2.1
As of December 2021, Australia has had more than 52 years of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, beginning in March 1969 and with the establishment of an embassy in Kabul in August 2006. Australia's development engagement in Afghanistan began in the 1960s and 1970s in various forms. Australia's first military engagement in Afghanistan lasted from January 1991 to December 1993. Following the 11 September (colloquially referred to as 9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States (US), Australia entered Afghanistan which would become its longest deployment to a conflict zone. By 18 June 2021, all Australian diplomats and military forces had left Afghanistan and by May 2021 the Australian embassy had closed.
2.2
A timeline of recent key events in Australia’s engagement and withdrawal from Afghanistan can be found at Appendix 3.
2.3
This chapter outlines key events and decisions which influenced the nature of Australia’s engagement over its twenty-years in Afghanistan. Evidence received by the committee demonstrated that Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan were influenced by the objectives and decisions of its allied partners including the US, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It was clear that Australia’s core objectives centred on fighting terrorism and supporting our alliance interests. From 2005, however, Australia’s objectives shifted towards reconstruction and development efforts, working alongside allies to support the Afghan government and security forces.
2.4
This chapter considers the issues raised in evidence in relation to Australia’s objectives. It covers perspectives on the clarity of Australia’s stated objectives, the achievement of those objectives, Australia’s relationship with the US, and the viability of democracy in Afghanistan.
Australia’s military footprint in Afghanistan
2.5
This section provides a high-level picture of Australia’s military footprint in Afghanistan. The Department of Defence (Defence) outlined Australia’s deployment to Afghanistan:
Over twenty years more than 39,000 Australian Defence Force (ADF) members and Defence civilians deployed on Operations HIGHROAD and SLIPPER in support of operations in Afghanistan. ADF personnel fought alongside Coalition and Afghan partners to deny Afghanistan as a safe haven for international terrorism.
2.6
General Angus Campbell, AO, DSC, Chief of the Defence Force, noted that out of the 50 or so countries that participated in the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, Australia was often described as the largest non-NATO contributor and about the 10th largest contributor overall. At the peak of Australia’s deployment, approximately 1,550 personnel were on the ground in Afghanistan.
Defence personnel worked alongside Australian diplomats, police officers and aid workers, and with Afghan and coalition partners, to improve the security and welfare of millions of Afghans.
Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan
Australia’s objectives from 2001
2.8
The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) explained how the events of 11 September 2001 led to Australia’s initial involvement in Afghanistan:
On 11 September 2001, militants associated with the Islamist extremist group al-Qaeda carried out a series of significant terrorist attacks against the United States…The attacks resulted in almost 3,000 fatalities of citizens from 77 countries, including Australia. The event prompted the US Government to declare a war on terror, in which the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden was a key target. Bin [L]aden was thought to be harboured by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
On 7 October 2001, the US-led International Coalition against Terrorism (the Coalition) launched attacks in Afghanistan, and by the first week of December 2001 the Taliban regime had collapsed.
Australia’s military involvement in Afghanistan began on 11 October 2001 when Australia joined the Coalition, citing the terrorist attacks against the US as a basis for invoking the mutual-defence clauses of the ANZUS Treaty [Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty]. This was the first time the Treaty’s clauses on acting to meet a common danger had been invoked since it was enacted in 1952.
2.9
On 22 October 2001, Australian troops departed Perth to join coalition forces. A few days later in an address to the Australian Defence Association on
25 October 2001, then Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP outlined Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan:
We should be clear about our aims in this operation. The immediate goal is to seek out and destroy al Qaeda and ensure that Afghanistan can never again serve as a base from which terrorists can operate.
The task they face is particularly suited to the temperament of Australian service personnel. In Afghanistan itself, the mission is likely to be pursued through precision, ground operations conducted by small teams of special forces. The hallmark of Australian soldiers has always been one of personal initiative and independent action. It remains so to this day, and the decision to include Australian SAS [Special Air Service] soldiers was recognition both of the highly targeted nature of the coming campaign and the important role our soldiers could play within it.
2.10
However, in a media interview on 18 November 2001, then Foreign Minister the Hon Alexander Downer MP said Australia had told the United States that:
…we don’t want to get…bogged down in Afghanistan. We don’t want Australian troops to be part of managing and running Afghanistan for the next five or six years…we want to help with the war on terrorism, to destroy al-Qaeda and its network and so on. But we don’t really have a great desire…to get into the long-term management of Afghanistan.
2.11
The Refugee Advice and Casework Service noted that ‘Australia became one of the first nations in the world to join the US-led war in Afghanistan known as “Operation Enduring Freedom”’.
2.12
On 20 December 2001, ISAF was established via the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 in response to a request of Afghan authorities to create an international security and stabilisation force. ISAF was a multinational ad hoc operation with rotating command before NATO took over command in 2003. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) also supported ISAF alongside NATO allies.
2.13
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) stated that Australia’s core objectives in Afghanistan over the two decades since 2001 were ‘to fight terrorism and to support our alliance interests’, explaining:
In partnership with our allies and with Afghan forces, Australia worked to deny terrorist organisations safe havens in Afghanistan from which to plan and export terror. Our troops fought alongside Coalition and Afghan partners to degrade the capabilities of terrorist organisations, including
al-Qaeda.
2.14
Similarly, General Campbell stated that Australia’s initial strategic objectives when Australia’s ADF personnel were first deployed to Afghanistan in
2001–02 were:
…to deny Afghanistan as a safe haven for the international terrorism, to attack areas or al-Qaeda and other international terrorist facilities and organisations as a member of a coalition to seek to capture Osama bin Laden as the leader of al-Qaeda and to see Afghanistan not able to be a base for international terrorism.
2.15
Professor Theo Farrell, an academic at the University of Wollongong, explained that the ‘first objective [to fight terrorism] had been achieved by the end of March 2002’ when:
…the final concentration of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces were defeated in Operation Anaconda. By this stage, the Afghan Taliban had been decimated and were in utter disarray, and al-Qaeda had been chased out of the country. The US had facilitated the installation of an anti-Taliban interim government led by Hamid Karzai.
