined and bypassed a legitimate government. That was the first problem, but it was not something new. Post-9/11 the approach by most international actors in Afghanistan was paradoxical. As such, they bypassed the state, creating parallel mechanisms. The result of that was [the] prolonging of state weakness. This is something which I discuss in my book; its paradox is an Afghanistan building and undermining the state. The Doha agreement bypassed the government and the people of Afghanistan ...
The second one is that this agreement facilitated fragmentation of the state and polity from within Afghanistan and empowered the Taliban as a group to act as a state and put the state in a much weaker position as another actor, rather than as the major actor, in Afghanistan, and it had implications at different levels in Afghanistan.
4.24
However, Home Affairs noted that while the Afghan government did not participate in the US-Taliban talks, ‘on the same day the Agreement was signed, a press conference was held to address the next steps in peace negotiations, outlining plans for intra-Afghan peace talks’.
4.25
Nonetheless, Emeritus Professor Maley explained that while the US had put forward that the Taliban continue with ‘intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides’ following the Doha agreement, they did not even name the Afghan government:
The problem was that the United States, in its initial agreement, gave to the Taliban everything they really wanted. It gave to them the status of a place at the table with one of the most powerful states in the world. It gave them a commitment for the release of up to 5,000 combat or political prisoners. And it provided a firm timetable for the withdrawal of US forces. Having got, at that point, everything that they really wanted, the Taliban had no significant interest in negotiating seriously with anyone else thereafter, and therefore the Taliban movement remitted to a position of strategic stalling rather than serious good-faith negotiations with other parties.
4.26
Referring to the article noted earlier by Professor Semple, Professor Farrell pointed out that the Doha agreement was a ‘fundamentally flawed’ process that ‘[i]nstead of bringing peace, it enabled the Taliban victory through an approach of appeasement’. The article also agreed that ‘the Taliban leadership had never been seriously interested in sincerely negotiating or reaching agreement with the government in Kabul’, but rather the peace negotiations for the Taliban were a ‘strategic communications exercise, to pose as a legitimate political movement and encourage complacency towards their military campaign’.
4.27
As for the US, the article claimed that ‘[i]t is clear that the US wanted to use the illusion of a political process to provide some political cover for extricating itself from Afghanistan’. It explained:
The US talked up the prospects of a political settlement and the hopes that it would hand over to a powersharing administration including the Taliban. But throughout the 2018–2021 peace initiative, the Taliban leadership gave their fighters an entirely different narrative. Unambiguously, it was a victory narrative. Taliban fighters were told that they had defeated the United States in the war and that the US had agreed to hand over power to them as they left– “the Americans have handed us the keys of the presidential palace” was a frequently repeated phrase.
4.28
Professor Farrell added, therefore:
The Taliban correctly interpreted this deal as the clearest signal yet that the US government had given up on Afghanistan. It led to the immediate ending of the US air strikes in support of besieged Afghan forces and critically undermined Afghan army morale.
4.29
However, Professor Farrell did note that it was assumed at the time that the Doha agreement would result in a reduction in conflict, not an escalation, and explained the significance of the cessation of US air strikes following signing of the Doha agreement:
There's quite a lot of evidence, and it was reported by the United Nations Security Council, for instance…what the Doha peace deal provided was an assumption on both sides that there would be a reduction in the conflict. For instance, US forces in Afghanistan tweeted that it was expected…that there would be an 80 per cent reduction in fighting. But actually what happened was the Taliban intensified their military operations, but they did so just below the threshold that would trigger US air strikes. For instance, the Afghan Analyst Network, which is a very reputable network of analysts that do field research in Afghanistan, went to several provinces after the Doha deal and what they discovered was the Taliban were using the cover of the Doha deal to make gains on the ground, to capture road networks, to surround district centres but to do it in a way that didn't trigger a US military response. It was only when the Taliban in Afghanistan, in what would have been the autumn of 2020, attacked Lashkar Gah, which is the provincial capital of Helmand—and that was a major attack—that US air strikes were triggered to repulse them. That's why they were seen as a Taliban attempt to see how far they could push it before the US would strike back.