2.16
On 20 November 2002 in a media release, then Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Robert Hill announced: ‘Australian Special Forces will return from Afghanistan from the end of this month…As the focus of operations has moved towards supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the particular skills of our Special Forces are in less demand’.
NATO’s takeover of the ISAF mission
2.17
Professor Farrell explained that a key turning point in the evolution of the international mission occurred in 2003, when the US decided to invade Iraq, which led to a series of events resulting in Australia deciding to stay in Afghanistan—a decision driven by ‘alliance politics’. Professor Farrell explained:
NATO countries such as France, Germany, Belgium and a number of other countries strongly opposed US efforts to go to war in Iraq;
NATO indicated to the United Nations that they were prepared to take over the ISAF mission in Afghanistan; and
The US was happy for them to do so because it meant that the US could further concentrate its efforts on the war in Iraq.
2.18
On 11 August 2003, mandated by the United Nations (UN), NATO took over the ISAF mission where its ‘primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists’.
2.19
Following this, Professor Farrell stated:
…there was a driving political reason for a strong coalition to coalesce around an expanded ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and that's what led to the expansion of ISAF and everything that followed. In that sense, Australia joined many other countries in wanting to be a good partner to the United States, but there weren't really driving national security reasons for why all of these countries were engaged in Afghanistan. There were humanitarian reasons and there was nation building and so forth, but we all got pulled into what were high-intensity insurgency operations in the south of Afghanistan—very costly. You have to ask yourself: if you have to do that level of fighting to bring stability to the country, are you ever going to bring stability? That question was never asked. So that's how the mission evolved. Driving this was actually alliance politics.
Australia’s capacity to influence NATO and ISAF decision-making
2.20
The evidence indicated that as a non-NATO nation Australia had limited input into decision-making at the levels of NATO and ISAF.
2.21
However, Professor Craig Stockings, Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Australian Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor at the Australian War Memorial, emphasised that there was a distinction between the objectives of ISAF, the US and Australia:
…ISAF's objectives in [Afghanistan], American objectives in [Afghanistan], are not Australian objectives. They are different and they're nuanced. Yes, we have to work within those frameworks, but the ideal outcome for ISAF isn't necessarily the ideal outcome for Australia. It may well be, but we have our own specific set of objectives.
…
Certainly, the maintenance and the perception of being a credible and reliable ally is always a centre point and a touchpoint. But that doesn't mean we're simply directed to act in certain ways…Australia has its own policy and its own objectives. It has to operate with wider objectives in mind, but we don't do what we're told; we do what's in our national interest. We always have. Sometimes that aligns with what the Americans might want us to do, for very good reason.
2.22
Nonetheless, Professor Stockings explained while Australia had some influence on ‘the framing and conduct of operations’ and ‘on the overall scheme of operational strategic decisions’, Australia did not ‘have the agency to shape those’ at ISAF. Professor Stockings noted that Australia was only ‘one small player in a large coalition’ and:
… the equivalent of two-and-a-bit squadrons in Afghanistan is not the same as 110,000 American troops. There's only so much bang for your buck you can get ... The smaller the commitment, the smaller the say, but we do have a say.
2.23
Professor Farrell agreed that Australia had limited input into decision-making through ISAF, stating:
Did Australia's military contribution enable it to exercise any influence over the ISAF campaign? Probably not.
Formerly, ISAF was a NATO-led mission and the campaign was supposed to have been directed by the North Atlantic Council via Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum to ISAF headquarters in Kabul. In reality, the US commander of ISAF had broad discretion to determine his campaign strategy. The main factors that shaped this determination were pressures from Washington DC, host nation dispositions and the enemy. With few exceptions, the preferences of NATO partners hardly figured in ISAF strategy, much less those of Canberra.
2.24
On the other hand, Professor Stockings noted that under the leadership of Prime Minister the Hon Kevin Rudd MP, the government ‘sought—and achieved—a presence and a stronger voice in strategic planning fora, especially with NATO—precisely because decisions were being made without our input’. He explained:
In the end, it is fair to say Australia had a major hand in reform of NATO processes for involvement of non-member states in military operations, which allowed comment (and some involvement in drafting) policy and involvement in policy debate, but we ultimately did not have a vote. We had better visibility and a forum to raise our voice, but Australia's influence was still primarily around the edges of policy. Australia was notoriously frank in its criticism of NATO's approach, and the lack of cohesion in ISAF, but the reality is that Australia was only a relatively small player. Remember, until late in our Afghanistan commitment, Australia was not even the lead nation in its own province. Big decisions, therefore, were the purview of those doing the heavier lifting. Had Australia wished to have more influence, particularly in the early days of its commitment, it would have had to assume a more significant and leadership role.
Australia’s objectives from 2005
2.25
From 2005 when Australian troops were re-deployed to Afghanistan, it was clear that the narrative surrounding Australia’s objectives began to evolve alongside those of allied forces. The mission evolved to include elements of reconstruction, mentoring and development as a means of promoting the
self-sufficiency of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
2.26
General Campbell acknowledged that while Australia’s ‘principal and enduring objective’ in Afghanistan was to ‘deny Afghanistan as a base for international terrorism’, there were other aspects to Australia’s objectives that fed into the primary objective:
…at different times during the campaign, there was a greater or lesser focus across the coalition on undertaking a counterterrorism approach or a counterinsurgency approach, a nation-building approach—these are forms driving towards the unifying objective of denying Afghanistan as a base for international terrorism.
2.27
On 13 July 2005, at a press conference, then Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP announced the re-deployment of Australian troops to Afghanistan:
It’s fair to say that the progress that’s been made and the establishment of a legitimate Government in Afghanistan has come under increasing attack and pressure from the Taliban in particular and some elements of Al Qaeda. We have received, at a military level, requests from both the United States and others and also the Government of Afghanistan and we have therefore decided in order to support the efforts of others to support in turn the Government of Afghanistan to despatch a Special Forces Task Group which will comprise some 150 personnel, comprising SAS troops, Commandos and supporting elements. We would expect that group to be in place by September of this year. It will be deployed for a period of twelve months. It will have a security task which is very similar to the task that was undertaken by an SAS taskforce that went in 2001. It will operate in conjunction with forces of the United States. There will be a separate Australian national command, although the SAS Task Group will be under the operational control of United States forces.
2.28
Defence confirmed the objectives of the Special Forces Task Group (TF 637) in 2005 were:
…to counter the threat posed by global terrorist groups using Afghanistan as a safe haven; support alliance partners’ operations in Afghanistan; and assist in preparing Afghan security forces to take responsibility for providing security in the country.
2.29
On 21 February 2006, in a media release, Prime Minister Howard announced an additional deployment:
The Government has decided to deploy an Australian Defence Force (ADF) reconstruction task force to Afghanistan as part of a Netherlands-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). This deployment is further evidence of Australia’s commitment to supporting the Government and people of Afghanistan as they build their new democracy.
The ADF contribution will be a mixed security and reconstruction task force of approximately 200 personnel and will be deployed over a period of up to two years. The task force will work on reconstruction and community based projects. Australia is committed to assisting Afghanistan to achieve a stable and secure future. It is important that we continue to work with the Afghan people to prevent the return of the Taliban and to ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a haven for terrorists to plan, organise and train.
2.30
After announcing an additional 150 personnel to reinforce the Reconstruction Task Force in August 2006, Prime Minister Howard announced additional troops on 10 April 2007:
We have a clear national interest in helping to prevent Afghanistan again becoming a safehaven for terrorists.
This decision is also based on the Government’s steadfast commitment to helping Afghanistan’s democratically elected government create a secure and stable environment in that country, and on Defence’s advice that the increasing threat posed by the insurgency requires the deployment of additional force protection and support elements…
Approximately 400 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel are already contributing to a Reconstruction Task Force in Oruzgan Province, working closely with Dutch forces to deliver reconstruction and community-based projects…a Special Operations Task Group of about 300 personnel will shortly deploy to Oruzgan province for at least two years.
2.31
Following a change of government at the November 2007 election, then Minister for Defence, the Hon Joel Fitzgibbon, announced on 19 February 2008 that Australia would ‘maintain our current level of military commitment to Afghanistan, but…increase the focus on training and mentoring of the Afghanistan national army’.
2.32
On 29 April 2009, then Prime Minister the Hon Kevin Rudd MP announced an additional deployment of troops which would, in total, bring Australia’s deployment in Afghanistan to its peak since the beginning of its engagement with a total of approximately 1,500 troops. He stated:
President Obama has defined the new mission in Afghanistan as, and I quote him “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” Australia concurs with this mission.
It intersects with our own definition of our own mission within Afghanistan, which is as follows: Strategic denial of Afghanistan as a training ground and operating base for global terrorist organisations; second, stabilisation of the Afghan state through a combination of military, police and civilian effort to the extent necessary to consolidate this primary mission of strategic denial; and third, in Australia’s case, to make this contribution in Oruzgan Province in partnership with our allies, with the objective of training sufficient Afghan National Army and police forces and to enhance the capacity of the Oruzgan provincial administration in order to hand over responsibility for the province in a reasonable time-frame to the Afghans themselves…
Australia has therefore decided to increase its medium term contribution to Afghanistan, not as a blank cheque but with the explicit objective of training Afghan forces so that responsibility for Oruzgan province can in time be handed over to the Afghans themselves.
2.33
In May 2012, then Prime Minister the Hon Julia Gillard MP confirmed the withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 when the transition to Afghan-led security responsibility in the Urzugan province would be complete, but noted the signing of the Comprehensive Long-term Partnership Between Australia and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan which committed Australia to supporting Afghanistan's security after 2014 through development and aid support.
2.34
Home Affairs acknowledged that the ‘level and type of commitment provided by Australia has varied since operations commenced in 2001, with the ADF focus on Operations Slipper [concluding in December 2014] and Highroad [commencing in January 2015] transitioning from security to reconstruction to training and mentoring’.
2.35
Major Heston Russell (Retd) also noted that ‘the Australian Government had committed to discontinuing combat operations as of 2014’ with the conclusion of Operation Slipper.
2.36
In summarising Australia’s core objectives for the two decades since Australia went into Afghanistan, Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary, DFAT, stated the Australian Government's objectives were threefold: ‘to fight terrorism, to support our alliance interests and to coordinate our development assistance and our humanitarian activities’.
Australian Federal Police deployment
2.37
It is important to note that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were also deployed to Afghanistan and had their own set of objectives. AFP members were deployed:
…to Operation Slipper, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) led operation for Australia’s joint contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions in Afghanistan and the Middle East, between 2007 and 2014. The AFP deployed 140 members across three operations—Synergy [2007–2010], Contego [2008–2010], and Illuminate [2010–2014]. Consistent with Australia’s broader drawdown strategy in Afghanistan, the AFP finalised in-country operations on 9 January 2014.
2.38
The AFP provided further detail on the nature of its deployment:
The AFP deployed the first capacity development contingent of four members to Afghanistan in October 2007. The purpose of this mission was to provide assistance to the Afghan National Police to rebuild safety and security in Afghanistan through a functioning and successful police force. The role of the AFP quickly expanded into other critical areas including strategic planning, criminal intelligence, counter narcotics, and recruit selection and training.
2.39
In evaluating the outcomes of the missions, the AFP reported:
An AFP review of capacity development missions in Afghanistan found that AFP’s support to the IPCB [International Police Coordination Board] and the NTM-A [NATO Training Mission Afghanistan] in coordinating and managing police development were successful. AFP members’ expertise played a significant role in achieving better police development outcomes at the national level, and directly contributed to the creation and endorsement of the Afghan National Police ten year plan.
Likewise, AFP support was instrumental in improving the quality of training packages at the Afghanistan Staff College and Central Training Centre which were led by the European Union police development mission. AFP members delivered training to large numbers of mid-ranked Afghan National Police throughout this process. More importantly the AFP worked to emphasise a train the trainer approach at the Staff College, which is designed to contribute to the sustainability of the training delivery.