That's really critical, because the US air strikes were important for two reasons. The first is they stopped the Taliban taking major capitals and major cities. Whenever the Taliban amassed to do that, the US, which had regional targeting teams, could call on air strikes in a matter of minutes to stop them. The second is that it gave support and morale to the Afghan army on the ground. But, from March 2020 onwards, when the US stopped doing air strikes because of the Doha deal, what the Afghan army saw were planes flying in the sky above them, but they weren't dropping bombs to support them. That caused Afghan army morale to collapse.
4.30
With regard to the Taliban’s attack on Lashkargah in Afghanistan, Professor Farrell referred to a report by the United Nations Security Council which found:
…that the assault on Lashkargah was most likely ‘a probing exercise to gauge how far conditions of the Doha Agreement could be tested before being challenged by the United States’. It finds that overall, the greater freedom of movement had ‘allowed the Taliban to mass forces around key provincial capitals and district centres, enabling them to remain poised to launch attacks, while technically still abiding by the terms and conditions of the Doha agreement’ (see paragraphs 30 & 31 [of the United Nations’ report]).
4.31
Dr Srinjoy Bose, an academic at the University of New South Wales, identified another shortcoming of the agreement, stating:
One of the conditions mentioned in the agreement relates to terror networks and terror groups such as al-Qaeda. The Americans wanted assurances from the Taliban group that they would sever any and all ties with the al-Qaeda terror group. However, as part of those negotiations, there weren't any enforcement or monitoring mechanisms that were identified. Without monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, they were really giving the Taliban group a free hand to continue and maintain their generations-old relations with the al-Qaeda terror group and other terror groups.
4.32
Adjunct Professor Saikal argued that the Doha agreement not only legitimised the Taliban, but also gave the wrong impression to terrorist groups in the region:
At the time, I remember, even before the signing of this agreement, I personally warned Mr Khalilzad, the negotiator of the US, that this was a mistake, that this would be a very disastrous agreement, that it would really raise the morale of the Taliban to the highest and also that it would give the wrong signal to other terrorist, radical and extremist groups in the region and around the world that this is the way to go. You commit terror, you commit violence, and we credit you, we pat you on the shoulder, we sign an agreement with you, and we formalise things with you.
4.33
Similarly, Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, an academic at La Trobe University, submitted that the Doha agreement ‘elevated the Taliban as an actor in the region’ and explained:
We should remember that, until 2018 and 2017, many countries in the region which had relations with the Taliban were doing so discreetly. It was not very common for the Taliban leadership to arrive in public meetings or official visits in countries around the region. It was only after the Doha agreement, which was lodged by the United States, and the way it was managed, that countries in the region saw the Taliban as a regional, legitimate actor. They started perceiving the Taliban as a legitimate actor with some inevitable role to play in the future of Afghanistan. And that, I think, reinforced what we saw happen on the ground in Afghanistan…But I think we have seen quite a dramatic shift in the region about how countries and capitals in the region see the Taliban. And that was really triggered by the way Doha leadership negotiations were handled by the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad.
The role of Pakistan
4.34
Some submitters reflected on Pakistan’s role in the destabilisation of the Afghan government through its apparent relationship with the Taliban and noted that the international community should have dealt with the issues surrounding Pakistan’s role sooner.
4.35
Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, discussed the historical links between Pakistan and the Taliban:
There's certainly a range of reporting that points to historical links between parts of Pakistan's government and the Taliban. I can't comment on whether that's the primary source or otherwise of Taliban funding. There are family links and other links across those borders, so there's an ongoing relationship, but that's not all formally government endorsed. If we go back to the antecedents of the organisation, certainly there's a link there to the Pakistan government. They are separate entities now, and the Pakistan government makes that clear, but clearly there's an ongoing relationship.