2.41
The AFP reported that the ‘mentoring component of the mission was less successful, especially because of the security challenges posed by an increase in attacks on coalition forces by Afghan security forces. In order to manage the risk to AFP personnel, mentoring was discontinued’.
Australia’s decision to withdraw
2.42
For context, on 29 February 2020, the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (known as the Doha Agreement) was signed by the US and the Taliban. This agreement committed US and allied forces to withdraw from Afghanistan by May 2021. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
2.43
Australia’s decision on 15 April 2021 to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan followed an announcement by US President Joe Biden on 14 April 2021 to withdraw its remaining forces from Afghanistan before 11 September 2021.
2.44
Home Affairs outlined the series of decisions:
On 8 July 2021, President Biden revised the US final withdrawal date to
31 August 2021, noting that remaining in Afghanistan with a minimal Coalition presence would have resulted in the deaths of US armed forces personnel. He further acknowledged that the Taliban’s military is at its strongest since 2001.
On 14 April 2021, NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan announced it would start the withdrawal of RSM force by 1 May 2021, reducing from approximately 9,500 personnel from 36 contributing countries to 2,500 of which 80 were Australian.
On 15 April 2021, following confirmation of a US withdrawal timeline, Australia announced the departure of its contribution to the NATO-led RSM in Afghanistan. On 25 May 2021, the Government confirmed that the closure of the Australian embassy in Kabul was to take place by 28 May 2021.
2.45
The processes around Australia’s withdrawal and subsequent evacuation efforts are discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.
Issues raised in relation to Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan
2.46
A number of issues were raised in relation to Australia’s stated objectives. This section covers the main concerns put forward in the evidence, including: the clarity of the objectives; transparency of government decision-making; Australia’s relationship with the US; perspectives on whether Australia’s objectives were achieved; and the viability of establishing democracy in Afghanistan.
Clarity and communication of Australia’s objectives
2.47
A number of submitters suggested that there was a lack of clarity around Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan and that, in such a conflict, objectives should be clearly communicated to the public.
2.48
The Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN) stated:
There is a dearth of documentation in which the Australian governments’ stated objectives have been made public or in the progressive evaluations of progress towards those objectives. One questions therefore whether, in fact, there were clear, stated objectives when Australia entered this Afghanistan war with the United States. John Blaxland in the SMH of 16th April, 2021 made a pertinent statement on this matter saying: “Most of the time Australia was comfortable allowing the United States to take the lead in strategy formulation, reckoning that by avoiding engaging too closely on such decision-making Australia could risk manage its contributions. As a result, Australians deployed with only woolly ideas about exactly what they were trying to do there.”
This lack of clarity and lack of publicly available documentation makes it difficult to judge whether these objectives have been achieved. Reasons for engagement in this war have been given but clear objectives for that involvement are hard to identify. The specific strategies adopted, which could then be evaluated for progress in their achievement, are lacking. Certainly this is lacking in the public domain…
2.49
Similarly, the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia) submitted:
Over the course of two decades, Australian political and military leaders have been unable to properly define Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan, and no agreed criteria exist by which to measure their achievement.
2.50
Australians for War Powers Reform concurred that ‘[i]t is impossible to evaluate what success the ADF had in achieving the Australian Government's stated objectives, because those were unclear, equivocal, and changeable’.
2.51
Professor Clinton Fernandes, an academic from the University of New South Wales, added: ‘the government’s real objectives [to support the US-Australia alliance] were not meaningfully disclosed to the Australian public, nor to most members of parliament. Neither the public nor parliament could hold the government to account because they lacked the relevant information to do so’.
2.52
Emeritus Professor William Maley, Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Dr Nishank Motwani and Dr Srinjoy Bose, in a joint-submission, noted that ‘it remains surprising that the strategic goals of the engagement were not more precisely delineated and defended by successive Australian governments’. The authors questioned the direction of the Australian Government’s stated objectives describing them as not only ‘an uninspiring strategic narrative, but one that provided little in the way of direct guidance as to exactly what military, developmental and democracy-promotion activities Australia should seek to pursue in Afghanistan’.
2.53
Major David McBride (Retd), a former serving officer in the ADF who was deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 and 2013, agreed, stating that ‘[m]any of the problems and failings that [beset] Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan began, and were exacerbated by, the fact the “stated objectives” were unclear, unrealistic and subject to change according to domestic political considerations’.
2.54
From another perspective, Major Russell (Retd) argued that the public’s confusion about the nature of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan was a government failure in clearly communicating Australia’s purpose and achievements in Afghanistan. He stated:
The simple fact that the Australian public and media were left to ask if our time in Afghanistan 'was worth it' is the most monumental failing of successive Australian governments, who otherwise excel at all forms of marketing spin and rhetoric—failing to educate and engage the Australian public throughout our longest conflict, failing to set the conditions to better support veterans once we returned from this conflict and failing to learn from the exact same mistakes that occurred during and after our commitment of Australian forces to the Vietnam War.
2.55
However, using contemporaneous sources, such as then-Prime Minister John Howard's public address to the Australian Defence Association on 25 October 2001, Australia's independent national interest, sovereign decision-making, solidarity with the positions of the EU and NATO, and Australia's global collective security interests were set out. It is of note that in the same address Mr Howard predicted that misrepresentations of the reasons for involvement in Afghanistan may come with time.
Decision-making in relation to committing Australia to war
2.56
Some submissions raised concerns about the decision-making processes that commit Australia to war and saw the need for greater transparency and debate in parliament.
2.57
IPAN questioned the legality of committing Australia to the war in Afghanistan stating:
The legality of the decision to invoke the ANZUS treaty is certainly questionable. The ANZUS treaty refers to an attack on a member signatory in the pacific area. New York was not in the pacific area. Afghanistan is not in the pacific area.
The decision to invade a sovereign country, Afghanistan, was not sanctioned by the United Nations. It was therefore in violation of the United Nations Charter.