4.36
A 2015 study found that the Taliban leadership was ‘acutely aware that its military campaign is dependent upon retaining access to Pakistani territory’. In this context, the Department of Defence (Defence) was asked whether it agreed with the congressional testimony of the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, who stated that ‘never effectively dealing with Pakistan’ was a critical error. Defence stated that it agreed with US General Milley’s assessment:
…that the endstate in Afghanistan was the cumulative result of a series of decisions and actions taken over twenty years. The Taliban’s military campaign did depend on retaining access to Pakistani territory.
4.37
Similarly, Dr Bizhan stated that ‘critical factor in Afghanistan's fall was Pakistan's role in providing the Taliban with sanctuaries, logistical support and equipment’.
4.38
Additionally, Mr Poate raised the point that the Taliban ‘was backed by Pakistan’ and that this, amongst other contributing factors, meant that ‘the Taliban was always going to win that war’.
4.39
Adjunct Professor Saikal argued that Pakistan played a role in the ‘remaking’ of the Taliban:
At regional level, Pakistan's policy of using violence in pursuit of strategic objectives has been a key factor behind the rise or the return of the Taliban—the remaking of the Taliban…
It looks like the Taliban have been there for 27 years. They came to power for five years between 1996 and 2001, and then Pakistan played a double game when 9/11 happened and the international forces came to Afghanistan. They brought them back over time.
4.40
Professor Maley added:
Pakistan has been up to its neck in the perfidious actions of the Taliban since the Doha agreement was signed to use military force to seize control of Afghanistan. There are geopolitical factors and historical factors that explain that particular pattern of behaviour on Pakistan's part.
The initial reaction of Pakistan to the fall of the republican regime in Afghanistan was so ill judged that I think they are attempting rhetorically to back a little bit away from some of the things that were said at that time—for example, Prime Minister Imran Khan’s florid statement that the return of the Taliban had broken the shackles of slavery in Afghanistan and also a very foolish speech he gave to the General Assembly of the United Nations…as a result Pakistan have been seeking to create the impression that there is more distance between them and the Taliban than actually is the case. But if one looks at the politics playing out in Afghanistan, it's very clear that the Haqqani network which is now dominant within the Taliban regime was Pakistan's preferred group to dominate the new regime…
4.41
Dr Bose added ‘[w]e now know that the Haqqani Network are in charge of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. That's their portfolio’.
4.42
Dr Ibrahimi agreed, explaining:
While Pakistan would like to show that it's playing the role of a responsible actor in Afghanistan, managing our affairs, I think we should also remember that Pakistan has had a lot of influence on the Taliban, the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani shura and the Haqqani Network, which is now in control of Kabul. With that sort of power and influence comes responsibilities. At the end of the day, it seems to me that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan on 15 August and the overthrow of the government of Afghanistan was by proxy from Islamabad [capital of Pakistan], in a way…the Taliban victory would not have been possible had it not been for that really sustained strategic, military training and adviser support that they received from within Pakistan.
4.43
Mr Sloper, DFAT, noted that ‘[t]here's some well-known media coverage around the establishment of the Taliban so-called cabinet, which involved consultations with Pakistan representatives’. However, Mr Sloper also explained:
Equally, when we look at the history of the Taliban in Afghanistan, there is a clear line through Taliban thinking that they wish to avoid being perceived to have or having what they would describe as 'foreign interference' in their operations.
4.44
Professor Farrell agreed:
For the regional powers, the Taliban offer the potential for security that would increase trade from Pakistan to Iran and so forth. The Taliban can be very enabling for economic growth in the region, but I would emphasise that the Taliban, in one respect, are cagey enough customers to understand that they don't want to be beholden to any regional power. They became very dependent on Pakistan during the war against the Americans, and they resented that.
There has always been a tension between the Taliban and their Pakistan hosts throughout the 20-year war because they didn't like the extent of control that Pakistan had over them, so they will be very slow to let any kind of dependency like that develop.
4.45
Additionally, Professor Farrell noted:
The Taliban are a nationalist network. That's the first thing to realise. The rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan is quite intense among the ordinary population, so it's entirely possible that parts of the Taliban—already some of the southern Taliban groups are very resentful towards Pakistan, particularly because Pakistan took some measures which impacted on Afghan refugees in Pakistan who were their people.
4.46
Adjunct Professor Saikal also discussed how the Taliban will likely interact with Pakistan moving forward, stating:
The possibility of whether [the Taliban] can go against Pakistan is low. Yes, in the lower rank and file, they may get hurt when they see too much meddling from Pakistan in the affairs of Afghanistan. As you know, when Kabul collapsed, among the first visitors was the chief of the ISI [Inter-Service Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence agency], who came to Kabul and worked with the Taliban very closely to put their so-called caretaker government together. At this stage, I don't envisage a revolt against Pakistan at the highest level of the Taliban leadership. In the lower level, maybe; they may become noisy. But at the higher level, no. In the long term, I can see some kind of partnership emerging between Pakistan, the Taliban and China…China has a keen interest to see Afghanistan joining the CPEC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Of course, they've been talking to the Taliban about that. But in order to get these mega regional economic projects up and running you need the expertise, and, I'm afraid, the Taliban don't have that.
4.47
In considering what Australia can do in response to the role of Pakistan, Adjunct Professor Saikal put forward:
…the door is still open for the member states of the UN to put a joint resolution together, and I hope that Australia can take the initiative to draft that resolution that will really mention the level of support that the Taliban have enjoyed from Pakistan, the safe havens and the leadership of the Taliban there and the training. You know that leading figures of terrorist organisations have lived in Pakistan, have died in Pakistan, have been killed in Pakistan and are buried in Pakistan…Pervez Musharraf, who served Pakistan for eight years as president, said to the Guardian in 2015, “We created the Taliban so that we could counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan.” What other evidence do we want?
The evidence is there and therefore there is a need for the international community to be mobilised. My fear is that, if we don't take this seriously, the state sponsorship of terror might turn into bigger things. For a country to push a terrorist group to this level of occupying another country and now really having a terrorist group governing this country, you can imagine how many other terrorist groups are now in Afghanistan from the regions: from central Asia, from the Arab world they're being attracted to Afghanistan like to a magnet. Therefore, I think this question of why Pakistan has been behaving like this should be raised at the highest level, and certainly there should be an investigation. As I said, Australia has a good bilateral relationship with Pakistan. There's the platform of the Commonwealth and the platform of the UN and other multilateral platforms where Australia could become active.
4.48
Adjunct Professor Saikal added that whilst the international community is putting the necessary pressure on the Taliban and ‘none of the 193 member states of the UN have recognised the Taliban’, it must also put ‘the necessary pressure on the backer of the Taliban, Pakistan. There is a fair bit of pressure on Pakistan but not enough’.
4.49
Additionally, Dr Bizhan submitted:
…the international community needs to impress upon Afghanistan or states such as Pakistan that any recognition or engagement in the future with any government in Afghanistan will be based upon certain firm conditions. Those conditions are respect for human rights, inclusiveness in government and how the rule of people will be seen in that context in Afghanistan. These are some of the areas, but time matters in Afghanistan—if you leave it too long. While the situation is quite challenging and the policy options are quite limited, there are at least still some options for leverage available to the international community.
4.50
In terms of what the Australian Government is doing in relation to Pakistan, Mr Gary Cowan, First Assistant Secretary of the North and South Asia Division at DFAT, explained:
Obviously, Pakistan's a very important country here: it's got closer relations typically with Afghanistan than most others, it's got the refugee population that's come over the border and we know that Pakistan and the new regime have been in close cooperation. The foreign minister [Senator the Hon Marise Payne] has spoken to her Pakistani counterpart, Foreign Minister Qureshi, on a couple of occasions in recent months, and I know that we much appreciate the cooperation we have had from Pakistan, not least in helping take people who've made it over the border into Pakistan onwards.