2.58
Therefore, IPAN proposed that before any decision is made by government to commit the ADF to war:
(a)
It must clearly state its justification for such a commitment and demonstrate it is in compliance with the United Nations Charter and international law;
(b)
It must clearly demonstrate that such action is vital to the security of the Australian people;
(c)
It must clearly state the objectives of such an engagement and the process for evaluating and reporting on progress towards those objectives during the engagement;
(d)
It must clearly state the exit strategy from such an engagement;
(e)
Points (a) to (d) must be made public to facilitate community and parliamentary scrutiny and discussion before a decision to commit is made; and
(f)
The decision to commit must be subject to parliamentary debate and vote.
2.59
Mr Justin Tutty stated that the decision-making that committed Australia to war initially involved ‘one man’ and that ‘very few people were involved in various decisions along the way, to formally extend or re-engage military operations in Afghanistan’. Mr Tutty submitted:
This is not the way these decisions are made in other peer nations, where decisions to engage or prolong conflict are necessarily subject to debate and vote by broad representative bodies, like parliament or congress.
I strongly support the long standing calls for reform of so-called ‘war powers’, to ensure that future wars are subject to greater deliberate oversight. Any future decision to go to war should be made in the context of full debate and a public vote by our elected representatives. The entire parliament should share responsibility for a decision to [go to] war, and they should also share responsibility for any decision to prolong, expand or re-engage conflict.
I request this inquiry consider the value appropriate parliamentary oversight might have brought to bear upon the costs of Afghanistan and the circumstances of evacuation.
2.60
Similarly, Australians for War Powers Reform noted ‘Australia lags behind our NATO coalition partners’ as it does not ‘analyse or account for the legal, military, and political decisions that were made’ in committing Australia to war.
2.61
The Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia) submitted that:
Australia should guard against further costly and harmful participation in wars of choice, and protect our sovereignty, national interests, defence force personnel, and citizens, by amending the Defence Act 1903 to require parliamentary approval of overseas service by members of the Australian Defence Force.
2.62
Mr Hugh Poate, whose son was one of three Australian soldiers killed by a Taliban-recruited Afghan soldier who committed an insider attack, Hekmatullah, in Uruzgan province in 2012, also suggested decisions to go to war should be made by the parliament rather than by the executive:
What transpired during the war and our involvement with America in particular indicates that it's inappropriate to have a decision of this magnitude made by one person—that being the Prime Minister. It should be made by parliament. It should be debated. One thing that I think the Australian public have noticed is that, within weeks or, at the most, months of a new Prime Minister—and there seemed to have been a myriad of them lately coming to power in Australia, we see photos of them next to the American President of the day as though this is a big deal. It was America who got us into this war. Don't get me wrong here: I believe that we should have gone to war—to fight al-Qaeda, not necessarily to fight the Taliban. But we should debate the reasons for going to war and the reasons for staying at war as conditions unfold and change. War is always a fluid environment.
The outcome was that we lost the war. The reasons we lost should be analysed to lead us towards lessons to be learnt by governments which commit our forces to war and the ADF which sends our ADF to war on behalf of this nation. Former Chief of Army Lieutenant General Morrison once stated that the Army has a contract with the nation. This is quite correct, but the nation has a very limited ability to participate in this contract.
…the decision for Australia to go to war and to stay at war must be bipartisan and fully articulated to the Australian public…[and] Defence must be more transparent in its contract with the nation.
Australia’s relationship with the United States
2.64
A number of submitters raised concerns about Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan being intertwined with the US’s mission and national interest.
2.65
Mr Poate referred to an observation by the former Chief of Army Peter Leahy and explained that ‘the US took the policy lead in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of both conflicts and Australia largely acquiesced to the US strategy and narrative for both conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq’.
2.66
In this light, Major McBride (Retd) submitted:
While the promotion and maintenance of the ‘Strategic Alliance’ with the United States is an acceptable reason to go to war, it can never be simply a ‘blank cheque’. If an ‘alliance’ is to [be] more than simply a servile relationship, both partners need to be able to have input into strategic direction. This must change if Australia can feel confident that our next armed conflict in support of the United States is not to be as disastrous as the last. The lives of Australian servicemen should never be sacrificed merely to satisfy American domestic political agendas.
2.67
Professor Fernandes argued that the real objective for Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan was ‘to uphold the umbrella of US power and in doing so to show Australia’s relevance to the United States…at a critical moment’.
2.68
IPAN questioned the value of the alliance to Australia and submitted that ‘the Australia-U.S. alliance is in urgent need of review’ and explained:
The major political parties adopt defence policies in which dependence on the United States to protect Australia from (undefined) enemies is fundamental and this is despite the fact that no guarantee written or verbal has ever been given by the United States to that effect. So to ensure that Australia is always on the “radar” of the U.S., the political leaders are quick to follow the lead of the U.S. in foreign policy [and] are equally quick to commit Australian troops to expeditionary wars in which the U.S. is engaged. Critical commentators have likened this to paying “premiums on an insurance policy” …The issue is for Australia to be there with the United States so they don’t forget us and may feel some indebtedness to Australia and so come to our aid in time of need.
…We are a country of 25 million people now. We have abundant natural resources and the workforce and knowhow to become far more self-reliant and independent and are capable of defending our territory, our independence and our way of life with a re-structured military trained for that purpose.
2.69
Mr Poate proposed that ‘[a] balance must be achieved between sustaining the ANZUS alliance for capability and security reasons, and meeting Australia’s sovereign national interests. Australia needs to recognise that it is a sovereign nation, not the 51st State of the United States of America’.
2.70
Emeritus Professor Maley, Dr Ibrahimi, Dr Motwani and Dr Bose warned that a ‘state that does not sufficiently think for itself risks being taken for granted in other spheres’. They submitted that ‘[t]he emphasis on the alliance…arguably subordinated Australia’s own strategic thinking to that of its US ally, which recent events would suggest was not a wise step to take’ given that the US committed not only the withdrawal of US forces, but also the forces of its allies and coalition partners in the Doha agreement.