4.51
Mr Sloper, DFAT, provided additional detail explaining that Australia is engaging with Pakistan in relation to a number of common concerns about the situation in Afghanistan such as the humanitarian crisis, displacement of people, illegal narcotics, trafficking and terrorism, stating that the ‘primary reason for that is that they, as an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan, share those concerns’.
Views on the speed of the Taliban takeover
4.52
There was some commentary in the evidence relating to the speed of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan with division on whether or not allied forces could have predicted how fast the capital would fall.
4.53
Professor Farrell noted that ‘[i]n just a few days, over 6 to 15 August 2021, the Taliban swept across Afghanistan, seizing all of its provincial capitals and major cities, including Kabul. The speed of the Taliban advance belies an insurgent victory that unfolded over years’.
4.54
Professor Farrell added two observations on the speed of the Taliban’s takeover:
The first thing is: with almost no exceptions, I think everybody was surprised at how quickly the Afghan state collapsed in August 2021. The speed with which the Taliban swept across the country took everyone by surprise. It was anticipated that the Afghan Taliban were clearly making gains on the battlefield but it was anticipated that those gains would unfold over a matter of months. Even right up to 15 August, when the Taliban ended up on the doorstep of Kabul, it was expected that Kabul would hold out for a number of months, because Afghan security forces had pulled back to Kabul. It's a large city of five million people. There was a concentration of Afghan security forces there. In fact, Kabul fell literally overnight. So the speed of the Taliban advance took everyone by surprise. That's the first thing I would say.
The second thing I would say is that there were actually multiple indicators that the Afghan national defense and security forces were in severe distress and were losing ground quite considerably ever since the Doha peace deal was signed on 29 February 2020.
4.55
General Angus Campbell, AO, DSC, Chief of the Defence Force, noted that not only was the Afghan government not expecting the Taliban to advance so quickly, but the Taliban:
…were also surprised at the speed [of their advance and ease with which they entered Kabul]. Essentially, within about 10 or 11 days they were able to negotiate the handover of all provincial capitals and then occupy Kabul, overwhelmingly without fighting—certainly without substantial fighting. I don't think it was what they were expecting.
4.56
Mr Hugh Jeffrey, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy, Department of Defence, added:
We think, ultimately, [the speed of the Taliban’s takeover] reflects that the Afghan population more broadly believed that the Taliban was eventually going to take control, so therefore you might as well not fight it. Intelligence analysts have talked about this for many years—that it's really about who has confidence, who is perceived to have the wind behind their backs, and that one step can potentially lead to a cascade. So there was concern about countries conducting visible evacuation efforts.
4.57
In an answer to a question on notice, Mr Jason Scanes, Founder of Forsaken Fighters Australia Inc, referred to a number of reports as far back as 26 January 2021 which warned of the potential collapse of the Afghan government:
A news report on 26 January 2021 stated that groups in Afghanistan would view the U.S withdrawal as a victory, shifting the balance of power in favour to the Taliban and increasing the possibility of a Taliban takeover of the capital, Kabul. It further stated that the growing threats to cities like Kandahar and Kabul were real, with the Taliban having the military advantage having overrun some Afghan checkpoints, destroyed military bases, and seized some district centres.
…
There were significant concerns over the ANSDF effectiveness, readiness and sustainability…It was reported [in a testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) on 16 March 2021] that the Taliban maintain a high level of violence with increases each quarter since the [Doha] agreement was signed (April–June, July–September, and October–December 2020), a much higher number of enemy-initiated attacks compared to seasonal and historical norms.
In a report on 09 April 2021, US Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence reported that…without coalition force support the Afghan Government would struggle to hold the Taliban at bay.