2.71
Furthermore, Emeritus Professor Maley, Dr Ibrahimi, Dr Motwani and Dr Bose stated that, in relation to the Doha agreement:
We have seen nothing in the public domain to suggest that the Australian government had approved, in advance, the making of this commitment. If, indeed, the US negotiator made this promise to the Taliban with a view simply to presenting it to allies (including Australia) as a fait accompli, it does not suggest much sensitivity in Washington DC to the rights of allies as sovereign states. If, on the other hand, Australia had delegated the making of a commitment about the strategic deployment of the Australian Defence Force to an unelected US official (in this case Dr Zalmay Khalilzad, who signed the 29 February 2020 agreement on behalf of the United States), major questions about who exactly controls Australian forces could obviously arise.
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Professor Fernandes also criticised the way in which the US negotiated with the Taliban during the Doha peace deal, given that the US agreed to the release of 5,000 prisoners, including Hekmatullah who killed three Australian soldiers, noting how this reflected on Australia’s alliance with the US:
Instead of receiving the death penalty, [Hekmatullah] recently joined the Taliban delegation in Qatar. The United States did not block his early release from prison. Last year, Hugh Poate, father of one of the murdered Australian soldiers, said the US practice of ‘pandering to the wishes of a terrorist group’ rather than respecting ‘the sacrifice of soldiers and families of its longstanding ally’ was ‘a damning indictment of the Australian–American “alliance”’.
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In answer to a question on notice, DFAT confirmed that ‘Australia was not a party to the [Doha] Agreement, nor did it participate in negotiations’:
However, Australia was consulted on the timeline for the likely withdrawal of US and NATO troops.
…
Australia was one of many nations in the US-led Coalition, and Australia participated in the NATO Resolute Support Mission (2015-2021) as a non-NATO member, after the conclusion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission (2001-2014). Australia recognised US and NATO leadership of these missions, and contributed senior members to the respective leadership teams. Australia’s contributions to military, stabilisation and other non-diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan were also appropriately at the request of, and with the consent of, the Afghan Government. Australia’s sovereign decisions were properly made within these contexts. Australia’s diplomatic mission to Afghanistan was always a sovereign enterprise, as are all our diplomatic missions around the world.
Perspectives on the achievement of Australia’s stated objectives
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The evidence on whether the government’s stated objectives were met varied.
Fighting terrorism
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According to Defence:
We were successful in disrupting the ability of extremist groups to plan, execute, or support terrorist attacks on our soil or that of our partners. Our people did so in numerous acts of valour and bravery. This helped to protect the safety and security of Australians at home and abroad.
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However, Defence acknowledged that:
Assessing the success and costs of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan necessarily includes consideration of the findings of the Inspector General of the ADF’s Afghanistan inquiry report. This important work takes place within the larger context of the activities and achievements of the ADF and partner agencies in Afghanistan over the last twenty years.
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When asked what he thought were the most important achievements in Afghanistan, General Campbell stated:
The most important, I think, was the purpose for which we went to Afghanistan—that is to work with our coalition nations to deny Afghanistan being a base or a safe haven for international terrorism.
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Dr Sayed Amin, Zoe Safi, Naseer Shafaq, Tamkin Hakim, Raz Mohammad and Atal Zahid Safi submitted that Australia’s:
…primary success can be drawn from their relentless effort and long-term commitment to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations to defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Over the past twenty years, Australia’s contribution to Afghanistan has been positive nonetheless, as it promoted the advancement of a democratic government, human rights, women’s rights, rule of law, health, education, agriculture, and different sectors including improving stabilisation and community development for all…
Australia’s strong military presence in Afghanistan meant that they supported Afghan military forces by training and equipping them… Overall, Australia’s engagement was working towards the long neglected human rights in Afghanistan. For this, the Australian Afghan Diaspora is forever indebted.
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Major Russell (Retd), who served in Afghanistan, agreed that Australia’s objective to fight terrorism was successful:
My deployments to Afghanistan provided me with first-hand experience and exposure of success in the targeting and destruction of Taliban, Terrorists, Foreign Fighters, Lethal Aid (Weapons and Ammunition), as well as Narcotics used to fund global insurgent and terrorist activities. Our Australian Special Forces conducted operations that killed and captured over 11,000 insurgents, seized and destroyed millions of dollars (US) of lethal aid, and destroyed billions of dollars (US) of Narcotics.
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Major Russell (Retd) added:
A great outcome of our time in Afghanistan was the experience and expertise that our special operations in particular achieved. Within Australia now, we have some of the most combat experience[d] veterans. We are renowned around the world for our expertise on the ground but also for our ability to not only take life but to save life as well.
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However, Major Russell (Retd) expressed his disappointment in the reporting of Australia’s achievements:
Elements of the media here at home continue to hunt down, contact and threaten to publicly identify members of our special forces on the basis of allegations—which haven't yet been through our courts—of illegally killing 39 civilians. Let's quickly take a moment to pause on those statistics. There were over 11,000 insurgents and terrorists killed, yet our legacy has come down to accusations of illegally killing 39 civilians. That is less than 0.04 per cent of those killed during the conduct of our operations in Afghanistan, yet we hear nothing of the 99.96 per cent of those operations that saw our Australian special forces demonstrate everything it means to embody the Australian spirit and values we readily lack here today.
…
Unfortunately those facts and figures are not out there. When I engage with these reporters, asking when they're going to publicise both sides of the story—unfortunately, it's just not a popular narrative. In Australia we don't like to build up poppies…We like to cut them down.
2.82
Defence took on notice to confirm the number of enemy combatants killed or captured during Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, and provided the following response:
Historically Defence has not published aggregated enemy casualty numbers, as this is not a measure of performance or effectiveness for the Australian Defence Force. Given the complexity of Australia’s mission in denying Afghanistan as a safe haven for international terrorism, and the nature of some air and land combat operations, accurate enemy casualty numbers are often difficult to obtain and are likely to be inaccurate.