Perhaps the most direct picture was painted regarding the future of Afghanistan in a news report on 13 April 2021, where John Sopko, SIGAR, warned "It may not be an overstatement that if foreign assistance is withdrawn and peace negotiations fail, Taliban forces could be at the gates of Kabul in short order."
4.58
On the other hand, Professor Farrell noted that it is only in retrospect that we can ‘put the pieces of the puzzle together’ despite there being:
…multiple indicators that the Afghan national defense and security forces were in severe distress and were losing ground quite considerably ever since the Doha peace deal was signed on 29 February 2020…
For instance, in June 2021, the Taliban were in control of a quarter of the districts in Afghanistan. That's 104 districts. They doubled that inside one month. By July they'd doubled that to 216 districts that they controlled in Afghanistan. But what happened was that analysts didn't put the pieces of the puzzle together. It's only in retrospect, when we sat back and put the pieces together, that we realised how the Taliban were able to sweep across the country so quickly in July and August.
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As such, Professor Farrell attributed responsibility to both the Afghan government and to the US:
The Afghan government bears significant responsibility for its own downfall and especially the incompetent leadership of President Ashraf Ghani. However, the Biden administration is responsible for accelerating the collapse of the Afghan state by hastening the US military withdrawal in the second quarter of 2021 when Biden should have taken measures to stabilise the Afghan army. These measures—suspending the Afghan deal given Taliban breaches, resuming US air strikes and continuing a small US military presence to enable contractors to remain to provide maintenance and logistic support to the Afghan army—could have been continued indefinitely at little cost to the United States. Instead, President Biden pursued his political goal of having all US forces out of the country before the 20th anniversary of 9/11 and in so doing he abandoned the country and its people to the Taliban.
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In answer to a question on whether or not he believed the Afghan government could have survived if a contingent of US forces remained in Afghanistan, Professor Farrell stated that yes, they could have and raised the point that their presence not only provided the capacity for US air strikes, but also importantly enabled several thousand contractors to remain in Afghanistan which was crucial to hold the Taliban at bay because the contractors serviced:
…the Afghan army air force—their fleet of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were serviced by these contractors—and also the Afghan army vehicle fleet.
About 80 per cent of the servicing of the vehicle fleet was by foreign contractors. Once the US military postured towards a complete withdrawal the contractors left and took that capacity with them. They also took some high-end capacities around signals intelligence and electronic counterwarfare measures.
The short answer is that the Afghan security forces could have held the line, particularly if they had followed US advice, which was given to Ashraf Ghani in May 2020, to draw back Afghan army forces to a more strategically defensive posture—advice that he ignored, because he refused to give up any ground. They could have easily held the line for a much longer period of time had they followed that advice and continued to receive military support. And it would have been affordable. In terms of the US military budget, it would have been easily affordable. The reason the United States pulled all of its forces out was that President Biden was following a political agenda to get them all out by the anniversary of 9/11 and not that there was a strategic reason for it.
Perspectives on the capability of the Taliban to govern
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A number of witnesses questioned the capability of the Taliban to form government and to govern effectively.
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Professor Felicity Gerry, Queen's Counsel at Crockett Chambers in Melbourne, stated ‘I think we have to accept that the Taliban doesn't know how to govern. They haven't had the experience in governing…’
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Professor Farrell questioned the Taliban’s prospects of being able to provide public services reflecting on their previous time in power in Afghanistan and enduring ideological focus:
If they do maintain control, the problem is that they simply lack the capacity to deliver public services. They already demonstrated that they were a very ineffective government when they were in government in the late 1990s. They literally lacked the capacity to deliver public services, and there's not much indication that they've improved. The government they announced in early September is a very hardline government. It is very ideological. They put ideological people into positions of government. So they're not optimised to harness [the] human capital that remains in Afghanistan around governance—quite the opposite—and of course they're not optimised to engage with the international community to access humanitarian support and development assistance, and Afghanistan desperately needs humanitarian support and development assistance…they're not optimised to access international support and deliver the public services that are desperately needed, so it's looking pretty grim unfortunately.
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Additionally, Professor Farrell reflected on Taliban’s influence in areas such as Helmand Province in Afghanistan during the 20-year war in making a point about their prospects in governing today:
…Taliban commanders who are now having to be provincial governors and deputy ministers and are pretty clueless about it because they're not trained in public administration. They have no experience in this; they're not even politicians. I did quite a bit of research on the Taliban campaign in Helmand. We reconstructed the campaign and we looked closely at the rise of Taliban shadow governance. This was an area of really great concern for ISAF from 2009 onwards. ISAF was concerned that the Taliban were actually, behind the shield of their military campaign, building a shadow governance, and that was undermining public support for the Afghan government. What was quite interesting was that the Taliban, on paper, had a shadow governance, but they really struggled to put it in place. They just didn't have the personnel. Very often the shadow district governor was also the military commander…What they weren't able to do was to deliver, for instance, health care or education in the areas they controlled. What we saw during the war was that the Taliban tolerated government delivery of health care and education in the areas they controlled. The Taliban, during the course of the war, didn't actually develop—you see in some insurgencies, like in Latin America, that the insurgencies develop the capacity for governance. They develop that expertise. The Taliban have never developed that. I think you're absolutely right in saying that, now they are in control, it's very likely that you're going to see historically incompetent governance now in Afghanistan, at a time when it desperately needs capable governance. There is a considerable possibility that this will, over time, erode—it already is eroding—public support, whatever small amount of tolerance there is for the Taliban. In time that could manifest itself in public unrest and, potentially, armed resistance.
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Adjunct Professor Saikal also questioned the capabilities of the Taliban in relation to regional economic cooperation:
China has a keen interest to see Afghanistan joining the CPEC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Of course, they've been talking to the Taliban about that. But in order to get these mega regional economic projects up and running you need the expertise, and, I'm afraid, the Taliban don't have that. At the moment, key economic portfolios have been given to local mullahs, who don't know much about how to run a small administration—how to run a village—let alone how to run a country and how to deal with China on their mega project of Belt and Road. So I can't see how the continuation of the Taliban in power in Afghanistan would work in the interest of regional economic cooperation, as far as other countries are concerned.
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Furthermore, Dr Nishank Motwani, an academic at the Australian National University, raised concerns about the Taliban’s legitimacy due to the association of members of its cabinet with terrorism and what this might mean for the emergence of violent extremism in Afghanistan:
The Taliban's caretaker government has done little to assuage fears of the new rulers providing an enabling environment for violent extremists. It is a matter of fact that more than half of the Taliban's 33-member cabinet are on UN or US terrorist sanctions lists. Among the individuals sanctioned is the Taliban's caretaker prime minister, Mullah Hassan Akhund, who served as foreign minister and then deputy prime minister during the Taliban's previous rule, from 1996 to 2001…the Taliban's interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, head of the Haqqani network, [is] a specially designated global terrorist, with a US$10 million reward for his capture.
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Emeritus Professor Maley described the Taliban interim government as ‘like the smile of the Cheshire cat in Lewis Carroll, really: the smile is there but the body isn't’. He explained:
… the situation in Afghanistan is still extremely fragile. The state has actually collapsed; it has lost its key revenue sources and it has lost its key operational personnel … The likelihood is that this will incline the Taliban not to deliver social welfare for the population but to try to increase its coercive capability and rule through fear. If it goes down that path, however, there's a real risk that there will be mass demonstrations and contentious politics directed against it, and the Taliban regime could unravel.
… In that sense, I think it's actually quite important to keep connections open to non-Taliban political and social actors in other parts of the world so that if the Taliban regime collapses one doesn't just end up with a war of all against all, which could be truly disastrous for everyone. There needs to be a willingness to recognise that alternative centres of authority need to be engaged at this point rather than at a point when it's far too late to help anyone on the ground.