Suggestions of mission creep
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Mr Poate saw the phenomenon of ‘mission creep’ as an issue for Australia’s objectives and engagement in Afghanistan. He referred to the work of a journalist who was with Prime Minister Howard at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and reported that the Prime Minister ‘wanted to commit sharp edged forces for a limited period during the hot part of the war but not get bogged down in a long-drawn-out peace keeping operation’. However, Mr Poate explained:
[This] stated objective…was overridden by successive Australian governments and it morphed into a policy of ‘nation building’ which was also ‘mission creep’ to replace the ruling Taliban regime with an American style democracy. This mission creep was not one of the original stated objectives for Australia to go to war in Afghanistan. It became a policy objective of the US, most likely for self-interest knowing that Afghanistan is resource-rich, and Australia merely went along with the American narrative.
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As such, Mr Poate concluded that Australia’s achievements ‘need to be balanced against the unintended consequences that followed from “mission creep” or “nation building” of Afghanistan at the behest of the US’ whereby ‘[t]his unstated policy objective was largely responsible for the war continuing for twenty years, our longest war in history’ and resulted in the Taliban getting back in control of Afghanistan.
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Major Russell (Retd) agreed that Australia’s operational strategy ‘embark[ed] upon this line of what we call mission creep’ and noted ‘the wayward nature of [the] nation building operations and the absolute reality of how this focus became such an ineffective, let alone inefficient development and deviation of our national strategy’. He explained:
When we first deployed to Afghanistan in 2001 and 200[2], we achieved everything we needed to achieve as far as al-Qaeda, and then we went back in there as part of the NATO contribution. What continues to happen…is that we deploy our special forces for this finite role, and you will hear our government always come back to talking about how we killed Osama Bin Laden and we destroyed al-Qaeda and all of that. That was our original mission. Then there was opportunity around then…to deploy more of our conventional forces and, indeed, achieve these humanitarian missions. But that doesn't hold up when we talk about and come to 2014, when NATO withdrew their mission and we maintained on there with our train, advise, assist and training the local Afghans up…
So, for myself as a military tactician and operational person, the whole lesson learned for me is to really define our mission. If we're going to target the terrorists and that's our key thing, then let's do that. But, if we're going to get in there and conduct this reconstruction and reinforce and support these Afghan women and children, that's a big effort and that has to be deliberately planned separately and long after any form of military action, because that takes a lot more than the military to achieve. But that's all we left it down to—the military to achieve those effects.
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Despite the success of Australia’s initial mission, General Campbell noted the coalition’s efforts to support the ANDSF was less successful, and explained:
The effort in seeking to develop the Afghan national security forces, and more generally the Afghan government, was the only path to see the possibility of a stabilised future Afghanistan under the government of Afghanistan as we knew it. Ultimately though it would have to be an Afghanistan that was governed and secured by Afghans. It was always their sovereign nation and, ultimately, their sovereign effort and contribution. I know there are a range of views as to whether or not they could do it on their own, but the coalition could never stay there permanently. When the coalition and in particular when US decision-makers determined that the principal coalition partner would be withdrawing Australia also had to withdraw….I would then politely say that while I respect all the views offered, I've found in things such as our defeat in Afghanistan everyone has perfect hindsight.
Examining the current situation
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The Australian Muslim Women’s Centre for Human Rights submitted that looking at the current situation ‘[t]o what extent Australia and the US-led intervention in Afghanistan’s objectives has been achieved is debatable’:
The Afghanistan state and security forces have collapsed, with the former President and his cabinet fleeing the country, leaving the fate of the country’s 38 million population in the hands of the Taliban. Women and girls are barred from resuming their education and going back to work. Music is banned. In some parts of the country, summary executions are already taking place. Hazaras are being dispossessed of their ancestral land by the Taliban, who are then distributing the land to their supporters. The security and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is continuously deteriorating, with more than half of the country’s population living in severe poverty.
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Similarly, Mr Benjamin Cronshaw also questioned the success of Australia’s objectives suggesting that much of what had been achieved has been undone by the rise again of the Taliban:
The intervention notably removed the Taliban from power, weakened the Al-Qaeda organisation and led to the death of Osama Bin Laden. This indicated some success in the counter-terrorism objectives. However, the return of the Taliban insurgency to power in Afghanistan, and their continued relationship with Al-Qaeda, is a sobering reflection on the outcome of the operation.
Following the initial incursion, the involvement of western forces (including Australia) also gained peacekeeping, human rights promotion and even nation-building roles. There were challenges and mistakes over the years, though we did see success with Afghanistan society becoming much freer and advancing human rights. However, again, the return of the Taliban has brought a shocking and traumatic shift in the lives of Afghanis –reversing much of what Australia was trying to support and build in Afghanistan.
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Mr Phil Gorman, a retired ship’s officer, also raised concerns about the Taliban’s resurgence:
Although [Australia’s objectives] intended to provide a generational buffer against extremism such advances are being savagely curtailed by a fundamentalist theocracy…
Afghanistan is now subject to different influences with seismic shifts of power and influence in Asia. It may once again become a haven for international terrorism, possibly in conjunction with a revived Al-Qaeda, Pakistan and other actors.
Many surrounding countries will have perceived interests in wresting power from ‘The West’. China and Russia seek to be the main beneficiaries. This will inevitably be at the expense of Western Powers, QUAD nations and other neighbours.
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Major Russell (Retd) noted that while the ADF played an important role in Afghanistan, he also questioned the longevity of its impact:
I want to say very quickly that the conventional forces that were deployed to Afghanistan were deployed in a great role that was that mentoring and reconstruction—building schools, supporting the local population. But the realities of this are that we are just a drop in the bucket as far as trying to achieve that. And what we've seen, particularly with the capitulation, is that, as soon as we are no longer there, particularly in a nation such as Afghanistan, all of those efforts go to waste, because you are actually trying to focus on these Western ideas within an ideology and a culture that is not skewed to support those at all. There are not those strategic levels of engagements going on with all sides of government, regardless of who takes over the place once we leave, to make sure that what we've done and the good work we've done sustains and maintains there.