Resistance in Afghanistan
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Evidence received by the committee indicated that there was persisting resistance present in Afghanistan and that the Taliban’s rule may not yet be guaranteed.
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Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Adjunct Professor Saikal argued that there remained resistance within Afghanistan against the Taliban on a number of levels, albeit fractured:
…opposition is appearing strongly in Afghanistan. You see the women of our country demonstrating on a daily basis. I saw a group of them who, a few days ago in Kabul, were stopped from demonstrating on the streets. They went inside their houses and they started raising their placards—still raising their voices. Political opposition is strong. Also, combat resistance against them is there. But they need a lot of coordination…There is an element of fatigue and tiredness among the bulk of the population but the opposition is there.
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Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, a PhD candidate at Melbourne University, also commented on the resistance within Afghanistan despite the violence inflicted by the Taliban, stating:
Afghanistan [is] the only country in the world which bans girls from attending schools. Despite that, Afghan women have protested for their rights, demanding their right to education, work and social liberties, to which the Taliban have responded with intimidation, threats and the killing of women activists. You might have heard the tragic news coming out of northern Afghanistan, where five women activists have been shot dead as of last week.
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Dr Bizhan noted the transformation of Afghan society and the changed expectations of citizens, particularly of women, but was pessimistic about the prospects of the resistance:
The situation in Afghanistan is grim, quite dark. But one fact we can't deny is that, in the last two decades, society has been transformed in Afghanistan. The Taliban are pursuing the same policies they had in the nineties, but the people are different. The population has had access to services, education and media and, by and large, was connected with the rest of the world. So now we hear that women are protesting and making demands of the Taliban. At the moment, that protest is being repressed—not only through force but also through economic means. I'm in contact with people in different provinces—friends, family members and former colleagues. They don't see any hope to sustain themselves because the economic situation is so harsh.
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On the other hand, Her Excellency Hasina Safi, Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad and Professor Felicity Gerry QC were more hopeful and recommended that the Australian Government support informal grassroots movements ‘by communicating and supporting individuals and movements on the ground, as well as processes and work done to consult with women across Afghanistan prior to the Taliban takeover’. They explained:
Despite the difficult circumstances which continue to worsen each day, there are still grassroots activists and movements both inside and outside Afghanistan. The work and strength of these networks have grown over the past two decades…This can be done by continuing communication and support to these individuals and movements.
…Due to obvious constraints posed by the Taliban, influencing the continuation of certain progressive laws and provisions will not be immediately possible, however research and consultations with women across the country done by Ms Safi’s former Ministry for Women’s Affairs can be used as a resource upon which to build and guide international efforts to enable governance for the benefit of women that are in line with international law.
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Adjunct Professor Saikal reflected on past conflicts and resistance in Afghanistan and noted that coordination was the key to Afghanistan’s future:
It will take some time. But I have lived long enough to see the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. I'll never forget when the Red Army invaded Afghanistan. For two months it was silence. But then two months later there was a huge uprising in Kabul. People were going up on their roofs and declaring opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With the Taliban this time around on day one of their takeover [of] Kabul, the people of Afghanistan rallied in support of their national flag…The women of Afghanistan rallied in seeking their own rights [on] day one. The people of Afghanistan stood up in different cities against the Taliban. As you know, even after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban fighting continued in certain areas in the north of the country. There is still resistance, armed resistance, to the Taliban. So these elements are there, as I said, in a very scattered way. It needs coordination. The opposition needs coordination inside Afghanistan. The international stand against the Taliban needs a lot of coordination. And coordination is needed between the national opposition and the international opposition to the Taliban.
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Adjunct Professor Saikal concluded by stating ‘in the long-term, I can really only see change happening in Afghanistan if there is opposition to the Taliban. The political opposition is there, and the civil opposition is there. We see a continuation of this, and, of course, they need a voice; they need support from the international community’.