Other views
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The Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia) submitted the ‘impossibility of destroying an ideology by warfare was pointed out by many commentators at the time’ and that the ‘critical missing step at all stages was to examine the root causes of terrorism. In addition, there seemed to be a false belief that a nation can be constructed by force of arms’.
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Mr Poate added that ‘[t]his war showed that religion was a force multiplier that could even defeat a superpower, as did the ten year war against the Soviet Union before it’.
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Mr Gorman described the war against terrorism and the conflict in Afghanistan as ‘unmitigated human disasters which will resonate for many decades. The unnecessary toll in blood and treasure is due to repeated failures of statesmanship, intelligence and diplomacy. Australia and her allies must learn from this or repeat it’.
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The Support Association for the Women of Afghanistan (SAWA-Australia SA Inc) questioned whether Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan was worth it, and argued that there were potential alternative approaches:
In June 2010, the Australian Minister for Defence stated…Our fundamental objective in Afghanistan is to combat a clear threat from international terrorism to both international security and our own national security…
SAWA considers that this objective was met in part as no major terrorist attacks have occurred on US or Australian territory since that date. However, we question whether a twenty-year, largescale military operation, alongside US troops, was the only possible response by the Australian Government to achieve an outcome which resulted in a high loss of both Australian and Afghan lives. We respectfully suggest that pursuing diplomatic avenues more robustly, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council and/or with the UN Peacekeepers, may well have achieved a more favourable outcome for both Australia and Afghanistan, with significantly lower financial and human costs.
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SAWA-Australia SA Inc also added:
It would seem that Australia’s “diplomatic and development engagement” with Afghanistan over two decades achieved minimal outcomes in terms of developing and supporting effective systems of governance or fledgling democracy. Instead, it would appear that this engagement did little more than prop up an ineffective government.
Democracy in Afghanistan
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Evidence heard by the committee spoke to the viability of democracy in Afghanistan. While some submitters questioned whether attempts to establish Western-style democracy in Afghanistan was futile, others had a much more positive outlook on democracy’s place in Afghanistan’s future.
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Mr Poate questioned the prospects of establishing democracy in Afghanistan:
[Australia] stayed on to try to stabilise an American style of democracy. Democracy was never going to work in a country where around
70 per cent of the population is illiterate and a country that is divided into so many districts and provinces. We've got enough trouble managing democracy in this country, where we've only got six states.
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On the other hand, Emeritus Professor William Maley, an academic at the Australian National University, warned that some assumptions about Afghanistan are out-dated:
One of the problems in the study of Afghanistan is that there's still the unfortunate influence of out-of-date imagery from the past of Afghanistan as a tribal society and as a realm of never-ending conflict—all those kinds of tropes. They don't actually assist in making sense of the complexity of a country in which, for example, a 2019 survey showed that a majority of rural households had access to television. No country has been affected more by globalisation in the last two decades than Afghanistan.
That means a lot of images of Afghanistan which go back to the 19th century and the First and Second Anglo-Afghan wars are really unhelpful in trying to make sense of the current situation. We never try to understand modern Britain simply by going back to Queen Victoria, and yet the equivalent is what we often see with these kinds of orientalist ideas being trotted out. It's a very unfortunate development. In particular, the rich and highly intelligent new generation in Afghanistan, scattered though it may be at the moment, nonetheless is an important asset for the future and are the ones to try to nurture and sustain.
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Mr Muzafar Ali, Community Representative and Co-Founder, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, reflected on his and his family’s experience with democracy in Afghanistan, stating:
What happened when Australian and international forces—Dutch forces—came to Oruzgan? The Hazara people were living in Taliban tyranny during the first time they came. They took my ancestral land from us in our village. Democracy was an opportunity for us to join the international community. We opened up our school. Our kids went to school. We joined the government. Some of our youth joined government forces and some of our youth were embedded with the Australian forces.
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Adjunct Professor Mahmoud Saikal argued that democracy was possible in Afghanistan, explaining:
I have been a prime witness of our people enjoying having a democratic government, if you look at the election of 2004 and the level of participation. Have a look at the election on 5 April 2014…the entire country was mobilised. Probably one of the most democratic days in the life of Afghanistan is 5 April 2014, where our men and women came out in large numbers and voted. Yes, there was fraud later on and they pushed us, as I said, because of those national factors. They pushed us to the second round, and then there was fraud again and eventually we had to put a national unity government together. But, definitely, the majority of our people have embraced democracy, and let's not forget that 63 per cent of our population are under 25. They have seen democracy, they have seen freedom of expression, they have seen civil and political rights, and this is why our women and men are brave enough to stand up in front of the Taliban on the streets of the cities of Afghanistan. If there is one gain we have made in the field of human resources, it's this: we have a more aware population inside Afghanistan, especially our youth, and they know their rights…We've done a lot of work in the past 20 years and we must protect those gains and consolidate those gains.
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Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, an academic at La Trobe University, concluded that the end of international intervention in Afghanistan is not necessarily an end to Afghanistan’s democratic future:
I think that one of the tragedies of Afghanistan over the past two decades has been that this local demand for democracy, human rights and women's rights in Afghanistan was mixed up with the international agenda, and the international agenda was often confused in terms of its goal and objective—whether counterterrorism or promotion of democracy. Now that the international intervention has come to an end, many people are likely to assume that this is also the end of democracy and human rights within Afghanistan. I think this is not the case. I think the country has a history, going back at least to the early 12th century, of people calling for some form of constitutional democracy…There is this thought of the long-term struggle of the country for some sort government where people are respected and included and their dignity is preserved…
I also completely agree that the Taliban's control in Afghanistan is far from guaranteed. They have established some form of control at gunpoint, but they have not secured any form of social or popular legitimacy. I think, from what we've seen over the past few years, there's no indication that the Taliban leadership is headed towards some form of democratic future in Afghanistan. I think the gap is really wide there, and I will just echo the point that the international community, particularly Australia, should be really open to the possibility of protecting human capital around the world, and it should also not place all faith in Taliban control of Afghanistan.